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Preface
Many of our expectations regarding patterns of historical change in global history 
continue to be based upon understandings of the significance of what William 
McNeill called “The Rise of the West” in the title of a seminal work he first pub-
lished in 1963. Marx and Weber are the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
intellectual ancestors of this basic approach to human history. For many social 
scientists who provide us contemporary approaches to economic development 
and state building, the readings of history that inform their approaches to con-
temporary political priorities and economic possibilities continue to be based on 
a tradition of grand social theories. The metrics they employ for evaluating times 
and places beyond early modern Europe and the modern West remain anchored 
in European history and its connections to modern historical transformations of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however irrelevant those intellectual foun-
dations appear to them.
Anxieties over the extreme simplifications that considerable numbers of schol-
ars writing between the late 1960s and early 1980s utilized in their approaches to 
economic development and political change led a generation of scholars across the 
humanities and social sciences to question the limitations of metrics for histori-
cal change predicated on traits found in European societies and their white set-
tler society offspring in other world regions. But as our empirical knowledge has 
subsequently expanded dramatically regarding other world regions we have done 
surprisingly little to begin the formulation of reworked metrics of evaluation that 
seek to retain elements of earlier understandings that appear applicable in other 
world regions at the same time as we formulate new measures of understanding 
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the significance of practices not seen or underappreciated in early modern Europe 
and the modern West.
Scholars continue to be attracted to intellectually opposite poles of perception. 
There are those who persist in stressing the similarities and commonalities to any 
processes of change they deem desirable and positive. There are others who pro-
claim the significance of differences, as often cognitive as material, that signal dis-
tinctive and even incommensurate practices that separate the modern West from 
the experiences of many people in other world regions. These competing concep-
tual or even theoretical centers of gravity hinder the development of methodolo-
gies for navigating the force fields these ideas have created.
This book seeks to formulate elements of a methodology sensitive to these 
problems of similarities and differences in early modern Eurasia for the specific 
topic of public goods, especially those significant to economic performance. The 
challenge of confronting both similarities among and differences between places 
is a more general one that concerns many humanists and social scientists toiling 
in very diverse fields of inquiry and often deploying different tools for research. 
We will argue for an expanded definition of “public goods” to include all those 
created through nonmarket processes. In the modern era it was easy to see most 
such goods to be provided by government. But neither in contemporary times 
nor in the early modern era was this the case. Understanding our contemporary 
choices regarding public and private goods and the variety of “public-private part-
nerships” created to bridge the divide between them might well benefit from an 
awareness of early modern practices.
Since our expectations about how both markets develop and government pro-
vision of public goods expands are derived from European historical experiences, 
we are unlikely to look for practices in other world regions absent in Europe. In 
contrast, in this volume we will begin from an alternative empirical frame of refer-
ence, early modern Japan. We will propose the subject of an expanded definition 
of public goods to include those non-market-produced goods not limited to peo-
ple with strong personal connections, which we find in early modern Japan. We 
believe the intellectual payoff can reach scholars with interests well beyond early 
modern Japanese history and generally will concern those with curiosity about 
the larger patterns of historical change that created possibilities in the modern era 
at least in part from the practices of early modern ancestors, both one’s own and 
those of others.
The organization of the book, explained in more detail in chapter 1, invites 
the reader to first learn some basic practices responsible for public goods pro-
vision in early modern Japan and then takes us through three substantive areas 
of  activity—poor relief and famine relief, infrastructure building, and forestry 
 management—typically leading with Japanese examples and then adding both 
European and Chinese examples, which the reader can then compare. For European 
cases we deliberately choose Prussian cases (to be precise, cases that fall within 
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the eighteenth-century boundaries of Prussia even if the practices themselves 
include those of earlier centuries) in all three case studies and offer far more lim-
ited  evidence for the paradigmatic Western European case of England, providing 
a full case study only for poor relief. The addition of China allows multiple forms 
of comparison between Japan and both European cases and Chinese cases. From 
these comparisons can emerge multiple dimensions of variation and difference 
as well as an appreciation for what kinds of issues were conceived in similar ways 
even if addressed with somewhat different practices. These exercises can become 
elements of a methodology of analysis that aims to build a common framework for 
understanding public goods formulation and provision that doesn’t depend solely 
on understandings derived from a selection of European practices made according 
to what was a crucial dynamic of state formation in that world region, namely, war 
making, that neither was uniformly important across Europe nor played the same 
crucial role in other world regions. Those possibilities will be further explored in 
chapter 16, the concluding chapter of this book. We hope potential readers of the 
studies to follow will have enough curiosity to make their way through a time and 
place foreign to most of us in order to discover guidance toward problems that 
should be of concern to all of us.
Many of the papers contained in this volume were presented at the conference 
held at the Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo, in March 2015. 
We are grateful to Fabian Drixler, Koji Yamamoto, and Toyo’o Yoshimura for their 
inspiring presentations, and Eisaku Ide, Linda Grove, Kojiro Taguchi, and Osamu 
Saito for their constructive comments. The overall result at this conference was 
presented at the session in World Economic History Congress 2015, held in Kyoto, 
August 2015, in which we also received stimulating feedback from participants. In 
improving the contents for publication, we are greatly indebted to two reviewers 
of this project for their invaluable suggestions. We also would like to thank Linda 
Grove for her superb English editing work.
This research project was supported financially by Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science (JSPS), KAKENHI Grant Number 25285104 and 17H02548. 
Papers in part 4 were financed by MEXT-Supported Program for the Strategic 
Research Foundation at Private Universities 2014–2018 as well. We are most grate-
ful for their generous support.
June 2018




Toward the Public Goods Provision in 
the Early Modern Economy
Masayuki Tanimoto
WHY “PUBLIC GO ODS”?
Historically, to sustain and reproduce their economic lives, people have obtained 
goods and services in various ways. Although market transactions have taken 
a central position in the present economy and historical research has tended to 
stress this feature of economies due to an interest in economic growth, we must 
consider the possibly significant roles of nonmarket activities in the economy in 
order to grasp the entire picture of people’s lives in history as well as the present 
world. How did people tackle issues that the market did not handle well? To what 
extent did their approach to finding solutions to their economic challenges reflect 
their political and social institutions as well as the structure of their economy? 
The present volume explores these questions by investigating efforts made for the 
provision of “public goods” in early modern economies from the perspective of 
comparative socioeconomic history.
The concept of “public” in this volume denotes the sphere in which people 
obtain goods and services for their lives through neither market transaction nor 
direct provision based on “personal” relationships. The latter, “personal” relation-
ships, includes the relationships between a lord and his subject as well as family 
or kinship ties. Thus, this concept of publicness is defined in contraposition to 
“market” as well as “personal”1 relationships, not in relation with the specific char-
acteristics of providers such as government or state. The reason why we introduce 
the term “public goods,” which originated in economics, is owing to the fact that 
this concept is useful in identifying our intention to use “public” in this man-
ner. Economists conventionally define “public goods” according to their attribute 
of exhibiting nonrivalry and nonexcludability, traits that hinder proper provision 
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through the market since providers are unable to obtain appropriate rewards due 
to free riders who enjoy benefits without incurring costs. As we discuss later, many 
of the cases we address in the present volume fail to fulfill fully the requirement 
of this definition, showing the attributes more of, in economics vocabulary, “club 
goods” (nonrivalry but excludable), “common pool goods” (nonexcludable but 
rivalry), or goods with positive externalities. Such expressions are cumbersome 
to use frequently and they share with the economist’s definition of “public goods” 
the trait of being ill suited to market transactions, thus deserving to be regarded as 
“quasi-public goods” in the economist’s array of more conventional concepts. The 
aim of this volume is to investigate how and to what extent “public goods” (here-
after without quotation mark and including “quasi-public goods”) were provided 
to satisfy the needs for people’s ordinary lives and reproduction. They are public 
in the sense that they are produced and distributed neither by market mechanisms 
nor through personal relationships, but in a political-social space including gov-
ernment actors and other social entities. The early modern period is suitable for 
considering this subject since these three components, markets, personal relation-
ships, and a political-social space in which we find public goods (hereafter “public 
social space”), were sufficiently active to identify their functions in the economy, 
in addition to being sufficiently diverse in terms of the ways each component was 
weighed. The volume tries to disentangle the functions of these three components 
in order to identify the diversity of public goods provision across different early 
modern societies.
To clarify our approach in distinction to the existing literature, we first explain 
how we modify the concept of public goods, of the state, and of the demarca-
tion of market and nonmarket to address features of the early modern economy. 
The discussions on economic development in history, specifically those linked to 
industrialization or modern economic growth, have paid great attention to the 
formation and development of the market economy as a set of institutions able to 
augment people’s welfare, in theory by realizing the optimal resource allocation of 
the society. The literature that has been concerned with development in the early 
modern period, such as the proto-industrialization thesis2 or the Smithian growth 
argument,3 has revealed that actually market activities were spreading across both 
urban and rural sectors of the economy. The role of specific nonmarket practices 
for promoting the economic development and welfare has been a distinct concern, 
typically involving the discussion of the state’s economic policies. In fact, there 
has been a long-standing debate regarding the role of mercantilism in early mod-
ern Europe, with recent literature reviving and even enlarging concerns about the 
state’s roles in economic development in light of institutions and political economy 
(North and Weingast 1989, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In addition, the role of 
the state for augmenting the well-being of the subjects has been newly discussed in 
the early modern history and the fiscal state argument, apart from the viewpoint 
of mercantilism (Rosenthal and Wong 2011, Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien 2012, He 
Public Goods Provision    3
2013, Sng and Moriguchi 2014, Vries 2015). In much of this discussion, early mod-
ern states are expected to be the main provider of public goods, which, in light of 
the economic theory of “market failure,” were undersupplied through the market 
transactions. In short, the good workings of the market in the early modern econ-
omies were complemented by the contribution of the state providing public goods.
This volume looks at nonmarketed goods that only involved the government 
as one of several actors. Quite a few goods and services were supplied in early 
modern societies by various kin groups, communities, lords, and governments to 
sustain and reproduce the economic lives of ordinary people. It is impractical to 
confine our focus to the activities directly related to the state in paying attention 
to the role of nonmarket activities in economic life. By taking the following three 
fields up, all of which were apparently essential for sustaining people’s lives and 
reproductions in the early modern economy, this volume relativizes the role of 
states and the market/state dichotomy present in the available literature discussing 
the state formation and public goods provision.
In part 3, the chapters deal with infrastructure projects such as dikes, roads, 
and water control facilities. If we take a dike as an example, it appears to qualify as 
a public good since inhabitants near the dike are to be protected equally against a 
flood (nonrivalrous), without excluding neighboring inhabitants (nonexcludable). 
Strictly speaking, however, nonexcludability is unclear, as the expected benefits 
from the dike are confined to the inhabitants within a specific geographical area. 
The smaller the area, the larger the excludability of goods provision is. Therefore, 
we should recognize that nonexcludability has been rather weak in most of 
the dike cases, and this attribute is applicable to other physical infrastructures 
such as roads and water control facilities, which deserve to be defined as “club 
goods.” In contrast, part 4 deals with cases that lacked the attribute of nonrivalry. 
Each chapter tackles the benefits obtained from the forest where the concept of 
“common lands” is often applied. The common lands are open to users (nonex-
cludable) and are zero-sum in terms of benefits (rivalrous), fitting the criteria of 
what Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom labeled “common pool goods.” Furthermore, 
goods and services with “external effects” are not provided optimally through 
market mechanisms despite the fact that they are excludable and rivalrous, since 
the benefits and/or costs are not properly paid for by the beneficiaries or imposed 
on the providers. The former case may result in an undersupply and the latter an 
oversupply of a good. For our discussion, the positive externalities are significant 
because the provision of non-market-produced goods can supplement the under-
supply of goods in ways that may benefit people through their external effects. 
Poor relief, on which chapters in part 2 focus, can be discussed from this point of 
view, since it is beneficial for social order and peace at the same time as it enhances 
individual recipients’ well-being.
Thus, the attributes of goods and services discussed in the three main subjects 
of this book, namely, welfare policies for the poor, infrastructure construction and 
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maintenance, and forest management, can be recognized under the name of public 
goods in a theoretically relaxed sense, requiring provision outside the market to 
avoid undersupply. This recognition not only allows us to weave together three 
subjects having their own distinct strands of literature into a common fabric of 
discussion, but also enables us to contextualize the role of “state” as a provider of 
public goods. There is a good reason that certain public goods, for example, dikes, 
were provided by a local governing body, not by the state, because the excludable 
nature of the goods could limit beneficiaries geographically. In contrast, military 
capabilities, a representative example of pure public goods in economics text-
books, are provided almost exclusively by states of one kind or another in the 
early modern period. In fact, the fiscal state argument, coined by John Brewer for 
England and applied by scholars to other early modern European countries, evalu-
ates the capacity of the state mainly through its fiscal capacities to absorb major 
military expenses (Brewer 1989, Glete 2002, Storrs 2009). To understand more 
fully the role of public goods in early modern economies, it is therefore necessary 
to go beyond the specific subject of the state’s military expenditures in order to 
identify the goods and services affecting the economic lives of ordinary people.
This observation leads us to consider more carefully the nature of early mod-
ern states that are understood to be both centralizing their rule by growing their 
capacities and exhibiting features of what the social theorist Max Weber called 
“patrimonial states.” The evolution of absolutism in Europe, the transition from 
the declining Ming to the rising Qing dynasty in China, and the establishment 
of the Tokugawa regime in Japan all occur during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. In many parts of Europe, as well as in China and Japan, central govern-
ments emerged that acquired wider governing ability over their territories and 
provided the geographical foundations of subsequent modern national states. On 
the other hand, it is also apparent that a specific ruling family whose household 
economy was closely related to its public finance dominated the “state” in this 
period. Inevitably, the government’s behavior tended to be influenced by the rul-
er’s arbitrary motivations, which might be different from that of the modern fiscal 
or tax state, as Joseph Schumpeter argued a century ago (Schumpeter 1918/1991). 
For Schumpeter, the relationship between a ruler and the subject in the case of a 
“patrimonial state” was a personal relationship between kings or lords and ordi-
nary people, most often farmers. If people were provided with any goods or ser-
vices based on their mutual personal relationship, it is hard to apply the concept of 
public goods to this “transaction” even though they were provided by a patrimo-
nial state. Thus, this influential characterization of the historical nature of the state 
in the early modern period prevents us from conceiving naively the state as a main 
provider of the public goods specifically other than military affairs.4
To open up our abilities to understand public goods provision in early mod-
ern times, we can consider how the demand side for public goods to sustain and 
enhance people’s economic lives can be met within the social and political space 
Public Goods Provision    5
beyond familial and personal relationships. In fact, there were diverse ways of pro-
viding for the poor, from the use of lineage ties in China to the promulgation of 
the Poor Law in England, that is, from the usage of personal relationship to creat-
ing space for public goods provision. Even though poverty has been a universal 
phenomenon throughout history, demand for public goods was triggered under 
specific conditions in which the poverty emerged as a problem to which social 
responses were deemed possible and desirable. Similar aspects can be observed in 
terms of the existence of common lands, as they could alternatively be enclosed 
to form a self-sufficient economy such as lords’ landed estates or thrown into the 
market by establishing exclusive private property rights on each plot. Thus, it is 
important to notice that the magnitude of the need for public goods depends 
heavily on the historical context determining the width and depth of nonmarket 
activities organized outside of self-sufficient entities. With a consciousness of the 
theoretical sense of publicness, the role of public goods provision in early modern 
economy should be explored by identifying specific historical and sociopolitical 
contexts in which they emerge.
C OMPAR ATIVE APPROACH SET TING JAPAN  
AS A BENCHMARK
The present volume explores the public goods provision and their diverse pro-
viders by comparing the cases in East Asia and Europe. In doing so, we have 
selected Japan, Germany (using early modern Prussia as a key ancestor of the 
late-nineteenth-century German state), and China to show three kinds of public 
goods provision quite different from Britain, which is conventionally understood 
as the paradigmatic case. This is an approach different from the major family of 
approaches to early modern global history that extends the tradition of comparing 
European historical practices to those of other world regions found in Marx and 
Weber and in much early modern economic history, the field in which this volume 
is most centrally located. In this approach to the early modern era, there are com-
peting clusters of causal mechanisms intended to explain how Europeans came 
to achieve their political dominance and economic leadership in the nineteenth-
century world, a situation that moved into a twentieth-century era of American 
political and economic prominence and created a longer modern era dominated 
by Western power and wealth. Within these accounts of economic and political 
change the subject of public goods provision doesn’t occupy a very salient posi-
tion. The subject is brought up both implicitly and explicitly in the fiscal state lit-
erature by historians recounting what European states spent their revenues on, but 
the subject is only sometimes connected to how these expenditures affected the 
economy. Because Great Britain was the first industrial economy and its fiscal state 
focused so heavily on building an eighteenth-century navy, which was the founda-
tion of its global reach politically and supported its economic ventures into other 
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world regions, the analysis of other public goods has not seemed so important to 
economic change of the early modern period.
In order to relativize this influential approach, we take advantage of the rich 
scholarship on the Tokugawa era (1603–1868) to take Japanese public goods pro-
vision as our benchmark case. We devote part 1 of the book to a concentrated 
introduction to Japanese practices to form the frame of reference to consider 
poor relief, infrastructure, and forest management in parts 2 through 4. Under 
the Pax Manchurea (the peace under the Qing dynasty) and the Pax Tokugawa 
regime, early modern East Asia showed sharp contrast with contemporary Europe 
in terms of their respective military affairs. Therefore, it is true to state that the 
case of Japan is well suited for a focus on nonmilitary public goods provision. 
Moreover, our choice is made more attractive for the following reasons. Although 
the fine-grained local and regional histories that are available for Japan are lesser 
known than their counterparts for countries in Europe, there exists a consider-
able literature in Japanese that supplies the foundation on which we build our 
framework that takes Japan as the benchmark case. The archival sources that make 
this possible include village documents, which originally remained in the house 
of the village head’s descendant, as well as the official documents kept in the rul-
ers’ archives. They provide us with rich information on the economic and social 
situation of ordinary people, and reveal the relationship between public goods 
provision and the reproduction of people’s lives. We think that the literature on 
Japanese rural history that is established on the solid archival foundation is one of 
the valuable resources for exploring early modern economy and deserves to be a 
benchmark that comparative discussion would rely on.
Regarding the village level documents, it is worthwhile emphasizing that they 
comprise basic administrative information such as “taxation” and the registration 
of residents and lands. Although no village was large in terms of area and popula-
tion, comprising, very roughly, around one hundred households and five hundred 
individuals on average, the village was more the public governing body rather 
than just a private community, whose entitlement was delegated originally from 
the Tokugawa shogunate or daimyōs, rulers of the Tokugawa regime. It means the 
validity of the literature on early modern Japan is not just based on the archival 
advantage. Rather, it is the function of the rural village that deserves closer atten-
tion in considering providers of public goods in the early modern economies and 
that is most significant.
Interestingly, the autonomy of the village in terms of being the governing body 
evolved under the Tokugawa regime.5 Because of the deterioration of its financial 
situation, the Tokugawa shogunate as well as other daimyō (domain) governments 
reduced outlays on social welfare and infrastructure maintenance in the latter half 
of the Tokugawa period. On the other hand, the village, which had been autho-
rized as the basic unit for controlling peasants by “feudal” authorities, achieved a 
considerable level of autonomy in administration, accompanied by the formation 
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of village-level “public finance.” Although historians have conventionally used 
“public” to refer to certain activities of the warrior classes, we distinguish our focus 
on the economy from their focus on issues of social order involving the shogunate, 
daimyōs, and their warrior vassals. The Japanese publicness developed among vil-
lagers as relations within a social space that made possible collective decisions to 
respond to demands emerging among themselves, as well as to those placed on 
them by the warrior class that ruled them.
Furthermore, the cooperative unit of villages emerged and even evolved to 
form a public social space beyond the administrative unit of the village. It was a 
loosely integrated area called Gunchū, or other name, substantialized by the devel-
opment of the rural economy based on market-oriented agriculture and proto-
industry. The wealthy peasant-farmers led this development and behaved as “local 
notables,” complementing or even substituting the task of public goods provision. 
The recent scholarship discusses this by using the term “regional society” defined 
in this historical context.6 We think this recently revealed trajectory is distinct 
in emphasizing the role of “regional society” for public goods provision, and is 
expected to work as a catalyst that may clarify the focal point necessary for the 
comparative approach to be fruitful.
Based on this observation for the Japanese case, we can identify in Prussia 
people’s dependence upon relationships between lords and subjects in which 
ordinary people had “personal” contracts with lords regarding the provision of 
necessities not provided through market transactions or their self-sufficient activi-
ties. The public social space emerged outside of this relationship. Here, the role of 
the Prussian state or its prototype in the Brandenburg Electorate mattered in the 
absence of a strong self-governing body such as the village present in the Japanese 
case. The Prussian generation of “common goods” from the ruler’s side, discussed 
in a chapter of part 3, can be recognized in this context. The public social space 
in this sense enlarged as population increased between the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, reaching an even-higher level of abstraction and generality after 
German unification in 1871.
The early modern Chinese state is similar to Prussia in terms of lacking any 
formal and relatively independent local or regional governing bodies. In fact, 
the chapters dealing with Chinese cases of poverty and famine relief, water con-
trol, and forest management commonly focus on the roles of the emperor and 
bureaucrats, addressing their policy practices and in some instances addressing 
the ideas underlying their behavior. On the other hand, the market transactions 
were much more prevalent in China even in the rural level, distinguishing it from 
the case of Prussia, and perhaps from Japan. Perhaps unexpectedly, the Chinese 
case offers a kind of early modern public goods more similar to modern mean-
ings of public goods. The eighteenth-century Chinese state organized and funded 
goods outside market channels, incorporating in varied ways the efforts of lower-
level bureaucrats and local elites to achieve public goods provision, in some ways 
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anticipating some features of public goods provision more generally present in 
the modern era.
Thus, our comparative approach using Japan’s case as the most common ref-
erence point highlights the diverse approaches to public goods provision across 
societies without invoking an “advanced” Western Europe as the standard of excel-
lence against which other societies are typically found wanting. Even in the case of 
England, the chapter in part 2 discussing the workings of the English Poor Law in 
the local settings suggests the decentralized and regional nature of this nationally 
operating institution similar in some ways to regionally based public goods provi-
sion in Japan.
Together, our three main sites for what we consider three topics important to 
the economy give us alternative viewpoints from which to view the emergence of 
modern-era public goods. Choosing Japan as our primary reference point enables 
us to consider alternative ways in which early modern public goods provision was 
organized and how those practices became the background for modern-era devel-
opments. Our method seeks to identify the kinds of problems and opportunities 
to which elites and common people responded in early modern times by produc-
ing what we consider to be public goods. Furthermore, in general, to understand 
the varied constellations of practices occurring in different countries in the mod-
ern era, a look back at their early modern practices is useful. When we recall the 
typology of distinct kinds of modern welfare states noted by many scholars such 
as Gosta Esping-Andersen, who has written about “the three worlds of welfare 
capitalism,” it seems inappropriate to assume naively the convergent path of public 
goods provision from the nineteenth century onward (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Our expectation is not that modern practices remain closely similar to those of the 
early modern era but that modern-era features in each case can at times be seen 
as transformations of earlier practices, the absence of which would have made 
the subsequent practices less likely in one or more ways. Such an understanding 
supplements our conventional ways of understanding modern state formation and 
the place of public goods provision in that process. Certainly, it is worthwhile ask-
ing how, and to what extent, the structure of public goods provision in the early 
modern economy affected the diversity in public goods provision by the modern 
state. We will take up this subject further in our concluding chapter. The main 
work of the book, however, is to construct the beginnings of an early modern basis 
for forecasting the future into the modern and contemporary periods.
NOTES
1. Note that the term “personal relationship” in this volume does not exclude relationships based 
on “impersonal” foundations such as legal contracts based on the contemporary law system. The lords-
subjects relationship in Prussia discussed in the following chapters exemplifies this aspect.
2. For the survey of literature, see Ogilvie and Cerman 1996/2010.
3. Mokyr 1990. For Japanese case, see an overview by Saito 2013.
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4. In considering the military action carried out by the arbitrary motivation of the state owner of 
kings or lords, wars and military affairs might also have been done in the “personal sphere.”
5. For the details of this discussion, see the chapter 2 of this volume.
6. For overviewing this discussion, see Sawai and Tanimoto 2016, chap. 2.
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part one




as stated in chapter 1, the present volume takes the Japanese case as the bench-
mark case for a comparative analysis of public goods provision in early modern 
times. In fact, parts 2, 3, and 4, dealing with poor relief, infrastructure, and for-
ests, respectively, include at least one chapter on the Japanese case. (For a view of 
the Japanese Archipelago, see map 1.) Before delving into the individual issues, 
however, we devote this first part to a formulation of the frame of reference by in-
vestigating the structure of “public finance” in early modern Japan; we expect that 
this structure will generally reflect rulers’ behavior toward public goods provision.
In this volume, we regard the Tokugawa regime (1603–1868) as the early mod-
ern period in Japan. During the Age of Civil Wars in the sixteenth century, there 
emerged prominent local lords with superior economic, as well as military, power. 
After winning the decisive battle at Sekigahara in 1600, the Tokugawa family 
acquired the power to rule over the entire Japanese archipelago and established a 
government called the Tokugawa shogunate in 1603. Their rule, which lasted for 
more than 250 years, came to an end in 1868. Although theoretically the Tokugawas 
were one among the many “feudal” lords, the Tokugawa shogunate behaved as a 
central government that monopolized diplomacy, coinage of specie, foreign trade,1 
and the authority to guarantee feudal lords (daimyō) the right to rule over a par-
ticular domain. It not only ruled the largest domain, worth six million koku,2 and 
thus occupied one-fifth of the entire Japanese territory, but also benefited from 
monopolizing those aspects of power that fostered the rule of the shogunate. Under 
the shogunate reign, around 250 lords ruled domains, whose sizes varied from one 
million to ten thousand koku; there were also a certain number of direct vassals of 
the shogunate, the hatamoto, who ruled territories less than ten thousand koku.3 
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These lords and vassals had exclusive rights to impose levies on the lands they 
ruled, and maintained the autonomy to manage their revenue and expenditure, 
that is, “public” finance, as well as the jurisdictional power over residents in their 
domains. In return, each feudal lord was obliged to render “ military duty” to the 
Tokugawa shogunate and had to stay at Edo (the capital, where the shogun—the 
head president of the shogunate—resided) every other year.4
There were two dimensions to the ruler-subordinate relationship in the Tokugawa 
regime. The first one was among the rulers, shogunate, and lords; the other was 
between the rulers and ordinary people. The ruling class comprised the lords and 
their vassals—the samurai (warriors)—who were based at the capital of each of 
the domains; the capitals were called castle towns (jōka-machi). This resulted in an 



























Map 1. Japanese Archipelago
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towns; further, they made up a remarkable 6% to 7% of the population. In addition, 
the merchants and craftsmen, who were originally supposed to serve the warrior 
class, also moved to the castle towns. Edo, with a population of around one million 
in 1700, was the largest castle town in Japan; it was followed by Osaka, a distribution 
center providing merchandise to Edo and other towns, and Kyoto, an agglomeration 
of traditional craftsman.
In contrast, the ordinary people classified as peasants (hyakushō) constituted 
around 80% of the population and resided in the villages (mura) in the coun-
tryside. Peasants usually paid the land levy in kind (rice) to the office of each 
domain through the village, the formal unit responsible for transferring the land 
levy to lords. A certain percentage of the domains’ revenue was distributed to 
vassals according to their ranks. It is noteworthy that the village had to assume 
responsibility for paying in full the levy imposed on the lands within its territory, 
even though the levy was officially imposed on an individual household basis. 
This administration method, known as muraukesei, worked as a significant factor 
in establishing the village as the formal governing body. Thus, in theory, the resi-
dential place of rulers and ordinary people (except that of merchants and crafts-
men) was geographically remote. It is also worth noting that the local notables 
discussed in part 1 did not belong to the ruling warrior class; they were drawn 
from the ordinary people, mostly of hyakushō (peasant) status, residing outside 
the castle towns.
Overall, the Tokugawa regime was organized as an agricultural economy that 
was mainly based on rice cropping in the paddy fields equipped with an irrigation 
system. The peasant households comprising stem-family members with a single 
inheritance system played the central role in the agricultural production, which 
used family labour and labour-intensive technology. On the other hand, market 
transactions were intrinsically integrated within the Tokugawa system because the 
rulers sold the land levy, which was, in principle, paid in kind, to purchase necessi-
ties, as well as luxuries, for coins minted by the shogunate. The development of the 
market economy and the growth of commercial sectors and nonagrarian produc-
tion in the latter half of the Tokugawa regime were remarkable developments; this 
led to an increase in their contribution to the entire economy. We should also keep 
this trend in mind when we consider the changing patterns in “public” finance of 
the shogunate and lords.
The first chapter by Masayuki Tanimoto (chapter 2) examines the relative size 
of the Tokugawa shogunate’s as well as domains’ public finance to evaluate the 
 changing role of rulers in the latter half of Tokugawa era. The chapter goes on to 
discuss the role of the regional society in public goods provision and as an 
 incubator of industrial development by focusing on the activities of local notables 
 comprising wealthy farmers, land owners, brewers, and local merchants. Overall, 
the chapter evaluates the substitutable and complementary roles of “regional 
 society” as a provider of “public goods” in early modern and modern Japan.
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The next two chapters deal with the details of public finance, concentrating on 
the relationship between the rulers and the villages or local notables under them. 
The second chapter by Kenichiro Aratake (chapter 3) focuses on rulers, investigat-
ing the various data derived from several individual domains, such as Hiroshima, 
Okayama, and Sendai. The chapter looks into the composition of the administra-
tive organization run by the lords’ vassal band. The author also observes and eval-
uates the actual workings of the individual vassals in terms of governing ability. 
Based on these observations, the chapter emphasizes the limited role of lords and 
vassals in administering villages and providing public goods for regional society.
The third chapter by Kazuho Sakai (chapter 4) discusses the same issue from 
another angle. Focusing on a case in which a lord outsourced the fiscal manage-
ment activities to local notables, the chapter reveals that the local notables reduced 
the lord’s household expenses and created a fiscal surplus. This surplus was used 
not only to repay the debt to intradomain creditors, but also to create a fund that 
they expected to spend on civil engineering, building, or relief projects for the 
domain’s inhabitants. In other words, the local notables diverted the lord’s finances 
to establish a financial basis for providing public goods to local inhabitants. This 
diversion can be recognized as a contribution to the formation of local public 
finance that played a significant role in public goods provision, well into early-
twentieth-century Japan.
Through these chapters, part 1 reveals that the formation of the centralized power 
of the Tokugawa shogunate did not necessarily entail an increase in the public goods 
provision by rulers. Further, it emphasizes the role of villages and regional societies 
as the entities creating the public social space for public goods provision, with local 
notables, who had emerged from hyakushō (peasant) status, as the leaders.
Masayuki Tanimoto
NOTES
1. The profit from the monopolization of foreign trade began to decline from the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, owing partly to the so-called seclusion policy that began in the 1640s and limited 
trade by Japanese traders to only their Dutch and Chinese counterparts, mainly because of the deple-
tion of silver mines in the Japanese archipelago.
2. During the Tokugawa regime, the size of territories was expressed in terms of the formal esti-
mate of the annual production of rice by volume. Koku is the unit of volume used to measure rice and 
one koku is equivalent to 180.39 liters.
3. Of the six million koku ruled by the shogunate, two million were delegated to hatamotos.
4. Among the lords, there were variations in the duration of stay at Edo. For example, the lords in 
the Kanto area, which was the hinterland of Edo, stayed for around six months in Edo every year. The 
lord’s family, wife, and underage children had to live in Edo all the time.
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From “Feudal” Lords to Local Notables
The Role of Regional Society in Public Goods Provision from 
Early Modern to Modern Japan
Masayuki Tanimoto
This chapter reviews the workings of public finance in early modern Japan, that 
is, those of the shogunate and domains (daimyōs) and describes the changing pat-
terns of public goods provision toward the nineteenth century—the period cov-
ering the transition from the Tokugawa to the Meiji era. The first section of this 
chapter examines the relative size of public finance of the Tokugawa shogunate and 
domains, with the purpose of evaluating the changing role of rulers in the latter half 
of the Tokugawa era. We go on to discuss the role of the regional society in terms 
of public goods provision by focusing on the activities of local notables, comprising 
wealthy farmers, landowners, brewers, and local merchants. The second section 
extends the scope of the discussion to the Meiji era. After pointing out the signifi-
cant role of local public finance, which was institutionalized under the centralized 
Meiji government, the diverse activities of local notables, ranging from industrial 
investments in local enterprises to being the leader of local entities, are discussed in 
search of the driving force for public goods provision in the regional society.
THE CHANGING FACE OF “PUBLIC FINANCE” UNDER 
THE TOKUGAWA REGIME
The “Annual Tribute” as the Financial Basis of Rulers
We describe the financial situation of the rulers by examining their revenue 
and expenditure, and discuss the changing behavior of rulers in terms of public 
goods provision. Throughout the Tokugawa regime, the levy (nengu, in Japanese) 
imposed on lands and paid in kind (i.e., generally in the form of rice) consti-
tuted the major part of the revenue earned by the shogunate, as well as domains. 
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Hereafter, we use the term “annual tribute” for this levy, as literally implied by the 
Japanese term nengu. The amount of revenue collected by each domain was influ-
enced largely by the volume of the annual tribute.
Then, how were the volumes of annual tribute determined? The rulers executed 
a cadastral survey to set the official estimation of yearly rice production per land 
area during an early stage of their reign, and a certain proportion of this official 
estimation was imposed on each landowner (usually a peasant household) as 
annual tribute. Figure 1 shows the long-term fluctuation of this proportion in each 
territory, that is, the imposed volume of the annual tribute divided by the for-
mal estimation of production (hereafter, “tribute rate”). Figure 1 shows the tribute 
rates of three different areas. The grey line with triangle markers and gray line 
with circle markers express the weighted average of tribute rates among villages 
in the domains of the Tokugawa shogunate and the Hosokawa family (Kumamoto 
domain), respectively.1 The remaining solid black line with circle markers shows 
the tribute rate of Shimokoma-sōbō village in the Yamashiro province, located in 
the western part of Honshū, the “Main Island” of Japan.
First, it is worth pointing out that the tribute rates in these figures stagnated or 
even declined over time. In fact, all the tribute rates remained stagnant after the 
latter half of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, we notice the relatively high 
tribute rate in the seventeenth century. This is particularly distinct in Shimokoma-
sōbō  village, where the tribute rate from the 1640s to the 1670s exceeded that from 


























































Figure 1. The Changing Patterns of “Tribute Rate”: Shogunate, Domain, Village
Source: Sawai and Tanimoto 2016, figure 1.2, Tanimoto 2018, figure 2.
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the domains of the Tokugawa shogunate and the Hosokawa family, the relatively 
high rate in the mid-seventeenth century cannot be denied.
Second, we have to pay attention to the fact that the tribute rates indicated in 
these figures should be taken as a “nominal” index for measuring the distribu-
tion of the economic value between rulers and peasants. It was often the case that 
the official estimate of production per land remained at the level fixed during the 
seventeenth century, when the rulers had executed cadastral surveys, even in the 
subsequent centuries. Indeed, muradaka, the values of villages expressed in koku, 
were recorded as fixed numbers from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth 
century in Shimokoma-sōbō village.
In contrast, there are several pieces of evidence that indicate the continuous 
increase in land productivities. The estimation of average land productivity of 
whole domains from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century suggests that rice 
yield per acre increased from 0.98 koku in 1650 to 1.30 koku in 1850 (Miyamoto 
2004, 38), and the similar trends were exemplified by several villages in western 
Japan by aggregating the records from primary sources.2 Considering the fact 
that a cadastral survey was rarely carried out after the eighteenth century, it 
is not unrealistic to conclude that the “substantial tribute rate” that accurately 
reflects the distribution of economic value to the ruling class was much lower 
than the level shown in the figures mentioned earlier. In fact, the estimation 
based on the industrial census in the Kumamoto domain carried out in 1842 
revealed that the proportion of the total annual tribute to the aggregate value of 
production was not more than approximately 23% (Yoshimura 2013, 196–200). 
In other words, the weight of the public finance of rulers relative to the whole 
economy tended to deteriorate, at least during the latter half of the Tokugawa 
period. We have to bear this long-term trend in mind during the following dis-
cussion on expenditure.
The Changing Pattern of Rulers’ Expenditure
Owing to the loss and destruction of the official documents, data sources for the 
analysis of the comprehensive financial expenditure of the Tokugawa shogunate are 
scarce. Table 1 compiles the extant data from three different years of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries to show the breakdown of the entire annual expenditure. 
As is shown in the table, the payment for vassals constituted the largest portion 
in 1730, followed by the expense of satisfying the needs of the Tokugawa family, 
and these were the largest two in the nineteenth century as well. If we add the 
expense in kind (rice) for vassals that were managed through another account, 
the  proportion of the two items mentioned earlier increases to more than 60%. 
On the other hand, the direct expenses, which can be regarded as those incurred 
to provide public goods, such as the maintenance of infrastructure, seem to have 
represented a rather small part of expenditure in these years. The significance of 
the expenditure incurred because of the needs of the lord’s family and the vassals 
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was also seen in the case of the domains. For example, the financial data of the 
Saga domain around 1650 showed that 64% of the expenditure on rice, which 
accounted for 38% of the total expenditure, was allocated as stipends of vassals, 
and around 50% of the entire expenditure was spent outside the domain, mainly in 
Edo,3 the capital of the Tokugawa regime (renamed Tokyo in 1868). Since the needs 
of the lord and his family are likely to have occurred at their place of residence, the 
Edo expenditure should largely be classified as consumption-related expenditure, 
mainly for the lord’s family and his vassals.
However, considering the irregularity of expenses on construction or famine 
relief, table 1 is not sufficient for the evaluation of the role of public goods provi-
sion by the Tokugawa shogunate or other domains. In fact, many extant individual 
records show that the participation of rulers in construction and civil engineering 
projects or famine relief. Table 2 lists the various projects run by the Tokugawa 
shogunate with the help of daimyōs (otetsudai-fushin). From the table, we can 
identify that the seventeenth century was the age of construction. A number of 
construction projects, comprising the building as well as repairing of castles, tem-
ples, and shrines, were executed under this scheme. For example, the Tokugawa 
shogunate started the expansion work to Edo castle in 1606, and it lasted more 
than thirty years. After the Siege of Osaka in 1614–1615, whereby the Tokugawa 
shogunate overthrew the former ruler of the Toyotomi family, the shogunate 
reconstructed the Osaka castle as a symbol of Tokugawa’s reign over the west-
ern part of the Japanese archipelago from 1620 onward. As the castle construction 
projects included a wider range of works, these projects should be recognized as 
contributing not only to the construction of the place of residence of the Tokugawa 
family, but also to the creation of the capital (Edo) or the core city in western Japan 
(Osaka). In fact, the construction works that began in 1603 reclaimed a part of Edo 
bay by leveling a nearby hill, thereby creating an urban area where the warrior 
class and others could gather; this realized the policy of residential demarcation 
between the ruling class of warriors and their peasant subjects.
Table 1. Breakdown of the Expenditure of Tokugawa 
Shogunate (Excluding Temporal Expenses)
(%)
  1730 1814 1844
Vassals 40.7 29.4 28.0
Tokugawa family 21.3 32.7 30.8
Administrative expense 16.8 7.8 10.9
Providing loans 6.4 11.5 18.9
Others 14.8 18.6 11.3
Total 100 100 100
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On the other hand, the number of projects categorized as civil engineering 
works on river control in table 2 requires additional information for an appropri-
ate interpretation. Their appearance from the early eighteenth century onward did 
not mean that the shogunate or domains had not been engaged in this field before. 
While we have not had a comprehensive data set yet, many records indicate that 
the shogunate as well as the domains directly managed the civil engineering works 
during the seventeenth century; these included river improvement, harbor con-
structions, building of irrigation ponds, and land reclamations (Furushima 1956). 
Most of these large projects, which were organized directly by the shogunate 
or domains in terms of finance and management, were called go-fushin, which 
 literally means “construction by rulers,” in the Japanese of that period. Thus, the 
seventeenth century can largely be seen as the age of construction by rulers.
Considering these facts, we could derive two intriguing implications from 
table 2. The first is that the large works of castle and town construction almost 
ceased before the turn of the eighteenth century. Specifically, the number of con-
struction works related to castles decreased significantly in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century. This was a direct reflection of the relaxation of the military 
tension between the Tokugawa shogunate and the domain lords. In fact, the num-
ber of events related to military affairs—such as the military parade to the Nikkō 
Tōshōgū, a formal pilgrimage to the sacred shrine dedicated to the founder of 
the Tokugawa shogunate—decreased drastically from the latter half of the sev-
enteenth century onward (Tanimoto 2015). This marked the substantial start of 
“peace” under the Tokugawa regime, which might have changed the rulers’ finan-
cial needs.
While military issues lost their significance, the influence of diplomatic manip-
ulation increased, especially in the political arena in Edo. This required expendi-
ture for facilitating social contact among rulers, which was reflected in the rising 
expenses of rulers’ “public finance” in Edo, and also in the rulers’ hometown.
Establishing a domain-ran kiln in the Saga domain distinctively exemplified the 
efforts that the domains made for pursing diplomatic success. Based on the trans-
planted technology via Korean craftsman around the turn of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the Saga domain built its own kiln in the middle of the seventeenth century; 
it would specialize in producing uniquely designed and sophisticated porcelains. 
They were given to the shogun or other prominent daimyōs as gifts, facilitating 
social contact with politically influential entities for sustaining, or in some cases 
acquiring, a favorable position among the ruling class (Ōhashi 2007). In addition, 
because of the concentration of the warrior class in an urban agglomeration, the 
standard level of consumption among lords and vassals must have increased in the 
capital city of Edo or in the castle towns. In short, the stress given to the rulers’ 
expenditure moved from “investment” to “consumption,” in accordance with the 
start of the so-called Pax Tokugawa era.
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The second point is that the shogunate added the civil engineering works for 
controlling river waters into the otetsudai-fushin scheme from the beginning of 
the eighteenth century. Given that rulers, including the Tokugawa shogunate, had 
been reducing their investment in construction, it is not unrealistic to assume 
that this was derived from the motivation of the shogunate to reduce its finan-
cial expenditure by utilizing the domains’ resources for shogunate-run projects on 
river control (Yoshizumi 1967).
A similar motivation can be observed in the shogunate establishing a new 
scheme called kuniyaku-fushin (which literally means “province’s construction 
duties”) in 1720, under which the shogunate bore 10% of the total cost, whereas 
the domain lord and the village whose territory was located within the area of 
the province (kuni) concerned bore the rest (Kasaya 1976). The significance of 
these schemes for the Tokugawa shogunate can be seen through the available 
data (which is rather fragmented) on the finance of the Tokugawa shogunate 
between 1789 and 1815. According to this, the average annual additional revenue 
and expenditure reached approximately 10% to 15% of the normal revenue and 
expenses. An extra expenditure of 3.5 million ryō4 included 1.3 million ryō on 
riparian works, which were largely financed by the otetsudai-fushin and kuniyaku-
fushin schemes mentioned earlier. Here, we notice signs of the changing behavior 
of the Tokugawa shogunate in terms of building and maintaining infrastructure 
to control water.
A similar change can be seen in the areas of famine and poverty relief. Though 
the shogunate was accustomed to providing loans to impoverished domains 
affected by a bad harvest, it turns out that these loans were apparently reduced dur-
ing the 1780s when the great famine of Tenmei occurred. Concerning the method 
of poverty relief, the shogunate indeed established a loan system for the poor, and 
ordered villages to ensure adequate stock in granaries to counter the impact of a 
bad harvest, as part of the political reform of the late eighteenth century by the 
Tokugawa shogunate, known as the Kansei Reforms.5 However, even in these proj-
ects, the shogunate tried to control its expenses by introducing external monetary 
resources. For example, the financial basis for the loans provided to the needy and 
destitute by the shogunate was the interest income earned by a scheme of lending 
official money to merchants and wealthy farmers. Official granaries in the village 
were also filled with rice or other grains that were mainly delivered by the villag-
ers, rather than rulers. Thus, each scheme was usually planned in such a way that 
its financial basis was the introduction of money or in-kind delivery from wealthy 
peasants or landowners (Takeuchi 2009, Matsuzawa 2009). In sum, the expendi-
ture on infrastructure or poverty relief by the Tokugawa shogunate, which can be 
categorized as public goods in this volume, was dependent on the external intro-
duction of extra money and resources, apart from the “annual tribute” that was the 
economic foundation of rulers under the Tokugawa regime.
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Structural Change
We assume that the structural change in public finance was responsible for the 
change in behavior of the Tokugawa shogunate, as was the case in other domains 
toward public goods provision during the course of its regime. In the seventeenth 
century, specifically the first half, the projects run by the shogunate and daimyōs 
were more or less related to the “military” issues. Not only organizing military 
parades but also the outlay for construction and repair of castles and castle towns 
were recognized as “military” expenditure in preparation for conflicts among 
rulers.
In contrast, active expenditure on public engineering works for water control 
and transportation facilities might be seen, prima facie, as a kind of infrastructure 
development that resembled the so-called public investments by modern govern-
ments. However, the motivations for this investment were largely derived from the 
rulers’ interest in enhancing the basis of imposing land levy, or settling the ways 
to sell their annual tribute in a more profitable manner. Insofar as they are recog-
nized as methods to strengthen the fiscal and military ability of rulers, they shared 
an objective that was similar to that of the military-related expenses mentioned 
earlier.
Therefore, it seems far-fetched to assume any kind of benevolent ideas behind 
this “public” expenditure during the Tokugawa regime, at least through the sev-
enteenth century. In fact, the Confucian idea of benevolent rule was not prevalent 
among the warrior class in this period, and only a few daimyōs showed interest in 
these rather new ideas that originated in China or Korea and were later introduced 
into the archipelago. The rulers’ main concern was the formation of a social and 
political order among the ruling warrior class, which was originally based on its 
military powers, as well as economic abilities. The subjects were considered to be 
governed because of the power and authority of the rulers (Watanabe 2010). From 
the rulers’ point of view, the public social spaces for public goods provision were 
nonexistent.
However, for ordinary people, the need to be protected from the external 
 military threat might have been pressing because of the simmering tension 
among members of the ruling class in the first half of the seventeenth century, 
not long after the Age of Civil Wars. In this context, the rulers’ military expenses 
could possibly be justified as the unavoidable costs incurred from self-defense. As 
per this line of thinking, establishing and maintaining sociopolitical order among 
the rulers were also deemed efforts at keeping “peace.” Considering the fact that 
national defense exemplifies the attribute of a “pure” public good in textbooks 
of economics, rulers’ expenses related to military issues in a broad sense might 
have been situated in public social space by peasant subjects in light of people’s 
ordinary lives.
Regarding the civil engineering works for infrastructure, the economic inter-
ests of the people and rulers were likely to overlap more. The Owari domain, for 
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instance, expended its resources on the river-controlling project in response to 
the peasants’ request during the land reclamations around 1650 (Nishida 1984). 
If “peace” and infrastructure construction were demanded by the people, they 
deserved to be defined as public goods, regardless of the intention of the pro-
viders, that is, the shogunate and daimyōs. It is noteworthy that the cost of these 
projects could be covered by the relatively high tribute rate in the seventeenth cen-
tury. From our point of view, the high tribute rate in this period seems to be bal-
anced, thereby allowing the expenditure on these projects. In other words, public 
goods such as “peace” that were potentially seen as expensive by peasants subjects 
deserved to be acquired at the cost of a heavy levy imposed on their lands, or at 
least recognized as in the tolerable range of balancing the costs and benefits.
However, the relaxation of the tension among rulers (specifically between the 
shogunate and the lords) in the late seventeenth century changed the require-
ment for public finance. In fact, temples built for the use of the families of the 
Tokugawa or other lords became a major component of the expenditure on urban 
construction. While military issues lost significance, the expenditure on social 
contact among rulers increased; this is because the issue of maintaining sociopo-
litical order was intrinsically a matter among the ruling class. In a broad sense, the 
expenditure tended toward consumption instead of investment.
The financial deficit of the shogunate, as well as many other domains, around 
1700 can be regarded as a consequence of this structural change. In theory, the 
deficit in public finance can be tackled by increasing revenue, and specifically by 
raising the annual tribute rate. In fact, as shown in figure 1, the shogunate was at 
least nominally successful in regaining during the mid-eighteenth century the rate 
prevalent earlier. However, even the shogunate could not let the tribute rate exceed 
the nominal seventeenth-century level; therefore, it began to decline from the lat-
ter half of the eighteenth century onward.
As can be seen in figure 1, the tribute rate in other areas remained stagnant or 
even decreased over time. It is noteworthy that there was a decline in the annual 
tribute rate not only relative to production growth, which has been widely men-
tioned in the existing literature, but also in absolute terms when compared with the 
rate during the seventeenth century. The persistent imbalance, that is, the increase 
in consumption-related expenditure and the stagnation in revenue, seems to be, at 
least partially, a reflection of the mismatch between the expectation of the defray-
ers of the annual tribute and the rulers’ behavior. It is not incorrect to believe that 
the “publicness” of the expenditure of the shogunate and domains weakened as 
military issues lost their social significance, and that the rising expense on rulers’ 
consumption could not obtain the recognition that accommodates the need to 
provide public goods that might raise welfare.
How did the rulers cope with the persistent financial deficits? On the revenue 
side, studies exist that discuss the loans from merchants, the role of recoinage 
and issuance of paper money, and the industry-promoting policy executed by the 
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domains. From our point of view, however, the expenditure side should be signifi-
cant. As we have seen in table 1, several studies insist that the number of redundant 
vassals could not be effectively curtailed (Ōguchi 1989, Morishita 2012). In fact, as 
the chapter by Kenichiro Aratake in part 1 suggests, only a small number of them 
could be regarded as officials engaged in civil administration. The recognition of 
legitimacy of ruling people and maintaining political and social order with the 
ruling warrior class had still depended on fulfilling the military responsibilities. 
Under these conditions, if thrift ordinances could not drastically reduce the con-
sumption level, the persistent financial problems affected the provision of public 
goods; this was the case for the shogunate, as well as most of the domains. The 
above-mentioned schemes, executed by the shogunate to introduce external mon-
etary resources, were among the ways devised to cope with these issues, thereby 
avoiding a significant retreat from public goods provision. However, considering 
the ruling class as a whole, some schemes, such as otetsudai-fushin (domains’ help), 
which transferred a certain amount of funds from domains to the shogunate and 
might have resulted in curtailing the expenditure for the domain’s own purpose, 
were insufficient to meet the needs.
In that sense, the introduction of external monetary and other resources, that 
is, from merchants or wealthy farmers, was an essential source for public goods 
 provision, besides the annual tribute to the rulers. From the rulers’ point of view, 
these might be recognized as intentional outsourcing of public goods provision 
because of the shortage of revenue. In fact, it is said that the idea of benevolent 
policy toward the ruled, osukui (literally “help” in Japanese), existed widely among 
rulers from the eighteenth century onward (Fukaya 1993). In contrast, it was also in 
this century that the public finance capacity of the rulers weakened so much that 
they could not even collect sufficient annual tribute to meet their financial demands. 
Therefore, it does not follow that there were potential agreements between the 
rulers and the ruled about public goods provision, which we supposed earlier to 
exist in the  seventeenth century, though in a different manner, even if we recognize 
the prevalence of the idea of benevolent policy in this period. It could potentially be 
interpreted as the emergence, at least from a financial perspective, of new  providers 
of public goods who were not from the ruling warrior class. Examples of direct 
commitment to public goods provision by the nonruling class are discussed in the 
following section.
Infrastructure Development in the Regions
Shifting our focus from rulers’ activities to a regional level, we can easily find 
examples of public goods provision (specifically from late eighteenth century) 
in which ordinary people from outside the ruling warrior class had a significant 
participation.
The construction of an irrigation pond in Izawa village, located in Ise prov-
ince (the present-day Mie prefecture) in the central part of Honshū, was one of 
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these cases.6 In 1836, three prominent members of this village—all of whom had 
made their fortunes by being engaged in businesses other than cultivation or 
 landholding—planned a project of building an irrigation pond to solve the water-
shortage problem faced by farmers of the village. They had already contributed 
to the village by taking over its debt of two thousand ryō in 1833. According to a 
diary written by Hikosaburō Takekawa, the leader of this irrigation project, the 
plan aimed to rebuild the livelihood of villagers who were grievously affected by 
an extremely poor harvest in 1836; this was known as the Great Famine of Tenpō 
period. Three families shared the total expenses of thirty-five hundred ryō;7 the 
project, which was completed in 1838, started to provide water to twenty-six hect-
ares of paddy lands.
Thus, this construction work depended entirely on villagers’ finance under the 
“authorization” of the ruler of the village, that is, of the Toba domain. We use the 
term “authorization” instead of “permission” because we assume that the ruler had 
a role during arbitration proceedings in the case of disputes such as irrigation 
works that might potentially affect the water supply to neighboring villages. In 
this sense, the works were carried out under the jurisdiction of the Toba domain. 
However, the execution and management of the works were delegated entirely to 
Takekawa and other prominent villagers. At first, they made contact with engi-
neers through their acquaintances in the neighboring village. It is noteworthy that 
these two engineers, Saisuke Otobe and his subordinate, were skilled engineers of 
the warrior class who were in the service of the prominent Kishū domain, which 
was adjacent to the Toba domain. They made a concrete plan by measuring the 
area, and gave advice in their spare time to Takekawa during the construction 
works. In short, they were “hired” by villagers on a private basis, and this respon-
sibility was in addition to that arising from their official assignments for the Kishū 
domain.
Though the labor force was mainly provided by villagers, they were hired by 
daily wage, apart from the conventional villager’s duty imposed by the rulers. In 
fact, the use of the latter form of labor mobilization had diminished from the mid-
seventeenth century onward. The group of skilled workers in the civil engineering 
works, called kurokuwamono (literally “man with black hoe”), was also hired to 
deal with relatively high-skilled tasks. There even existed some claims from villag-
ers that the employment of skilled workers from outside would reduce employment 
opportunities for the villagers. These claims clearly imply that the construction 
works additionally aimed to be a form of job creation for the  destitute—an inten-
tion that was also mentioned in Takekawa’s diary. In fact, although Takekawa esti-
mated that the productivity of kurokuwamono exceeded that of the villagers by 
thirty percentage points, he continued to hire villagers. In sum, this case shows 
that the irrigation pond and the employment, that is, the infrastructure and pov-
erty relief, were provided by village-based activities that were not dependent on 
rulers in terms of finance, technology, and workforce.
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The Hamaguchi family’s contribution to the construction of protection facilities 
against natural disasters was another distinct example. When a great tsunami hit 
Hiro village—located in Kishū province (the present-day Wakayama prefecture) 
in 1856, the seventh Gihei Hamaguchi organized construction work to build an 
embankment, and supplied fifteen hundred ryō over a period of three years. During 
this time, his soy sauce brewing business was completely entrusted to a manager 
who, it was said, had to restrain Gihei’s demands for money (Tanimoto 1990 
and 2006).
Besides these purely civil and voluntary activities, the wealthy and influential 
families in the region, referred to as “local notables” in this chapter, contributed 
financially to the projects planned by rulers. Half of the construction of bridges 
and watercourses in the Kumamoto domain during the first half of the  nineteenth 
century was financed from the reserve fund of annual tribute in the district, 
and the rest by donations and loans from wealthy farmers (Yoshimura 2013).8 
Although the establishment of a village-level granary from the late eighteenth cen-
tury onward was based on a policy ordered by the shogunate, it was managed and 
financed by village people, as mentioned in the previous section.
Village Community and the Formation of a Regional Society
We assume that these activities were driven not only by a personal and individual 
motive, but also by the sense of responsibility for the regional society felt by the 
notables; this sense was derived from the notion of the village as a kind of official 
entity. The institutional basis that substantialized the notion of the regional society 
seems to have emerged in the latter half of the Tokugawa regime.
The appearance of quasi-public finance at the village level can be seen as a part 
thereof. Several empirical studies revealed cases in which the head of the village 
collected levies from land-owning villagers, in addition to the annual tribute to 
rulers, in order to fund the village’s own expenses. Although rulers tended to 
 dislike the emergence of this budget for fear of it affecting the collection of annual 
tributes, it did, on occasion, amount to 30% to 40% of the annual tribute.9 Villages’ 
own expenditure ranged from expenses for maintaining facilities to sponsorship 
of village festivals, adding the expenses by gunchū, which literally means “among 
the district,” the amount of which was allotted to each village (Fukuyama 1975, 
Sugahara 1979, Yazawa 1985, Kurushima 1993).
This last expense reveals the formation of a public social space beyond the vil-
lage, which is called gunchū, that is, a cooperative unit of villages. The village heads 
held meetings, laid down some kind of a protocol that was called gunchū gijō, and 
carried out the tasks that could not be performed by a village on its own. A well-
known case in the literature was a petition to the shogunate’s office jointly made by 
the cooperatives of around one thousand villages located in three provinces sur-
rounding Osaka in the 1820s (Tsuda 1961). Their purpose was to break the coalition 
of the monopolistic merchants of Osaka in order to defend their economic interest 
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in producing and dealing in cotton products. Moreover, a later study revealed that 
the cooperatives’ tasks were not only to organize these temporary movements, but 
also to manage daily problems, such as responding to the poor people wandering 
about in the countryside (Yabuta 1992).
Thus, the geographical unit that covered a much wider area than a single vil-
lage emerged at least in the early nineteenth century. In fact, the basic idea of the 
term “regional society” in this chapter is derived from this observation. Founded 
on the basic and tightly knit institutional body of the village, the regional society 
extended its coverage beyond this by forming the institution of cooperative vil-
lages, which was relatively weak but still quite substantial. In addition, it is impor-
tant to notice that economic factors might have contributed to substantialize the 
area. As we have already seen in the case of the petition by villages in the Osaka 
region, the development of cotton-related businesses communized the economic 
interest among traders beyond the village, serving as a foundation for collective 
actions. Therefore, considering that the market-oriented farming and proto-
industry characterized the economic development of nineteenth-century Japan, 
it does not seem unrealistic to assume that economic forces worked as important 
drivers in the formation of a regional society (Hayami, Saitō, and Toby 2004).
The question is whether the emerging, economically powerful agents, such as 
the wealthy farmers, brewers, local merchants, and manufacturers, behaved in 
a manner that substantialized the region. In fact, we have some examples of the 
wealthy, who were solely pursuing their private profits as economic agents; this 
invited criticism from other residents (Watanabe 1998). However, it is  important 
to point out that a number of rural wealthy families behaved as notables by 
 pursuing social reputation as well as economic profits; they did so by responding 
to the expectations of the residents or fulfilling responsibilities toward them. If 
the social relationships generated by their economic activities extended beyond 
the village, the residents concerned could not be limited to the villagers. In that 
sense, economic factors worked as a driving force to substantialize the regional 
society, which provided many actors who complemented the public goods 
 provision by the rulers. In the next section, we will see how and to what extent 
this structural change succeeded in the Meiji regime, which heralded the age of 
centralization.
BEYOND THE CENTR ALIZ ATION OF MEIJI  STATE
The Role of Local Public Finances
In 1868, the Tokugawa shogunate was abolished and the Meiji state’s reign began. 
By abolishing the domain system and executing land reform in the 1870s, the Meiji 
government established a centralized system of public finance, under which the 
entire amount of land tax, almost equivalent to the total annual tribute under the 
Tokugawa regime, was collected as the revenue of the central government.
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The proportion of government expenditure to GDP remained stagnant or even 
declined to 10% during the first stage in the 1880s and early 1890s.10 The trend 
reversed with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, and there were step-
wise rises by way of two wars that were the Sino-Japanese war in 1894–1895 and 
the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–1905. Note that this figure implies the expenditure 
by the central as well as the local governments; these correspond to two levels—at 
prefecture and city/town/village. Regarding the relative size of each government, 
central and local, we recognize from the statistics that the share of central govern-
ment remained around 70% or above.
Studying the breakdown, however, we find that more than half of the expense 
of the central government comprised the sum of the military expenditure, and the 
cost of national debt consisted of interest payment and the redeeming of national 
bonds. In other words, the amount of expenditure of the local governments was 
almost equal to the nonmilitary expenditure of the central government. Therefore, 
if we limit our focus to the expenditure related to the people’s livelihood, that is, 
the provision of public goods for public welfare in a broad sense, the public finance 
of the local governments carried significant weight.
Specifically in the field of civil engineering and education, the decisive role of 
local public finance was apparent. Figure 2 shows that the main providers of civil 
engineering works were the prefecture governments, followed by those of the city/
town/village. In fact, this figure indicates that their expenditure occupied around 
three-quarters of the entire expense on civil engineering works in almost all years. 
Even though the prefectural governor—usually the senior officer of the Ministry 
of Home Affairs—was appointed by the central government in those years, the 
prefectural government was rather independent in financial terms because the 
prefectural taxes were distinct from national taxes (Kanazawa 2010).
In terms of education, the introduction of the public primary schooling sys-
tem in 1872 was an epochal moment in institutional change. It was based on the 
promulgation of the “education system order” by the central government, which 
ordered the start of primary schooling in each of the local entities—village and 
town—that were reorganized through the institutional reformation processes in 
the early Meiji period. However, there was only a small expenditure on education 
by the governments up to 1878. Even though the expenditure increased signifi-
cantly in 1879, the primary school system that was launched depended mainly on 
donations from the regional society, as the central government solely focused on 
higher education (at least up to the early twentieth century). The local govern-
ments, especially those of the city/town/village, incurred education expenditure 
from 1879. The expenditure first rose at the turn of the century, and then, after 
1907, with the extension of the primary school period from four to six years, tak-
ing up nearly half of the total expenditure of the city/town/village governments. 
Among the entire expenditure on education by the governments, the share of the 
central government did not exceed 20% up to the 1910s.
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Thus, the local public finances in the Meiji period carried the burden of 
 providing public goods in critical areas, such as public engineering works and 
public education. One may regard it as a significant change by emphasizing the 
formalization of the local public finance system through institutional trial and error 
during the early Meiji period. However, we notice the substantial continuity of the 
revenue of local governments. This was heavily dependent on wealthy farmers, 
landowners, or local wealthy people paying local taxes, in addition to national 
taxes, such as the reformed “land tax.” The central government was further dependent 
on increasing indirect taxes, comprising brewery tax and consumption tax.
The system of imposing household tax (kosūwari, literally meaning “dividing 
among households”) provided prefectures around 20% of their tax revenue; the 
corresponding figure for city/town/village governments was 50% to 70%. Since the 
taxation was determined by the assembly of each local government, according to 
the estimation of income and asset holdings of each household, wealthy house-
holds tended to have a heavier tax burden. This resulted in a distribution of the tax 
burden that was rather similar to that during the late Tokugawa period, in spite of 
the formalization of local public finance.
Hoping to retain their social reputation, the wealthy still behaved as notables, 
responding to the expectations of the regional society. What was new in the Meiji 

























































Figure 2. Expenditure for Civil Engineering Work by Public Finance (Estimated by Source of 
Revenue)
Source: Naikaku Tōkeikyoku, ed., Nihon Teikoku Tōkeinenkan (Japan’s Annual Statistical Book).
32    Chapter 2
to respond. Contribution to the public education system was an important one, 
but the field of regional business-based activities also rose to prominence. The fol-
lowing cases vividly show the diverse activities undertaken by local notables, along 
with the political centralization of the Meiji government.
Region as a Motive for Activity
The case of the Hamaguchi family, to which we have referred already as making 
a notable contribution to the construction of an embankment to protect against 
tsunamis, exemplifies the inclination toward regional business activities. The 
Hamaguchi family invested about half of its assets in enterprises other than its tra-
ditional family business of soy sauce brewing. Besides supporting a local shipping 
firm, Kisaka-Hikifunegumi, the Hamaguchi family moved its investment from 
relatively secure assets, such as national bonds and the stocks of already estab-
lished national companies—Nihon Tetsudō (railroad) and Kanegafuchi Bōseki 
(cotton spinning)—to businesses that were connected with the Wakayama or 
Chiba prefecture, the home bases of the Hamaguchi family.11 Out of their seventy-
thousand-yen stock investment balance in 1900, close to half was invested in local 
enterprises, such as local banks (Arita Kigyō Bank and Busō Bank) and a steam-
ship transportation firm (Chōshi Kisen).
This regionally inclined investment behavior can be generalized to some 
extent by considering cases from a database comprising 251 shareholders in the 
Niigata prefecture in 1901. By analyzing their shareholding, we distinguished 
two types of investors: the first type inclined to invest in established nationwide 
corporations, and the other investing in newly established and Niigata-based 
corporations with a relatively uncertain future. A wide range was observed in 
both types. Combining this with the information of shareholding patterns, we 
identify a specific type of shareholder who concentrated investment on Niigata 
corporations but did not participate in their management. This type of investor 
can be characterized as a “sponsor” type, in contrast to the entrepreneur or rentier 
types; they comprise almost 60% of shareholders and 30% of the investment 
portfolio (Tanimoto 1998). By combining this “sponsor” type behavior with the 
Hamaguchis’ investment activities, we can infer that investment in private firms 
were not solely a profit-pursuing activity for a certain number of the wealthy in 
those years.
Recalling that public goods were intrinsically undersupplied through market 
transactions due to their particular attributes, we can identify that the investment 
in these recently established enterprises shared characteristics with public goods 
in terms of being undersupplied through the existing capital market owing to the 
large uncertainty in expectation of profits because of their newness. Under these 
conditions, investing in local corporations was a new activity that was driven by 
a motivation similar to that behind the provision of public goods during the late 
Tokugawa period by the notables.
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The diverse activities of Hachibei, the head of the Sekiguchi family, in the 1890s, 
who made his fortune with soy source brewing from the mid-Tokugawa era, exem-
plify the motivation of these local investors.12 Besides starting new business activi-
ties, such as beer brewing, Worcestershire sauce production, brick manufacturing, 
and a water transportation company to conduct a billing and shipping business 
on the nearby Kasumigaura Lake, in the vicinity of the residential area of Edosaki 
(Hitachi province), the Sekiguchi family was involved in social and political activi-
ties. Hachibei became a chief of the league of villages in 1881, besides being a mem-
ber of the committee for educational affairs of these villages. In 1883, he donated 
over one tan (approximately 0.1 hectare) of land and five hundred yen for the con-
struction of a primary school in his area of operation. Moreover, Hachibei joined 
the Rikken Kaishintō (Constitutional Reform Party)—one of the major parties of 
the people’s rights movement in the early Meiji period—and financially supported 
a party-affiliated magazine called Jōsō Zasshi (Jōsō Magazine) that was published 
in the Edosaki area. He himself wrote two short essays on social systems and cus-
toms in this magazine. Finally, Sekiguchi Hachibei was a candidate in the first 
House of Representative election of 1890 and was elected as the only representative 
from the sixth constituency of the Ibaragi prefecture.
It is, of course, quite normal for those involved in politics to be property own-
ers. Max Weber, who argued the administration by notables as a type of legitimate 
domination, defined a notable as “the individual” who is able to “count on a certain 
level of provision from private sources” and is “free for political activity” (Weber 
1968, 290). For Weber, business activities are seen as the economic foundation that 
enables people to behave as notables. However, in the case of the Sekiguchi family, 
both business and sociopolitical activities took off at the same time. Wealthy prop-
erty holders in the early Meiji era did not seem to consider these two apparently 
different spheres of activities as strictly separate. If this is true, one can assume a 
common ground for their activities spanning both spheres.
Recalling the achievement of the Tokugawa regime in terms of the forma-
tion of regional society, we assume that acquiring a reputation as a notable in a 
regional society is a common motive for property owners, namely, notables. This 
assumption tallies with the fact that numerous examples exist of notables who 
were financially, as well as politically, committed to the introduction of railways to 
the region, or to the establishment of the branch of a government-run post office 
or telegraph station in the village or town during the late nineteenth century (Fujii 
2005). Even if they were run on a business basis, which was more likely in the case 
of a private railroad corporation, they certainly provided critical infrastructure 
that connected their regional society to the nationwide transport and information 
system. Thus, the significant role of the regional society in public goods provision 
was based on the activities of notables acting in a wide range of social roles, such 
as that of a donor, taxpayer, entrepreneur, investor, and politician. In other words, 
the social order based on propertied persons characterized the nineteenth-century 
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transformation of the political structure, from the Tokugawa regime to the Meiji 
society; this social order accomplished the task of providing public goods in rural 
Japan.
For the sustainability and reproduction of their economic lives, ordinary people 
depend not only on goods and on services obtained through market activities, but 
also on public goods in a broad sense. When the rulers under the Tokugawa regime 
largely withdrew from the provision of public goods, the regional society that devel-
oped with the emergence of local notables complemented or even substituted the 
task. Although a modern fiscal state was established through the Meiji Restoration, 
the regional society that maintained its structure throughout the political reform 
process played significant roles in providing public goods, especially in the field of 
public welfare. They did so by way of institutionalizing the support of local public 
finance through taxation on property owners, that is, notables.
Moreover, the establishment of modern enterprises, as well as the infrastruc-
ture for transport and information, was supported financially, at least in part, by 
the wealthy, who dared to invest their monetary accumulation in the risky local 
corporations or nonprofit organizations as “sponsors.” In other words, these proj-
ects were undersupplied with necessary funds if they depended only on ordinary 
capital markets. Considering that public goods were also undersupplied through 
market transactions, it is not incorrect to say that investing in profit-making proj-
ects was similar to the provision of public goods in a specific historical context. 
Thus, the regional society itself functioned as a motive for the local notables, who 
played a significant role in providing public goods from the eighteenth century to 
the early twentieth century, that is, during the eras that saw the emergence of early 
modern and modern Japan.
We assume that a sense of responsibility toward the regional society led to 
this phenomenon. This sense would be rooted in the rather strong adherence 
of inhabitants, specifically the peasant households that constituted the largest 
proportion of the population, to the place where they managed their family farms. 
This particular behavior originated in the establishment of the ie system among 
peasant households around the turn of the eighteenth century; it represented the 
end of the age of reclamation that spanned the seventeenth century. According to 
Kizaemon Aruga, a leading sociologist in this field, the Japanese peasant family 
can be characterized as a stem-family with the custom of single inheritance of 
lineal male descendants. Ie was a family system well suited to a system that placed 
a high value on the succession of the ie as an independent unit (Aruga 1972). If 
the ie—rather than the individual or the nuclear family unit—became established 
as the subject of inheritance, a choice to sell land and to abandon farming could 
not be made by a single generation. As a result, the household gave first priority to 
From “Feudal” Lords to Local Notables    35
farming, suggesting strong adherence to the inherited land.13 This argument can also 
be applied to landless tenants, if we recall the long-term stability of the relationship 
between landowners and tenants in modern Japan (Sakane 2011).
Thus, the ie system resulted in a geographically low mobile society in which 
people formed rather long-term and coherent relationships under the regional 
bond. A sense of loyalty to the region where most people would spend their entire 
lives would be fostered under these circumstances. The wealthy were prepared to 
make any contribution to the region in order to fulfill their responsibilities, and 
consistent “good” behavior on their part would result in a good reputation; this 
might represent an indispensable nonmonetary reward, namely, to be regarded as 
“notables” in a long-standing regional society whose composition remained more 
or less fixed. The adherence to their place of residence was a basic social condition 
underlying the workings of a regional society that undertook the public goods 
provision discussed in this chapter.
NOTES
1. The range of the territory of the Tokugawa shogunate extended from the northeast to the south-
west of the Japanese archipelago. The Hosokawa family ruled a territory named Higo (Kumamoto) 
region, which was worth three hundred thousand koku of rice and occupied most of the central Kyūshū 
Island, located in southwestern Japan.
2. See Tanimoto 2015 for the details.
3. Calculated by the financial data in Nagano 1980, 203–205.
4. Ryō was the unit of currency used in the Tokugawa period. Its value in the eighteenth century 
was approximately equal to one koku (unit of volume equivalent to 180 liters) of rice, except during 
years of bad harvest.
5. Kansei is the name of era that lasted from 1789 to 1801.
6. Information on construction of irrigation ponds is obtained from Yamazaki and Kitano 1955, 
196–240.
7. The value was approximately equivalent to the price paid in 1830 by consumers in Edo for 2,500 
koku (450 kiloliters) of polished rice.
8. In the Kumamoto domain, the head of a village union that comprised several villages played a 
significant role in activating civil engineering and construction works in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Called Sōjōya, these heads had hyakushō (peasant) status and worked as civil engineers, as well 
as governors of regions.
9. Tanimoto (2018) gives a case study of Nishihokkeno village in the early nineteenth century. 
Although this calculation of proportion was based only on fragmented village level data, the represen-
tativeness of these results can be verified by the official estimation of land reform, carried out by Meiji 
government in the 1870s. This estimation set the village-level tax at one-third of the land tax when it 
calculated the official price of each plot of land through the capitalization method.
10. See Sawai and Tanimoto (2016), figure 3.9, for the details.
11. Hamaguchi’s head family resided in Hiro Village in the Wakayama prefecture, and the family’s 
soy sauce brewery business operated in Chōshi, a town in the Chiba prefecture (Shimosa province).
12. Historical facts concerning the Sekiguchi family are taken from Tanimoto 1996.
13. The fact that the number of farming households remained almost constant at around 5.5 million 
from the 1890s to the 1930s suggests that the assumption is valid (Namiki 1955).
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What role did samurai play in the functioning of civil administration in early 
modern Japan, and how did they interact with peasants in the areas they were 
charged with supervising? Did the administrative organizations under the feudal 
lords (the shogunate and domains) employ a large number of samurai, and what 
did they contribute to the governing of rural areas? The answers to these questions 
are important for thinking holistically about the provision of public goods by the 
feudal lords, as well as for gaining a more concrete understanding of the allocation 
of human resources.
In early modern Japan, the shogunate and domains collected land levy called 
nengu (annual tributes)1 from commoners, out of which the samurai’s salaries were 
paid. This system of public finance gave rise to two obligations in the  relationship 
between feudal lords, retainers (samurai), and commoners (Ravina 1999). The 
first obligation is that, in order to pay retainers’ salaries, feudal lords levied 
tributes on commoners; the second is ethical in nature: feudal lords were to act 
with mercy toward commoners. This is the starting point for understanding 
the civil  administration and society of early modern Japan and the relationship 
between feudal lords and subjects. The topic we expand is the ways samurai and 
peasants were involved in tribute collection and in the governance of the domain. 
Collection of the annual tribute was based on a cooperative effort between samurai 
and the peasants who were delegated to represent their village communities.
Let us begin with an examination of who was appointed to the civil administra-
tion and what roles they played. Did the samurai play a leading role in the depart-
ments of civil administration, which were created to facilitate the domain’s rule of 
rural areas, or did the representatives of the peasants take the lead? One of the key 
3
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steps in administration was the cadastral survey, which registered land holdings, 
which were the basis for assessment of annual tribute. Though it would not have 
been strange for the samurai to assume all roles in conducting the surveys, as the 
surveys primarily served the interests of the lords, peasants were actively involved 
as well. A second question involves the domain’s attitude toward civil administra-
tion as reflected in its staffing, the proportion of samurai in the domain’s vassal 
band involved in the civil administration. Finally, the answers to these questions 
tell us about the relationship between the nature of the participation of samurai in 
the civil administration and the regions they ruled.
RULER AND SUBJECT:  THE REL ATIONSHIP BET WEEN 
SAMUR AI AND PEASANT S
Under the rule of the Tokugawa shogunate, which lasted from the seventeenth 
century to the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan was divided among 
about 250 domains. Although each domain, in principle, had autonomy over 
the management of its revenue and expenditure, the organization and rules that 
applied to the villages were similar to the structure employed in the territories 
under the direct rule of the Tokugawa shogunate. All domains had a local inten-
dant’s office, to which the samurai belonged, and this office appointed a group of 
village officials, which mostly comprised local villagers. The structure by which 
domains ruled villages, therefore, involved the participation of both samurai and 
peasants, and in nearly all domains, interaction in administration created relation-
ships between samurai and peasants. The samurai and peasants composing the 
group of village officials were responsible for collecting tributes and maintaining 
the public order. The Okayama domain can serve as an example of how samurai 
and peasants were organized within the civil administration (Taniguchi 1964).
In the “Samurai” structure of Okayama domain, the county director (gundai, 
referring to a director general) was at the top of a village’s judicial system; there 
were a maximum of two director generals. This post, which was created by the 
rural administrative reforms of 1682,2 was filled by what at first were called “experts 
in village administration” (jikatakōsha). Appointed under the county director were 
officials called county magistrates (kōribugyō). It is unknown when this post was 
established, but it existed before the creation of the county director. Originally, 
there were four magistrates, and they lived in the castle town district (Jōka-machi), 
but in 1654 their number was increased to eleven and they were moved to the coun-
ties they were to administer. The reforms of 1682 reduced their number once again 
to four. From then until the end of domain rule in 1871, the county magistrates 
lived at their residences in Minamigatamura, on the outskirts of the Jōka-machi of 
Okayama Castle, and commuted to the county office, which was in the Jōka-machi. 
Under this system of village administration, the county director was something 
of a figurehead position, with the real power being held by county magistrates. 
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The chief duty of the county magistrates was the oversight of all aspects of rural 
governance; their specific duties were (a) determining annual tribute amounts, (b) 
conducting twice-yearly village inspections,3 (c) appointing village officials,4 and 
(d) informing villages of laws promulgated by the Tokugawa shogunate and by the 
domains, among other things. The post of county inspector (kōrimetsuke) was also 
established in 1682, to be filled by five people. In the beginning, each inspector 
was assigned to his respective area; however, after 1789, all five inspectors shared 
jurisdiction over the entire domain. The job of county inspector was to moni-
tor everyone, from the samurai under the county magistrates to peasants in the 
most far-flung villages. According to the regulations established by the domain, 
the county inspectors were responsible for examining the working conditions of 
county magistrates and the local administrator (muradaikan) and the farming and 
living conditions of the peasants. While it may have been possible for them to 
monitor the small number of samurai engaged in village administration, it would 
have been very difficult in practice for five officials to survey and monitor the 
approximately 350,000 peasants in the more than seven hundred villages under 
their jurisdiction.5 The local administrators were the samurai who were closest in 
position to the subjects of the domain. Their numbers decreased over time from 
fifty-four in 1654 to thirty-four in 1676, and finally to twenty-six in 1682. They took 
orders from the county magistrates and were originally responsible for communi-
cating a wide range of messages to the villages, but a decree in 1682 limited their 
role to carrying out the religious inquisition6 and to duties related to the annual 
tribute. These annual tribute duties, however, consisted of drafting measures to 
boost agricultural production, which had been waning since the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, and do not necessarily signify their actual involvement in the 
collection of annual tributes.7
This concludes the description of the organization of the samurai in village 
administration and the changes in their posts, appointments, and official duties. 
Aside from the fact that the positions of county director and county inspector 
were newly created in 1682, there was a clear decrease in the overall number of 
samurai assigned to all of the official positions from county director through local 
administrator. From the end of the seventeenth century until the end of domain 
rule in 1871, no more than forty or so samurai ruled Okayama domain’s 350,000 
peasants and, although village management was ostensibly their primary duty, the 
number of samurai who actually visited villages was fewer still. It is difficult to 
imagine that they managed to fulfill the monitoring and surveying responsibilities 
stipulated in the feudal decrees. However, before it can be concluded that there 
were not enough samurai in village administration, it is necessary to consider how 
their subjects, the peasants, were organized.
The administrative unit of rural areas in early modern Japan was the village, 
and the “Big Three” village officials (murakata sanyaku), consisting of village 
headman (shōya, nanushi), vice headman (toshiyori, kumigashira), and peasants’ 
Samurai, Peasants, Civil Administration    41
representative(goningumi-gashira, hangashira), played leading roles in the admin-
istration. In the Okayama domain, when the rule of the Tokugawa shogunate was 
established in 1603, the Big Three were called shōya (village headman), toshiyori 
(vice headman), and goningumi-gashira (peasants’ representative). In 1689 these 
titles were changed to nanushi, kumi-gashira, and han-gashira.8 The typical proce-
dure was for each village to choose its officials and subsequently obtain the county 
magistrate’s approval for their appointment.
Among the Big Three, the most important role belonged to the village headman, 
who either inherited the post or was voted in by peasants in an election (irefuda).9 
Most villages had one village headman, but some large villages of one thousand 
koku10 or more appointed two. In contrast, some village headman served double 
duty for two smaller villages (five hundred koku or less). The Okayama domain 
encompassed approximately seven hundred villages, so we can estimate that there 
were roughly 750 village headman, based on the proportion of large and small vil-
lages. The duties the village headman fulfilled during the Edo period are enumer-
ated in historical records compiled in Okayama during the Meiji period. They were 
(a) to gather the annual tributes collected from individual peasants, (b) to create 
records about the villages, and (c) to oversee general affairs in the villages. The role 
of vice headman was to assist with these duties. There were usually two vice head-
men appointed to a village so we can estimate that the number of vice headmen 
was approximately fifteen hundred across the entire Okayama domain. Finally, vil-
lages did not have a fixed number of peasants’ representatives; rather, it was stipu-
lated that there should be one peasants’ representative for dozens of households, to 
be determined by an election within the village. The fact that they were elected as 
peasants’ representatives meant that they served as village inspectors in addition 
to participating in village administration under the headman and vice headman.
One of the important duties of these village officials was to collect the annual 
tributes levied on peasants in the village and deliver them to the domain. If a peas-
ant could not pay the annual tribute, it was stipulated that the village would be 
held collectively responsible for payment (Shirakawabe 2010). Evidence for the 
important role that the village officials played in paying these annual tributes to 
the domain is contained in the records they kept. Previous research shows that the 
village officials had to become proficient in the creation of “administrative docu-
ments,” which gave them a strong sense of responsibility toward village admin-
istration (Kurushima 1995). Certainly the historical materials that were passed 
down from the houses of village headmen include many documents about annual 
tributes and substantiate the claim that village officials took the initiative in per-
forming this role. Furthermore, Miyaoi Yasuo, an author who had firsthand expe-
rience as a village headman in the early nineteenth century, wrote in one of his 
books that “village headmen selflessly devote themselves to village administration, 
for which not only the precise calculation of annual tributes, but also the careful 
maintenance of village records” is of utmost importance (Watanabe 1989).
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Above the village officials were the ojōya11 (representative of the village head-
man); five to fifteen ojōya were chosen to represent multiple villages.12 In the 
Okayama domain, sixty-three ojōya were appointed in 1701, with roughly similar 
numbers being appointed after that. Their main duty was to represent their vil-
lages in direct negotiations with samurai; this, in effect, connected villages to the 
administration of the domain.
From this description we can see that some forty or fifty samurai were appointed 
to posts in village administration and that 3,750 village officials13 composed the 
peasants’ side of the administration. These numbers also seem to indicate a declin-
ing trend in the numbers of samurai in charge of civil administration from the 
seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries. The domain’s acceptance of fewer samurai 
in village administration is surely due, at least in part, to the growth of village 
organizations made up of peasants.
The heavy burden assumed by the village headmen and others and the limited 
involvement of the samurai suggest that the samurai could not fully grasp the local 
areas’ administrative issues. The next question that arises is how this impacted the 
collection of annual tribute and the roles of samurai and the peasants in collection.
CADASTR AL SURVEYS AND LO CAL INSPECTIONS  
BY SAMUR AI
The annual tributes collected from peasants, compiled by village officers, and paid 
to feudal lords (the shogunate or domains) were calculated according to data col-
lected in cadastral surveys conducted by the rulers. What roles did the samurai 
and peasants play in carrying out these cadastral surveys?
Land surveys were conducted in many villages under the command of rulers, 
and in the second half of the sixteenth century they were used to calculate annual 
tributes. These surveys began with the Taikō survey, which was actively pursued 
under Hideyoshi Toyotomi’s rule. This was followed by the Tokugawa shogunate’s 
Keichō survey in the first decade of the 1600s, which was nationwide in scale; the 
Kan’ei-Keian survey during the 1630s and 1640s; and the Kanbun-Enpō survey14 
during the 1660s and 1670s, which focused on the shogunate’s territory in Kanto 
and Kinai, to name just a few. In contrast to these surveys, which were carried out 
by the shogunate, domains sometimes conducted surveys themselves within their 
own territories. However, from the end of the seventeenth century until the Meiji 
Restoration, hardly any large-scale surveys were conducted by the shogunate or 
domains.
The process of conducting a survey was as follows: (1) determine the bound-
aries of the village, (2) measure the area of the village’s land according to zones 
defined by usage (e.g., rice field, vegetable field, housing, and so on), (3) assess 
the agricultural yield of each zone based on the fertility of its soil,15 and finally (4) 
identify the owners of the plots of land thus measured and assessed. The names 
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of these individual landowners from whom annual tributes were collected, along 
with the agricultural output assessments, were then documented in a cadaster16 for 
that village. Analyses of land surveys in many historical studies have been based 
on these results, with the assumption that the villages were surveyed by the ruler’s 
vassals (Watanabe 2004). However, surveying all the farmland in Japan required 
extensive manpower and was very expensive; thus, many surveys could be con-
ducted only once. Furthermore, while the domain did send samurai to villages to 
conduct surveys, the work could not have been completed without the help of the 
village headmen, who were familiar with the villages (Watanabe 2008).
From 1640 to 1643, a “General Survey” was carried out across all rural areas 
in the Sendai domain in the Tohoku region17 (Sendai-shi 2001). The survey was 
prompted by, among other factors, the loss of the previous survey books in a fire 
in 1636 in the office where the domain’s administrative records were kept, and 
heavy damage incurred to rural areas by major flooding throughout the domain 
in 1637. The Sendai domain sent 160 samurai in thirty-five groups18 from the castle 
town to villages. Armed with specialized techniques for land measurement and 
assessment, these samurai were tasked with conducting the survey and recording 
their findings. To do so effectively, however, would have required the guidance of 
the village officials, who were knowledgeable about village affairs, as well as the 
participation of peasants, who could help with small tasks. The precise number 
of peasants mobilized for the Kan’ei-era survey is unclear, but their cooperation 
was surely indispensable for a mere 160 samurai to survey one thousand villages 
(Watanabe 1983).
Moreover, the Tokugawa shogunate’s Kanbun-Enpō survey conducted around 
Osaka can serve as a reference for estimating the proportion of samurai and peas-
ants participating in cadastral surveys (Mori 1970). The neighboring domains of 
the shogunate’s territory, who were in charge of the task instead of the shogu-
nate’s officials, sent their vassals to the villages targeted for the survey, and for each 
ten samurai the village enlisted the participation of twenty people, including vil-
lage officials. Conducting cadastral surveys was important not only for the rulers 
(shogunate and domains) to collect annual tributes, but also as recognition of the 
domain’s authority in the villages. In addition, because surveys could not be con-
ducted frequently, they were a rare opportunity for samurai to set foot on peasants’ 
lands. However, in practice, very few samurai were actually dispatched, and thus 
they needed the help of the peasants as a matter of course.
While the collection of annual tributes was based on large-scale cadastral sur-
veys conducted by the shogunate and domains that focused on existing fields, 
there was also an established rule throughout the country stipulating that agricul-
tural land that had been expanded through the development of new fields was also 
to be registered in the cadasters, in a system called takaire. The Hiroshima domain 
in the mid-eighteenth century provides evidence for considering the relationship 
between samurai and peasants in the basic takaire system (Hiroshima-ken 1973).
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Once a newly developed field in a rural area became capable of sustaining pro-
duction that was equally as stable as existing fields,19 the village headman recorded 
its land area and projected yield in what was called a “preliminary inspection 
book” and submitted it to the county magistrate.20 Upon receiving the document, 
the county magistrate would check to see if it followed the correct format, without 
going to inspect the field directly. If he deemed it correct, the county magistrate 
approved the takaire registration of the new field and issued a directive to the vil-
lage headman to pay annual tribute of 50% of its projected yield for the next five 
years. Since the figures written in the preliminary inspection book were, above all, 
estimated yields, the actual yields over its initial five-year tribute-exempt period 
were checked,21 and their average was registered as the official number in tribute-
related documents such as the cadastral. That is the process by which new agricul-
tural land in the Hiroshima domain was registered as official territory: the village 
headman undertook land inspection and documentation from the very beginning, 
whereas the county magistrate (responsible on the domain’s side) merely received 
the document and made decisions based on it without verifying it.
However, the county magistrate and his subordinate samurai did tour the area 
under their jurisdiction every year under a system called junken, which, in the 
Hiroshima domain, was defined as follows. First, every March, the county magis-
trate was to visit the villages under his jurisdiction to verify village affairs firsthand. 
March was chosen (a) to ensure that the peasants were preparing for the upcoming 
rice planting season and (b) to motivate peasants to work hard at farming. The 
magistrate’s subordinate administrators22 were also to conduct village inspections 
at least twice in total over the spring and summer every year. The purpose of the 
administrators’ inspections was to ensure that crops were growing normally. If a 
crop failure was forecasted due to the weather, measures such as tribute abatement 
needed to be taken to adjust for the poor rice harvest in the fall. It was this pre-
dictive ability that was sought in an administrator. All together, there were to be 
three inspections per year in the Hiroshima domain, conducted by samurai in the 
civil administration, and it is probable that other domains generally had a similar 
rule. But did samurai in the Hiroshima domain actually make the rounds they 
were supposed to? Excluding years when there were major natural disasters such 
as droughts and floods, samurai did not visit villages more than once a year or so. 
Rather than inspecting villages themselves, it became the norm for the country 
magistrate and administrators to implement laws relating to the village based on 
reports submitted by village headmen. Even in the case of annual tributes, which 
are of utmost importance in feudal rule, village headmen and other officials col-
lected grain from individual peasants and delivered it to the domain office. The 
county magistrate thus came to depend on the peasants for his work.
From the perspective of cadastral surveys and annual tribute collection, which 
are central issues in rural administration, the preceding analysis of the samurai’s and 
peasants’ roles shows that the role of the samurai was even smaller than previously 
Samurai, Peasants, Civil Administration    45
thought, which leads to the conclusion that their duties were proactively handled by 
the village headmen and other peasants. How, then, did civil administration in rural 
areas come to be dependent on the peasants? The self-reliance of villagers who per-
formed all of the basic work involved in administration has been cited as one reason 
(Kurushima 1995, Watanabe 2010). Village headmen and village officials accumu-
lated knowledge about village management, increased efficiency, particularly in 
duties that had become routine work, and worked toward maintaining good rela-
tions with the feudal rulers.23 Taking into account the structure of organizations in 
the Okayama domain along with the distribution of work between the samurai and 
peasants as described for the Hiroshima domain here, it is apparent that the rulers 
did not need to appoint a great number of people from their side. This leads to the 
next question, what proportion of samurai were involved in civil administration?
THE POSITION OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTR ATION IN 
VASSAL BANDS
The Organizational Structure of the Vassal Band in the  
Hiroshima Domain
The average percentage of the population holding the rank of samurai is estimated 
at about 6% nationwide, though there were domains with higher percentages, such 
as Sendai with 23% (Morris 2009). In the Hiroshima domain, there was a total 
population of approximately 910,000 in 1869 as the domain system was approach-
ing its end, just over fifty-six thousand were samurai.24 That puts the percentage 
of samurai in the total population at 6.2%, roughly on par with the national aver-
age (Hiroshima-ken 1984). Though these numbers cannot be precisely verified 
because of the nature of available statistics, there was a vassal band in the second 
half of the eighteenth century predominantly comprising about four thousand 
close attendants25 to the ruler.
The organizational structure of the vassal band in the Hiroshima domain is 
shown in figure 3, along with the respective numbers of samurai who held each 
post in 1753 and 1862. These numbers should be understood to represent the upper 
echelon,26 those who were superior in rank to the ruler’s aforementioned four 
thousand close attendants. At the very top was the ruler (daimyō), and directly 
under him were the chief vassals: elders (karō), chief directors (toshiyori), and 
chief inspectors (ōmetsuke), in that order. Second in command to the ruler, the 
elders oversaw the domain administration and vassal band. Next in line, the chief 
directors’ role was to take directives from the elders and issue instructions accord-
ingly to the specialized departments, whose roles are described later. Finally, the 
chief inspectors, despite their title, composed the remainder of the core of the 
domain administration along with the elders and chief directors. There were no 
great changes in the numbers of these chief vassals between 1753 and 1862 except 
for the chief inspectors, whose numbers increased.
46    Chapter 3
Under the chief vassals were five specialized departments: (1) “steward of the 
ruler,” which dealt with various tasks on behalf of the ruler; (2) “security and military 
affairs,” the department that defended the castle and the territory; (3) “local rule,” 
the samurai engaged in the work of governing towns and villages as government 
officials; (4) “commissioner of finance,” the department that dealt with fiscal issues, 
comparable to present-day financial departments; and finally (5) “others,” including 
samurai who lived in Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka permanently as government officials.27
The numbers under each section denote the numbers of samurai included 
therein. Let us consider the changing pattern of these numbers. In 1753, 304 out 
of four thousand samurai held posts of elder or below. Then in 1862 the num-
ber of samurai holding official posts, which had remained steady at around three 
hundred for over a century, skyrocketed. This was because, during the nineteenth 
century, each domain attempted to expand its army to face the international crisis 
in Japan. As table 3 indicates, this entailed the near-quadrupling of those attached 
to the Office of the Ruler and a threefold increase in the section charged with 
security and military affairs. However, the numbers of samurai in the other three 
departments remained the same, suggesting that the ruler was actively looking to 
strengthen the military and augment his staff of close attendants.
An analysis of the “public office work” conducted in 1862 found that a total of 
268 people were employed as close attendants, forty-five worked for the commis-
sioner of finance, and thirty-two were in civil administration. These close atten-
dants served the domain ruler and his family, and performed everyday chores. 
They also included doctors who provided medical treatment to the ruler. The 
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Chief director
(Toshiyori)
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Figure 3. Hiroshima Organizational Formation of 1753 and 1862
Source: Hiroshima-ken 1984.
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote the change from 1753 to 1862.
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production of wood, paper, iron, and salt. It also managed finances for merchants 
and peasants. Civil administrators assessed annual tribute collections and imple-
mented related laws in the villages.
What can be inferred from these numbers? First, the domain ruler had an over-
whelming number of close attendants, whereas there were only a small number 
of employees in the offices of commissioner of finance and local rule. In addition, 
because of the sankin-kōtai system, it had become the ruler’s duty to live in his 
Hiroshima castle and the Edo capital each for two years at a time. Therefore, there 
must have also been a large number of people accompanying the ruler who also 
had to go back and forth between Hiroshima and Edo. The retirement of a ruler 
presents another point to consider. When passing the position of ruler down to a 
successor, the retiring ruler typically built himself a retirement mansion. However, 
after the mansion had been built, close attendants would be employed to serve the 
retired ruler, creating a situation where there were effectively not only “two rulers” 
but also a dual structure in personnel and funding.
This concludes the discussion of the characteristics of the vassal band in the 
Hiroshima domain. Though the numbers of samurai appointed to posts in 1753 
and 1862 were influenced by historical circumstances, the structure of the vassal 
band indicates an emphasis on roles for serving the ruler and his family, followed 
by posts relating to the military, especially in accordance with the situation near 
the end of the Edo period. In contrast, the proportion of those who were involved 
in civil administration was rather small.
The Proportion of Samurai in Civil Administration Relative  
to the Rural Population
Let us consider the civil administration from another angle. Table 3 contains 
information about four of the Hiroshima domain’s seventeen counties in 1715, 
beginning with agricultural output, the numbers of villages and households, and 
their overall population. The middle columns of the table show the number of 
town magistrates or county magistrates engaged in administrative work in each 
county, as well as the number of local administrators,28 who were burdened with 
substantial work. In total, the Hiroshima domain had twenty-seven county magis-
trates and town magistrates, and seventy-five local administrators who performed 
actual local administration duties. According to the “local rule” section of figure 3, 
there were twenty-eight county magistrates and town magistrates in 1753, so their 
numbers hardly changed from 1715. There were also seventy-five subordinates to 
the local rule division, though they are not indicated in figure 3. Area 1, “Villages 
around Hiroshima,” refers to the villages in the direct vicinity of the castle town 
(Jōka-machi) of Hiroshima. There were seventeen such villages, containing a total 
of 893 households and a total population of approximately ten thousand.29 Unlike 
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it was under the jurisdiction of the town magistrate, who was in charge of the 
castle town. The three local administrators were thus under the town magistrate’s 
command. The final two columns of table 3 show the population of each county 
per magistrate and per administrator, which was fifty-four hundred and thirty-six 
hundred, respectively, for area 1. Area 2 was the smallest in scale of all the counties; 
areas 3 and 4 were the largest.
Let us look at Toyota County (area 4) as an example. This county was about 
fifty-six thousand koku in size and contained eighty-five villages, eighteen thou-
sand households, and fifty-five thousand people. Two county magistrates and 
seven local administrators were responsible for its governance. The tendency for 
this county and all of the others was to have a fixed number of two county magis-
trates and to adjust the number of local administrators according to the number 
of villages and the population. By comparing these numbers with the population, 
it can be concluded that each county magistrate had to administer a rural popu-
lation of 28,000, and each local administrator administered 8,000. The averages 
across the entire domain were 18,500 people per town or county magistrate and 
6,650 people per local administrator.
These numbers indicate that in the Hiroshima domain, a small number of gov-
ernment officials were engaged in civil administration. In fact, five hundred thou-
sand people were administered by just one hundred samurai, a proportion that 
would have made it difficult for those samurai to grasp the overall conditions of 
village communities. Such numbers further suggest, as I have argued in this chap-
ter, how few samurai there were engaged in civil administration.
The County Magistrate’s Duties
Having established the small number of samurai appointed to the civil administra-
tion, it is now time to address the question: What work did they actually have to 
do? To answer this, let us take a look at the mid-nineteenth-century work journal 
of a county magistrate of the Kurume domain,30 which was located in Kyushu. The 
Kurume domain was ruled by the House of Arima, which occupied an area of two 
hundred thousand koku, and contained a population of about 250,000 people in 
550 villages (Nishimura 1980). This work journal, which belonged to the county 
magistrate of Mizuma County31 in the Kurume domain, provides insight into 
his work. The journal begins with the names of eleven samurai who served as 
secretaries, treasurers, and village administrators32 before moving on to work-
related entries. According to the entries made by the county magistrate, he would 
hold meetings every winter with relevant subordinates to verify annual tribute 
collections and also meet with the village headmen’s representatives. However, 
the journal does not contain detailed information about the collection of annual 
 tributes, and while there is special mention of matters related to delayed payments 
of annual tribute to the ruler, this was limited to a minority of villages. This is 
probably because there was no need to write anything about prompt payments. 
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The entries corresponding to visits from the village headmen’s representatives are 
also exceedingly short, which gives the impression that they were more of a for-
mality than a forum for the discussion of actual business.
Other than tribute-related items, there are many entries about (a) public order, 
the police, and lawsuits; and (b) participation in the ruler’s formalities. The police 
mentioned in the (a) entries were a part of the civil administration and, needless 
to say, persons whose duty was indispensable for the safety of society. However, 
an independent police force served a large part of the Kurume domain, and 
within the villages there were also neighborhood watch–style groups headed by 
village headmen’s representatives, which meant that the county magistrate did not 
necessarily oversee everything. Rather than general police functions, it may be 
more accurate to say that it was special investigations for which the police force in 
the (a) entries was responsible. In particular, special mention in the journal was 
given to the discovery and control of gambling, which was a prohibited activity 
and punishable offense at the time. Suspects were arrested by the subordinates 
of the county magistrate, who intervened on behalf of the local community. 
With the possibility that nonsamurai investigators (who were subordinate to the 
village headmen’s representatives) would be partial to the suspects, it made sense 
for prosecutors to pursue a fair investigation by the county magistrate. Religious 
rites for the ruler and his ancestors and visits to Buddhist temples (item [b]) were 
also among the country magistrate’s important duties. The county magistrate was 
also in charge of matters like public declarations of filial piety, which were carried 
out in domains across Japan during this time.
THE DUTIES OF THE  
SHO GUNATE’S  CHIEF ADMINISTR ATORS
As suggested by the aforementioned numbers and roles of samurai appointed to 
organizations on the ruler’s side, vassals were relatively unconcerned with civil 
administration. This section will discuss the activities of officials in the bakuryō, 
or lands under direct control of the Tokugawa shogunate, with the intention of 
comparing them to those of the domains discussed earlier.
There were pockets of bakuryō all over the country, with about forty of the 
shogunate’s officials (hatamoto) appointed as chief administrators (bakufu dai-
kan),33 who held de facto positions as leaders of their respective regions. These 
chief administrators were similar in stature to feudal lords, presiding over areas 
roughly equal in scale to those of minor daimyo; however, like the county directors 
and county magistrates of domains, they were also responsible for work related to 
civil administration.
Bakuryō in Kanto were presided over by chief administrators called Kanto dai-
kan, whose office was established in Edo. Previous research on Kanto daikan has 
shown that they reported to work at this office more than three hundred days per 
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year (Nishizawa 2004). This number varied in subsequent generations; there even 
appears to have been one instance where they reported to work in Edo 340 days 
out of the year. While such working conditions would seem to be rather cruel at 
first glance, normal working hours were from 10:00 am to 2:00 pm, and sometimes 
they only had to work for two hours in the morning. It is supposed that their “desk 
work” consisted of duties such as communicating the shogunate’s directives to the 
villages they governed, examining the reports received from villages, and offering 
judgments on individual court cases (Murakami 1970). However, judging by their 
working arrangement, it is difficult to imagine that their workload was very exten-
sive; rather, it must have been quite light, at least most of the time.
The administrators of Nakano in Shinano province presided over one hundred 
villages in the bakuryō around their regional office (Nishizawa 2004). One might 
expect them to have worked and looked after their subjects from the regional 
office in Nakano, the local center of power.34 However, in Nakano, subordinates 
were stationed at the regional office; the administrators themselves lived in Edo.35 
The extent of their visits to Nakano and the villages they governed was once a year 
in the fall—a mere twenty days’ trip, of which ten were dedicated to village inspec-
tions. Though the goal of these trips was ostensibly the on-site verification of rice 
harvests, the mere fact of visiting as many as one hundred villages suggests that the 
administrators could not have conducted sufficient inspections. Ultimately their 
visits were nothing more than a formality.
The Career of  Itaro Hayashi
Born in 1806 to the family of an official for the shogunate, Itaro Hayashi aspired 
to be a scholar (Murakami 1970, Yasuda 2009). Although Hayashi did become 
a scholar, he subsequently served as a chief administrator in many areas. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate often appointed 
scholars to the post of chief administrator; other than Hayashi, however, nearly 
all of them resigned within the first year.36 In that regard, Hayashi was a rare 
 individual who left the scholarly world and would go on to hold various positions 
in civil administration.
From 1858 to 1862, Hayashi was appointed as a local administrator for 
Shibahashi in Dewa Province (the northeast region of Japan called Tohoku, ten 
days on foot from Edo), where he presided over a bakuryō encompassing one 
hundred villages. The regional office was in Shibahashi, but only a few of his sub-
ordinates were stationed there. Meanwhile, Hayashi worked from his residence 
in Edo, which he himself owned. He visited the area he governed for about two 
weeks each year, which means that he was in Edo for the remaining 350 days. Of 
course, it would have been impossible for Hayashi to complete one year’s work in 
two weeks and oversee all of the villages that he managed. In view of this fact, the 
local administrators worked as direct managers under his supervision. The num-
ber of local administrators who held a post in Shibahashi is uncertain; however, in 
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Nakaizumi, where Hayashi began a new assignment,37 there were initially twenty-
six local administrators in 1853, and this number dropped to seventeen in 1858. 
In any event, what kind of work did the feudal lord’s administrative organization 
do, with only twenty samurai for an area where tens of thousands of people lived? 
Hayashi recorded daily events, which included the activities being conducted in 
Shibahashi at the time.38 His journal contains an enormous amount of informa-
tion, but evidence of interaction with commoners and detailed entries about the 
civil administration are rare.
Many of his office hours were spent creating and signing documents and mak-
ing plans, with almost no activities involving positive interventions in village com-
munities. However, inspecting the Shibahashi regional office over a period of two 
weeks seemed to be a hard schedule. He was accompanied by a subordinate and 
finished the inspection of a village on the first day. This indicates that the chief 
administrator’s visit was just a formality—an item to be checked off the list with-
out involving the actual work of inspecting the village. Moreover, while Hayashi 
was staying in Shibahashi, he also observed how a copper mine in the area under 
the shogunate’s jurisdiction was being developed and managed; he subsequently 
developed that mining project further. Although there are entries about mat-
ters other than the development of the copper mine, there are few indications 
that he had developed innovative policies. He tackled a lawsuit and satisfacto-
rily addressed an incident that occurred in the copper mine project. On the other 
hand, Hayashi hardly mentioned management of the village, and neither did his 
subordinate. This suggests that local administrators tasked peasants with man-
agement of the village, which was probably because annual tribute collection and 
other duties did not entail much work.
Hayashi’s record of his daily activities adds two additional points to what we 
have learned about local administration from early examples. First, the local offi-
cer did not always reside in his administrative area. Hayashi performed on-site 
inspections only once a year; it is uncertain whether he actually fulfilled his duties 
as a member of the civil administration in the area he governed. Second, local offi-
cers had very few subordinates. In one example, there were twenty subordinates, 
and in another case, only ten people worked for one local officer. This was thought 
to be a small number, and it is surprising that a single officer could administer one 
hundred villages containing tens of thousands of people.
The smooth functioning of the civil administration in early modern Japan required 
the active participation of the peasants, particularly the village officials. Indeed, the 
peasants’ contribution to local administration is a distinctive  characteristic of the 
society during this period. On the other hand, the suzerain authority’s limited 
employment of samurai in the civil administration clearly indicates that they did 
not assign it much importance. One could also argue that they had created a very 
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effective system for local administration, incorporating commoners that worked 
very efficiently, so they did not need to employ more samurai. Furthermore, 
the few samurai who did hold posts in the civil administration were not deeply 
involved with the villages they ruled and rarely even visited them. The level of rul-
ers’ involvement in the human side of local governance was therefore extremely 
low with respect to their provision of public goods.
This chapter looked at the specific relationship between rulers and villages with 
regard to the staffing of the civil administration. Earlier research has shown that 
rural governance functioned smoothly with the help of peasants (muraukesei),39 
but there has been little study of the staffing of administrative organizations.
As is evident from the appointment and roles of samurai in the Okayama and 
Hiroshima domains, not only did domains allocate only a small number of samu-
rai to civil administration, but the samurai who were employed in that capacity did 
not live in the regions they ruled, severely limiting their opportunities to exercise 
their role as inspectors. It is not at all surprising, then, that such a state of affairs 
led to the active participation of a comparatively large number of village officials in 
civil administration. This is illustrated by the fact that the most salient tasks in the 
relationship between feudal lords and their subjects—conducting cadastral sur-
veys and determining and collecting annual tributes—depended on the peasants. 
Moreover, in addition to the small proportion of samurai in civil administration 
compared to both vassal bands and the rural population, the civil administration’s 
reliance on villages was also prompted by the rather light workloads of individual 
samurai.
Another major finding of this analysis, and one that may be regarded as another 
characteristic of early modern Japanese society, is the fact that peasants, who had 
to pay annual tributes, were not compensated by the load as employees.
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Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo.
NOTES
1. For the details of annual tribute, see chapter 2 of this volume, by Masayuki Tanimoto.
2. The reforms of 1682 established the structure of village administration in the Okayama domain, 
which encompassed, for the most part, posts and hierarchy that were inherited by subsequent admin-
istrations (Taniguchi 1964).
3. These inspections were intended to inform subjects about ways to promote agricultural growth 
and to improve habits and customs.
4. The norm was for villages to nominate village officials and inform the county magistrate of the 
nominees, whom the magistrate would then appoint.
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5. There are data to indicate that there were 721 villages in 1868 and that the rural population of the 
domain was 366,867 in 1721 and 346,866 in 1834 (Kanai 1953).
6. This religious inquisition, the Shūmon aratame, was the Edo shogunate’s measure to ban Chris-
tianity and expose adherents. Families and individuals were asked about their religious affiliation (Bud-
dhist sect) and had to prove that they were registered with a Buddhist temple. This information was 
recorded in the administrative documents.
7. Taniguchi (1964) states that local administrators treated the collection of tributes as their job, 
citing the “persuasion” of villages with declining production. However, it is unclear whether they actu-
ally collected the tributes.
8. The official titles of the Big Three varied from region to region and were sometimes changed over 
time, as in the case of the Okayama domain. In general, village headmen were called shōya, nanushi, or 
kimoiri; vice headmen were called toshiyori or kumigashira, and the peasants’ representative was called 
hyakushōdai. Nevertheless, their respective job duties remained largely the same regardless of their title.
9. These two paths to assuming the post—by inheritance or by irefuda election—were the same in 
other domains as well. The vice headman could also be chosen by nomination of the village headman, 
in addition to either of those two methods.
10. For details of the koku, see the short introduction to part 1.
11. The village headmen’s representative was called ojōya in the Okayama domain, but in other 
domains, other titles such as ōkimori and warimoto were used.
12. Organizations of multiple villages were called kumi or kumiai.
13. The village headmen’s representative was chosen from among the village headmen.
14. Surveys of lands belonging to the shogunate were usually conducted by officials from the sho-
gunate, but for the Kanbun-Enpō survey, neighboring domains were put in charge in order to prevent 
fraud by officials from the shogunate and by the peasants under its rule (Mori 1970).
15. Surveyors measured the land’s productivity and ranked each zone. In the beginning, there were 
three levels: high, medium, and low.
16. Cadasters were land registers upon which the collection of tributes was based. Each cadaster 
was created in duplicate; the original was kept by the feudal lord, and the copy was issued to the village 
(Kanzaki 1983).
17. This Kan’ei survey was the only time that the Sendai domain carried out its own cadastral survey 
across the lands under its jurisdiction.
18. Each group consisted of four samurai.
19. In general, newly developed fields were exempt from consideration in the collection of tributes 
for the first five years.
20. This corresponds to the Okayama domain’s county magistrate.
21. It is unclear how the actual yields were determined, but there is no evidence that the county 
magistrate or other samurai were actively involved.
22. This corresponds to the Okayama domain’s local administrators.
23. Popular movements such as peasant uprisings and village riots raised the caliber of officials 
(Kurushima 1995).
24. This figure includes the ruler’s close attendants (his direct servants), rear vassals (their ser-
vants), servants of samurai households, and their families.
25. The number of close attendants was 385 in 1619, but subsequently increased (Doi 2015).
26. Their actual numbers for each section are unclear, but it is assumed that samurai were em-
ployed in proportion to the number of official posts.
27. The Hiroshima domain built residences in Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka, in which some samurai were 
stationed permanently.
28. These are the same posts as county magistrate and local administrator.
29. All of the numbers for area 1 pertain only to the villages around the castle town. For reference, 
the population of the castle town itself was about thirty thousand.
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30. Arimake Monjo n.d.
31. Mizuma County contained 130 villages and had a population of about fifty thousand.
32. These correspond to the local administrators. The county was divided into four regions, each 
governed by one administrator.
33. Chief administrators had greater authority than officials in the domain administration and 
often governed lands of between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand thousand koku. Some 
samurai inherited this post, whereas others were appointed by the domain and transferred to different 
regions, with the proportion of the latter increasing after the eighteenth century (Murakami 1970).
34. Regionally based chief administrators lived in buildings that housed both their private resi-
dences and the regional office.
35. Chief administrators had subordinates called tetsuki and tedai, of whom administrators gener-
ally had about twenty in total (Yasuda 2009).
36. There were many reasons, but ultimately, they were not cut out for politics, and it appears that 
the shogunate asked them to resign.
37. Prior to his appointment as an administrator for Shibahashi, Hayashi was an administrator for 
Nakaizumi in Tōtōmi province.
38. Yasuda 2003.
39. For details of the muraukesei, see the short introduction to part 1.
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Who did provide the public goods and how did they do so in the early mod-
ern Japan? This volume emphasizes on the role of “local notables”—comprising 
wealthy farmers, land owners, brewers, and local merchants who emerged from 
hyakushō (peasant) status, residing outside of the castle towns. Some recent 
research and other chapters in part 1 revealed that such local notables often played 
a greater role in the provision of local public goods in the late Tokugawa era than 
had previously been the case (Kikuchi 2003, Yoshimura 2013). However, it is not 
yet clear how they established a resource for financing the public goods. Although 
they had achieved authority in civil administration, it was not always accompa-
nied by a corresponding transfer of revenues from feudal lords. The creation of a 
new financial basis for the provision of local public goods seemingly became an 
important problem for them. This chapter shows a pattern on how they created 
financial basis for the public goods provision based on a micro case study.
This chapter focuses on the outsourcing of the lord’s finance and investi-
gates how local notables changed the lord’s finance, which was not able to satisfy 
demands for the public goods, and utilized it as the financial basis for the pub-
lic goods provision. In the late Tokugawa era, rural economy based on market-
oriented agriculture and proto-industry developed dramatically compared to 
urban economy, and new economic surpluses were formed and accumulated in 
the countryside (Shinbo and Saitō 1989). For example, it is known that the popula-
tion of castle towns including Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto was stagnant or declining, 
whereas that of villages and country towns was increasing from the late eighteenth 
century to the nineteenth century (Smith 1989). However, feudal lords were unable 
to completely capture the benefits of those new surpluses under the annual tribute 
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(nengu) system.1 Consequently, most of feudal lords suffered fiscal deficits and fell 
into fiscal crisis (Tsuchiya 1927), and so more and more lords entrusted their fiscal 
management to local notables who lived in their domain and increased the man-
agement ability or fund-raising capability starting in the late eighteenth century.
On the other hand, similar tasks of fiscal management were also outsourced to 
wealthy financial merchants—such as rice brokers and money changers—in the 
castle towns, especially Osaka and Edo, where were the financial center of Japan 
(Mori 1970). We should focus on a difference between fiscal management by local 
notables in the countryside and that by wealthy financial merchants in the Osaka 
and Edo. The wealthy financial merchants, who weren’t domain inhabitants, took 
on the fiscal management as a profit-seeking business, but the local notables could 
not pursue only self-profit. They, who were domain inhabitants, tribute-payers, and 
local administrators, had a direct responsibility to sustain the other domain inhab-
itants and regional society and worked as substitutes for their lords. Therefore, 
such outsourcing to the local notables changed the fiscal system into something 
more beneficial to local inhabitants than that to the wealthy financial merchants.
How did the local notables change the fiscal system by intervening in their 
lords’ finance? To whom did the change become beneficial in the relationships 
between the lord, wealthy merchants in the castle towns, and local inhabitants in 
the countryside? Focusing on these questions, this chapter clarifies that local nota-
bles converted the lord’s finance into the financial basis for public goods provision.
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
Lord Tsuda
This chapter deals with a case of the outsourced lord’s finance by focusing on the 
case of the hatamoto Tsuda clan. The reason for using this case is that we can 
overview the lord’s finance overall based on the historical materials. Although it is 
not easy to overview the overall fiscal management in the lord’s finance because of 
lack of historical materials, in this case it is fortunately possible due to abundant 
historical materials.
Hatamoto, like the daimyō, was also the domain lords who were direct vassals 
of the Tokugawa shogun. The dividing line between the hatamoto and the daimyō 
was the scale of the territory (income level), such as ten thousand koku.2 Hatamoto 
was one type of feudal lord in the Tokugawa era, despite the domain’s relatively 
small size of ten thousand koku. From a standpoint of domain inhabitants, there 
was no precise difference in governance between the hatamoto and the daimyō, 
but hatamoto didn’t have alternate attendance (sankin-kōtai) duties like the daimyō 
and they lived in the shogunal capital, Edo all the time.
Even among the hatamoto, the Tsuda clan had a relatively large domain and 
notably high number of retainers. As of 1842, Tsuda clan ruled over fourteen 
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villages, assessed at about 6,614 koku, in the Kantou region near Edo.3 The Tsuda 
clan held as many as ninety-six retainers and two residences at Edo.4 They always 
lived in the Edo clan residence and ruled the domain without putting in local offi-
cials or a provincial office. Then, they only dispatched their vassals to their domain 
if necessary, and much of local administration was entrusted to the village head-
men of their domain in general.
Key Players
Merchants or village headmen in Sawara village of Tsuda domain, Shimousa 
province, played a key role in the outsourcing of fiscal management. Sawara was 
legally designated as a village throughout the Tokugawa era; however, Sawara was 
a famous country town in which many merchants and wealthy people resided.5 Its 
economy grew significantly late in that period, when it capitalized on its sake and 
soy sauce brewing industries and its position as a port city on the lower Tone River, 
and thus became an urbanized commercial hub (Ishii and Uno 2000).
In this chapter, we will deal with the three types of key players in outsourcing 
fiscal management, (1) the chief manager, (2) the treasurer, (3) a syndicate group. 
(1) The chief manager (makanai-yaku) bore fiscal management responsibilities 
and held the authority to make decisions about anything concerning the out-
sourcing of fiscal management duties. The post was held by two men—namely, 
Hidekata Seimiya and Kageharu Inō. The Seimiya and Inō families were prominent 
 merchants in Sawara and served as Sawara village headmen during the Tokugawa 
era. Under these two men, (2) the treasurer (makanai-tōban), a position held by 
two Sawara merchants, held all cash and was in charge of accounts. In addition, 
(3) a syndicate group (goyōtashi) comprising approximately ten Sawara merchants 
provided the working capital needed to run the finance apparatus. They were the 
wealthiest merchants in Sawara.6
Other Activities of the Chief Managers
Among key players, the chief managers, Hidekata and Kageharu, had the initiative 
and played the most important role. What kind of the social and economic activi-
ties other than those of fiscal management did they do? Both the Seimiya and Inō 
families were distinguished, longtime inhabitants of Sawara. Their children and 
grandchildren had been since the Meiji period among the area’s renowned local 
notables, serving as mayors of Sawara and as members of the Chiba Prefectural 
Assembly. Both Hidekata and Kageharu lost their fathers when they were children; 
at tender ages they both became managing heads of their family businesses, and 
through their stewardship they reversed the waning fortunes of their respective 
houses. As managers, they succeeded in growing their family wealth. They also 
served as headmen of the Sawara village administration, where they worked hard 
on behalf of the local government.
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As a scholar of history and geography, Hidekata left behind numerous works of 
his own authorship, and so subsequent generations do indeed recognize his name; 
however, few know about his work in the government as the headman of village 
administration during the Tokugawa era. After the Meiji Restoration, he was in 
charge of implementing land tax reforms in Sawara. It is also known that he went 
on to establish the financial administration of the new greater Sawara area, after it 
absorbed the surrounding villages. In addition, he oversaw the construction and 
improvement of roads connecting Sawara to the surrounding regions and fun-
neled much of his own money into these projects.7 Furthermore, he made gener-
ous donations to the construction of the new district office and police station. 
He adapted well to the demands of local government in post–Meiji Restoration 
society.
As for Kageharu, during the Tenpo Famine of 1836, he provided food relief each 
morning to some two hundred impoverished people and conducted other relief 
activities.8 In 1861, a group of mutineers (roushi) from the Mito domain partici-
pated in an armed uprising in support of a campaign to revere the emperor and 
expel foreigners (the sonnō-jōi campaign). They murdered merchants in Sawara 
and demanded a large sum of money to finance their military efforts. Together 
with Hidekata, Kageharu negotiated with the mutineers while simultaneously 
petitioning the feudal lord to send retainers for their protection. He succeeded 
in resolving the problem and maintaining peace by taking defense measures on 
his own initiative, including the purchase of rifles. In his final years, his most sig-
nificant achievement was the flood control work he undertook on the Tone River. 
Flooding was a serious and widespread problem for Sawara and its surrounding 
area. The river project expenses disbursed from the new external fund were used 
by Kageharu to conduct part of this flood control project.9 The roles and func-
tions that the internal reserved fund and the new external fund performed for 
the region were as an embodiment of the actions and initiative of Hidekata and 
Kageharu, who worked not only as chief managers, but also as merchants, domain 
inhabitants, and local notables.
CHANGES GENER ATED IN THE OUT SOURCED  
LORD’S  FINANCE
The outsourcing of fiscal management took place over a twenty-three-year period, 
from 1842 until the Tsuda family ceased to rule Sawara, in August 1864; the out-
sourcing of fiscal management was generally implemented as a reform measure to 
address financial crisis, and this was also true in the case of its implementation in 
Lord Tsuda’s finance. In starting, the lord and the chief managers exchanged the 
contract. The contract stipulated that the chief managers were given complete dis-
cretion over where and how the annual tribute rice was sold, and how expenditures 
were disbursed in return for supplying a designated sum of money (goyōdate-kin) 
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to the lord’s residence in Edo.10 In many cases, they sold the collected annual trib-
ute rice for bidding in Sawara.11
In this outsourcing of fiscal management, the chief managers made Lord 
Tsuda’s finance more beneficial to local inhabitants in the domain than their lord 
or merchants in the castle town, Edo. The chief managers’ strategy for giving prior-
ity to local interests was based on four measures: (1) reduction in the lord’s house-
hold expenses, (2) charging the “interest” only to lord’s household expenses, (3) 
prior repayments to intradomain creditors, (4) the creation of an internal reserved 
fund.12 Let us turn to an examination of each of these measures.
Reduction in the Lord’s Household Expenses
The chief managers succeeded in reducing expenditure by more than 10% by 
cutting the lord’s household expenses. Initially, they began to survey the fiscal 
health of the clan and domain and to plan in a detailed manner how to reduce its 
annual expenditures. The chief managers then investigated the amounts of annual 
income (annual tribute) from the previous twenty years and estimated standard 
annual revenues as about 1,931 ryō after considering changes in the rice price rate.13 
On the other hand, the chief managers lowered the salaries paid to retainers, 
maids, and servants working in Edo residences.14 More importantly, following 
close inspection of the lord’s daily life, he compelled the lord to accept changes 
that would lead to reductions in his living expenses. To achieve the objective of 
lowering annual expenditures, for example, the chief managers made the following 
demands of his lord.15
 1.  Anywhere the lord travels for the next three years must be by horse, and not 
by palanquin.
 2.  The lord, his family, retainer, and even his maids and servants must be 
dressed in low-priced clothes made of cotton.
 3. The lord must take no more than fifteen baths per month.
 4. Daily shopping is prohibited.
 5.  The sumptuous New Year’s dinner must be served for no more than three 
days.
 6.  Firewood and charcoal must not be purchased in quantities exceeding those 
dictated by regulations.
 7. One horse must be abandoned.
 8. The lord and his family must live together on a single residence.
 9.  When a living residence can be sold at a high price, the lord must move to 
another residence, even if doing so is inconvenient.
By enacting these changes, the chief managers succeeded in reducing the lord’s 
household expense by two hundred ryō, an amount equivalent to 10% of total 
annual expenditures (2,020 ryō). Consequently, they could estimate the standard 
annual expenditure as 1,820 ryō and generate fiscal surplus.
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Charging the “Interest” Only to the Lord’s Household Expenses
The chief managers separated lord’s household expenses from domain adminis-
trative expenses, and seemed to treat the former as an unfavorable expense and 
the latter as a favorable one. This is because they consistently added a 10% extra 
charge, called “interest” (rigin), only to lord’s household expenses in spite of not 
doing so to the domain administrative expense. In other words, they deducted 
about 10% from the lord’s household expense.
What is “interest”? Why was it added? “Interest” was consistently recorded 
in tandem with the lord’s household expense in the budget, account statement, 
and account book. For example, on April 2, 1855, the chief managers paid and 
remitted thirty ryō to the lord in Edo. In the account book, thirty ryō and forty-
five monme (equivalent to 0.75 ryō) were accounted as the lord’s household 
expense for October and the three months’ worth of “interest”. It is thought that 
“three months” refers to the time period extending until the December 31 fiscal 
year end.
The reason why the “interest” was added is that the lord’s household expense 
was advanced to the lord before the annual tribute income came in. The lord’s 
household expense was paid every month, but annual tribute income was received 
only between October and the following March. This time lag was covered by 
short-term debts from the syndicate group and so on. Strictly speaking, the chief 
managers borrowed the money needed for the lord’s household expense to remit 
it to the lord and repaid it with “interest” after annual tribute income came in. It 
is thought that the “interest” was charged because it was the cost of financing the 
lord’s household expense.
However, it should be noted that no such “interest” was added to the domain 
administrative expenses when the expenses were made in the same way prior to 
the fiscal year end. For example, in the account book, 1.0625 ryō was recorded on 
April 24, 1855, as the expense for planting the seedling needed to maintain the for-
est in the domain, but no interest was charged on this expense.
Why did such a difference arise between household expenses and administra-
tive expenses? Unfortunately, the chief managers did not tell us the reason directly, 
but we need to consider for whom these expenses were used. The lord’s house-
hold expense on which the interest was charged was used primarily to maintain 
the lord’s daily life at the Edo residence—something that would not have been 
considered a domain administrative expense. The details of the lord’s household 
expense could be revealed by the estimate of the standard expenditure, which 
the chief managers made at the beginning of the outsourcing. According to the 
estimate, of the standard expenditure of 1,820 ryō, salary wage paid to retainers, 
maids, and servants accounted for 35.2%, gifts or party expenses for 9.2%, and 
clothing, food, and other living expenses for 55.4%.16 These were a cost needed for 
the lord, his family, retainers, maids, and servants, not for the domain inhabitants. 
Now, we should turn our attention to the sense of interest. In general, interest is 
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something that occurs when different economic agents share a lending relation-
ship.17 Therefore, the existence of an extra charge called “interest” indicates that 
the chief manager separated the lord’s household from civil administration and 
considered the former as a domain outsider (external affair).
Prior Repayments to Intradomain Creditors
The chief managers strove to cut expenditures related to the lord’s household, 
while at the same time actively repaying and greatly reducing the debt load. It is 
noteworthy that they paid off debts to intradomain creditors first, to others later. 
To understand the scale and trends of the long-term debt obligations that the 
Tsuda clan faced, see figure 4, which shows its total outstanding debt as of 1852: 
it amounted to 7,009 ryō. As its annual income in 1854 was approximately 2,000 
ryō, this means that the long-term debt in 1852 was about 3.7 times greater than its 
annual income. However, in 1864, its total outstanding debt was reduced by half, 
to 3,794 ryō—an amount roughly 1.4 times greater than the annual income. We can 
see clearly that the chief managers’ handling of finances resulted in a consistent 
decline in long-term debt.
However, in examining the pattern of debt reduction by region, one can see 
that these debts were not uniformly reduced. The historical source for figure 4 is 
a document written by the chief managers themselves, and it classifies the debt 
obligations as intradomain (Sawara and Izu)18 or extradomain (Edo). Of these, 
debt owed to villages that are intradomain, aside from an increase of about 639 ryō 
in 1857, consistently declined as well. With average annual repayments of approxi-
mately 170 ryō over thirteen years, as shown in figure 4, by 1864, the size of the debt 
shrank to one-fourth of the initial outstanding long-term debt.
In contrast, debts owed that are extradomain were repaid at a rate of 50 ryō 
per year. Allowing for increased borrowing due to new loans in 1853, 1854, and 
1856, this repayment rate is lower than that at which debt owed to areas within the 
domain were paid back. Furthermore, although old debts can be considered very 
long-term debt, they were frequently amalgamated with the debt owed to creditors 
in Edo. It is therefore estimated that the majority of debt was owed, in regional 
terms, to the extradomain. Accordingly, when such old debts are factored in, the 
subordinate status of the debt to the extradomain in relationship to that owed to 
others becomes even more prominent. In examining the trends in outstanding 
long-term debt, one can surmise that the chief managers prioritized the repay-
ment of debt owed to intradomain creditors over that of debt owed to extradomain 
creditors.
The Creation of an Internal Reserved Fund
The chief managers allocated fiscal surplus not only to debt repayment, but also 
to creating a fund separate from a general account. This, referred to as Betsukado 
Tsumioki-kin, was the internal reserved fund (IRF) formed by depositing the 
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fiscal surplus, and kept and managed by the chief managers. This IRF had two 
roles: (a) lender who provided working capital needed to finance the lord’s house-
hold expenses, (b) payer who spent on public goods for inhabitants living in the 
domain. Among these two roles, (a) is shown in figure 5 and figure 6, and (b) will 
be described in detail in the later section.
Figure 5 schematically illustrates the flow of funds in Lord Tsuda’s finance. 
Referring to figure 5, let us further looking at figure 6. Figure 6 shows the quarterly 
balance of the cash flow statement on the general account of Lord Tsuda’s finance 
in 1862. Importantly, the cash flow statement included the short-term debts, 
which were repaid within a fiscal year and were not accounted in the statement 
of account. An examination of figure 6 reveals that the remittances needed for the 
lord’s household expense were paid every month in advance of the annual tribute 
income, which was received only between October and the following March. We 
can confirm that this time lag was covered by short-term debts from the syndi-
cate group and the IRF. The syndicate group and the IRF were both repaid with 
interest of 10% per year when the annual tribute income came in. Strictly speak-
ing, the short-term money from the syndicate group and the IRF was borrowed 
by the chief managers to send the lord’s household expenses. In short, the syndi-
cate group and the IRF financed the lord’s household expenses through the chief 
manager. In examining the total amount of short-term debt paid each year from 
1860 to 1864 from both the syndicate group and the IRF, we see that the syndicate 
group paid 72% of the total amount (9,628 ryō), and the IRF did 21%.19 The syndi-



























































































Figure 4. Outstanding Long-Term Debt
Source: The Archives of Seimiya Family, Bun 24–16.
Credit: Sakai 2014.
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needed to cover the lord’s household expenses. In other words, the IRF formed 
in Lord Tsuda’s finance functioned as a fictitious lender separately from the lord’s 
household.
CREATION OF THE LO CAL “PUBLIC ” FUND FOR 
PROVIDING PUBLIC GO ODS
The Founding Source and Function of IRF
Then, what is the IRF used for? Where did the funds come from, and how were they 
used? In principle, it was the lord’s deposit with the chief managers, but it was an 
involuntary deposit that the lord didn’t have a free hand to control. Substantially, 
the IRF had the characteristic of the fund profitable for not only the lord but also 
local inhabitants. This will become apparent from the management and contents 
of the financial statements of the IRF. The asset and ledger of the IRF were kept 
by the chief managers. That ledger details the daily inflows and outflows of cash 
from 1842 until Sawara was no longer part of the Tsuda domain, in August 1864. 
Therefore, that ledger can make the balance sheet and profit and loss statement 
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Figure 5. The Conceptual Diagram of Lord Tsuda’s Finance
Credit: Sakai 2014.
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The net assets column of the balance sheet shows transfers from a general 
account surplus, as well as profit from the partial sale of rice deducted from 
the revenues in the general account statement. These were the primary funding 
sources of the IRF. Additionally, the assets and income columns show loans to the 
account for the lord’s household and local merchants, suggesting that this was a 
money-making endeavor. The borrowers were primarily merchants like brewers 
and pawnbrokers in Sawara and wealthy farmers from the surrounding villages.
On the other hand, from the income statement you can see what the IRF was 
used for. The expenses column in the profit and loss statement of table 4 shows that 
72.5% of the total revenue was spent from 1842 to 1864. Furthermore, in examining 
the breakdown of the expenses column 52.8% of the total expenses was used for 
long-term debt repayment, 23.3% was used for purchasing the military goods, and 
20.4% was used for subsidies for the famine relief and civil engineering project 
in domain villages. This subsidy was obviously a public expense for the domain 
inhabitants, but what about other expenses? Based on the earlier-mentioned pat-
tern of the long-term debt repayment, much of this repayment seems to be car-
ried out against the intradomain creditors. In addition, the military goods were 
needed by the lord and retainers when they prepared for the defense against the 
arrival in 1853 of US Navy ships led by Matthew Perry,20 and by the chief managers 
when preparing for the defense against the attack in 1861 of mutineers from the 
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Figure 6. The Quarterly Balance of the Cash Flow on the General Account in 1862
Note: IRF includes the prior year fiscal surplus.
Source: The Archives of Seimiya Family, Bun 23–4.
Credit: Sakai 2014.
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Table 4. The Financial Statement of the IRF
Balance Sheet (August 1864)
(unit: ryō)
Assets Liabilities
Cash 66 Deposit payable 50
Short-term loans to the lord’s household 1,152 Total liabilities 50
Long-term loans to the account for lord’s 
household
100 Net assets
Loans to local domain merchants 643 Fiscal surpluses from 1841 to 1863 789





Total net assets 1,947
Total assets 1,997 Total liabilities and net assets 1,997
Note: The unspecified loan had been recorded in the source at the beginning of a period. Thus, the author shows the 
loan as (unknown) in the net assets column.
Profit and Loss Statement (from June 1841 to August 1864)
(unit: ryō)
Expenses Revenues
Interest expense 22 Interest income gained from loans 
to the lord’s household
175
Military goods 186 Interest income gained from loans 
to local domain merchants
903
Subsidies for the famine relief 143 Others 26
Subsidies for engineering project in domain 
villages
20




Total expenses and net income 1,104 Total revenues 1,104
Source: The Archives of Seimiya Family, Bun 24–38, 24–40, 24–23, 24–41
and disbursed independent of the IRF. Considering the existence of the aforemen-
tioned expenses, it is likely that the IRF comprised fiscal surpluses generated by 
the chief managers during the fiscal management process, and that the fund was 
used to support the military activity and the civil administration.
From IRF to the Local Public Fund
What happened to the IRF after 1864? In August 1864, when Lord Tsuda ceased to 
rule Sawara the relationship between the chief managers and Lord Tsuda ceased to 
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be one between a feudal lord and his subject. Thus, after that time, no new entries 
were made in the IRF ledger, which the chief managers kept. One concludes that 
the IRF left the hands of the chief managers and reverted to the lord. Is it true that 
the accumulated IRF money had disappeared in Sawara? The answer is no. Rather, 
a new local fund was restructured using the IRF as the funding source. In other 
words, the IRF effectively continued as a new local fund external to Lord Tsuda’s 
finance, under a different name—namely, Sunshu-okatte Ingaikin.
In January 1865, the former lord Tsuda deposited seventeen hundred ryō 
(approximates to the net asset of the IRF, nineteen hundred ryō) with an annual 
4% interest with the former chief managers, Kageharu and Hidekata.21 They 
exchanged a contract for the deposit. This deposit became the founding source of 
the new local fund.
Why such a vast sum of money was deposited with former chief managers, 
instead of being invested elsewhere? The reason seems to be that Lord Tsuda could 
not take away this money from Kageharu and Hidekata due to their relationship 
built up over many years. As before, the former chief managers were still entrusted 
with the task of converting the annual tribute rice into money, which was primar-
ily done in Sawara and in Choshi, the largest town in Shimosa province.22 The 
direct funding source of the deposit was a portion of the money obtained from 
selling annual tribute rice extracted from the former Lord Tsuda’s newly bestowed 
holding. Accordingly, they were the ones responsible for generating the seventeen 
hundred ryō in the first place. Had the outsourcing of the fiscal management sys-
tem continued as before under the same framework, the seventeen hundred ryō—
which was the annual tribute income—should have been returned to the IRF as a 
payment of short-term debt for remittance. It was better to keep the funds in the 
hands of the former chief managers. Wealthy farmers and merchants in the local 
domain were entrusted with these finance duties. In the process of performing 
these duties, they generated surpluses that they themselves oversaw and managed 
as a local fund. This historical experience shaped the former lord’s subsequent 
financial management activities.
The deposit from the former lord had further increased to twenty-two hundred 
ryō by 1867.23 However, it began to decrease after 1871 when the feudal domain sys-
tem was abolished, and it shrank to one hundred ryō by 1875. From 1875 onward, 
the cumulative investment gains, which can be said to be equity capital, became 
major funding sources.24 This fact indicates that the new local fund was external 
to the lord’s finance.
The funds were used first to provide working capital to local merchants, and 
second to finance local public construction projects, including buildings and 
a civil engineering project on the rivers. Looking at the assets of the new local 
fund, somewhere from almost 70% to over 90% of them were allocated as loans 
to  merchants in Sawara and the surrounding region;25 this leads to the  conclusion 
that this was the fund’s primary purpose. Interestingly, the fact that most of the 
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original capital for these loans came from deposits from the former lord was widely 
known among the merchants who were the recipients of this funding,26 even well 
into the Meiji period in the 1880s. The existence of such financial basis seemed 
to be significant in providing liquidity and avoiding the shortage in the supply of 
working capital in the first half of Meiji period, when new financial institutions 
such as banks were established, while demand for funds was increasing due to the 
expansion of regional markets.
According to the detail of expenses, the new local fund was used to pay for the 
construction of Sawara’s new police station in 1883. As one of Chiba  prefecture’s 
major towns, Sawara established a post office in 1872, the Katori district office 
in 1878, and the Kawasaki Bank in 1880 (Sawara town 1931). Sawara merchants 
made major contributions to these public building projects, in the forms of both 
land and money (Kawajiri 2003); however, the new local fund also played a role 
in subsidizing these projects. Furthermore, direct expenses related to a civil 
 engineering project on the river were financed by the new local fund, between 
1874 and 1881. This project rerouted the Tone River and constructed levies to 
prevent flooding. The river was dredged to allow ship access, and piping was 
laid and wells were dug to secure clean drinking water for the populace in the 
surrounding area. More than a total of 476 ryō had been spent for this project 
within seven years. Until a modern local administrative and financial system was 
established, the new local fund that was created by deposits from the former lord 
during the Edo period played no small role in the funding of the provision of 
local public goods, such as basic infrastructure. That is to say, this functioned as 
the local “public” fund.
We can confirm that the local notables to which the lord outsourced their fiscal 
management had structurally changed the fiscal system from something profitable 
for the feudal lord to something profitable for local inhabitants and regional soci-
ety. This conclusion is supported by four notable findings—(1) reduction in the 
lord’s household expenses, (2) charging the “interest” only to the lord’s household 
expenses, (3) prior repayments to intradomain creditors, and (4) the creation of an 
internal reserved fund (IRF) generated by fiscal surplus.
With respect to (1) and (2), it was found that local notables had divided the 
lord’s finance into two sectors—namely, the lord’s household finance and the 
civil local (domain) finance—and tried to restrict the former. Furthermore, they 
reduced the lord’s household expense, that is, salary wage, gifts or party expenses, 
and clothing or food, as well as other living expenses of the lord, his family, retain-
ers, maids, and servants in the Edo residence.
Then, as the (3) finding indicates, all of this resulted in generating a fiscal 
 surplus and local notables allocated most of the surplus to the active repayment 
of debts. However, they prioritized debt repayments to intradomain creditors, and 
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repaid only a little money borrowed from extradomain creditors. In other words, 
these changes can be regarded as the local notable’s attempt to prevent outflows of 
money to extradomain areas, including merchants in the castle town (Edo) and 
the lord’s household, and instead retain them to accumulate money within the 
local domain.
This attempt also relates to (4). Some of fiscal surplus was reserved in local 
notables’ hands to create the IRF: a deposit that was controlled and managed by 
them, and augmented by reinvesting in local merchants and their lord, rather than 
increase fiscal expenditures. In addition, this fund, which was managed sepa-
rately from the general account and the lord’s household, also provided the money 
needed to finance the military activities, civil engineering, or relief projects for 
domain inhabitants. That is, this fund worked to finance public goods provision.
As the IRF also had certain benefits for the feudal lord, its academic evalua-
tions have not necessarily been uniform. However, the current study emphasizes 
that the lord did not have a free hand in managing these funds, which served as an 
involuntary deposit. The lord’s ownership and use of this fund were restricted, and 
its management was strongly controlled through the will of local notables.27 In this 
respect, the IRF had the characteristic of a local fund, rather than the lord’s house-
hold fund. Therefore, even after the feudal lord–subject relationship was dissolved, 
a new local fund was re-created outside Lord Tsuda’s finance, and the large amount 
of money accumulated within the old fund (IRF) was retained in the reginal soci-
ety, well into the Meiji period. Furthermore, this money played more significant 
role in the provision of local public goods, such as public building projects or civil 
engineering projects.
On the other hand, feudal lords often entrusted some tasks of managing their 
finance to the wealthy financial merchants in Osaka or Edo, and some of these 
merchants also created reserved funds like the IRF (Takatsuki 2014). However, 
the fund created by them didn’t finance local (domain) public goods and were 
never preserved in their hands after the Meiji Restoration. This difference in two 
reserved funds can be recognized as the difference of statue and purpose between 
wealthy financial merchants and local notables. Whereas wealthy financial mer-
chants were only fiscal managers, local notables were not only fiscal managers but 
also local inhabitants and local administrators. Local notables had a direct respon-
sibility to sustain the other local inhabitants and regional society and worked as 
substitutes for their lords in providing public goods.
In summary, local notables’ intervention into the lord’s finance draws a clearer 
distinct line between the lord’s household finance and the civil local (domain) 
finance, and then generates a fiscal surplus by reducing the amount of money sup-
plied to the lord, instead reserving it to create a local fund for providing pub-
lic goods. Through this process—which may be understood as a silent conflict 
between the feudal lord and the local notables—they converted the lord’s finance 
to a financial basis for the provision of public goods for the local inhabitants. This 
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diversion can be recognized as one of the paths to the formation of the local public 
finance in the early modern Japan.
NOTES
1. In recent research, the effective national (Tokugawa shogunate) tax rate per gross agricultural 
product is estimated to decrease from 40% to less than 30% during the period from the mid-seven-
teenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, and per gross domestic product (GDP) from 30% to 
16%–17% during the same period (Imamura and Nakabayashi 2017).
2. The size of a domain was measured in the income it was expected to produce, which was calcu-
lated in units of rice (i.e., koku, which is equal to one hundred liters of rice).
3. The archives of Seimiya family, Bun 4c–18. (This copy is preserved in Chiba Prefectural 
Archives.)
4. Seimiya, Bun 4c–12.
5. In 1810, the number of households is 1,301, the population is 5,335 people; in 1873 the number 
of households is 1,415, the population is 6,411. Generally, it is said that in Tokugawa Japan the average 
number of households in the village is one hundred and the average population is four hundred people 
(Watanabe 2008). The number of households and population of Sawara village is quite large compared 
to that of a standard village.
6. In 1864, as the lord levied a bond of about ten thousand ryō upon Sawara, they expended 75% 
(Sakurashi-shi Hensan Iinkai 1971).
7. Hidekata was awarded by Nīhari prefectural government in 1889 (Seimiya, Butsu7–54–14).
8. The archives of Inō family (Now preserved in National Museum of Japanese History), C-19.
9. Kageharu was awarded a type of medal with blue ribbon (for distinguished service in social and 
public works) by Meiji government in 1889 (Inō, E26–3).
10. Seimiya, Bun 4c-63–4.
11. The primary purchasers of the annual tribute rice—which constituted the bulk of this income—
were Sawara’s sake brewers and rice merchants (Seimiya, Bun 22–15, Bun 34–3–3, Bun 34–3–9, Bun 34–
3–13, Bun 3–13–18, Bun 13–3–23). Aside from the chief managers, the existence of the Sawara merchants 
was extremely important to the outsourcing of fiscal management duties within the Tsuda domain.
12. If you want to confirm the detail and evidences, refer to Sakai 2014.
13. Seimiya, Butsu 2–57–4.
14. Seimiya, Butsu 4–57–1.
15. Seimiya, Bun 4c–63–4.
16. Seimiya, Butsu 2–57–1.
17. As compared with the contemporary corporate accounting, we can recognize this charge as 
the “internal interest” of the divisional performance. In addition, “internal interest” and the divisional 
system were observed in the accounting of wealthy merchants in early modern Japan (Nishikawa 1995).
18. Both Sawara and Izu were villages in Lord Tsuda’s domain, but the chief managers didn’t live in 
Izu. Therefore, they wrote in a distinction between Sawara and Izu.
19. Seimiya, Bun 23–5, Bun 23–6.
20. The Lord Tsuda and retainers armed themselves for the battle against the US Navy by the 
shogun’s order (Inō, C–19).
21. Seimiya, Bun 3–10–32–4.
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27. The recent studies in daimyō lord’s finance has also revealed the existence of an IRF (Itō 2014). 
However, the IRF of daimyō lord’s finance was controlled not by local notables (the governed) but by 
samurai (the governor).
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Part I I
Coping with Poverty and Famine

75
Poor relief reflects the characteristics of a society in a given period in 
respect of who is regarded as being in charge of assisting the poor, what level of liv-
ing standards is considered poor (that is, who is regarded as eligible for relief), and 
how much support is considered to be enough both in amount and in duration. 
Thus, a comparative approach toward poor relief history would be a suitable topic 
when discussing the historical role of public goods, or nonmarket activities, in the 
sustainability and reproduction of ordinary people’s economic lives.
Although comparing historical evidence and the backgrounds of poor relief 
in different premodern European areas has already been attempted in previous 
studies, a more worldwide comparison including non-European societies remains 
to be carried out. In line with this aim, part 2 examines the characteristics of poor 
and famine relief in early modern Japan, England, Prussia, and China. Though 
the types of historical records used in each study differ widely, which means that 
approaches to the history of poor and famine relief will also differ, these four areas 
provide us with significant but complex viewpoints for discussing what factors 
affected the quality of relief, and how the public social space arose historically in 
each area in helping indigent people.
The first point is the type of polity. Japan and Prussia’s states comprised lord-
ships that inevitably brought about a decentralized state formation; this therefore 
necessitates research into the role of regional lords and the central government in 
poor relief and the relationship between them. On the other hand, states where 
lordships had little or no effect formed a rather centralized polity that enabled 
them to introduce a nationwide safety net system: with one Parliament and one 
system of law, England created the Old Poor Law system; Qing China, a state simply 
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comprising the emperor, bureaucrats, and the subjects, enforced an empire-wide 
granary system.
The second viewpoint is the role of local communities. Although Japan and 
England differed widely on the type of state formation, both areas heavily depended 
on villages and parishes to operate poor relief activities, which put the public social 
space of relief at a micro communal level from the beginning. Prussia’s villages also 
played a role in poor relief, but it was only after an increase in the number of those 
who were not protected by the traditional lordship Gutsherrschaft that the respon-
sibility of villagers for providing poor relief arose at state-level politics.
Closely linked to the second point, the third is the viewpoint of micropoli-
tics: face-to-face negotiations managed inside communities, or between lords and 
their subjects. Even in England, where poor relief was underpinned by national 
law, relief was not provided mechanically toward the indigents but was supplied 
through severe negotiations at the communal level that divided who was the 
“deserving” and who was not. Therefore, a close look at these face-to-face negotia-
tions is required when we discuss the characteristics of poor relief in each area. In 
Japan and England, micropolitics in villages, parishes, and counties was the foun-
dation of practicing poor relief, while face-to-face negotiations between a lord and 
his subject made sense in Prussia. Moreover, as the change in economic and social 
environments forced the Prussian state to become engaged in poor relief and 
made the role of villages a focus, micropolitics emerged even among the Prussian 
villagers in practicing relief in their own communities.
Under these perspectives, each case in our volume offers an abundant amount 
of new evidence that will pave the way for further comparative discussions.
In Tokugawa Japan, where no permanent poor relief system was incorporated 
at the state level, autonomous villages were delegated the primary responsibility 
for ensuring the subsistence of community members by their lords. This meant 
that the villages shouldered the formal and public role in relief activities, and each 
village decided independently when communal relief should be carried out, what 
the duration and amount should be, and who the “deserving” were at that time. 
Villagers maintained an attitude of willingness to provide relief when help from 
personal relationships became overburdened; on the other hand, they did not hes-
itate to shame and punish the recipients who were treated as dependents or a bur-
den on their community. As shown in Mitsuo Kinoshita’s chapter (chapter 5), all 
these characteristics of poor relief in early modern rural Japan were underpinned 
by the micropolitics that evolved in each individual village.
Thanks to its unique nationwide safety net system constructed after the late 
sixteenth century, studies on England outperform any other area in the world in 
investigating the details and realities of poverty and poor relief, which have been 
addressed at an individual level using quantitative data. Along with the accumula-
tion of scholarship starting from the beginning of the twentieth century, detailed 
documents such as pauper censuses and petitions of the poor have enabled these 
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high-level studies, that were themselves the result of micropolitics engaged in by 
the poor, ratepayers, overseers, and justices of the peace in each parish and county. 
In our volume, using 3,169 first-time petitions documented in Lancashire between 
1626 and 1710, Jonathan Healey (in chapter 6) examines how the Old Poor Law’s 
relief was incorporated into people’s “economy of makeshifts,” what kinds of causes 
of poverty were reported by the petitioners, which, in turn, shows what people 
expected the Old Poor Law to do, and how the Poor Law system contributed to the 
disappearance of famine in England after 1623.
While the micropolitics of poor relief in early modern Japan and England 
occurred spatially at the local community level, from the seventeenth century 
onward Prussia showed a different level of face-to-face politics in securing peo-
ple’s everyday lives: personal relationships between the demesne lords and their 
subjects. Takashi Iida (in chapter 7) shows what obligations of protection were 
owed by the lords to their tenants, and how extraordinary assistance was provided 
through lord-tenant negotiations. Furthermore, as lodgers who were not inte-
grated into the lord’s protection increased after the eighteenth century, poverty 
became a political and public problem that brought the role of state and village 
into focus. In Iida’s chapter, what reaction was shown by the villagers is also dis-
cussed, which would indicate the Prussian type of micropolitics engaged in at the 
communal level.
Unlike these areas, Qing China holds a difficulty in examining poor and famine 
relief at the level of micropolitics. It stems from the scarcity of historical records, 
but this absence of documents itself may indicate the characteristics of relief in 
early modern China. On the other hand, Qing China’s case teaches us how a huge 
granary system could be carried out throughout the empire. R. Bin Wong (in 
chapter 8) explains how the emperors, the officials both at the center and in the 
locales, and the local elites of eighteenth-century China together operated a large-
scale granary system, and what ideological background motivated these players to 
maintain the granaries.
Closely drawn comparative discussions with dense historical evidence can lead 
us to a better understanding of the contemporary problem surrounding welfare 
systems, namely, stigma against relief recipients and the poor. Early modern Japan 
can be a suitable benchmark for this argument and is challenged by Kinoshita in 
chapter 5 by combining our case studies from the perspectives of micropolitics, 
targetism, and social sanctions. There are only four research areas in part 2, but the 
insights extracted from them are fruitful and may contribute to more advanced 




Sanctions, Targetism, and  
Village Autonomy
Poor Relief in Early Modern Rural Japan
Mitsuo Kinoshita
Granting restricted relief and shaming the recipients before the community mem-
bers are the symbols of poor relief in early modern rural Japan and the most nota-
ble facts in discussing worldwide poor relief history from a Japanese perspective. 
In this chapter, we use documents composed by village communities to examine 
who was in charge of assisting the poor in rural Tokugawa Japan, how it was man-
aged, and why people were so eager to punish the relief recipients. While there 
were various types and providers of relief, both in urban and in rural parts of 
Japan,1 we should focus foremost on the role of autonomous villages since they 
were the most important backbone of Tokugawa state and society.2
In premodern Japanese history, research on poor relief has not been as attrac-
tive a theme as in European scholarship,3 but one may easily find many documents 
concerning poor relief in rural Japan, particularly after the seventeenth century. 
However, this abundance compares unfavorably with that of Europe, as in the eyes 
of Japanese historians, the depth and detail of historical records and studies on 
poverty and poor relief in early modern Europe appear astonishing. In European 
studies, as shown in Robert Jütte’s introductory textbook (Jütte 1994), counting the 
total number of recipients or the expenditure of poor relief and tracing its histori-
cal transition after the sixteenth century would be an ordinary research method. 
On the other hand, it is almost impossible to do the same for early modern Japan; 
only after the Tokugawa state system collapsed and the Meiji government enforced 
the first poor law in 1874 (jukkyū-kisoku) could a statistical table of the poor be 
constructed.4 In contrast to seventeenth-century England, there were no poor 
laws, poor rates, or regular doles in the era of Tokugawa Japan. Thus, the state 
system did not require regular censuses, accounts, or individual petitions of the 
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poor. As we see in the following chapters, poor relief documents in the Tokugawa 
period were mostly made not at the state level but at the village level, and not for 
constant relief but for ad hoc assistance. Therefore, qualitative rather than quanti-
tative approaches are required when assessing the characteristics of poor relief in 
early modern rural Japan.
As statistical research does not fit the case of Tokugawa Japan, qualitative 
inquiries overcome differences in historical sources and pave the way for com-
parative discussions in the same dimension, especially concerning the quality of 
rural micropolitics in poor relief, which has already been emphasized in studies 
of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England (Hindle 2004, Healey 2014). In 
discussing these points, this study first shows why statistical approaches are dif-
ficult to use in understanding the case of Tokugawa Japan, where these difficulties 
stem from, and how this connects to the characteristics of Tokugawa Japan’s poor 
relief practices: village autonomy, ad hoc attitude, targetism, and social sanctions.
DIFFICULTIES IN CALCUL ATING THE PO OR
In spite of the absence of research that specializes in the history of poverty, previ-
ous studies of early modern Japan often used the term hinnō (poor peasants) by 
setting the poverty line at five tan (0.5 ha) of crop field or five koku, a number of 
the tax base calculated by the Tokugawa land tax system called the kokudakasei 
(kokudaka system).5 However, neither the size of the cropland nor the amount of 
the tax base would prove suitable for quantifying the poor in rural Japan.
First, most peasants in the Tokugawa villages earned their livelihood by farming 
alongside several other types of work, such as wage labor, spinning, weaving, fish-
ing, and selling firewood. Thus, their household income could not be easily esti-
mated by the size of their crop fields alone. Second, the kokudaka system was not 
a tax based on the actual amount of each household’s farm products. Previously, 
kokudaka (calculated by multiplying the size of cropland and its assessed value 
[todai] per one tan [0.1 ha] together)6 was assumed to be equivalent or nearly 
equivalent to the real amount of agricultural produce. In recent studies, however, 
this assumption has been denied, and it is thought that through the medieval era 
to the early modern era, the estimated value of todai always meant nengu (land 
tax) itself, rather than products; thus, kokudaka could not be anywhere near equiv-
alent to the amount of farm products; it was a tax base that was not supported by 
product surveillance (Ikegami 2004).
With these apparent weaknesses in proving household income, previous stud-
ies contain additional problems of defining the precise positioning of the poverty 
line and how it should be set; the calculation of household expenditure, which is as 
essential a procedure as income research is in the definition of poverty, was totally 
overlooked. Hinnō has been a popular term in historiographies of rural Tokugawa 
Japan, but in these respects, the ability to prove the calculations has remained so 
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limited that the challenge persists as to how to investigate and quantify the poor in 
rural societies, or whether it is even possible given the scarcity of historical records 
that show the reality of peasants’ household finances.
Currently, the only accessible document that indicates the real family bud-
get is the account made by Tawara village in Yoshino county, Yamato province, 
in 1808.7 To entreat their lord for tax reduction by emphasizing their household 
deficits, Tawara villagers researched the 1807 annual income and expenditure of 
all the community members, who constituted a total of forty-one households. 
Income content ranged from cash crops and labor wages to crops for home use. 
Expenditure research covered tax, interest on loans, diet grain (rice and barley), 
wages for laborers, fertilizer, and even private expenses for each household mem-
ber. From these detailed data, new images of Tokugawa village life emerge at the 
level of household realities. Household income was not at all proportionate to each 
family’s kokudaka, proving that kokudaka was not an appropriate indicator of pov-
erty. The tax burden ranged widely from 7% to 87%, and almost every household 
was in the red, but even those high-tax-rated families who were deeply in debt did 
not always become bankrupt. Household deficits were mostly brought about by 
diet grain and private expenses, not by tax and interest; this indicated people’s lack 
of intention to alter their living standards even if they were suffering from severe 
income deficits.
As indicated earlier, the account of Tawara village is an epoch-making docu-
ment for early modern Japan studies, but despite the excellence of this record, 
the poverty line cannot be easily set for these forty-one households. Equivalized 
household disposable income, which is the most trustworthy indicator for counting 
the poor, could be calculated from the 1808 Tawara account by using the amount 
of annual income, tax, interest, agricultural expenses, and number of household 
members. However, the figures are dispersed, and this makes it additionally hard 
to even clarify which households are normal or middle-class, let alone poor. In 
Tokugawa studies, a huge barrier exists in investigating who the real hinnō are and 
how to quantify them through the calculation of peasants’ household finances.
In contrast to the scarcity of family budget accounts, many villages docu-
mented the names and numbers of impoverished peasants, called nanjūnin or 
konkyūnin, in order to gain formal relief (osukui) from their lords. From these 
records, it seems that the total numbers and percentages of the poor in a given 
village could be easily calculated, but as shown in an example later, the matter is 
not so straightforward.
In 1866, rice prices skyrocketed in the Kinai district and villagers of the Odawara 
domain8 in Settsu and Kawachi provinces (seventy-two villages, population greater 
than twenty-one thousand), who were used to purchasing rice because of their ten-
dency to grow cash crops like cotton, entreated their lord to provide subsidies in 
order to save the komae-nanjūnin, the impoverished peasants. Fortunately, 150 kan 
in silver was granted as osukuigin, and the domain ordered the petitioner’s leaders 
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to have it allocated autonomously by each village. The Odawara domain did not 
give any instructions for provision standards, which left each village to decide for 
itself how and to whom benefits should be distributed. One village called Rokutan 
(Tanboku county, Kawachi province) divided the targets into three ranks: The first 
rank consisted of tenant households working hard in farming, but who were still 
in need of payments for diet grain and fertilizer; ten monme per person was given 
to seventy persons (12.5% of the total population of 556 persons in 131 households). 
The second rank consisted of tenants “in dire need” (itatte-nanjū), and 14.5 monme 
was given to each of these 172 persons (30.9%). The third rank consisted of “the 
destitute” (goku-nanjū), and 11 monme were given to each of 32.5 persons (5.8%). 
Among recipient households, household members who were working as servants 
for more than fifteen days a month were counted as half a person while those who 
were registered but apprenticed were not counted.9
While negotiating with their lord, the Settsu and Kawachi villages of the 
Odawara domain used the term komae-nanjūnin, a general word meaning 
“impoverished peasants.” However, at the level of actual distribution by village 
autonomy, not every impoverished peasant was considered deserving of relief, and 
in the Rokutan village case, the main target was set for tenants. Therefore, even if 
a landowning household was in dire need or even destitute, it was not counted. 
Moreover, as shown by the difference between the unit cost of ranks two and three, 
“the destitute” were rated lower than tenants “in dire need,” meaning that the real 
level of poverty was not the main standard for relief in Rokutan village at this 
time. Furthermore, the number of those who deserved relief in each rank was 
subject to change. The numbers shown earlier were the final result. In the docu-
ments submitted beforehand to the domain officers during negotiations, Rokutan 
village initially included twenty households (111 persons in real numbers, 19.9% of 
the total population) in the first rank, thirty-two households (116 persons, 20.8%) 
in the second rank, and thirty-four households (113 persons, 20.3%) in the third 
rank. In the actual relief provision, ten households, or fifty persons (42.5 persons 
at the allotment rate), were moved from rank one to rank two, and 16 households, 
or fifty-six persons (thirty-five persons), were moved from rank three to two. This 
indicates that the village tried to apply the highest unit cost, rank two, as much 
as possible to households in other ranks. How these decisions were made is not 
clear, but in any case, neither the documents drawn up before allocation nor those 
drawn up after allocation are reliable for measuring the total number of the poor 
or the degree of poverty in Rokutan village.
As the Rokutan village case shows, Tokugawa studies are blessed with docu-
ments counting the numbers of recipients for a certain relief case, but even those 
records would not be worthy of statistical analyses such as those being conducted 
in European studies. On the other hand, the difficulties associated with quantita-
tive research reflect the characteristics of Tokugawa poor relief practices: who was 
thought to be the “deserving,” what level of relief was considered to be enough, 
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and who was in charge of assisting the poor. The discussion opens with where the 
primary responsibility of poor relief was laid in early modern Japan.
PO OR RELIEF MANAGED BY VILL AGE AUTONOMY
Compared to the constancy, regularity, and legitimacy underlying the poor relief 
system of England after the seventeenth century, poor relief in early modern 
Japan could be characterized by its unsystematic and ad hoc nature. The position 
and attitude of lords were symbolic. As a compound state,10 neither the “states” 
in Tokugawa Japan, the shogunate (bakufu), nor the domains (han) attempted to 
enact a statute or form a permanent system to relieve the poor, and their basic 
policies toward poor relief were to leave it to the autonomy of villages and towns. 
In 1642, although the whole country had been suffering from famine since the 
previous year, the shogunate decreed that if a single peasant became sick and 
could not maintain his cropland, villagers in the same community should help 
that peasant with farming and making ends meet, especially with respect to tax 
payments.11 The Tsu domain also ordered their subjects in 1643 to support hungry 
community members and, again in 1660, during a time of high crop prices in 
Yamashiro and Yamato provinces, ordered that each village had the responsibil-
ity to take care of those who were compelled to beg and keep them from seek-
ing alms away from home.12 Even when lords recognized their subjects’ economic 
hardships, the primary responsibility for subsistence was delegated to the people’s 
autonomy; as indicated by Keiko Yanagiya’s study, it was only after communities 
were overburdened with poor residents and implored for formal relief (osukui) 
that governmental aid from the shogunate or domain was granted.13 Some lords, 
such as the Nihonmatsu domain, introduced a subsidy system for newborns and 
the aged after the latter half of the eighteenth century,14 but even within these relief 
systems, village autonomy still owed the poor the basic duty of support.15
In the absence of systematic formal relief and the obligation required of them, 
rural people mobilized every possible way to cope with poverty. This ranged from 
informal help by kin, neighbors, and economic relations (e.g., landowners and 
tenants), to assistance provided by various autonomous bodies, such as the gon-
ingumi (a neighborhood unit comprising every five households), village headmen 
(shōya or nanushi), and the whole community. As in European poor relief history, 
these options were often combined, and support from autonomous communal 
bodies was recognized as actual formal and public relief by the villagers. This is 
why we can find so many documents concerning poor relief from archives kept by 
either the families of the headmen or the communities themselves.
Basically, the mobilization of these types of relief occurred in stages. First, 
households in hardship were expected to rely on their relatives, and if relatives 
became overburdened, communal formal support was enacted; goningumi bore 
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the first stage, and when their limits had been reached, assistance from the whole 
community finally appeared.
While this step-by-step policy formed the basis of poor relief practice, peo-
ple often avoided the exercise of communal formal help, and tried to shift the 
relief responsibility to the field of personal relationship, and especially to family 
and relatives as much as possible. In 1669, when one individual from Hari village 
(Yamabe county, Yamato province) became bankrupt through his unpaid tax and 
debt, the village attempted to transfer the responsibility of repayment to the bank-
rupt villager’s brother, whereas the previous local custom rules had dictated that 
the prime duty of repayment was held by goningumi, not by relatives; Akatsuka 
village of Ito county, Kii province, enacted a village law in 1771 that announced 
the abolition of absorbing members’ unpaid tax by the whole community and that 
now one’s kin and descendants owed the payment duty; a law from 1775 in Kubota 
village (Heguri county, Yamato province) divided the relief responsibility between 
the community and the sector of personal relationship, providing that the goning-
umi would take care of the impoverished household so as not to become bankrupt, 
but once they went bankrupt, the responsibility of payment was to be shifted onto 
their relatives.16 In the days of village autonomy, the rural societies of Tokugawa 
Japan vacillated between who should bear the final responsibility for poor relief: 
the public sector consisting of communal autonomous bodies, or the personal 
relationship sector including kin, descendants, and the indigents themselves.
AD HO C AT TITUDE D OMINATES
Poor relief, whether granted by lords or village autonomy, was provided on an ad 
hoc basis. In 1669, Nara-bugyō, the shogunal governor of Yamato province, inter-
mittently bestowed rice porridge in alms (kayu-segyō) to beggars (kojiki or hi’nin) 
and starving people (katsuebito) in Nara city for about four months. While doing 
so, he did not forget to notify the people that this osukui would not be carried out 
often, and hence, they should take care of themselves so that they would not go 
hungry by their own actions.17 The amount of governmental aid fluctuated dra-
matically as well: in 1729, the shogunate lent twenty thousand koku of grain for diet 
and seeds to his domain subjects, and more than 107,000 koku in 1732, but after an 
announcement in 1734 that severely restricted the lending aid policy, the amount 
of aid soon shrunk drastically; in 1844, only 294 ryō in gold was disbursed from the 
shogunate treasury for the same aims, yet by 1863, it suddenly ballooned to 33,125 
ryō.18 The childrearing subsidy system enacted by the Nihonmatsu domain in 1786 
promised to grant a two- to three-year semiconstant allowance for third children, 
but first children were not eligible even if their parents were poor,19 meaning that 
poverty itself was not the central target of this relief policy, let alone a permanent 
and regular support for the impoverished. The expression used in the financial 
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accounts of the Matsue domain from 1767 to 1841 was more symbolic: expenditures 
for osukui were always classified as “extraordinary expenses” (rinji-gonyūyō).20
In accordance with this ad hoc attitude, there was no guarantee that lords would 
offer formal relief every time it was requested, even if the economic situation of 
the petitioners seemed similar. As shown in the previous chapter, villagers of the 
Odawara domain in Settsu and Kawachi provinces got 150 kan of osukuigin from 
their lord in 1866, a year when prices were particularly high. The next year, how-
ever, even though prices were still high and peasants again petitioned for relief, the 
Odawara domain did not easily consent to provide aid and probably rejected the 
petition.21 Similar economic environments were not a sufficient condition to either 
grant or receive formal poor relief.
Thus, split decisions about osukui between domains were not unusual. Peasants 
of the Odawara domain in Settsu and Kawachi provinces succeeded in gaining 
formal relief in 1866, but that did not mean all residents in both provinces enjoyed 
the same benefits. While representatives of the petitioners were negotiating with 
Odawara domain officers in Osaka, one Kawachi village headman researched 
and reported on how other lords responded to people’s requests for osukui: the 
Tatebayashi domain chose not to grant relief, but instead to lend rice from gra-
naries one month earlier than usual (the domain had been lending rice annually 
during the sixth lunar month); the Koga domain did nothing.22
An ad hoc attitude also determined the shape and quality of the communal 
formal relief managed by village autonomy. The contents of financial statements 
for annual autonomous expenses (muranyūyōchō) reflect this trend. Poor relief 
expenditures rarely appear on these books, even if relief was provided through 
formally autonomous systems during a given year, which means that commu-
nal formal relief was not recognized as an essential running expense for daily 
self-governance.
The length and amount of relief was treated the same way. In 1801, when a 
peasant family headed by Kyūemon of Nonaka village (Tannan county, Kawachi 
province) fell into poverty due to sickness, his relatives and the goningumi paid for 
meals and assisted his family until they could earn their own living again. However, 
the burden soon surpassed the supporters’ capacities, so they petitioned the village 
officers for help from the community, and were permitted to rent one kan in cop-
per for buying diet barley. Fortunately, Kyūemon was allowed not only to pay no 
interest, but also to render the sum whenever he could in the future (shusse-barai), 
though this one kan was calculated by an estimate of just thirty day’s consumption, 
four gō of barley a day for the whole family.23 In addition, in 1866, when Rokutan 
village, one of the Odawara domain villages in Kawachi that received osukuigin 
that year, gave rice in alms to “the most destitute” residents (gokugoku-nanjūnin) 
in their community, the allowance was limited to sixty days and only one gō for 
each person per day.24 The same amount of charity rice was allocated to “the desti-
tute” (goku-nanjūnin) in 1867 at another Kawachi village called Wakabayashi, and 
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was prepared for just twenty days.25 Because of the fact that most rural people ate 
four to five gō of mixed grain a day at that time,26 communal formal relief provided 
an absolutely insufficient amount and was strictly restricted within a given period 
as well. This suggests that people considered a limited safety net sufficient in both 
quantity and length of time; permanent, sufficient assistance was not thought to 
be required, even for the most desperate neighbors. Though granary systems, such 
as those in the Qing dynasty of China,27 were created in rural Japan especially after 
the eighteenth century, they did not promise a constant and regular relief for the 
poor either.28 The ability to be self-supporting was strongly demanded in the rural 
society of Tokugawa Japan, while the attitude of only occasional relief dominated 
the nation.
Because of the ad hoc character of relief, targets for communal formal relief 
differed from time to time in each village. As in other areas and eras, the aged, 
disabled, and sick tended to be the primary subjects, but there was no basic prin-
ciple as to who would receive relief, and the criteria for identifying the “deserving” 
changed often. As shown in the previous chapter, in 1866 Rokutan village estab-
lished the main relief target as the tenants, excluded needy landowning house-
holds as eligible for relief, and treated the tenants “in dire need” (itatte-nanjū) 
more favorably than “the destitute” (goku-nanjū), who were supposed to be the 
most impoverished members in their community.
Given its ad hoc character, predictability, an important quality that Marjorie 
Keniston McIntosh perceived in institutionalized assistance to the poor in early 
modern England,29 was not incorporated into poor relief in Tokugawa Japan. As 
the villagers of Odawara domain did in 1866, people often pleaded with their lords 
for osukui when they felt they could not make ends meet and expected their lords 
to be obligated to sustain their subject’s subsistence. However, these measures did 
not result in a constant, regularized poor relief system, either nationwide or in 
regional domains, and perhaps, as Yanagiya suggests, the people themselves did 
not consider whether such access to predictable assistance would be formally con-
structed.30 The ad hoc attitude to poor relief penetrated the state and society of 
early modern Japan; occasional relief was enough and no formal system prevailed.31
Therefore, quantitative approaches, such as calculating annual expenditures of 
poor relief in a lord’s finances or those of an autonomous village, or counting the 
number and types of recipients continuously and systematically in a communal 
formal relief, are not only impossible but also meaningless in evaluating Tokugawa 
Japan’s poor relief practices. Qualitative analyses are required, and the most attrac-
tive viewpoint to consider is the quality of village autonomy that shaped the sub-
stance of poor relief in each rural society: that is, where the “deserving” line was 
established, who was counted out, and what sense of value was used by each vil-
lage’s autonomous judgments concerning relief.
Although these standards were substantially set on a case-by-case basis, the 
way an individual worked seemed to be a key criterion in relief judgments. The 
86    Chapter 5
Rokutan village case in 1866 symbolizes this tendency: being a tenant was the pri-
mary concern, the laboring poor were treated lightly, and the actual condition of 
each household’s living standard did not matter particularly. “Goodness” in every-
day behavior seemed influential too. When Yamanobō village of Tōichi county, 
Yamato province, allocated seeds from its granary to the three ranks of the needy 
in 1800, households whose heads were regarded as “faithless” (fujitsu) or “selfish” 
(wagamama) were provided smaller amounts of relief than they should have been, 
even if their standards of living were ranked at the “destitute” (goku-nan) level.32 
These attitudes in communal formal assistance lead us to a serious problem sur-
rounding poor relief in early modern rural Japan: social sanctions directed toward 
relief targets.
TARGETISM AND SANCTIONS
Before discussing the sanctions thriving in poor relief, we should briefly trace the 
history of targetism in Japan, the precondition of social practices that brings shame 
on relief recipients.33 In the field of poverty research, selecting and naming one by 
one those who deserve relief and those who do not is called targetism or selectiv-
ism, which are antonyms of universalism. Targetism requires listing the names, 
numbers, ages, earnings, and health of each household of recipients or applicants 
for relief; thus in the periods that targetism prevailed, many kinds of historical 
documents concerning poor relief were completed, and fortunately have remained 
extant until today. The abundance of poor relief documents in early modern Japan 
and England is owed to this principle of targetism.
In Japanese history, targetism first appears in the eighth century, a period 
of forming a centralized state ruled by the imported Chinese law system called 
ritsuryō. The central government decreed in 718 that the primary responsibility to 
relieve those who were not able to earn their own living, such as the aged, orphans, 
the disabled, or the economically destitute lay with their kin. If nobody was suit-
able, then the micro administrative unit in the capital Heijōkyō and rural areas, 
the bō and ri, would offer some formal help.34 Clear evidence of this kind of formal 
assistance, if any, is rarely found and it seems that the ritsuryō state paid no atten-
tion to providing constant relief to the needy. On the other hand, the formal relief 
called shingō was bestowed temporarily at special times, such as the enthronement 
of the emperor, or bad times, involving famine, plague, and disasters (Terauchi 
1982). Targetism appears in these shingō cases. In 739, when shingō was undertaken 
in Izumo province, the names of recipients, the aged, orphans, and the destitute, 
were listed one by one in each community unit gō and eki.35 The basic policy of 
registering “all” nations for centralized taxation and conscription enabled target-
ism in this kind of occasional formal relief.
As the ritsuryō state system collapsed in the tenth century, the targetism prin-
ciple was abandoned. Throughout the medieval era, formal poor relief was rarely 
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confirmed, apart from the almsgiving called hi’nin-segyō, which was temporarily 
provided by the shogunate or the imperial court in urban areas. However, even 
in this kind of charitable relief, alms were given to unspecified beggars (Mizuno 
2013). Poor relief run by targetism vanished for centuries, both nationwide and at 
the community level.
Targetism reappeared in the seventeenth century as the Tokugawa shogunate 
began to govern the country and the family register system was introduced. Although 
we are rarely told about when targetism first started in Tokugawa Japan, the number 
of starving people during the years of famine from 1641 to 1642 was already minutely 
counted in formal documents,36 which means that targetism was probably underway 
by that time. The histories afterward are shown in the previous chapters.
Poor relief managed by targetism seems to be more sophisticated than that 
directed toward unspecified individuals, but it inevitably brought harsh social 
sanctions against the recipients. The practice of shaming the recipients by coerc-
ing them to wear badges is well documented in studies of seventeenth- to eigh-
teenth-century England,37 but early modern rural Japan was no less eager than 
England to punish poor relief recipients. In 1837, a year when famine hit the whole 
country, eleven neighboring villages in Heguri county, Yamato province, made an 
agreement to take sanctions against the recipients of community almsgiving. For 
one generation, equivalent to about twenty to thirty years, recipients could not 
wear showy clothes, had to live a simple life, and were not permitted to wear haori 
(coat) and setta (high-grade sandals), a full dress for male adults, meaning that 
they had to attend community ceremonies, with shame, in ordinary clothes. Full 
members, including the children of each recipient household, were forced to sign 
their names to this agreement.38
Wakabayashi village of Kawachi province went further. As noted in the previ-
ous section, Wakabayashi village gave rice in alms to the destitute in 1867, and 
drew up a book listing the names of those who donated the charity and those who 
received it. In the same document, they blamed the recipients, stating that their 
economic hardship was brought about by their idleness, and instead of providing 
alms, the village coerced the recipients to live in disgrace for five years: the names 
of recipients were openly posted at the barbershop (kamiyuidoko), where villagers 
gathered daily, as well as in front of each recipient’s house; recipients could not 
wear or use setta, silks, or sunshades and were not allowed to drink a lot or go 
on trips, each of which symbolized a luxurious life; moreover, recipients had to 
assume an obsequious posture when they entered a donor’s house.39 Although the 
term of the sanctions was shorter than in the Yamato villages’ case, having one’s 
name conspicuously posted might have been a harsher stigma for the recipients, 
as harsh as the badges worn in early modern England. The price of depending on 
charity was not light in the age of targetism.
Furthermore, depending too much on your home community could cost you 
your right of residence: in 1699, Terada village of Kuze county, Yamashiro province, 
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became so overburdened with taking over a bankrupt member’s heavy unpaid tax 
that they finally decided to expel him from their community.40
In view of these facts, we may recognize why people in Tokugawa Japan endeav-
ored to avoid depending on others’ alms as much as possible and preferred to get 
relief through financial markets rather than almsgiving, even if they were in des-
perate need. When osukuigin was dispensed in 1866, Rokutan village also decided 
to lend or sell rice to the needy from the granary, either with no interest or at low 
prices. Low prices were set for each of the three ranks mentioned in the former 
chapter: rank one paid six hundred monme per one koku, rank two 550 monme, 
and rank three five hundred monme, while the market price was nine hundred to 
950 monme. Moreover, the village suggested to “the most destitute” (gokugoku-
nanjūnin) in rank three that the community was prepared to give in alms one gō 
of rice per person a day for sixty days. Three households accepted this suggestion, 
but most of the gokugoku-nanjūnin preferred to “buy” low-priced rice, so Rokutan 
village set their price at 450 monme for a maximum of two gō for each person per 
day.41 Even though others regarded the destitutes’ living standard as miserable, it 
did not mean that the destitute would easily choose the “cheapest” way to survive.
A few more affluent people behaved similarly. In 1850, at Minamiōji village 
of Izumi county, Izumi province, the economic situation was so difficult that 60 
wealthy households decided to allocate charity rice, barley, and cash in copper 
to “the destitute” (goku-nan) for a while. Meanwhile, the middle-class residents 
(chūbun-no-mono), about 170 households, were facing the same hardships and 
were in great need as well. However, the middle-class not only refused to accept 
alms from others, but also refused to go begging outside their community, so, 
as a substitute, the village officers distributed several kinds of reserved funds to 
these residents.42 In a sense of being “given” relief from others, accepting charity or 
reserved funds seems to be the same, but for the middle-class residents reserved 
funds were more acceptable since they themselves were investors of the funds; it 
relieved them of being haunted by the fear of being total “dependents” on their 
communities.
As in early modern Europe, seeking alms was not an unfamiliar choice to main-
tain subsistence in rural Japan, and begging was incorporated into the so-called 
economy of makeshifts, the household strategies for the survival of the indigent 
(Hufton 1974, King and Tomkins 2003). Nevertheless, there was a great differ-
ence between “buying,” “renting,” and being “given” when people decided to rely 
on others’ help; the last was avoided as much as possible because it meant being 
labeled unequivocally as a dependent or burden on the community, and had a high 
chance of bringing social sanctions onto oneself as well.43 A strong belief in evalu-
ating highly the ability for self-support backed these judgments, and this attitude 
was so strong that it could force the poor to flee from home even if their commu-
nity intended to continue supporting them. In Minamiōji village, in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, there was an impoverished household headed by a peasant 
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called Hanbei. His family was in so much need that not only were relief from kin 
and goningumi provided, but creditors also suspended demands for payment until 
his finances improved. The community showed a positive attitude to maintaining 
his subsistence but, at last, Hanbei’s family fled their home in 1846. The reason for 
their moonlight flight was a painful one; they felt so ashamed that they could not 
bear anymore to depend on others’ help. (The Hanbeis came back to Minamiōji 
village five years later and described the circumstances of why they fled and how 
they lived during their time away.)44 For peasants living in rural Tokugawa Japan, 
feeling sorry for neighbors’ burdens and pride in economic independence could 
outweigh the objective conditions of being offered relief in one’s home community.
THE HISTORICAL POSITION OF TOKUGAWA JAPAN IN 
D OMESTIC C ONTEXT
Poor relief in early modern rural Japan was substantially managed by the mic-
ropolitics of each autonomous village, which means numerous types of relief could 
be provided depending on duration, amount, and target. Thus, the quantitative 
approaches familiar in European poor relief studies are not useful for describing 
Tokugawa Japan, at either the state or the community level. On the other hand, 
even in these case-by-case circumstances, we are able to confirm the common 
attitudes held toward poor relief, which penetrated rural society in Japan. A stress 
on each household’s ability for self-reliance, or “self-help,” formed the core of com-
munal formal relief policies; an ad hoc attitude prevailed, and limited assistance in 
both quantity and duration was thought to be enough for even the most impov-
erished members. While the village community did not completely desert their 
indigent fellows and tried to support them as much as possible so as not to allow 
them to become bankrupt or totally hungry, once the recipients were regarded as a 
burden to the community, and especially when they were “given” communal help, 
then with the backup of targetism, harsh sanctions were implemented, even if the 
assistance was provided only occasionally.
From these characteristics of rural poor relief practices, several new histori-
cal images of the state and society of Japan can be discussed. First, the ad hoc 
attitude confirmed in osukui, the formal relief granted by the lords, can change 
our conventional view toward state power in early modern Japan. In previous 
studies, both the shogunate and the domains were regarded as holding “interven-
tional” powers toward public welfare, especially in the seventeenth century, and as 
lords’ finances got worse after the eighteenth century, the attitude toward osukui 
retreated. Reluctance to provide funds for granaries or lend grain to the needy was 
recognized as typical proof of the retreat of osukui policy.45
Certainly, as stressed in Masayuki Tanimoto’s chapter in part 1, the interven-
tional attitude toward building large-scale infrastructure, such as irrigation and 
urban development, tended to shrink after the eighteenth century, but that does 
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not mean the political attitude toward public welfare, typified by poor relief, 
“retreated” as well. The facts were far different, and as this chapter indicates, the 
lords’ principles for formal relief were established on an ad hoc basis from the 
beginning. Therefore, as also shown in part 1, expenditures for public welfare in 
the lords’ finances remained low throughout the era of the Tokugawa shogunate. 
No evidence shows the historical transition from a “positive” attitude toward osu-
kui to a “negative” one, and facts that had been recognized as showing this transi-
tion should be regarded as just a “ripple” in the vast ocean of occasional relief. 
Discussing whether the osukui policy “retreated” is out of the question in its his-
torical context from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth.
Moreover, the lords and the shogunate in Tokugawa Japan are often said to have 
governed their subjects with the idea of a Confucian-style benevolent rule called 
jinsei, and the osukui policy has been described as the symbol of jinsei ideology.46 
Acceptance of jinsei thought may explain partly why early modern rulers granted 
more relief than their preceding medieval lords. However, considering the ad hoc 
attitude toward osukui policy, we should not emphasize the rulers’ benevolent 
ideas in discussing the characteristics of poor relief in Tokugawa Japan. Repeatedly 
stressed in this chapter, the core of poor relief in early modern Japan lies in the 
micropolitics carried out in each autonomous village. Villagers of Wakabayashi 
in 1867 shamed the recipients on their own and not because of their lord’s order.
The historical position of the attitude to self-reliance should also be afforded 
attention. Previously, the emergence of stressing the ability for self-support was 
thought to be a symptom of “modernization,” and it was assumed that premodern 
Japan was transformed from a society essentially underpinned by people’s mutual 
assistance to a “modern, competitive” society in which a strong belief in the ability 
for self-help existed.47 However, as this study shows, self-supporting ability was 
strongly demanded from each peasant household from the beginning, and there-
fore, together with the combination of communal mutual assistance, Tokugawa 
villages vacillated throughout the era over which sector, personal or public, had 
the ultimate responsibility for saving the poor.
In the context of the Japanese history of poor relief, the Tokugawa era holds a 
unique and significant place. Even though an ad hoc attitude ruled poor relief in 
early modern Japan, both the lord and the communities did start to relieve impov-
erished households one by one, compared with the medieval era, when no active 
movement was made to assist the poor formally and individually for hundreds of 
years. On the other hand, the characteristics of poor relief in Tokugawa villages 
may have shaped the framework of the modern poor relief system, and even that 
of contemporary Japan. The modern poor relief system legitimated by the poor 
law jukkyū-kisoku of 1874 was known for its severe restrictiveness, shown in the 
extremely low ratio of recipients, compared with that of England under the Old 
Poor Law system.48 Twenty-first-century Japan is not more accommodating of the 
poor than it was in the prewar era; although a new comprehensive relief system 
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was started after 1950, the system has only covered 20% of the truly needy,49 and in 
spite of this low ratio and insufficient allowances, a harsh stigma that involves treat-
ing recipients as “lazy” occurs repeatedly. According to The Pew Global Attitudes 
Project 2007 Survey, the Japanese seem to now be the “coldest” nation in the world 
in terms of supportive attitudes toward a governmental safety net.50 Behind the 
restrictiveness incorporated into the modern relief system, Yoshimasa Ikeda per-
ceived a deep gap that existed between the Tokugawa mutual assistance practices 
managed by people’s autonomy and the modern relief system that imposed the 
poor law “from above” on the people as a blessing from the emperor and sup-
pressed the former practices of development “from the bottom” into a nationwide 
public welfare system.51 Certainly, we should not overlook the differences between 
the early modern and modern era, such as having a nationwide poor law system 
or not; however, more attention must be paid to the legacy or tradition that has 
survived from the seventeenth century onward. It must be remembered that tar-
getism, restrictiveness, sanctions, and a strong belief in self-help were the most 
significant elements of poor relief in rural Tokugawa Japan.
A C OMPAR ATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF JAPAN WITH 
ENGL AND,  PRUSSIA,  AND CHINA
As shown in the chapters in part 2, the characteristics of poor relief, as well as 
the types of historical documents concerning it, differed widely in early modern 
Japan, England, Prussia, and China. If the research areas are expanded, the differ-
ences will be diversified as well. Where numerous types of poor relief practices and 
systems might have prevailed, how can we compare them on the same dimension 
while not only mentioning the differences or varieties? An examination of how the 
vivid micropolitics at the communal level influenced the qualities of poor relief 
and whether sanctions were exercised against the recipients or not would be worth 
undertaking, because social sanctions and stigma surrounding poor relief, which 
made the welfare system work inefficiently, have been a big headache in several 
contemporary countries, and, therefore, research into the historical background 
to this problem is required acutely.
From this viewpoint, the historical experience of Tokugawa Japan would be a 
suitable benchmark for comparative discussions, as poor relief in early modern 
rural Japan was notably characterized by social sanctions and targetism imple-
mented at the micropolitical level in autonomous villages. To conclude this chap-
ter, we compare the characteristics of poor relief in Japan, England, Prussia, and 
China from the dimensions of micropolitics and social sanctions and then discuss 
the reason for the difference between areas where harsh sanctions were brought 
against the recipients and those that seemed to be not so eager about them.
From a Japanese perspective, the case of early modern England could be com-
pared to that of Tokugawa Japan on the same dimension. As is well known, from 
92    Chapter 5
the late sixteenth century onward, England constructed a unique, permanent, 
and nationwide poor relief system based on poor laws, poor rates collected from 
each parish, regular doles allocated weekly to the indigent, and a juridical system 
accepting complaints from applicants and recipients whose applications or allow-
ances had been rejected or cut off by the overseers (Slack 1988, 1990, King 2000, 
Hindle 2004, McIntosh 2012, Healey 2014).52
It would seem that England was completely different from Japan, where no 
poor laws, poor rates, or regular doles existed in the same period.53 However, if 
we adopt the viewpoint of targetism and sanctions, major commonalities surface: 
England’s poor relief system was also well known for the severity of its distinction 
between the “deserving” and the “undeserving” and its harsh attitude in shaming 
the recipients by coercing them to wear badges.54 While the two were differen-
tiated by whether or not they had a systematic support structure for the poor, 
recipients of communal formal relief in both areas were treated in a similar way 
by the fellows of their own parish or village: as a burden on the community. As 
the sanctions in rural Tokugawa Japan were managed by the micropolitics in each 
autonomous village, so was England’s badging policy determined by each parish 
and county’s micropolitics, which consisted of negotiations and struggles between 
the poor, the ratepayers, the overseers, and the justices of the peace.
While, in Japan and England, the micropolitical method is suitable for looking 
inside each village or parish autonomy, in early modern Prussia under demesne 
lordship (Gutsherrschaft), the viewpoint of micropolitics is also useful in exam-
ining the personal relationships between the demesne lords and their subjects. 
The protection provided by the lords for the peasants (tenants), which was called 
Konservation,55 is especially significant in discussing the history of poor relief from 
a comparative perspective.
In Prussia, in return for owning the peasant farm (the “upper ownership”) and 
withholding the “lower ownership,” lords accepted responsibility for their sub-
jects’ subsistence and had to protect their tenants’ everyday lives. Demesne lords 
were required to provide farm equipment, livestock, seeds, and buildings when 
they first leased their farms to tenants, and, in some cases, even beds and kitchen 
utensils were prepared.56 If tenants did not hold the lower ownership, lords were 
obligated to grant timber continuously in order to maintain tenants’ buildings.57 
Moreover, as Takashi Iida’s chapter in part 2 indicates, tenants could enjoy exemp-
tion from feudal rents in rebuilding their buildings, which were called “ordinary 
assistance.” These protections by the lords were called Konservation and were not 
regarded as a “blessing” but as the lords’ duty. Therefore, the cost of Konservation 
was not considered by the villagers to be a burden on their community, and would 
not provoke social sanctions against the recipients as well.
Of course, this does not mean that peasants in early modern Prussia lived 
peacefully under demesne lordship. Although providing timber allowance was the 
lords’ duty, routine maintenance of farm equipment, livestock, and seeds was the 
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tenants’ duty. If the tenants faced difficulties in performing this routine mainte-
nance, they had an opportunity to receive “extraordinary assistance” from their 
lords. However, as Iida’s case study shows, whether the extraordinary assistance 
would be granted or not depended on the negotiation between each lord and ten-
ant, which was influenced by the availability of a worthy successor to maintain the 
farm, and if the lord judged a tenant incompetent and ineligible for extraordinary 
assistance, the tenant was evicted from his farm and downgraded to the status of 
a lodger, even if he held the lower ownership. In the context of Prussian lordship, 
targetism played a role in the bargaining for extraordinary assistance, which was 
affected by the micropolitics between the demesne lords and the tenants.
On the other hand, as the population of lodgers grew during the eighteenth 
century, poor relief for them became a political and public problem since they 
were not integrated completely into the demesne lords’ personal protection. Thus, 
the Prussian state ordered each village to support their impoverished members, 
but, as shown in Iida’s chapter, the villagers’ reaction was rather negative: as in 
Japan and England, communal relief recipients were regarded as a burden on 
the community, and the Prussian villagers were so reluctant to relieve the poor 
that, in some cases, they even passed an impoverished lodger from one village to 
another to cut the cost of communal relief as much as possible. Although villag-
ers in Prussia did not shame the recipients by revealing their names or coercing 
them to wear badges, probably indicating the differences in the level of communal 
autonomy between Japan and England and Prussia, harsh sanctions in all areas 
were underpinned by the micropolitics at the local community level.
In contrast to these cases, no social sanctions were imposed on the recipients 
of poor relief in Qing China. As shown in R. Bin Wong’s chapter, Qing China 
developed a nationwide granary system which comprised “ever-normal granaries” 
set in county seats, “community granaries” in the countryside, and “charity grana-
ries” in major towns (Hoshi 1985, Will and Wong 1991). The ever-normal granary 
was the core of the system and, in combination with the community and charity 
granary, its main aim was stabilizing grain prices and relieving the poor by giving, 
lending, and selling grain at reduced prices.
What is noteworthy about China’s case is that, unlike Japan, where accepting 
communal alms was avoided as much as possible because it meant being labeled 
unequivocally as a dependent or burden on the community, no such stigma seem-
ingly existed in China, and no social sanctions were imposed on the recipients of 
free grain from these granaries. This difference probably depended on the degree 
of “openness” to relief resources. While the substance of communal formal relief 
in rural Tokugawa Japan was its restrictiveness underpinned by targetism, China’s 
granary system was actually open to anyone, including those who were not in 
real need but wanted to make an easy profit from it: merchants often bought up 
grain from the granaries for private resale, lowering the possibility of reduced-
price sales reaching the truly needy; corruption of officials who maintained the 
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granary system was always a headache for the authorities. Drawing up a list of the 
poor was attempted in some areas in the 1730s to the 1750s, but that targetism was 
not for selecting or excluding severely the “deserving” and “undeserving” but for 
protecting those who were eligible for granary sales or loans. Nevertheless, even 
this kind of listing did not work well in China because of the difficulties in locating 
and registering the poor.58
Previous studies have compiled detailed data on the holdings and balance 
of each type of granary in each area or the numbers of people fed by granary 
 disbursals. On the other hand, investigating what kind of people required and 
utilized free grains, loans, or reduced-price sales is hard because of the scarcity of 
historical records, which means that applying the micropolitical method to Qing 
China is not so easy. However, though our inquiry faces these problems, we are 
still able to conclude that, thanks to the granary system’s “open access” and 
 profitable characteristics, grain recipients in China did not face shame and 
 sanctions, and, ironically, that merit itself could also be an obstacle to efficient 
relief of the poor.
By comparing poor relief cases of Japan, England, Prussia, and China from the 
viewpoints of social sanctions, targetism, and micropolitics, we can gain an insight 
into what kinds of historical mechanisms provoked harsh sanctions against the 
recipients of communal formal relief in early modern societies.
As the cases of Japan and England show, targetism, alongside an efficient reg-
ister system, was a necessary condition to shame the recipients before their com-
munity members. The contrast was with China, where malfunctioning targetism 
and open granaries made sanctions less likely, though they simultaneously made 
relieving the truly needy less efficient.
However, as the negotiations with the extraordinary assistance between the 
Prussian lords and the peasants indicate, targetism alone would not bring about 
sanctions toward the recipients of relief at the community level. A decisive fac-
tor seems to have been a feeling of resentment against being burdened by the 
recipients of communal relief, among the communal charity donors in Tokugawa 
and Prussian villages and the ratepayers in England parishes. In order to provoke 
social sanctions, communal relief should be a “public” affair rather than just a “for-
mal” action. Thus, a viewpoint that favors micropolitics at the community level 
becomes significant since participating in communal politics is necessary to make 
the relief resources “public.” Tokugawa Japan provides more interesting evidence 
that shows types of relief that were free from sanctions, which helps us to under-
stand this mechanism. Whether the donors were all village members or only the 
wealthy villagers, once communal charity was provided through village autonomy, 
the almsgiving became a public affair and inevitably made the recipients a burden 
on the community. On the other hand, if the donor was a certain wealthy peasant 
and made the personal decision to grant charity, the almsgiving was regarded as 
a personal affair, which would not force the recipients to be a communal burden, 
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let alone be punished by their village fellows. Formal relief from the lords, the 
osukui, did not also provoke sanctions at the community level, even if it was allo-
cated through village autonomy. Though the actual resources of osukui came from 
the land tax collected from the villages ruled by each lord, alms from the lords 
were treated by the villagers not as a financial burden but as a “blessing” by the 
lords. Osukui was certainly “formal” relief but was assumed not to be “public” 
assistance, whereas communal relief underpinned by people’s autonomy was 
regarded not only as actual formal help but also as a public service of one’s com-
munity. Furthermore, as Japan shifted from a lordship state to a centralized nation 
at the latter half of the nineteenth century, the stigma surrounding poor relief went 
from a communal level to a national level. Although popular desire for sanctions 
managed at the micropolitical level in autonomous villages might have receded, 
the historical stigmatizing of relief recipients and the poor as dependent or lazy 
has become nationwide, as the expenditure on poor relief has become a matter of 
national interest.
Our volume may be the first attempt to compare poor relief in early modern 
societies, including not only European areas but also Asian areas, from the view-
point of social sanctions, targetism, and micropolitics. Only four areas are chosen, 
but even with those limited cases, we are able to obtain a great insight into the his-
torical background and mechanism of shaming the recipients of formal and pub-
lic relief, which, regrettably, still survives in our twenty-first-century societies. If 
we broaden our research areas, another historical path may appear. In continuing 
this approach, not only will a newer image of each early modern society become 
clearer, but we will also come to a deeper understanding of the characteristics of 
our contemporary world.
NOTES
1. For relief cases such as almsgiving in urban areas, see Yoshida 1991, Kitahara 1995. Beggars, 
called hi’nin, often formed their own autonomous status groups (Tsukada 1987, Ehlers 2018).
2. For details of the autonomy operated in village communities, see Masayuki Tanimoto’s and 
Kenichiro Aratake’s chapters in part 1.
3. There are only two historiographies that specialize in the Japanese history of poverty and welfare 
from a long-term perspective: Yoshida 1984, Ikeda 1986.
4. For tables: Ikeda 1986, 192, 194, 304–307, 310, 312, 539–541, 696–700, Garon 1997, 43.
5. For a survey on previous studies, see Kinoshita 2017, chap. 1.
6. If one crop field is ranked as jōden (a fertile rice paddy) and its todai is set at 1.5 koku per 1 tan, 
the kokudaka of 5 tan of jōden will be 7.5 koku.
7. For details and analysis of each household’s data, see Kinoshita 2017, chap. 2, 3.
8. Regional lords (han) in early modern Japan are usually translated as “domains,” but considering 
Wenkai He’s strict definitions of the “domain state” and “fiscal (tax) state,” han should be considered 
as “tax state” as well, and a definite category for “domain (demesne)” should be applied in the same 
way to those such as Gutsherrschaft in Brandenburg-Prussia, as shown in Takashi Iida’s chapter. In this 
chapter, we will use the term “domain” for convenience. See He 2013, 1–23.
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9. Kinoshita 2017, chap. 6.
10. The notion of characterizing early modern Japan as a compound state and regarding domains 
as “ ‘states’ within a ‘state’ ” is presented by Mark Ravina: Ravina 1999, 1–45.
11. Tokugawa Kinreikō, Zenshū 5, Sōbunsha, 1959, 154–155.
12. Fujita 1983, 51. Tōdō-han Yamashiro-yamato-bugyō Kiroku, Seibundō Shuppan, 1996, 62.
13. Yanagiya 2007, 254–255.
14. Drixler 2013, 158–169.
15. Nihonmatsushishi, 1, Nihonmatsu City, 1999, 706–720.
16. Tōdō-han Yamashiro-yamato-bugyō Kiroku, 380, Hashimotoshishi, Kinsei Shiryō 1, Hashimoto 
City, 2007, 94–95, Andochōshi, Shiryōhen Jōkan, Ando Town, 1990, 747–749.
17. Nara-bugyōsho Kiroku, Seibundō Shuppan, 1995, 163–174, 196.
18. Ōtomo 1982, 44, Ōguchi 1969, 37, Ōguchi 1981, 39, Ōno Mizuo, ed., Edo-bakufu Zaisei Shiryō 
Shūsei, Jōkan, Yoshikawakōbunkan, 2008, 368, Edo-bakufu Zaisei Shiryō Shūsei, Gekan, 39.
19. Nihonmatsushishi, 1, 718.
20. Yasuzawa Shūichi ed. Matsue-han Deiri-shōran, Hara Shobō, 1999, 33, 35, 57–67, 125, 165–171. 
Relief expenditures in the shogunate finance were also classified as “extraordinary expenses” (rinji-
gonyūyō or betsukuchi-haraikata): Edo-bakufu Zaisei Shiryō Shūsei, Jōkan, 363–370.
21. Kinoshita 2017, 263, 271.
22. Kinoshita 2017, 261.
23. Fujiiderashishi, 8, Fujiidera City, 1989, 133–134.
24. Kinoshita 2017, 241–242, 252.
25. Kinoshita 2017, 244.
26. Kinoshita 2017, chap. 2.
27. Hoshi 1985, Will and Wong 1991. See R. Bin Wong’s chapter in part 2 as well.
28. Even in the case of Izumi province in 1803, where an allowance called “everlasting formal re-
lief ” (ei-osukui) was provided to an aged resident through the granary, “everlasting” in fact meant just 
one month’s supply: Saito 2014, 299–301.
29. McIntosh 2012, 1–4.
30. Yanagiya 2007, 254–255.
31. The only exception would be the relief system introduced in Edo city in the late eighteenth 
century, which granted a constant allowance called jōshiki-osukui to those living in hunger with no 
supporters, such as orphans under ten, single people older than seventy who were also sick, and single 
youth who were chronically ill. Indigent families bearing sick members were also eligible: Yoshida 1991, 
3–38, Garon 1997, 30–31.
32. Jintarō Ichidaiki, Seibundō Shuppan, 1994, 65–68.
33. Kinoshita 2017, chap. 8.
34. Nihon Shisō Taikei, 3 Ritsuryō, Iwanami Shoten, 1976, 235.
35. Dainihon Komonjo, 2, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1901 (reproduced in 1968), 201–247.
36. Kikuchi 1997, 15–16.
37. Hindle 2004, 433–445.
38. Ikarugachōshi, Shiryōhen, Ikaruga Town, 1979, 493.
39. Kinoshita 2017, 244–245.
40. Okuda Shūzo, Genroku Murakata Nikki: Minami-yamashiro “Ueda-shi Kyūki” wo yomu, Bun-
rikaku, 1988, 75.
41. Kinoshita 2017, 223–224, 241–242.
42. Okudake-monjo, 6, Osaka Prefectural Library, 1971, 740.
43. Avoiding being “given” help from others demonstrates how loan agreements in everyday life were 
important for Tokugawa villagers. For details of microcredit in early modern rural Japan, see Ōtsuka 1996.
44. Okudake-monjo, 5, Osaka Prefectural Library, 1971, 781–783.
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45. Fukaya 1986, 63–97, Fukaya 1993, 15–66, Kikuchi 2003, 185–220.
46. Fukaya 1993, 15–66, Ehlers 2018, 1–32.
47. Yasumaru 1974, 4–55; Makihara 2006, vii–viii, 78–80, 88–91, 139, 201–202, Garon 1997, 31–32.
48. Ikeda 1986, 192–198.
49. Iwata 2007, 71–73.
50. Only 59% of Japanese people agree that taking care of the poor is the state’s or government’s 
responsibility, while most countries’ consensus on this issue reaches 80% to 90%: World Publics Wel-
come Global Trade—But Not Immigration: 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Cen-
ter, 2007, 22, www.pewglobal.org/files/2007/10/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Report-October-4–2007-RE-
VISED-UPDATED-5–27–14 pdf.
51. Ikeda 1986, 194–198.
52. See Jonathan Healey’s chapter in part 2 as well.
53. As Jonathan Healey insists, England outperformed other European countries as well in con-
structing a nationwide safety net, but even such countries (especially their urban areas) as France, 
Spain, Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries had a history of enacting poor laws, surveying the poor, 
and allocating regular weekly or monthly doles to the indigent, which did not exist at all in Tokugawa 
Japan: Healey 2014, 4, Jütte 1994, 45–58, 100–142, 201–203.
54. In Steve Hindle’s study, cases of badging policy are found in more than eighty parishes in 
England from 1677 to 1790: Hindle 2004, 438–440.
55. Eddie 2013, 29–67.
56. Eddie 2013, 46.
57. For details, see Takashi Iida’s chapter in part 4.
58. Will and Wong 1991, 398–399, 408. 
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THE “OLD” PO OR L AW
The English Old Poor Law was unique in early modern history, in that it was a 
national system of poor relief, funded by systematic taxation. It stipulated that 
each English and Welsh parish (there were around nine thousand at the time) was 
to collect money from those who could afford to pay, and to redistribute it to those 
of their poor neighbors who were unable to support themselves. From uncertain 
and somewhat faltering origins, it became established over the course of the sev-
enteenth century to a point where it was probably transferring around £400,000 
a year by the 1690s. This has been calculated as enough to feed about 5% of the 
population (Slack 1988, 170–173).
Why England developed this system before her neighbors is a difficult ques-
tion. On the face of it, the challenges faced by the English in the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries were no more acute than those anywhere else. As 
with much of Europe, rising population brought falling real wages: the numbers 
of those in poverty grew (Wrightson 2000). Certain economic and religious fac-
tors might have made the situation worse: England’s monasteries were dissolved 
in the 1530s under Henry VIII, removing their traditional role in the support of 
the needy; the chantries, which supported many institutional forms of relief, were 
swept away in the 1540s during the more radical Edwardian Reformation (Fideler 
2006). England may have been unusually capitalist, too, though this is arguable 
(Patriquin 2007). Certainly commentators at the time complained of enclosures, 
rising rents, and the engrossment of farms—though the old argument that these 
changes destroyed the peasantry can no longer be sustained (Whittle 2013). What 
seems to have happened is that population growth brought fissures among the 
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peasantry: wealthy peasants—the “yeomen”—got wealthier, buying new con-
sumer goods and rebuilding their houses into the handsome buildings that sur-
vive in the English countryside today (Wrightson 1977). Their poorer neighbors 
suffered, and it was these who provided the main “constituency” for the Poor Law. 
But many of these developments can be detected elsewhere in Western Europe. 
What— perhaps—was unique about England was the nature of the state. She was a 
unified political entity, with one Parliament and one system of law. Thus the Poor 
Law depended on statute law, and the political will among the governing class 
(from the Privy Council to local magistrates right down to parish officers them-
selves) to impose and manage it (Hindle 2004). Uniquely, it appears, in England 
this political will for a robust system of poor relief was there.
Central government played a major role in this, although there was also consid-
erable local initiative. The early sixteenth century had seen attempts to encourage 
voluntary giving to the poor, but as the problem intensified in the latter half of 
the century Parliament increasingly turned to compulsory rating (local taxation). 
Important work by Marjorie McIntosh has shown many parishes in the south and 
east implementing rates and formal relief in the later sixteenth century, but the 
key acts were those of 1598 and 1601 (the latter slightly modifying the former) 
(McIntosh 2011). These codified existing laws that provided for a local taxation and 
support for the impotent poor, as well as for work to be created for those who were 
unemployed but able-bodied, but they also created an effective mechanism for the 
system’s operation (Slack 1990). Thus the statute of 1601 ordered that overseers of 
the poor (the parish officers charged with the day-to-day management of the Poor 
Law) in each parish were to set to work “all such persons, married or unmarried, 
having no means to maintain them, use no ordinary and daily trade of life to get 
their living by,” and relieve with cash “the lame, impotent, old, blind, and such 
other among them being poor and not able to work.” Poor children, meanwhile, 
were to be apprenticed (43 Eliz. I, c. 2). This was to be supervised by magistrates, 
who effectively oversaw the overseers.
The English Poor Law thus created was, in a sense, a classical public good pro-
vider, although the exact nature of the “public good” has been a topic of debate. 
It has variously been credited with helping to foster social stability, end famine, 
and even underpin the economic risk-taking that allowed a large portion of the 
English labor force to specialize in industry (Solar 1995, Hindle 2000, Smith 2011). 
It was also a system in which the regional society played a major role. Setting aside 
the point that England was a relatively small country, and in population terms lit-
tle larger than a province of China or of the Ottoman or Mughal Empires (to name 
but a few), one of the most fundamental tenets of the Poor Law was the devolution 
of its administration to a set of local institutions. Most fundamentally, its day-
to-day operation took place at the parish level (or, in northern England, where 
parishes could be very large, at the level of the township). These were local, rather 
than regional, societies, but each parish was only semiautonomous of control from 
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more obviously “regional” bodies. Most importantly, parishes and townships were 
subject to the jurisdiction of the magistracy: the body of amateur officials, usually 
gentry, that administered the English legal system at the regional level (Fletcher 
1986). Particularly important were the counties, at which magistrates (“justices 
of the peace” or “JPs”) sat as members of the “county bench,” looking after local 
administration, and presiding over the county courts, known as “Quarter Sessions” 
(because they sat four times a year). In the early years of the Poor Law, Quarter 
Sessions played a major role in ensuring the implementation of Poor Law legisla-
tion, and throughout the Old Poor Law period (1598 to its drastic alteration by 
Parliament in 1834), magistrates at Quarter Sessions helped mold local practice 
by hearing appeals against local judgments on relief and “settlement” (the law that 
dictated which parish was obliged to relieve whom). By the latter part of the sev-
enteenth century, if not earlier, many counties had devolved much of this business 
down to relatively new tier of government, the “Petty Sessions division,” some-
times coterminous with the old “hundreds” at the subcounty level. Nonetheless, 
either by counties or by Petty Sessions divisions, the element of regional supervi-
sion over the more “local” parishes remained an important part of the Poor Law 
story. Indeed, it has been suggested—though not without question—that regional 
cultures of welfare existed by the eighteenth century at least. In the south and east, 
it is suggested, the regional welfare culture was relatively generous; in the north 
and west, meanwhile, the culture was one of parsimony (King 2000). Certainly 
spending per head was lower in northern and western counties, but whether this 
reflects a frugal regional welfare culture, or different economic needs and possi-
bilities, remains open to debate.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the Old Poor Law as a 
provider of a public good. Obviously “public good” is a somewhat nebulous con-
cept, but here I will define the key public good provided as the right of people 
not to starve to death, so long as they were willing (if not necessarily able) to 
work. This was not a new “right” in the seventeenth century, nor was it unique to 
England (Swanson 1997). But, with the Poor Law, England made a uniquely thor-
ough attempt in the seventeenth century to turn a theoretical right into a real one. 
With this in mind, we can examine the reasons people called upon the Poor Law 
to support them, and use these to create a model of the social function of formal 
poor relief that will hopefully be useful for comparative purposes. In doing this, 
I would like to suggest that the prime function of the Poor Law was the provi-
sion of social security against personal, and household, economic risk. If the key 
public good underpinning the Poor Law was the right not to starve, this meant 
that it worked as a system of social insurance against the uncertainties of a harsh 
economic environment.
In keeping with the themes of the book, and in order to explore a critical issue, 
this chapter will focus its evidence on one “region,” namely, the historic county of 
Lancashire in the northwest of England. This was clearly a “regional society” in a 
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meaningful sense, although it was—of course—neither independent nor uniform. 
It was, indeed, economically quite diverse: mostly pasture farming, but with a dis-
tinction between the rough grazing of the uplands of the Pennines and southern 
Lake District and the plusher pastures of the lowlands (Walton 1987, Phillips and 
Smith 1994). It also had areas of good arable land, most notably the Fylde plain on 
the western seaboard. And it was an area of developing rural industries: woollens 
in the east, and cotton-using textiles in the southeast. In the southwest there was a 
growing metalwork industry reliant on local supplies of coal.
The chapter will begin by looking at the nature of Poor Law administration 
in our “regional society,” arguing that county-level institutions were important 
in determining policy, and highlighting our key sources: petitions by paupers, 
archived by those county institutions. After this, it will discuss the “economy of 
makeshifts” in which formal poor relief operated: a term used by historians for the 
very diverse collection of “survival strategies” deployed by those facing hardship, 
on top of (but not excluding) application for support from the Poor Law. Next, 
we will consider what the evidence tells us about the nature of poverty as relieved 
(or expected to be relieved) by the Poor Law. Then, finally, I would like to say 
something about the role of the Poor Law in bringing about the end of famine in 
England, something that took place in the seventeenth century, at around the same 
time as the implementation of the Poor Law. I would like to suggest that this was 
not a coincidence. Indeed, Lancashire, as a regional society subject to famine until 
relatively late, constitutes a very valuable case study of this development.
L ANCASHIRE AS A “REGIONAL SO CIET Y ”
Although England was unified by a monarchy, a parliament, and a system of law, 
it was also—in some senses—a patchwork of regions. Counties remained crucial 
focal points for peoples’ political and social activities, particularly in the case of the 
landed gentry (for a sceptical discussion of this, see Holmes 1980). More generally, 
people were conscious that their lives were bounded by what was usually called 
their “country.” This word has evolved to mean, in contemporary English, some-
thing akin to the “nation-state,” but in the early modern period the word “country” 
usually referred to a smaller area, often unified by some economic or administra-
tive characteristic. Famously, Wiltshire had its “chalk” country and its “cheese” 
country. Daniel Defoe, visiting the Sheffield area in the early eighteenth century, 
wrote about the “country called Hallamshire” (Hey 2016, 1–4). Such examples 
could be multiplied.
Where these regional units had administrative functions, most obviously in the 
case of counties but also with hundreds, Petty Sessions divisions, and other units, 
they played a major role in the formulation of Poor Law policy. In the early years 
of the system, counties and divisions can be seen directing parishes within their 
respective jurisdictions (Lister 1888, Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts 
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1905). In the 1630s, with the royal government pushing for local enforcement, the 
Privy Council ordered justices in their divisions to push on with the implementa-
tion of the Poor Laws, and to report back (Quintrell 1980). Meanwhile, county 
government was crucial to the reimplementation of formal poor relief in the 
aftermath of the first Civil War (1642–1646), albeit this time under pressure from 
below (Hindle 2008). Nonetheless, the growth of poor relief was always driven 
by a dynamic interaction between national regional and local institutions. Each 
component was important.
In Lancashire, the administrative landscape was perhaps especially com-
plex (Healey 2010a). Because parishes were very large, the fundamental unit of 
administration gradually became the township—an old subdivision of the parish. 
Confusingly, parishes did still maintain a role in some areas, especially where the 
level of poverty was uneven across a large parish, and thus the parish served as 
a useful mechanism for redistribution of expenditure across space. These were 
then subject to higher jurisdictions: most immediate were Petty Sessions divisions, 
which covered a group of parishes, and theoretically met as a body of magistrates 
every six weeks. Above these were the institutions of the county, although because 
Lancashire was quite large and suffered relatively poor communications these 
county institutions actually met in four separate locations: at Lancashire for the 
north of the county, at Preston for the middle areas, at Manchester for the south-
east, and alternating between Wigan and Ormskirk for the southwest. In addition, 
Lancashire’s justices met to discuss administration at “Sheriff ’s Table,” during the 
biannual visitation by the Assize judges on circuit out of London.
Central to the operation of this administrative web was the system of appeal, 
often by petition, whereby those with a grievance against some local decision took 
their case to higher institutions. Crucially, decisions made in townships could be 
appealed upward. Increasingly, it would seem that Petty Sessions divisions were 
taking these cases on, but happily for historians, Quarter Sessions heard many 
thousands of these cases across the seventeenth century. Thus, from the end of the 
Civil War to the first decade of the eighteenth century magistrates heard an aver-
age of nearly fifty new cases relating to the relief of individual paupers coming up 
to Quarter Sessions every year. On top of this, they also dealt with appeals for hab-
itation orders and settlement cases. Of course, compared to the number of people 
relieved in the county without such appeals, these are small numbers, but these 
were likely to have been the most contested, borderline cases. They could thus set 
important precedents. Appeals also generated documentation, and in some cases, 
actual petitions survive.
ASKING FOR PO OR RELIEF
These surviving petitions are the crucial sources for this chapter. Some 3,169 initial 
petitions survive for the county (i.e., excluding those whose case had already been 
Coping with Risk    105
heard and were thus contesting some aspect of a former order). In order to under-
stand the importance of these as sources, it is worth noting how they differ from 
other material relating to the English Poor Law (Healey 2014). The system of paro-
chial poor relief was, quite apart from anything else, an impressive bureaucracy. In 
theory, each parish or township was to write up lists of both taxpayers and recipi-
ents of poor relief. At least from the middle decades of the seventeenth century, it 
seems that the majority of parishes did this. Only a minority of these survive, but 
where they do they are extremely useful sources, and historians have used them to 
recover local poor relief policies, and some data about the number and nature of 
the poor in receipt of relief. The big problem, of course, is that such accounts are 
records of relief rather than poverty. They can tell us what people got, but they do 
not necessarily tell us why they needed it. For this, historians have had to be more 
creative. Sometimes, they have used the (sadly rare) pauper censuses that survive 
for some English towns. Because these often collected more data about recipi-
ents (such as information about earnings, family sizes, or infirmities) they can be 
mined for insights into the question of who got poor relief (Pound 1971, Slack 1975, 
Healey 2010b). Alternatively, historians have deployed “nominal record linkage” 
(the linking of names found in Poor Law records with those in other sources) to 
gain similar insights. In particular, they have linked records of Poor Law payments 
to “family reconstitutions,” which give basic demographic data about parishio-
ners. This is a time-consuming methodology, and it is subject to some important 
source biases—most notably its difficulty in “seeing” the migrant poor—but it has 
nonetheless underpinned some important and influential studies of poverty and 
its relief (Wales 1984, Newman-Brown 1984, Williams 2011).
An issue with all of these sources is that they are “top down”: that is, they do 
not give the poor a voice of their own. In recent years, historians of the Old Poor 
Law have developed a much greater interest in sources that record some element 
of the “voices” of the poor (Hitchcock, King, and Sharpe 1997). For the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, there now exists a vibrant literature on pauper letters—
sources generated when a pauper who lived in a parish different from their place 
of formal “settlement” applied back to that parish of settlement for relief (Sokoll 
2001). These are incredible sources, which in many cases appear to have actually 
been written by the paupers themselves. None, or very few, survive for the seven-
teenth century, but for this period there are sometimes archives of pauper peti-
tions, such as the many thousands that survive for Lancashire. In most cases, these 
petitions were created when a poor individual had been refused relief by their 
parish or township, and were thus appealing over the heads of local officers to the 
magistracy in the hope of a more favorable hearing. In the process, the pauper 
described what conditions had left them in poverty, as well as (sometimes) giving 
information about their strategies of avoiding destitution.
They need to be read carefully, however. So far as can be seen, petitions of the 
period were rarely actually written by the poor. They were at best “hybrid voices” 
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in which the stories of the poor were transmitted to paper and thus to the court 
and to history by the scribe. Indeed, they follow a well-established epistolary form, 
starting with a salutation, following with a narrative of the reasons for poverty, and 
ending with an appeal to the conscience and benevolence of the magistrates, and 
usually an offer to pray for their soul (Jones and King 2015). They are instrumental 
documents: they had a specific political purpose—getting a dole—which means 
they are not objective records of the past. Nor are they necessarily a representative 
sample of the poor themselves: they normally refer to cases in which the pauper 
had been refused relief in the first instance. As has been noted, they were probably 
representative of the most controversial cases.
This all said, petitions—particularly their narrative section, in which the 
would-be pauper set out the reasons for her or his poverty—present an exciting 
opportunity for historians to explore why some people needed poor relief, and 
what they expected of the Old Poor Law. Before we do this, though, we need to 
say something about issues of reliability. Clearly, as these were instrumental docu-
ments, they cannot necessarily be taken as unproblematic records of “historical 
truth.” Rather, they are a representation of poverty aimed at provoking sympathy 
and (ultimately) a dole. Nonetheless, petitioners were subject to a series of checks, 
which likely prevented them from lying outright. As petitioners tended to be illit-
erate, the scribe would have acted as a potential moral check on any obvious false-
hoods. Meanwhile, petitioners appear to have been expected to present petitions 
in person, and to have been subjected to some kind of cross-examination in court. 
Moreover, townships aggrieved by particularly serious falsehoods could them-
selves appeal successful petitions, allowing them to present contrary evidence. In 
most cases, petitions seem to have been successful, and not to have generated an 
appeal: this probably speaks to their general accuracy as a record of individual 
hardships. Finally, even if we refuse to trust a single statement in any of the peti-
tions as representative of historical “truth,” then they still exist as representations 
of deserving poverty: they can be taken, at the very least, as powerful statements of 
what people expected the Poor Law to do. The remainder of this chapter will tackle 
this question in more detail, focusing on the evidence contained in the Lancashire 
petitions. It first points out that formal poor relief existed as one part of a wider 
“economy of makeshifts,” before discussing the kinds of economic misfortune that 
brought people to need poor relief, and then finally exploring the suggestion that 
the Old Poor Law was an important factor in the disappearance of famine from 
England in the seventeenth century.
THE “EC ONOMY OF MAKESHIFT S”
It has become clear in the last couple of generations of Poor Law scholarship that 
formal poor relief was just one way in which those in poverty supported them-
selves (Ben-Amos 2000, Boulton 2000, King and Tomkins 2003, Muldrew and 
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King 2003, Hindle 2004, 15–95, Ben-Amos 2008). The petitions, for example, show 
paupers getting help from their kin, or neighbors. Grace Rydings of Heywood, for 
example, told in 1656 that she
hath been sick about two months and having but 3d a week allowance was enforced 
to go abroad for relief and coming to one James Hardman’s house being in the par-
ish of Middleton for an alms [sic] was so sick and weak that she could not go again 
into the parish of Bury neither hath any place of abode but for the space of 12 days 
hath been at the said James Hardman’s house and put him to cost and trouble. (LA, 
QSP/124/18)
Sometimes petitioners worked for small wages. Anthony Higginson of Priest 
Hutton recalled in 1656 that, when able of body, he had undertaken “so hard a 
labour or another lawful calling as killing of foxes, badgers and other devour-
ing creatures which he much used when he was not otherwise employed” (LA, 
QSP/129/5). Some, meanwhile, admitted to begging for alms, though they might 
profess a reluctance to keep doing so. In 1663, for example, Jane Seed of Ribchester 
stated that she went begging for relief, but was “ashamed” to have to do so (LA, 
QSP/234/16). Others still stated that they had sold their possessions: land, cows, 
even the clothes from their back, to pay for their relief (Healey 2014).
The existence of such strategies of “making shift” is, of course, well attested 
by existing scholarship. Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, for example, has shown how 
“gifts and favours” were crucial to social relations at all levels of wealth (Ben-Amos 
2000, Ben-Amos 2008). The importance of formal charity as part of a “mixed 
economy of welfare” was emphasized most effectively by Joanna Innes, while a 
recent project has done much to recover the importance of almshouses to the sup-
port for the vulnerable (Innes 1996, Broad 1999, Goose, Caffrey, and Langley 2016). 
Meanwhile, although there is surprisingly little evidence for it in the Lancashire 
petitions, it has long been supposed that the poor were often able to make use of 
common land to help make ends meet (Neeson 1993).
Slightly ambiguously, formal poor relief existed as part of this “economy of 
makeshifts,” and there is no necessary reason to think that paupers saw the taking 
of relief from the parish as especially different from taking it from their neighbors 
as charity. But formal relief also clearly existed in part to plug the gaps in this 
“economy of makeshifts.” It is, for example, implicit in petitions that one of the 
reasons people might need parish support was that their attempts to “make shift” 
had failed. They needed relief because they had no kin, because their neighbors 
were exhausted, because they had sold all their goods and had none left, or because 
they were too sick to beg relief from door to door. It is thus possible to argue 
that one of the functions of poor relief was to provide support where structural 
changes were making the wider “economy of makeshifts” less capable of support-
ing the marginal population. So, as enclosure removed common land, as people 
moved more and perhaps fractured their relationships with kin and neighbors, or 
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as certain industries ebbed and flowed (perhaps most obviously the destruction of 
hand spinning at the end of the eighteenth century), in each of these cases formal 
poor relief picked up some of the slack. More generally, this emphasizes the point 
that poor relief existed within a wider social environment: need was dictated not 
just by the availability of resources, but also by cultural norms. It was accepted, as 
we shall see, that women should earn less than men, and this patriarchal assump-
tion had consequences for the nature of poverty: it meant you were more likely 
to be poor if you were female (Bennett 1992). Ethical considerations, particularly 
notions of distributional justice, were also a part of this: petitioners might ask for 
relief “as may stand with justice and equity and as is usual in such cases,” or they 
might claim their circumstances were “fitter for a swine then a Christian who 
is of the age of 65 years and lame” (LA, QSP/52/14; QSP/129/5; cf. QSP/197/15; 
QSP/570/2). Such statements betoken ethical ideas about acceptable and unac-
ceptable levels of deprivation, and these clearly conditioned peoples’ expectations 
of the Poor Law.
THE CAUSES OF POVERT Y
The key pieces of information in petitions, though, are the causes of poverty 
reported by the petitioner. The main ones mentioned were old age, sickness, and 
family breakdown.
Forty-three percent of the petitioners complained of old age. This, they said, 
brought crippling decrepitude—failing eyesight, reduced mobility. William 
Oldham of Heaton Norris summed the problem up when he claimed poverty in 
1691 through the “weakness in body and other infirmities always attending upon 
old age.” He was eighty-two (LA, QSP/699/3). The key problem was simply that it 
was very hard for the aged to earn their living. John Burrow of Skerton was explicit 
about this in 1649 when he complained that “of late infirm and decrepit old age 
hath taken his work from him that he cannot neither will people have him to work 
as formerly” (LA, QSP/9/2). Alice Simpson, also of Skerton, petitioned in 1658 that 
she was “now far stricken into years, and of late grown blind, so that she is not any 
longer able to labour for her liveing or to help herself in any sort” (LA, QSP/153/7). 
Such examples could be multiplied many times over.
Neither were falling incomes the only problem. Senility and weakness of body 
also meant that individuals needed help to complete previously simple domestic 
tasks. Sometimes this help could be offered as charity by well-meaning neighbors, 
but if this was not available domestic assistance had to be paid for. Jane Bridge 
of Fazakerley, for example, pleaded in 1662 that she was “now somewhat aged & 
grown so infirm & weak of body, that your petitioner is not able to work for her 
living, & many times your petitioner’s said weakness is so extreme that had she 
meat your petitioner were not able to feed herself ” (LA, QSP/223/20). And in 1694, 
William Makater of Upholland provided a graphic image of old age, with him 
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“now scarce able to perform a day’s work, and his wife so extreme impotent that 
she is scarce able to crawl or go about” (LA, QSP/742/2).
Around 50%, on the other hand, claimed poverty on account of being ill. In 
fact, “old age” and “sickness” were clearly sometimes related, and it may well be 
that in some senses they were seen as two sides of a broader concept of bodily 
“impotence.” Although this is an idea that awaits its historian, the notion of the 
poor, impotent body was probably a crucial cultural idea underpinning poor relief 
in the period. Among those who were not also old, this figure was 55%. Given 
the vagueness of the petitions, and the unsophisticated medical knowledge of the 
time, we cannot read too much into the different diseases reported. Lameness and 
blindness were very common complaints, but others told of palsies, agues, the 
King’s Evil (scrofula), falling sickness, and mental incapacity. Elizabeth Dandy of 
Tarleton told JPs in 1701 that she was troubled with “a mazyness in her head that 
she is ready to fall if she doth not support herself by taking hold of some table 
or stool to help her” (LA, QSP/860/51). Isabel Hardman of Manchester had—in 
1699—“a melancholy man to her husband,” and as a result “none of your peti-
tioners family hath had or eaten any bread for the space of 3 days last past” (LA, 
QSP/833/18). One couple suffered a “surfeit of cold,” while another man told of 
being “very sore broken in his private parts” (LA, QSP/828/37; QSP/630/17). Anne 
Orrell of Pemberton was given poor relief in 1700 after being poisoned by her 
lover, the toxin being administered in a cup of sugary water he had given her to 
toast their marriage (LA, QSP/848/17). Pregnancy, while not—of course—a sick-
ness, was often written about in similar terms: in its final stages it acted as a form 
of bodily infirmity, reducing one’s ability to work. In 1688, Elizabeth Renshaw of 
Stretford petitioned that she had been widowed, and was great with child, and “is 
not able to work any longer by reason of her bigness with child” (LA, QSP/646/4). 
Just under 2% of petitioners referred to current or recent pregnancy.
Petitions also recounted cases of people suffering mental disabilities, including 
those from birth, and those of more recent onset. One of the most vivid examples 
is Mary Hill of Manchester, who in 1706 told of how her husband “has been mel-
ancholy for thirty years last past and now is wholly distracted and raving mad,” 
leaving her fully “employed in attending and looking after him” (LA, QSP/945/5). 
Others told of accidents. In 1658, John Singleton—a servant from Broughton-in-
Amounderness—needed poor relief after he was lamed by falling off a ladder (LA, 
QSP/162/1). John Renshall of Stretford claimed in 1655 that he was doubly unlucky. 
He had been blind in one eye for ten years, having been “at work making hedge 
for Sir Cecil Trafford, Knight, hastily stooping down chanced to hit his [other] eye 
upon an hazel stick & thereby lost the sight thereof ” (LA, QSP/120/8). There were 
also cases of injuries in coal mines and one petitioner who was hurt building a 
bridge (e.g., LA, QSP/224/6).
The third major stated cause of poverty was household breakdown. Some 40% 
of petitions referred to being single, either through widowhood or, in many cases, 
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through simple abandonment. This was a more serious problem for women than 
men, indeed only two male petitioners told of being abandoned by their wives 
(though several did mention being widowers). The problems of family breakdown 
were essentially twofold. First, in a society that tended to ascribe fairly inflexible 
economic roles to men and women, families needed to pool what were then thought 
of as “male” and “female” activities. Hence the difficulty felt by widowed husbands. 
John Howard of Chadderton is a good example. He petitioned in 1670 that
his vocation is what he can get with following and driving of two little horses loaded 
with coals or other loading what he can procure from one place to another, so as 
your petitioner by his calling is much forced to bee from his children and cannot be 
without someone amongst his children to dress and order them. (LA, QSP/360/13)
Second, marriage served as a form of risk-pooling in a difficult economic environ-
ment. Two incomes were always better than one. William Nicholson of Ulverston 
recounted in 1659 that, as he aged and his eyesight failed, his wife had been “his 
helper and the best comfort he had under God” (LA, QSP/173/7). And express-
ing the same sentiment from a rather different angle was Thomas Singleton of 
Wharles, who in 1660 lamented that he and his wife had become so destitute that 
“neither of them [were] able to look to one another when in any sickness or mis-
ery” (LA, QSP/198/36). Ultimately, though, family breakdown was gendered: it 
was a more serious occurrence for women than it was for men. This was an issue of 
culture and social structure: England was a patriarchal society where the earning 
power of women was lower than that of men.
Children were another element that could unbalance the family economy. It 
is not easy to get much meaningful quantitative information from the petitions, 
because paupers appear to have mentioned children who had evidently already 
left home. But it is worth noting that 43% of the petitioners mentioned having one 
or more children—and some had quite impressively large families: nine or ten 
children in a handful of cases.
Rather less frequent, but still important, were those who told of being 
 unemployed—or faced with what we might call a “cost of living crisis”—and those 
who had suffered some environmental misfortune such as fire, flood, or theft. John 
Leigh of Walton-le-Dale is an example of the latter. He petitioned in 1678 that he 
and his wife were
now reduced into poverty by reason of the two late great floods which happened in 
Walton aforesaid about the 11th of September a year ago at which time your peti-
tioner lost ten acres & a half of wheat, barley, & oats besides the washing down of 
your petitioner’s hedges and your petitioner further sheweth that your petitioner 
the year after for bread, corn, seed & other necessaries became indebted in the sum 
of fifty pounds by reason whereof your poor petitioner is clearly ruined & undone. 
(LA, QSP/483/7)
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As for economic crises, the best thing is to count the number of petitions received 
on over time, and to look for peaks. There were peaks in 1638, 1647–1650, 1657–1662, 
1674–1675, and 1699–1700. During these, it was not uncommon for petitioners to 
complain of high prices, or of the lack of available work, or simply of the “hard-
ness of the times.” In 1648, for example, William Ward of Alkrington reported that 
he and his wife were “especially now of late by reason of the scarcity of bread & 
hardness of the times both of them . . . brought into extreme want & misery” (LA, 
QSP/8/7). “I have but very little work,” Rebecca Hopwood told Manchester JPs in 
1699, “and everything is very dear” (LA, QSP/828/31).
Essentially, then, the fact petitioners were asking for support in times of family 
breakdown, sickness, old age, and other crises suggests that they construed the 
Poor Law as a system of support in the face of certain forms of economic risk. 
What unified these risks was that they caused people either to need more money 
or to have more difficulty in earning money, and that they occurred through no 
fault of the petitioner. The Poor Law was, then, a form of public good that pro-
vided support for people in the face of misfortune (if we can, indeed, describe old 
age—or having “too many” children—as misfortune). This fits with, and indeed 
expands upon, the work of scholars—such as, recently, Samantha Williams—who 
have emphasized the importance of “life-cycle poverty,” in other words, poverty 
that hits households at certain semipredictable moments in the family life-cycle 
(youth, old age, widowhood, and a period in middle age when families were “over-
charged with children” [Williams 2011]). It is also worth noting the concept of 
“nuclear hardship” (Laslett 1988). This emphasizes the importance of the nuclear 
household in early modern England, stressing its autonomy and weak interactions 
with kin, and posits this as a reason for the reliance in England on the “collectiv-
ity” to provide insurance against starvation. This argument has been questioned, 
on the grounds that kin interactions were not necessarily as weak as once thought, 
and because the English household was perhaps more flexible than the model 
allowed (Reay 1996). But, at its fundamentals, it is hard to argue against the idea 
that those in receipt of poor relief needed it, in part, because their kin networks 
were unable to protect them from misfortune. The Poor Law can thus be seen as 
providing a public good that—arguably—in other societies may have been pro-
vided by more flexible forms of household formation and by kin.
THE DISAPPEAR ANCE OF FAMINE
England suffered its last famine in 1623, and even this was a regional affair. We 
know relatively little about famine in earlier periods, although there was clearly 
major crisis in the years around 1315–1321, a famine in 1438, and recurrent crises 
in the reign of Henry VIII (Kershaw 1973, Pollard 1989, Sharp 2016). There is evi-
dence for starvation, even in Westminster, in the late 1550s, although this is hard 
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to disentangle from a much wider set of epidemics at the end of that decade. We 
get onto safer ground in the later sixteenth century, once we have access to vital 
registration data in the form of parish registers, and studies have suggested severe 
hunger coupled with an epidemic (perhaps typhus) in 1587–1588, a famine in 1597, 
and a regional famine in 1623 (Appleby 1978, Walter and Schofield 1989). After 
this, there were no more English famines, despite periods of bad harvests in the 
later 1640s, the 1690s, and at other times. In the 1720s, high prices coincided with 
high mortality, but this was explicitly considered an epidemic by contemporaries, 
and the geography of mortality does not fit what we would expect from a famine 
(Healey 2008). Other countries, within the British Isles and beyond, continued to 
suffer famines long after England had stopped doing so (Ó Gráda 2009). Scotland 
suffered widespread starvation throughout the seventeenth century, and especially 
during the “Ill Years” of the 1690s. Ireland, of course, remained famine prone in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The worst famine was probably that of 
1740–41, known as the “Year of Slaughter.” In Europe, famines continued to occur 
into the eighteenth century, although they were in decline by the early nineteenth. 
The history of famine in Asia and Africa is long and heartbreaking.
England, then, was unusual in its early “escape” from famine, something that 
demands explanation. Partly, no doubt, it was a reflection of growing wealth, and 
growing purchasing power on the international grain market. Improved local dis-
tribution networks, greater crop diversity, and of course access to colonial sources 
of food (including Ireland) undoubtedly also helped. The role of government is 
less clear. Ironically, indeed, formal government intervention in the grain market 
largely ceased at around the time that famine did, so it is hard to argue that this 
was a successful weapon in the war on hunger (Outhwaite 1981).
The Poor Law, on the other hand, seems likely to have had a role. There is, indeed, 
considerable circumstantial evidence for this. The geography of the spread of poor 
relief, for example, seems to fit quite well with the retreat of famine. In the 1590s, at 
a time when formal poor relief was only weakly implanted, even in the South, fam-
ine was general. By 1623, formal poor relief appears to have been much better estab-
lished in the South, but hardly so in the North. That year, famine hit the North, but 
not the South. After 1623, formal poor relief became more solidly embedded in 
northern parts; the dearths of 1630–1631, 1637, and 1647–1650 were ridden out with-
out mass starvation. There is evidence from poor accounts that relief costs could 
and did rise to meet peaks in the price of food. At Amersham (Buckinghamshire), 
for example, overseers in 1631 gave additional money to their poor “which have not 
of the weekly collection to buy corn in the time of dearth” (CBS, PR4/12/2, 41). In 
1730, William Stout of Lancaster reported, “[t]he last year, being a dearth of corn, 
increased the poor, so that our poor tax was advanced from one hundred to two 
hundred pounds a year” (Stout 1967, 207). Moreover, as we have seen, the record of 
the Lancashire petitions shows very noticeable peaks in 1637, 1647–1650, 1658–1662, 
1674–1675, and 1699: all of these were years of high prices.
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If we are to postulate a relationship between the English Poor Law and the 
decline of famine, then we might also speculate as to how this relationship might 
have worked. Most obviously the Poor Law had the power to prop up people’s 
“exchange entitlements” (Sen 1981). Thus, where food was available but was simply 
unaffordable (because of either high prices or low incomes), transfer payments 
through the Poor Law might ensure that everyone could eat. A more subtle reason, 
though, might relate to the impact of the Poor Law on migration patterns during 
crises. Disease was, it seems, usually the major proximate killer in famines. In 
Continental Europe, it has been pointed out, institutions of charity and formal 
poor relief tended to be strongly centered on the cities and towns (Smith 2011). 
This meant that, when poor harvests struck, the poor were forced to flee to urban 
centers to get poor relief, and as they did so they crowded in poorly sanitized 
suburbs. This dislocation, and particularly the movement of underfed people to 
crowded areas, greatly exacerbated the spread of disease, and thus of famine mor-
tality. In England, by contrast, poor relief was available at home, even in rural par-
ishes. This meant there was less imperative to migrate in search of succor, and thus 
disease spread less readily. Such a relationship makes logical sense, and indeed 
was sometimes visible to contemporaries. The town of Lamport in Somerset, for 
example, clearly saw the failure of poor relief as potentially leading to the spread of 
disease. During a plague outbreak in 1641 they complained to Bath Assizes that a 
tax for the relief of the poor was not being paid, “whereby the poore inhabitants of 
the said towne are like to famish or to breake into partes adjacent for releefe which 
may scatter a further infection” (Cockburn 1971, 4).
There is, of course, no reason that the two explanations are mutually exclusive. 
Both, however, do depend on there being enough food going around for everyone 
to eat. The Poor Law can only, therefore, be part of an explanation for the disap-
pearance of famine; improved food security must have been important too. But it 
seems a strong likelihood that a robust, national system of transfers to the poor 
played a considerable role.
C OPING WITH RISK
The Poor Law provided security against economic misfortune for everyone who 
was prepared to work. Given the character of the economy of early modern 
England this misfortune usually entailed bodily infirmity through either old age or 
sickness—“impotence” in the language of the time—but it could also encompass 
the exposure to economic hardship through the death of a spouse. This was seri-
ous for women and men, but it was always more serious for the former. The Poor 
Law helped protect against misfortune, but that misfortune itself was a product of 
the social and cultural landscape of the age. It was conditioned by the nature of the 
economy, by the demographic environment, by cultural notions of social justice 
and of the role of kin, and of course by the dead hand of patriarchy. Within this, 
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though, the public good ultimately provided by the Poor Law was social security 
against misfortune.
The role of the “regional society” in the provision of this public good was, how-
ever, somewhat ambiguous. There were, of course, many different entities that 
could claim to be “regional societies” in England, including counties, hundred, 
Petty Sessions divisions, older territorial units such as Baronies, and even some of 
the larger parishes. The sheer “localness” of Poor Law administration should never 
be underestimated: each parish—in large measure—set its own policies based on 
local conditions. The character of the local economy and the local availability of 
non–Poor Law charitable resources both colored the response to poverty in each 
individual parish (Broad 1999). Nonetheless, the focus here on county records, 
heard by magistrates, emphasizes the importance of regional institutions. These, 
because they had clear policy influence, helped implant a regional dimension to 
the operation of poor relief. The early modern “regional society” was undoubtedly 
an influence on the provision of this particular public good.
What the developmental impact of the provision of social security as a public 
good was is hard to say, but it is nonetheless worth asking. England was not, of 
course, the only country that provided such a safety net, though at this point it 
seems to have been the only country that operated a national, tax-funded system 
of poor relief based on the redistribution of cash to the needy poor. It seems likely 
that it played a role in the contemporaneous disappearance of famine. Whether it 
also helped underpin the industrial development that was just starting and was to 
transform England, Britain, and the world in two centuries will have to remain a 
matter for speculation.
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While the Prussian Kingdom rose to become one of the European great powers 
through expanding its army, territories, and economic power during the eigh-
teenth century, it still had a highly feudal structure characterized by demesne 
lordship (Gutsherrschaft), specifically in its provinces east of the Elbe River. The 
Hohenzollern monarchs were not only sovereigns of the Prussian state but also 
the lords of their domain estates that they owned just as noble lords owned their 
own estates. The income from domain estates increased remarkably and took a 
significant part of Prussian public finances throughout the eighteenth century 
(table 5).
In East Elbian Prussia, demesne lordship developed in the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries and existed until dissolution through the “peasant emancipation” 
that began in 1807 as a part of the Prussian reforms. Demesne lords had one or 
more estates as their landed properties, which comprised not only farms that their 
subject peasants held in hereditary or leasehold tenure, but also their own demesne 
farms and forests. The tenant peasants were obligated to pay feudal rents in kind, 
money, or labor. As the lords’ demesne farms enlarged, they compelled peasants to 
render even more labor services, often with draught animals. To ensure such labor, 
the lords restricted their peasants’ freedom to leave the farm and even required the 
peasants’ children to work as servants, also known as Gesinde. Thus, entire peas-
ant families became hereditary subjects (Erbuntertanen) to their particular lords. 
The subjects were also subordinated to their lords’ judicial right.1 While the lords 
thus strengthened their rule over their subject peasants, they were also obligated 
to support these subjects. The lords were obligated to grant timber to (re)build and 
repair buildings on peasant farms, especially in case of leasehold tenure, as well as 
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1713 1.6 2.4 3.4 2.5 38,000 1,600,000
1740 3.3 3.6 7 5–6 72,000 2,200,000
1786 6–7 10–11 23 12–13 195,000 5,400,000
1806 7–8 16 27 16–17 250,000 10,700,000
Source: Schmoller 1898, 180.
Note: rt = Reichstaler.
to provide peasants with firewood, litter, and fodder from their forests, as will be 
detailed in chapter 13 of this volume. Otherwise, they were generally obligated to 
support their subjects in case of need.
In his study from 1887 of the “peasant emancipation” from the demesne lord-
ship in Prussia, Georg Friedrich Knapp wrote a pioneering description of the East 
Elbian demesne lordship and gave a picture of the subject peasants as generally 
impoverished, unmotivated, and incapable of development under oppressive feu-
dal lordship, despite being on the verge of emancipation. He illustrated their deep 
dependence on their lords for a wide range of life’s necessities, suggesting that 
there was a region where “many subjects openly say that they do not regard it 
as an injustice to steal their lords’ goods, and do not call it theft, but nourishing 
by the lords.”2 Thereafter, for a century, the image of the patriarchal care of East 
Elbian lords for their subjects became a tradition in the scholarship,3 although 
counterevidence was cited as well.4 However, the traditional image was funda-
mentally challenged by new research beginning in the mid-1980s, which offered 
a more dynamic and diverse view of the peasants’ economy and society under the 
demesne lordship.5 Since then, the image of generally impoverished and depen-
dent East Elbian peasants can no longer be upheld. Nevertheless, it is still worth 
focusing on the lords’ obligations and practices to support their subjects’ lives, 
which varied according to the conditions.6
However, the lords were not solely responsible for supporting impoverished 
people. During the eighteenth century, the Prussian state sought to provide relief 
to the impoverished people through village or town communities.7 This was all the 
more necessary because of the emergence of a new type of rural populace. After 
the resettlement of peasant farms that had been deserted because of the Thirty 
Years’ War, the Prussian state’s population growth policy meant to ensure a large 
army (table 5) led to an increase in the number of cottage residents. Among them, 
the lodgers (Einlieger) especially were free persons who, in contrast to subject 
peasants of feudal estates, could leave an estate freely but were more likely to fall 
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into poverty. These landless people were beyond the control of each feudal estate 
and were to be supported publicly by the state authorities or each village and town 
community.
This chapter illustrates how this dual system of poor relief functioned in rural 
Brandenburg in the late eighteenth century, focusing on the case of the royal 
domain of Alt-Ruppin, one of the fifty-four royal domains in the Kurmark (the 
greater part of Brandenburg comprising the Altmark west of the Elbe River and 
East Elbian areas down to the Oder River surrounding Berlin). Around 1800, the 
Alt-Ruppin domain comprised two towns and twenty-seven villages.
RUR AL POPUL ATION,  SO CIET Y,  AND EC ONOMY IN 
L ATE-EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY KURMARK
During the eighteenth century, rural Brandenburg experienced rapid popula-
tion growth and social differentiation. Between 1725 and 1800, the number of 
rural establishments in the Kurmark increased from 35,784 to 65,804. While 
the number of peasant farm holders (Bauern and Kossäten) remained almost 
constant at around twenty-eight thousand, because of the impartibility of the 
farms, the number of cottage residents (Büdner and Einlieger) increased from 
7,930 to 36,345.8
In the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin, the number of large peasants (Bauern) and 
small peasants (Kossäten) was almost unchanged at around 420 and 110 between 
1764 and 1800. While farms passed undivided to a single child, noninheriting heirs 
were compensated with a portion with which they married into a peasant farm, 
set up a cottage, or rented it. Consequently, the cottage-resident class repeated 
their self-reproduction and became denser, because there was almost no chance 
of upward social mobility to the farm-holding class.9 Between 1764 and 1800, the 
number of cottagers (Büdner), who owned a cottage, remained also constant at 
124 after the rapid increase in the 1750s. However, lodgers (Einlieger) who rented a 
cottage that was built mostly on a peasant farm increased rapidly from 135 in 1764 
to 322 in 1800 (see table 8 in chapter 13). Cottagers and lodgers usually earned 
their living as laborers, handicraftsmen, or soldiers. In this social differentiation, 
poverty became concentrated among the cottage-resident class, especially among 
lodgers.
In the last decades of the eighteenth century, the social disparity between peas-
ant farmers and cottage residents widened. In this period, rural Brandenburg 
experienced an agrarian boom, in which grain prices almost doubled, because 
of increasing demands from industrializing England, the growing population 
of Berlin, and increasing number of local cottage residents.10 While increasing 
grain prices benefited peasant farmers, they disadvantaged cottage residents as 
grain consumers. This contrast increased poverty and issues pertaining to the 
Coping with Poverty in Rural Brandenburg    121
cottage-resident class. However, the peasant-farmer class was also never free from 
poverty, as the next section examines.
C OPING WITH IMPOVERISHED FARM HOLDERS
When a tenant peasant family was impoverished, the feudal lord’s authorities 
immediately handled this matter. It was no wonder because the impoverishment 
inevitably affected the economy of the tenant farm that made up the lord’s landed 
property. According to the Prussian General Legal Code (Allgemeines Landrecht 
für die preußischen Staaten) of 1794,11 every lord was obligated to look after his 
subjects unstintingly in case of need (II 7 §122). However, he was entitled to evict 
his peasant subjects not only in case of rebelliousness or crime (§289, §290, §291) 
but for economic reasons as well. An eviction could take place if the peasant 
ruined his farm and its appurtenances through slovenly economy (§288), if he 
wasted the loan (§292), or because of old age or an incurable disease rendering 
him incompetent to manage his farm economy (§293). The reason for evicting a 
peasant was based on his “incompetence” (Untüchtigkeit) in maintaining his farm 
economy. The lords required that a farm holder retain the number of livestock and 
maintain farm buildings such as houses, stables, and barns. Indeed, every usu-
fructuary holder and owner of peasant farms in the royal domains could obtain 
the necessary building timber from the royal forest free of charge or by paying 
one-third of the cost respectively.12 In the case of rebuilding, they could enjoy the 
“ordinary” assistance of Baufreiheiten, an exemption from feudal rent for specific 
years. Otherwise, the farm holder himself was responsible for retaining the num-
ber of livestock and maintaining buildings. How did the feudal authorities actually 
cope with an impoverished farm holder between their obligation to support him 
and their right to evict him? The following case of a farm-owning small peasant 
(Erbkossät) named Joachim Siering in the village of Schönberg in the royal domain 
of Alt-Ruppin13 serves as an illustration.
On April 21, 1784, Joachim Siering petitioned his lord, King Friedrich II, for 
extraordinary assistance to reconstruct his living house, stable, and barn, which 
were beyond repair. Since he had taken over the farm from his father, he kept it as 
a “most faithful subject,” put great effort into cultivating it, and repaid part of the 
loan on it. However, “as an impoverished man,” he could not afford to reconstruct 
the farm buildings. He attributed his poverty to family misfortunes. His mother 
had a lame hand, and of his seven children, one had a lame hand and stiff arm, and 
another a bandy leg. Siering had also been sick for a long time. In addition, two 
horses had died the previous winter.
Questioned by domain officials, the village headman of Schönberg named 
Döring confirmed that the difficulties of Siering’s farm economy mainly origi-
nated in his unfortunate family circumstances: when he inherited his father’s 
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farm twenty years earlier, it was already not mortgage-free, and he could marry 
only a poor woman with a dowry of ten Reichstaler. His family then grew, and of 
his seven children, four were still infants, and two were handicapped, as Siering 
complained. Furthermore, while supporting his growing family, he had to give 
a portion of retirement to his father for ten years and to his still-living mother, 
who was too infirm to work, for twenty years. Döring blamed him only for the 
frequent death of his horses, as Siering was engaged in transporting wares to 
different markets for handicraftsmen and tradesmen, which exhausted the ani-
mals, resulting in improper cultivation of the crop fields. Otherwise, Döring did 
not blame Siering for anything, and attested that he was never lazy in his farm 
economy.
Based on this attestation, the domain official of Alt-Ruppin gave his opinion 
to the Board of War and Domains in the Kurmark (Kurmärkische Kriegs- und 
Domänenkammer). His opinion was that Siering was a worthy recipient of extraor-
dinary assistance, with which he could restore the farm economy “with the largest 
possibility.” However, the Board did not accept this proposal, because the assistance 
cost 327 Reichstaler, which, while enough to rebuild the farm and complete the live-
stock, was too much for a small peasant farm. Thus, on March 26, 1785, the Board 
decided that Siering should sell his farm to someone capable of renovating it.
This decision suggests that unfortunate family circumstances such as Siering’s 
were not reason enough for a peasant to be allowed to keep his farm by obtaining 
extraordinary assistance from the lords. In the late eighteenth century, the lords 
in the Kurmark saw good prospects of finding a satisfying successor. Population 
growth and the drastic rise of grain prices meant that there were usually several 
well-off applicants waiting to obtain a vacant farm or marry a widowed farmer, 
among which the lords could choose the highest bidder.14 In this situation, lords 
could hardly decide to let an impoverished peasant remain as a farm holder by 
generously granting him extraordinary assistance.
Indeed, lords could make a different decision when a competent successor was 
not available. From the end of the Thirty Years’ War to the early eighteenth cen-
tury, the lords prioritized the restoration of devastated farms. A “people shortage” 
and agrarian depression made this restoration difficult. As such, they were forced 
to keep a farmer regardless of how poverty-stricken he was. Even after restora-
tion was completed, it was sometimes impossible to find a person willing to take 
on a ruined farm, especially when it was on poor soil and saddled with heavier 
labor obligations. In this case, the lords had to leave in place the impoverished 
farmer who had ruined the farm and provide him with extraordinary assistance.15 
However, these cases became more infrequent toward the late eighteenth century, 
because of the population growth and the agrarian boom. Thus, an impoverished 
peasant like Siering had less opportunity to keep the farm.
Before the eviction was decided, Siering started to find a purchaser who could 
both afford to renovate the farm buildings and livestock and provide him and 
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his family with at least free lodging on the farm. After much meandering, on 
May 2, 1786, the Board finally approved purchase of Siering’s farm by Christoph 
Hartmann, a large peasant in Schönberg. Hartmann offered to renovate the farm 
only if he received extraordinary assistance of sixty Reichstaler from the royal 
budget. In addition, he permitted Siering and his wife to live in a cottage, which 
was to be built on the farm, free of charge and for life, and offered the land culti-
vated annually with two Metzen (6.87 liter) of flax seed free of charge, as long as 
one of them was alive. As owner of another farm, Hartmann had to agree to hand 
over Siering’s farm to one of his sons or a competent person in five years, because 
no person was allowed to have two farms. However, until then, Hartmann could 
permit Siering’s family members to live in their original house and, while doing 
so, build a cottage into which they could move when handing over the house to a 
new farm owner.
Thus, forced transfer of the farm to a well-off successor helped the lords to 
minimize their costs of renovating the farm and the farm-leaving peasant family 
to obtain support for their future lives from the farm. However, it was uncertain 
whether the successor was ready and able to take on such support.16 Even when 
support was offered from a new farm holder such as in Siering’s case, it was usually 
temporary, because the new holder was interested in using his cottage to support 
his own family or for rent. Furthermore, on an impartible peasant farm in early 
modern Germany, it was usually the case that new people successively came to 
hold the farm through remarriage with a widowed farm holder, which meant that 
the interests of earlier farm-holder families were not really considered.17
After Joachim Siering and his wife died, the free lodging and free use of land 
cultivated with flax were no longer guaranteed for their handicapped children. 
Thereafter, they could not enjoy the support from the farm owners, which was 
authorized by the domain authorities, and had to rely on relief from their close 
relatives or, if not, on public relief, as was the norm for impoverished persons liv-
ing in a cottage.
C OPING WITH THE POVERT Y OF  
C OT TAGE RESIDENT S
While tenants of peasant farms were usually subjects (Untertanen) of feudal lords 
and thus were not entitled to leave the farms without the lords’ consent, lodgers 
(Einlieger) were free persons, who could move to another estate without seeking 
the lords’ consent.18 However, the lords’ authorities reserved the right to consent 
to admission of lodgers in the estate,19 and levy Schutzgeld (protection money) 
on them: in case of the royal domains, one Reichstaler on a lodger couple and 
twelve Groschen on a single lodger. Therefore, at least every six years, when the 
lease of a domain to the domain official was renewed, the domain authorities com-
piled a list of all the lodgers, who rented a cottage in the domain with his or her 
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Table 6. Number and Life Circumstances of Lodgers in the Rural Settlements in the Royal 
 Domain of Alt-Ruppin, 1771–1783
  1771 1777 1783
Lodgers (total) 149 170 168
Impoverished, without means, supported, begging 7 12 27
Elderly, sick, handicapped, single mothers, invalid 
soldiers
- 19 13
Sources: BLHA, Rep. 2, Kurmärkische Kriegs- und Domänenkammer, D. 16367, fol. 124–8, 402–3; D. 16368, fol. 
88–92, 198–9; D. 16369, fol. 39–44, 92–4.
family or alone, to estimate the income generated by the Schutzgeld. The lists also 
included information on each lodger’s life circumstances that could affect  ability 
to pay Schutzgeld. Table 6 is an extract of three available lists of lodgers in the 
 Alt-Ruppin domain, which were drafted for the domain lease every six years, from 
1771, 1777, and 1783. Over time, the number of impoverished lodgers—indicated as 
“ impoverished,” “without means,” “supported,” or “begging”—increased from seven 
to twenty-seven, and their proportion among lodgers also increased from 4.7% to 
16.1%. In addition, several lodgers were not indicated as impoverished but had 
difficulty—indicated as being “elderly,” “sick,” “handicapped,” “single mothers,” 
and “invalid soldiers”—and were likely to fall into poverty. Thus, the domain 
authorities cleared from paying Schutzgeld all impoverished lodgers and those 
having  difficulty, as well as all soldiers.
However, it was not up to the domain authorities but the state authorities 
to provide for the impoverished lodgers. That is, feeding and clothing the poor 
was practiced not in the feudal patrimonial space but in the public space, where 
the state authorities charged each village community with the task regardless 
of whether it belonged to a royal domain or a noble estate. Starting in 1725, the 
Prussian state repeatedly ordered the judicial authority of each village or town 
community to establish its treasury to support the impoverished people living in 
the village or town. The main motive of these orders was that, from day to day, still 
more paupers and beggars were rushing to the city of Berlin from other towns and 
the countryside. Generally, however, the village communities remained passive 
and reluctant in this task. According to a study and report from 1745 on village 
communities in the district (Kreis) of Ruppin, many villages had not established 
a treasury and some that had had ceased its operation. In fact, in the nine vil-
lages in the royal domain of Lindow, which were in 1764 incorporated in the Alt-
Ruppin domain, the treasury ceased in 1735, when the yearly cash contribution by 
villagers stopped. Instead, community members took turns to feed or clothe the 
impoverished, which, according to the report, was easier for them than making a 
yearly cash contribution to the treasury. In eight villages originally belonging to 
the Alt-Ruppin domain, where a treasury had established in and around 1725 and 
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still existed in 1745, the yearly contribution was not fixed, except in one village.20 
By 1769 and 1773, the number of the villages with treasuries or collecting boxes 
for the impoverished had increased. However, in several villages, contributions 
remained irregular.21
The village communities were cautious not only in their fixed contributions to 
the treasury, but also in supporting the local impoverished people, especially in 
the 1790s. To clear the country and towns in the Kurmark of beggars, three houses 
for impoverished and invalid people were established from 1791 on. A house for 
four hundred beggars and two hundred invalids was established near the town 
of Strausberg, and another for two hundred beggars and one hundred invalids 
was established near each of the towns of Wittstock and Brandenburg.22 However, 
since the establishment of these public houses for the impoverished on the provin-
cial level, many problems occurred pertaining to the local impoverished people, 
who were meant to be supported in each village. As reported in the inspection 
protocol of 1797 on villages in the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin, local impoverished 
people were oppressed in the most outrageous ways.23 These problems generally 
occurred in the Kurmark.24
The problems were related to the then custom that only a person who had lived 
for three years in a village was recognized as a local impoverished person eligible 
for support from the village community.25 The inspection protocol of 1797 on vil-
lages in the Alt-Ruppin domain reported three common patterns to the problems 
experienced. First, it was conjectured that a person or his children would become 
a burden on the village community, because of disease, old age, or having no close 
relatives. In this case, if the person had not yet lived for a full three years in the 
village, he was driven out toward the end of this period, at the risk of not being 
readmitted elsewhere. Second, if a person had already lived in a village for three 
or more years, the opposite scenario often occurred, especially in the case of an 
invalid soldier. Because the village community was obligated to support him, he 
behaved as he pleased and often neglected his obligation to serve as a herdsman. 
Third, an elderly person qualified as a local impoverished person who was eligible 
for relief by a village and, while still willing to work, could not find employment 
in the area. However, he could not leave for another village, because he would not 
be accepted elsewhere due to the risk of having to support him and his children 
in the future.26
Reluctant to take on tasks pertaining to relieving impoverished people, villages 
shifted the responsibility onto the parties close to the impoverished. The village of 
Herzberg refused to support orphaned children, whose father had moved to the 
village less than three full years before his death. Ultimately, the children’s relatives 
offered to support the orphans provided that the village of Herzberg fed them with 
a few Scheffel of rye.27 Furthermore, the village of Wildberg adopted a measure 
whereby each cottage owner had to support impoverished lodgers living in his 
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cottage to reduce the collective burden of the villagers. Unfortunately, this led to 
the cruel practice of driving lodgers between cottages after the lease period.28
Remember that according to the 1797 inspection protocol, each village adopted 
its cruel policy toward those lodgers likely to fall into poverty after the houses 
for impoverished and invalid people were established in the Kurmark. Another 
report of the same year also observed the emerging phenomenon of accommoda-
tion shortages for lodgers.29 However, while this was not common, there had been 
similar incidents previously in the Kurmark. Jan Peters found a case from 1728, 
in which an impoverished, elderly, sick woman was passed from one village to 
more than ten other villages across the border between Saxony and the Kurmark 
without being accommodated until she ultimately died. Peters argued that this 
organized form of collective refusal to accommodate a person in need of help was 
already familiar to the villages.30 This likely long-established merciless practice of 
village communities became common after the provincial houses for impover-
ished and invalid people were established. Thus, the village communities forced 
their responsibility onto the provincial institutions.
In the Kurmark Brandenburg, feudal lords were obligated to support their 
 impoverished subject peasants unstintingly. However, only in cases in which 
a competent successor was lacking was an impoverished peasant allowed to 
keep the farm while enjoying extraordinary assistance from his lord. In the 
late  eighteenth century, which was characterized by population growth and the 
agrarian boom, lords generally had good prospects for replacing an impover-
ished peasant with a competent successor selected from several applicants. 
Even in this case, the lords did not leave the evicted family to fend for them-
selves, but arranged as far as possible for the new peasant farmer to support the 
evicted  family by  accommodating them in a cottage on the farm or offering life’s 
 necessities, albeit for a limited time.
An increasing number of cottage residents, especially lodgers, suffered more 
frequently from poverty in the late eighteenth century. Indeed, the feudal lords 
helped impoverished lodgers in their estates by not holding them liable for the 
Schutzgeld payment. However, it was the task of the state authorities to provide 
for the impoverished lodgers, who could freely move over the boundary of feudal 
estates. To remedy the problem of the paupers or beggars rushing to the city of 
Berlin, the state ordered each village community to relieve the poor in the village 
by establishing a treasury for that purpose. However, the villages were never will-
ing to take on this task. They did not always carry out the order to give a yearly or 
monthly fixed contribution to the treasury to assist the impoverished. The villages 
were inclined to shift the responsibility of support to the close relatives of local 
impoverished people or the owner of the cottage in which an impoverished lodger 
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lived. Often, the villages refused to accept a lodger in prospective poverty and 
passed him from one village to another to avoid the future responsibility of having 
to support him and his family. This cruel practice of village communities, which 
had likely been long established, became common in response to the establishment 
of the houses for impoverished and invalid people on the provincial level in 1791.
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This chapter on Chinese efforts to cope with the problem of poverty and the 
threats of famine differs from other chapters in this part of the book regarding 
the spatial scale on which it addresses the topic. It places local activities within 
a much larger spatial frame than even the English case study since England is 
spatially and demographically so much smaller than China. England’s population 
of less than six million and China’s some two hundred million around 1750 mean 
China’s efforts at addressing poverty and famine affected a population many times 
the size of England’s. The two other case studies of early-modern-era approaches 
to poverty and famine stress actions taken within small spaces—Japanese efforts 
within the village and Prussian efforts by lords spanning a number of villages. 
In China, most county-level officials in the eighteenth century organized their 
efforts far from the political center and relied in part on the organizational efforts 
and financial resources of people without any formal positions in the govern-
ment; in this respect their activities resembled those we have seen in our other 
case studies. But because their efforts together were part of a virtually empire-
wide system, certainly in terms of population if not including some of the newly 
subjugated Inner Asian components of the empire, the centrally coordinated 
activities created public goods on spatial and demographic scales dwarfing those 
found elsewhere. To understand how and why policies to address poverty and 
relieve famine occurred on such a large scale in eighteenth-century China, a brief 
introduction to the ideological foundations of Chinese approaches to poverty as 
part of a broader focus on issues of material welfare provides some background to 
eighteenth-century policies that are designed to sustain people through times of 
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harvest hardship, and that are especially mindful that poorer people needed help 
on a more regular basis.
THE IDEOLO GICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
BACKGROUND TO FO OD SUPPLY POLICIES
Between the sixth and third centuries bce, a number of Chinese political think-
ers conceived social order and the viability of political rule to be linked in a direct 
manner that provided part of the basis for the subsequent imperial era’s approach 
to governance. The ruler’s political success depended on his ability and commit-
ment to benefiting the people (利民 limin). By formulating policies intended to 
promote common people’s material welfare, rulers could achieve both social sta-
bility and political acceptance. Governments could appeal to their subjects to sup-
port them in their competition with rival governments for territory and subjects 
during the Warring States era (475–221 bce). Such demands for service in times of 
war made more sense when understood by people to be coupled with the means 
to secure a livelihood. This approach to governance recognized the limited orga-
nizational capacity that rulers could call upon to enforce their will through coer-
cion and encouraged rulers to recognize that meeting their desires for wealth and 
power over the long run were more likely to be achieved by promoting the ability 
of people to produce more output than by impoverishing them in the short run 
through high taxation. Reputation as a benevolent ruler in a time of intense politi-
cal competition made more likely that subjects would not flee and even encouraged 
those suffering hardship from other rulers to settle in his territory (El Amine 2015).
Chinese concerns for the material welfare of the people in subsequent centuries 
covered at least three areas—the circulation of resources and goods in society, the 
possession of the means to produce for one’s needs, and intervention by the state 
when the production and circulation of grains failed to provide for people due to 
either poverty or dearth. Framing direct state interventions to address poverty 
and dearth became elements of an approach to governance known as jingshi (經
世statecraft) intended to foster “learning of practical use to society” (經世之用
jingshi zhi yong) in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries; the statecraft 
tradition informed policy discussions and choices in subsequent centuries, tak-
ing particular salience in moments of crisis but present as a backdrop to concep-
tions of state approaches to popular material welfare more generally (Hymes and 
Schirokauer 1993). To understand how the issue of poverty and dearth figured in 
the more general context of statecraft governance, this chapter considers the cir-
culation of food supplies among resources more generally and efforts to promote 
common people’s capacities to achieve material security through their own labors, 
before considering directly the eighteenth-century recognition of the desirability 
132    Chapter 8
to intervene against vulnerability to harvest fluctuations and, in extreme situa-
tions, famine.
THE IMPORTANCE OF MARKET S AND THE 
C ONSTRUCTION OF AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
C OMMERCIAL AGR ARIAN EMPIRE
The notion of the emperor anchoring his authority and demonstrating his vir-
tue (and hence legitimacy) according to his concern for popular material welfare 
began to be persuasive in the Han dynasty (206 bce–220 ad), China’s second 
imperial dynasty and the first to last beyond its founding emperor. A Confucian 
political logic of conceiving the state’s support to rest upon a society of small-scale 
agriculturalists whose taxes would support the government depended upon insu-
lating them from the predations of large land-owning lords to whom they could 
be reduced to some form of tenancy or servitude. Promoting popular welfare was 
thus one political strategy for creating a political base of support and avoiding 
the emergence of powerful families who could challenge imperial authority and 
power; at times more an aspiration than a reality, the logic nevertheless indicates a 
general frame of reference within which the use and hence flows of resources could 
be imagined and thus pursued. The fifteenth-century scholar Qiu Jun included in 
his discussion of the principles for the management of wealth a logic traced to 
what had initially been a divination text but became between the sixth and third 
centuries bce a cosmological and philosophical text, the Yijing (Book of Changes), 
addressing the unity of opposites and processes of change moving both cyclically 
and through historical time. Using the Book of Changes as a reference point, Qiu 
Jun discusses the movement of resources from the government to the people and 
from the rich to the poor; both movements promise future increases in wealth 
from which either the government or the wealthy would benefit. Government 
financial management, in Qiu Jun’s formulation, matters not only to a successful 
state but also to a prosperous society. Conceived properly and pursued effectively, 
state fiscal policies not only avoid harming the people greatly, but indeed also pro-
vide the basic conditions for increasing social wealth based on how resources flow 
within society and between the government and its subjects. Such resource flows 
became part of a far larger circulation of goods through markets in subsequent 
centuries.1
During the Song dynasty (960–1279) China experienced what Mark Elvin 
famously called a “medieval economic revolution” based on improvements in agri-
cultural productivity, largely owing to the expansion of paddy rice agriculture, the 
expansion of water transport for goods, and the emergence of merchants indepen-
dent of the kinds of state regulation present in earlier centuries and the expansion 
of market networks (Elvin 1973). After 1500, regional merchant groups and two 
especially prominent merchant groups associated with the northern province of 
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Shanxi and Huizhou prefecture in the eastern province of Anhui with empire-
wide networks moved increasing amounts of diverse goods between counties, 
across provincial borders, and even greater distances where riverine transporta-
tion was well developed and maintained. Craft production, which had been more 
town-centered than rural-based in Song times, had become increasingly common 
among rural households who pursued a combination of crops (including cash 
crops) and crafts for which market exchange was essential. This meant the econ-
omy was both largely agrarian and commercial at the same time. Moreover, this 
economic expansion took place within an empire that provided, over great dis-
tances for considerable segments of time, the relatively peaceful and secure condi-
tions that enabled trade to proceed relatively free of disruption and dislocation 
caused by violence, be this widespread banditry or more problematic war making 
of the sort that became increasingly present across the European landscape of the 
early modern era (Rosenthal and Wong 2011, 89–91).
The contrast between European interstate competition and a largely peaceful 
Chinese empire became more vivid in the eighteenth century when two especially 
activist emperors dominated the country from the 1720s into the 1790s. The prior-
ity placed on the circulation of goods, in particular grain, was made plain by the 
Yongzheng emperor (r. 1723–1735), who often opposed the efforts by officials in the 
provinces to impede the commercial flow of grain for fear that exports from their 
jurisdictions could create shortages amid possibilities of poor harvest (Abe 1957). 
Since grain on markets flowed from areas with prices lower than those to which it 
was being shipped, it made sense from a supply and demand perspective to uphold 
the free circulation of grain. Chinese notions of circulation related the logic of 
circulation to that of balance, in this case balancing supply and demand indicated 
by price differences. Officials also had concerns regarding balancing grain prices 
through the year. Market prices were lower when the fall harvests were reaped 
and far higher in the lean spring season when the past year’s harvests had been 
depleted. To meet this annual cycle of price fluctuations, ever-normal granaries 
(常平倉 changping cang) were established in each of more than thirteen hundred 
county seats and charged with selling grain in the spring to lower market prices 
and restocking in the fall after harvests brought prices down below those at which 
officials had sold grain the previous spring. These granaries in turn formed the 
core of a broader set of civilian granaries that were a major line of defense against 
conditions of serious dearth that threatened famine, a subject to be explored fur-
ther in this chapter (Will and Wong 1991).
Another indication of the relatively favorable conditions for trade in 
 eighteenth-century China compared to conditions in Europe was the low transit 
taxes levied in China. European rulers relied heavily on commercial  taxation to 
satisfy their growing appetites for fiscal resources needed to pursue war making 
with one another. China lacked such demands as there were no threats of war mak-
ing within China corresponding to the European space within which war making 
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was a chronic threat. With low commercial taxes, all domestic trade with the 
exception of salt avoided the heavy hand of the state. Salt production and distribu-
tion were administered by the state; production was legally limited to households 
registered for this purpose and distribution was limited in principle to merchants 
who had purchased licenses authorizing them to participate in the trade within 
the areas for which their licenses applied (Chiang 1983). Restricting legal partici-
pation in the salt trade to a small set of merchants fostered the emergence of a few 
very wealthy merchants, a common outcome of restricting access to a market—the 
state garnered revenues from these individuals, who in turn enjoyed the privi-
lege of limited competition from other sellers of salt, much as Dutch and English 
merchants who were members of their respective chartered companies engaged 
in Asian trade benefited from the limits to competition from other Dutch and 
English merchants not part of the chartered companies. In China more gener-
ally, however, the state favored market competition and the presence of multiple 
buyers and sellers, which made less likely the presence of a few merchants able to 
manipulate prices by holding supplies off the market to drive up their subsequent 
profits. This was especially the case for the case of grain, the staple so basic to 
people’s material security. Officials criticizing merchant hoarding of grain to drive 
up prices on local markets were simply one small part of a far larger set of policies 
intended to manage food supplies in a manner that assured poorer people access 
to grain at prices they could usually afford.
The eighteenth-century Chinese state’s antipathy toward merchants manipulat-
ing prices to garner profits beyond those possible on markets with large numbers of 
buyers and sellers applied to domestic markets but not to those merchants licensed 
to engage in trade with foreigners. The Canton system (1757–1842) limited foreign-
ers to the single port of Guangzhou, where they were allowed to do business with a 
specific group of merchants licensed for this purpose (Wakeman 1978). While the 
fortunes of these Chinese merchants certainly fluctuated, the possibilities of mak-
ing large sums of money meant a few of them became famously wealthy. In the 
preindustrial era when trade was the likely arena in which money could be made, 
restricting access to markets usually in exchange for the state gaining fiscal bene-
fits turned some commerce into a kind of capitalism, especially when we recognize 
as a key feature of capitalism the ability of a small number of firms or individuals 
to dominate leading sectors of the economy, which is seen among the early mod-
ern Dutch and English companies engaged in Asian trade and subsequently in the 
industrial era among the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American 
and German firms in chemicals, steel, and railroads. Eighteenth-century China’s 
general antipathy to market concentration in the hands of a few entrepreneurs not 
only made the emergence of such key capitalist traits less likely, but also enhanced 
the likelihood ordinary people would benefit from markets as consumers. To 
assure that most farmers could enjoy opportunities to benefit from markets as 
producers who sold their crops and crafts commercially, officials also had to be 
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concerned about the impact of rents on tenants. Thus, eighteenth-century officials 
continued to recognize the ideal of limiting landlord exactions on tenants even as 
they proved unable to prevent the basic negative impacts that tenants could suffer 
at landlord hands. While landlords and market supply concentration in the hands 
of capitalists were both present possibilities, state policies to promote circulation 
of grain freely to benefit peasants who could be either producers or consumers 
for commercial grain were a key component of efforts to maintain a stable food 
supply. These were efforts designed to promote a well-functioning structure for 
circulation of grain. But as population rose, grain production also had to rise in 
order to meet increased demand. For this reason a second cluster of official efforts 
was directed to increasing grain production.
STR ATEGIES TO PROMOTE MATERIAL WELFARE: 
SUPPORTING THE INFR ASTRUCTURE FOR 
PRODUCTION
Officials supported both extensive and intensive increases in grain production. 
Extensive growth occurred when land-poor peasants migrated to areas with more 
abundant opportunities to open barren land and turn it into productive fields. The 
state at times offered a grace period before taxes would be levied on newly opened 
fields to facilitate owner investment in making the land productive. Migration 
was a form of circulation of people that complemented the circulation of goods, 
in the broad spirit of balancing people and resources through movements found 
in  fifteenth-century Qiu Jun’s remarks noted earlier. Where markets moved com-
modities from areas of low prices to those with higher ones, migration moved 
labor from areas with limited farm land to those places where land clearance for 
fresh cultivation was more easily pursued. Officials further supported such migra-
tions by also encouraging the transfer of what were deemed the best technolo-
gies of crop cultivation and craft production from more developed areas to poorer 
ones. All these efforts entailed some form of circulation—of people and knowl-
edge to complement market-based movements of commodities (Wong 2014). 
While our contemporary categories of analysis regard markets as the site for pri-
vate transactions because ownership is vested in individuals or families and not 
the government, the eighteenth-century Chinese government played a significant 
role in assuring the success of markets as part of a larger vision of resources and 
people staying in balance through the movements of each.
Complementing extensive expansion of grain production was the intensified 
use of land through irrigation. This technology, virtually absent in Europe, but 
found in Northeast, South, and Southeast Asia, as well as China, depended on 
multiple levels of water control management and coordination among several 
parties. Given its far larger size and population, Chinese officials had more water 
control issues in general to consider on a larger spatial scale than did other Asian 
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countries. Not surprisingly, the historical importance of water management to 
China and to Asia more generally has long been recognized. We can divide the 
bulk of the literature into one of three categories—those stressing an authoritarian 
top-down perspective, those focused on local communities that have a bottom-
up perspective, and those studies addressing interactions of local actors and state 
agents. Karl Wittfogel made famous the top-down perspective, while Japanese his-
torians, notably Morita Akira, have contributed a community-centered bottom-up 
perspective for China (Wittfogel 1957, Morita 2002). Other scholars have either 
examined complementary and coordinated efforts of the Ming and Qing govern-
ments and elites to finance and organize the maintenance of water control works 
or noted the competition between elite efforts to create new polder lands and offi-
cial priorities on assuring free-flowing transportation routes (Li Cho-ying 2012, 
Will 1985, Perdue 1982).
None of the scholarship on water control issues to date has been intended 
to highlight the public goods dimension of official interventions. Takehiko To’s 
study in part 3 does this for China’s capital region during the eighteenth century. 
The challenge for us more generally in a volume on public goods regarding water 
control is to discover relationships among different spatial levels of organization 
from those headed by state officials at the top to others managed by local villagers 
at the bottom. In the Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’s analysis of “common pool 
resources,” the eighth and last principle for effective organization of activities such 
as water control, she speaks of “nested enterprises.”2 The “nested” nature involves 
the coordination above the level of different groups each organizing common 
pool resources drawing upon the same water sources. Some mix of state and local 
community efforts was present most everywhere irrigation was an important eco-
nomic practice, but Chinese approaches to mobilizing and managing resources 
and labor needed to maintain water control works for irrigation and transporta-
tion also evolved across diverse kinds of terrain and on an especially large spatial 
scale. Chinese efforts also fluctuated over time, affected by a changing cast of com-
peting priorities, especially clear after the mid-nineteenth century, when higher-
level officials were more likely to be constrained in their resources and abilities to 
intervene in water control issues.
State efforts made at the center, provincial, and county levels to promote inde-
pendent peasant household production of grain and its commercial circulation 
suggest political appreciation for a well-functioning economy based on private 
property. Clearly, some of these efforts, like the infrastructure for agricultural pro-
duction that forms the subject for part 3 of this volume, entailed recognition of 
nonmarket and nonprivate property features of the economy. To address dearth 
and poverty directly, official and elite efforts beyond the production and com-
mercial circulation of grain were mounted to form a separate kind of public goods 
provision.
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EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EFFORT S TO RELIEVE 
FAMINE AND MANAGE FO OD SUPPLIES
In preindustrial societies where the vast majority of sedentary populations are 
engaged in agriculture or, as in the Chinese case, in other craft-related pursuits, 
economic instabilities came in two temporal forms both tied to agricultural har-
vests. First were the annual variations in food supply availability tied to the harvest 
cycle—grain is plentiful and cheap after the fall harvests and scarce and dear in 
the months directly preceding the annual harvests. Second were the variations in 
the size of harvests, with a sequence of mediocre or bad harvests increasing the 
likelihood of severe dearth. Addressing seasonal fluctuations in grain availability 
targeted poor people specifically, seeking to assure them grain at lower prices or 
loans of grain. Severe annual shortages posed threats to people more generally and 
carried with them a potential to undermine social stability. Because the political 
legitimacy of Chinese governance depended in principle on officials averting or at 
least mitigating the impact of severe dearth, famine relief was a key component of 
effective food supply policies during the eighteenth century.
During this period, famine relief involved selection of multiple policies from 
a repertoire of techniques developed over the previous several centuries. These 
policies that were mobilized into an intensive campaign to relieve a famine were 
one kind of government provision of a social or public good. They were in turn 
embedded in a broader system of granaries utilized in a more routine fashion over 
more than a century, infused with new supplies of grain through major initiatives 
to augment granary reserves and with supplies reduced by both deliberate policy 
decisions and bureaucratic neglect. This apparatus was flanked by the grain price 
reporting system that provided officials from county to the capital with data on 
the conditions of grain supplies on markets across the empire (Will and Wong 
1991).
Inspired by political principles defining a Chinese approach to governance 
first articulated roughly two millennia before and drawing on institutions formed 
over several preceding centuries, eighteenth-century policies formulated by the 
Chinese state reveal three important attributes of the Chinese state’s approach to 
public or social goods. First, the state considered providing famine relief or build-
ing granaries to store grain to be a responsibility of officials across the empire, 
from those at the center to those in locales at opposite ends of the empire. Second, 
providing famine relief and grain storage was the shared responsibility of local 
elites, attesting to the elements of a governance agenda that they shared for main-
tenance of domestic social order. Third, in the extreme conditions of sequential 
bad harvests due to flood, drought, or pestilence, famine relief efforts required 
extraordinary mobilization of resources and human effort, creating a campaign-
level intensity well beyond what routine bureaucratic or social action entailed. 
Food supply interventions were both a kind of social good and a social service 
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performed directly by various levels of the state and elites outside the bureaucracy. 
Their effectiveness made the economy work more smoothly.
Eighteenth-century institution building for grain storage and the implementa-
tion of famine relief drew more immediately and concretely upon policies for-
mulated beginning in the Southern Song (1127–1279). The institutional basis for 
managing food supplies formulated during this period created an alternative to 
Northern Song (960–1127) “big government” associated with Wang Anshi, even 
as it affirmed the importance of popular material welfare. Almost all these efforts 
depended on the combined complementary efforts of local officials and local elites 
to forge and maintain institutions of local order. These included granaries to store 
grain, charitable estates the incomes from which went to aid indigent kinsmen or 
other local residents, and organizing emergency famine relief measures in times 
of acute harvest failure (Hymes and Schirokauer 1993). A similar reliance on local 
efforts to store grain and relieve famine that were part of late Ming dynasty (1368–
1643) governance can be placed in a larger context to include social commitments 
to charity inspired by Buddhism (Smith 2009). This kind of situation is consistent 
with emperors and the central government bureaucracy being neither interested 
nor able to create much in the way of grain storage across the empire, a situation 
easily accommodated by an influential strand of late-twentieth-century scholar-
ship that has claimed the late Ming government to be largely ineffectual (Huang 
1981). But even as the Wanli emperor (r. 1472–1620), typically viewed as a weak and 
ineffectual ruler, was embroiled in major disputes with high-level officials over the 
selection of his heir apparent, leading to his refusal to meet with current officials 
or appoint new ones, the state ruling in his name was able to mount a famine relief 
campaign in 1592 that prepared local reports, released grain from the local gra-
naries, and remitted land taxes in areas hardest hit by poor harvests (Des Forges 
2003, 34–35).
However modest and infrequent local efforts to relieve potential famine in the 
late sixteenth century were, they appealed to principles and policies developed 
over earlier centuries. Their existence, in contrast to a total absence of grain stor-
age and famine relief, made plausible the efforts to create more robust policies in 
the eighteenth century. These were pursued through the three kinds of practices 
introduced earlier—bureaucratic action, elite efforts, extraordinary campaigns—
practices that were also responsible for eighteenth-century Chinese efforts to 
provide public goods and services more generally. For subsistence issues specifi-
cally, officials spearheaded, in response to imperial instructions, the formation 
of an empire-wide system of centrally monitored granaries storing hundreds 
of thousands of tons of grain both for annual use to mitigate seasonal fluctua-
tion in grain prices and for relieving subsistence crises in more difficult years. 
Each of the empire’s more than thirteen hundred counties reported their granary 
reserves at the beginning and close of the year as part of an annual accounting of 
reserves, distributions, and replacements. Provincial governors summarized their 
Coping with Poverty and Famine    139
county reports and forwarded their summaries to the center. Behind this system 
of accounting was an even more remarkable bureaucratic procedure that entailed 
each county magistrate reporting to the provincial governor every ten days the 
high and low prices for each of the grains commercially available on markets 
within his jurisdiction. These reports were summarized on a monthly basis for 
dispatch to the center for central government officials to review and when nec-
essary report to the emperor regarding extremely high prices over a widespread 
area that required a famine relief campaign (Will and Wong 1991). Pierre-Etienne 
Will has analyzed the famine relief campaign mounted in response to the famine 
of 1743–1744 in the capital province of Zhili. Officials conducted surveys of the 
severely affected locales to assess the number of victims and severity of the famine 
in particular areas. They implemented a range of policies including remitting land 
taxes, setting up rice gruel stations, releasing local granary reserves, and seeking to 
move grain themselves into the most badly affected areas (Will 1990).
The manner in which the eighteenth-century state provided grain as a public 
good qualifies in at least three ways sometimes skeptical and even negative views 
of the state. First, the state’s chronic anxieties over big government and bureau-
cratic mismanagement, which historians have echoed, depended first on Chinese 
political leaders developing a rule-governed, vertically integrated bureaucracy that 
could identify violations of expected official behavior. The bureaucracy comprised 
highly educated individuals, increasing numbers of whom were selected based on 
their exam performance and were forbidden to serve in their home provinces and 
typically moved from post to post every few years so that they became less likely 
to promote local interests or develop long-standing relations to be exploited for 
illicit private gain. Chinese principles of governance in general and concern for 
material welfare more specifically could not have been pursued across such a large 
territory and impact such a large number of people without one of the world’s larg-
est and more effective bureaucracies operating virtually continuously for roughly 
a millennium before the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Even though an activist 
central state had been soundly rejected in principle during the twelfth century, 
the eighteenth-century central state was able to build an empire-wide system of 
civilian granary reserves that enlisted the active commitments of local elites to 
contribute and manage some of those reserves.
A second way grain provision to address poverty and dearth qualifies images 
of a weak and ineffective state comes through understanding that the agenda con-
structed by the central government was largely shared ideologically and institu-
tionally, not only with officials at lower levels of the bureaucracy, but also by local 
elites. This fact helps explain why it was still possible in the nineteenth century, 
when the initiative to sustain local institutions from the center waned and threats 
to domestic social order and new kinds of international political challenges both 
grew, for some local officials and local elites to keep up local granaries, and in 
moments of acute crisis for larger-scale efforts at famine relief to be planned and 
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implemented by higher-level officials. The elasticity and flexibility of Chinese gov-
ernance in practice made the durability of its principles more lasting. The third 
possible revision to some of the conventional views of the early modern Chinese 
state considers how governance was not a matter simply for government offi-
cials but in practice a set of efforts shared with elites. Perhaps not surprisingly 
this meant there was no simple and sharp distinction between what was consid-
ered “official” and what was considered not “official,” suggesting the inability of 
our conventional notions of public goods based on our more general conceptual 
divide between public and private to help us understand how public goods were in 
truth conceived and created in eighteenth-century China.
The problems of poverty and challenges of famine relief were addressed by gov-
ernment and elites in ways that spanned any conventional distinction between 
public and private.3 The significance of famine relief and the maintenance of gra-
naries officially managed and others officially monitored go beyond their being 
an example of public finance or more specifically the addressing of a basic human 
need as a social or public good. Because officials understood and undertook these 
activities in the context of both private market activities and local village-level 
informal exchanges, early modern Chinese conceptions of social or public goods 
continued to conform in important ways to ancient Chinese understandings of 
how state management of resources matters to social order and political legitimacy.
BEYOND THE BINARY OF PRIVATE AND  
PUBLIC GO ODS
The binary between public and private to describe the economic character of 
goods and services in modern societies is inadequate to address policies designed 
to prevent or at least reduce the problems of poverty and dearth in early modern 
China. Without a better taxonomy of methods for the allocation of goods and 
services beyond the conventional public-private dichotomy, it remains difficult 
to locate the related roles of officials from the center to the county level and of 
elites resident in their local communities in affecting the problems of poverty and 
dearth. For managing grain supplies, official actions complemented those of local 
elites and of merchants. From a vantage point of Chinese approaches to gover-
nance, the state’s water control efforts and grain storage policies were both con-
ceived with the intent of creating benefits for the people. This principle certainly 
was not uniformly sustained through the centuries, across China’s vast territories, 
and for all of its large population. But it did shape early-modern-era policy intent 
and motivate multiple concrete attempts to provide famine relief, to create institu-
tional structures to store grain in advance of extraordinary need, and to use such 
reserves on smaller-scale routine levels to aid poorer people on an annual basis. 
The central state’s specific efforts were located within a broader mix of official, 
local elite, and local community efforts.
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Chinese sources on famine relief, granary storage, and water control suggest the 
limited legibility about their origins, intent, and impact that we can gain by limiting 
our analysis to the conventional categories of modern economics, in particular the 
division of all goods and service into either private or public. This chapter suggests 
that there was a broader spectrum of mechanisms to allocate goods and services 
in early modern China than the private-public binary can accommodate. At the 
same time it links the basic principle from ancient times of benefiting the people 
to (a) early-modern-era Chinese campaigns to relieve famines, (b) efforts to build 
and maintain granary reserves to help meet extraordinary events and intervene 
more routinely to help people through seasonal supply fluctuations, and (c) man-
aging the economy’s water control infrastructure. These activities exemplify key 
components of the Chinese understanding of governance. Before we formulate 
assessments of the successes and failures of this system of governance, this review 
of famine relief and food supply stresses a need to take its measure by combining 
an understanding of what governance principles led the Chinese to attempt their 
food supply interventions through categories of analysis not typically deemed rel-
evant to our evaluations of early modern Europe.
In the Chinese case of addressing poverty and dearth, we can see behind these 
efforts a broader approach to promoting material welfare and benefits for com-
mon people that was inspired by an ideology of governance that linked the state’s 
material resources (fiscal base) and symbolic viability (political legitimacy) to its 
performance of effective governance. These appear most clearly developed in the 
eighteenth century and rely on efforts of both officials and local elites, with offi-
cials themselves serving at different administrative levels. The diminished role of 
the nineteenth-century central state to monitor and control grain reserves across 
the empire did not prevent local actors from mounting their own efforts without 
higher-level supervision; indeed, the relative contraction of central efforts made 
regional and local efforts even more important and more salient. The effectiveness 
of local grain storage efforts was far less affected by what other locales did or did 
not do than were the efforts of local officials and elites facing water control issues 
because their concerns were connected to those of their neighbors in ways that 
depended to some degree on the nested enterprises of organized effort to man-
age water use, as Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators identified as a general issue 
around the globe, especially in more recent times. Because larger-scale coordi-
nation of dredging and dike repairs spanned many small communities and even 
crossed administrative boundaries, nineteenth-century officials remained more 
involved with larger water control projects than they did with coordinating the 
uses of granary reserves. Only after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 did 
there begin roughly four decades in which the absence of much effective govern-
ment at provincial or regional levels, not to mention at a national scale, meant that 
the provision of public goods by Chinese regimes was far more meager than typi-
cal in the early modern era. This situation would be reversed after 1949 when the 
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state took upon itself ever more responsibility for allocating resources, goods, and 
services, even as it curtailed the use of markets in the name of socialism, extracted 
surpluses from agriculture to fund industrialization, and, as part of the follies of 
the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962), seriously exacerbated the impact of natural 
disasters and bad harvests beginning in 1959.
From the vantage point of this volume, which highlights early modern Japanese 
practices as a baseline against which to evaluate and compare public goods provi-
sion in other countries, the Chinese case of addressing poverty and dearth doesn’t 
fit the increased visibility of very local organizational efforts in Japan as a new 
early modern phenomenon that led to new kinds and scales of social or public ser-
vices. Chinese practices, in particular those affecting poverty and dearth, involved 
official and nonofficial actors at central, provincial, county, and subcounty lev-
els. The increased relative importance of lower-level official and local elite efforts 
in  nineteenth-century China occurred in conditions quite different from those 
marking the earlier emergence of Japanese public goods provisioning considered 
in part 1 of this volume. What the Japanese and Chinese cases do, however, share 
in the provision of early modern goods and services is a poor fit with the conven-
tional modern economics distinction between public and private goods. The same 
is, in fact, also true of early modern European efforts to address the increased inse-
curities of poorer strata of society because these activities tend to be overshadowed 
by the seemingly relentless expansion of fiscal extraction to finance growing mili-
tary forces. It is too easy to imagine that in Europe military defense was the only 
public good being produced in the era rather than simply the most visible. When 
we step outside of Europe we have a better chance of appreciating more common 
economic challenges that people and their governments faced and the distinctive 
ways such challenges were met through the provision of public goods. The early 
modern ideologies and institutions responsible for addressing famine and poverty 
varied in scale and substance across Eurasia. Chinese practices creating what we 
consider public goods to address these challenges in the eighteenth century were 
notable for the unparalleled spatial and demographic scales they aimed to achieve 
and the results they did in fact produce. Even when falling short of stated ideals, 
they created material realities dwarfing those inspired and organized within any 
other polity of the era.
In conclusion, it may seem implausible that eighteenth-century Chinese poli-
cies toward dearth and poverty could matter to the modern era. Certainly from 
the vantage points of modern state construction in much of Europe and in Japan, 
nineteenth-century Chinese changes reduced the scale of intervention to relieve 
poverty and dearth. If, however, we move forward to consider policies toward 
food supply pursued at various points after 1949 we can identify a persistent 
concern regarding promoting production and availability of grain, especially for 
the poorer members of society, most vulnerable to subsistence challenges. These 
policies were, to be sure, quite different both among themselves and compared 
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to policies of earlier eras. But they stemmed from similar political anxieties and 
drew upon a menu of policy choices containing ingredients also found in early 
modern Chinese menus of policy choices. We can recall the slogan “take grain as 
the key link,” which accompanied policies to promote and even coerce the plant-
ing of grain crops begun in the early 1960s to achieve grain self-sufficiency across 
China’s many diverse locales in response to the recent disastrous famine years. We 
might also remember that China’s current era of economic transformation started 
simply enough in late 1978 as a kind of tweaking of the socialist planned economy 
designed to offer peasants greater incentives to increase grain production in order 
to stave off possibilities of dangerous levels of dearth. Such historically recent and 
yet very different kinds of reactions to anxieties about grain production and the 
possibilities of dearth are in fact responses to far older issues for which Chinese 
approaches to governance had already long grappled and in the eighteenth century 
specifically achieved considerable evidence of success.
NOTES
1. Qiu Jun, Daxue yanyibu (Supplements to Expositions on the Great Learning), juan 21 “Licai,” 
part 2 (General discussion of financial matters, part 2). Siku quanshu edition. (Complete Library of 
the Four Treasuries.)
2. Ostrom (1993) formulated eight principles for the effective organization of common pool 
resources.
1. Clearly defined boundaries




6. Conflict resolution mechanisms
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
8. Nested enterprises
3. These and other traits of Chinese state activities and relations between officials and elites and 
common people, especially those related to political economy, are examined in Wong 1997.
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In part 3, we present chapters discussing the construction and maintenance 
of physical infrastructure for water control including dikes and irrigation and for 
transportation including roads and waterways. As mentioned in chapter 1, these 
facilities are weak in nonexcludability, as they have attributes of “club goods,” 
which places them between “pure” public goods and “private goods” suitable for 
market transaction. Potential investment, therefore, could be sourced from prof-
it-driven private entities to the “public” entities such as the state. Historically, it 
is well known that the profit-based construction and maintenance of toll roads, 
known as “turnpike,” played a significant transportation infrastructure role in 
early modern England.
Although the emergence of profit-based and market-oriented investment in 
physical infrastructure deserves further discussion, our intention in part 3 is to 
focus on nonprofit projects provided by rulers, including monarchs, feudal lords, 
and nonrulers such as community-related entities, discussing the diverse patterns 
in building physical infrastructure within nonprofit-based activities. The motiva-
tions and social structures that urged rulers or community leaders to undertake 
such projects are our main concerns, as these points are expected to relativize 
the influential framework of the state-market dichotomy frequently applied for 
explaining the difference between the providers of “private goods” and public 
goods.
From this point of view, the infrastructure building in early modern Japan pro-
vides us with intriguing examples to be discussed. The chapter by Junichi Kanzaka 
(chapter 9) discusses how paddy acreage was expanded and maintained from the 
seventeenth century to the nineteenth century in Japan, mainly focusing on the 
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building of water control facilities. Although rulers such as the Tokugawa sho-
gunate and other domain lords (daimyōs) carried out large-scale civil engineer-
ing works for expanding paddy lands in the seventeenth century, the initiative for 
investing in land improvement and maintenance of water control facilities moved 
to nonrulers such as entrepreneurial individuals and village communities from 
the eighteenth century onward. The chapter emphasizes the strength of village 
communities that were based on irrigation and drainage systems, and the role 
of regional society, which consisted of leagues of villages that had means of set-
tling conflicts among villages over water control. These findings reveal that the 
nonprofit-based providers, including rulers and nonrulers, were not uniform in 
terms of motivation and ability, and their composition may change according to 
the time periods.
The combination of rulers and nonrulers in committing themselves to the big 
project of infrastructure building will be discussed further in the next chapter by 
Heinrich Kaak (chapter 10). The chapter deals with the state-run water control 
projects in early modern Prussia, which constructed and maintained huge dikes 
to enable the expansion of land for cultivation and protection of existing land from 
floods. Under direction of the king, dike associations comprising lords and villages 
took responsibility for the construction and maintenance of dike parts related to 
their areas of interest. Their contributions were occasionally enforced through the 
military force executed by the state, namely, the king. In evaluating the success of 
these projects, the author explains that the king’s initiative was not based on any 
benevolent interest for the well-being of his subjects, but rather provided for an 
immediate fiscal advantage for the state treasury.
The chapter by Takehiko To (chapter 11) focuses on the rulers’ initiative in 
 pursuing water control policy during a period of the thriving Qing dynasty in 
eighteenth-century China. In fact, the embankment managing system discussed 
in this chapter was funded through focused public investment in expanding 
 inhabitable and cultivatable land. In addressing flood control and irrigation policy 
in the Jifu region near Beijing, the capital of Qing China, the author highlights 
the strong leadership of the emperor and the intelligent agenda-setting by the 
 governor general and governor. The author believes this to be a contemporary 
example of good governance and the concept of a “shapeless treasury,” in which 
the development of arable land has the same effect as a state treasury or grana-
ries in coping with famine and poverty. Assuming the common feature of agricul-
ture, the difference in the strength of rulers’ initiative in infrastructure building 
between Tokugawa Japan and Qing China is distinctive.
In addition to these three chapters mainly discussing water-controlling proj-
ects, the last chapter focuses on the transport facilities of roads and waterways. 
As mentioned earlier, profit-based “turnpike” was prevalent in early modern 
England, whereas it was the rulers’ task to construct and maintain major trunk 
roads in early modern Japan. Sascha Bütow points out in chapter 12 that the king 
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of the Holy Roman Empire advocated the concept of bonum commune topos (good 
governance for the people), taking responsibilities in constructing and maintain-
ing the traffic ways to legitimize his rule. This idea was built on the success of 
medieval communities that were responsible for traffic and road construction 
in Brandenburg-Prussia. The author insists that this sense of governance legiti-
macy has been carried forward into contemporary law in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.
These four cases illustrate the significant role that rulers played in building 
physical infrastructure in early modern periods. However, it also highlights a 
motivation away from enhancing societal well-being and more toward increasing 
state’s or lords’ treasury revenues besides the existing idea of “good governance” by 
the ruler. The combination of a king, lords, and other nonruling people was also 
an important factor in the case of dike associations in Prussia, whereas the role 
of village and regional societies was clear in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Japan. These diverse patterns within nonprofit-based activities reflected the socio-
economic background of each society at the time, and may have had an influence 
on the formation of the social welfare system in present states.
Masayuki Tanimoto
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In Japan, civil engineering projects have played an important role in the devel-
opment of agriculture. Building dikes, canals, and ponds substantially expanded 
the amount of irrigated land. Furthermore, draining lakes and the sea reclaimed 
a great deal of land. These investments in field expansion, as well as the rise in 
productivity per acre, contributed greatly to the advancement of agriculture in 
Japan (Ishikawa 1967, Booth and Sundrum 1985). It is true that, sometimes, vil-
lage communities opposed civil engineering projects. However, in many cases, 
village communities promoted field expansion and land improvement projects in 
Japan. Indeed, at the beginning of the Tokugawa period, large-scale projects by 
governments often promoted the establishment of close-knit rural communities. 
Government projects encouraged the growth of villages consisting of autonomous 
small households. Thereafter, villagers accumulated wealth and began carrying out 
civil engineering projects by themselves. In the nineteenth century, village com-
munities played a very important role in building facilities for irrigation, drain-
age, and reclamation. Villagers supported or initiated water management projects 
by making plans, providing labor, and, sometimes, funding capital. Furthermore, 
the close social network encompassing villages based on the water control system 
helped settle disputes among several villages. Prominent figures in regional society 
arbitrated many conflicts outside of government courts.
To examine the relationship between the development of civil engineering 
projects and the growth of village communities, section 2 of this chapter provides 
an overview of the increase in paddy acreage between the seventeenth century 
and the nineteenth in Japan, based on the database of civil engineering projects. 
Section 3 analyzes the relationship between the growth of villages and government 
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civil engineering projects. Section 4 analyzes the communal functions of village 
communities and regional societies. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
EXPANSION OF PADDY ACREAGE
Civil Engineering Projects
This analysis examines the effect of several civil engineering projects by calculating 
the acreage of paddies created by each individual project. In Japan, cultivated land 
mainly consists of paddies where rice grows and dry fields where wheat and other 
crops grow. Since irrigated paddies are usually more productive than dry fields are, 
the Japanese community tirelessly built water management facilities to convert 
wastelands and dry fields to paddies. Three such facilities are especially important, 
namely, dikes, canals, and ponds. First, dikes were constructed to control the flow 
of rivers. Many Japanese rivers flowing from mountains frequently change their 
courses on alluvial fans and flood plains. Therefore, peasants began to cultivate 
the soil and build new villages on former flood plains only after the construc-
tion of dikes. Thereafter, they built canals along former river courses to irrigate 
new paddies. Second, canals were sometimes dug without building dikes. Long 
canals of more than ten thousand meters were often constructed using advanced 
techniques, such as topography analysis to let water go down shallow slopes and 
the construction of tunnels and siphons to lead water beyond all obstacles. Finally, 
ponds were constructed where sufficient water was not available from river flows. 
In some places, a sophisticated system for the connection of several ponds was 
developed to stabilize water supply (JSCE 1936).
In this way, the Japanese built several facilities to provide paddies with sufficient 
water. In 1907, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce of Japan investigated the 
hydrological condition of paddies (MAC 1909). In the 1910s, the Japanese began to 
use power pumps for irrigation and drainage. Furthermore, as explained later in 
more detail, in the 1920s, the government began to subsidize the cost of large civil 
engineering projects. Therefore, the investigation of developments in 1907 reveals 
the achievements of privately financed projects utilizing the natural flow of water, 
indicating the sources of irrigation and the manner in which sufficient water was 
provided. The survey shows 65.5% of 2,738,508 hectares of paddies were irrigated 
by water coming from rivers. Almost all of this water is assumed to have been 
distributed through canals. Next, 20.7%, 5.3%, 1.3%, and 1.0% of paddies were irri-
gated by ponds, fountains, wells, and lakes, respectively. In addition, the investiga-
tion indicates that 22.3% of paddies were irrigated plentifully, and 58.5% of paddies 
were irrigated properly. Therefore, more than 80% of paddies had sufficient water. 
Since the survey shows the data by district (gun), I calculate the river irrigation rate 
(hectares irrigated by rivers divided by total hectares) and the sufficient irrigation 
rate (the ratios of hectares irrigated plentifully, properly, and insufficiently were 
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Figure 7. River Irrigation Rate in 1907
Source: Data from MAC 1909.
tentatively weighted by 1.0, 0.5, and 0.0, respectively, and summed), and I show the 
distributions of the two rates in figures 7 and 8. On the one hand, figure 7 reveals 
that the river irrigation rate varied widely across districts. Each district adopted 
its own suitable method for irrigation. In the regions around the Seto Inland Sea 
and the Bōsō Peninsula, where there are no large rivers, ponds provided water to 
many paddies. On the other hand, figure 8 also shows that the sufficient irriga-
tion rate was not so different between each district. It was less than 0.35 in only 
9.1% of districts, and there was no area where districts with a lack of water supply 
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Figure 8. Sufficient Irrigation Rate in 1907
Source: Data from MAC 1909.
were concentrated. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, each individual 
district throughout Japan had developed its own appropriate irrigation system.
Increase in Irrigated Paddies
How did the Japanese expand the acreage of irrigated paddies? Since there are no 
comprehensive statistical data on arable land before 1874, I estimate the increase in 
paddy acreage before 1873 in two ways. First, the paddy acreage at the beginning 
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and the end of the Tokugawa period was estimated based on existing historical 
documents. Following Miyamoto’s calculation based on a land survey executed 
by Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who politically unified Japan’s archipelago in the late 
sixteenth century, the total acreage of the arable land is estimated as 2,064,657 
chō1 at the end of the sixteenth century. Furthermore, assuming half of the arable 
land comprised paddies, the paddy acreage was 1,032,328 chō (Miyamoto 1999).2 
Next, using data from the survey for Land Tax Reform by the Meiji Government, 
the acreages of total arable land and paddies in 1872 are calculated as 3,476,844 
chō and 1,842,066 chō, respectively (APDLTR 1953–1957). Therefore, paddy acre-
age increased by 809,738 chō during the Tokugawa period. However, these num-
bers are calculated according to kyū-tanbetsu, or acreage measured by traditional 
methods. Meanwhile, the Meiji government eagerly reexamined the acreage of 
arable land by utilizing common national measures and adopting a strict approach 
to calculating acreage (Sasaki 2016, 311), and, as a result, the revised acreage (shin-
tanbetsu) was 42.9% larger than former acreage (kyū-tanbetsu).3 Hence, the acre-
age in the Tokugawa period may have been underestimated in comparison with 
that in the later period.
Second, the growth in paddy acreage is estimated based on the data of each 
individual civil engineering project. In 1926, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce of Japan conducted its survey of civil engineering projects in the 
Tokugawa era in order to examine the origins of customary irrigation rights 
(MAC 1926). A decade later, the ministry’s research was revised by the Japanese 
Society of Civil Engineering, and the number of listed projects increased from 
about 1,171 to 1,585. Based on the revised survey, Miyamoto (1999, 38) estimates 
the acreage of cultivated land, and Nakamura (1968) calculates the “real amount 
of production” in Tokugawa Japan. Nevertheless, the estimates are insufficient 
because they simply count the number of construction projects, ignoring the scale 
of each. Therefore, as to 2,857 projects registered by the two surveys (MAC 1926, 
JSCE 1936), and some other documents (Akita-ken ECLIH 1985, Ishikawa-ken 
ECLIH 1986, Niigata-ken ECLIH 1986, Toyama-ken ECLIH 2004), I built a data-
base recording information on who carried out each project, when it was accom-
plished, and how many acres were affected in the process. The total acreage of 
the affected area of the listed projects is 492,203 chō; this total accounts for 58.0% 
of the aforementioned paddy expansion during the Tokugawa period. Since vil-
lagers often increased their production simply by expanding their paddies to the 
adjoining land (kirizoe-shinden) without records, the database of civil engineering 
projects does not fully capture the activities of peasants. Nevertheless, the accu-
mulated acreage data of affected individual projects can be assumed to indicate the 
principal trend of paddy expansion.
The database reveals that there were three periods of paddy expansion from 
the end of the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century.4 Figure 9 shows the 
increase of paddy acreage in the Tokugawa period. First, until around 1680, paddy 
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acreage expanded greatly. This expansion is sometimes called the “great reclama-
tion” and is considered to have begun in the sixteenth century in advanced regions 
(Saito 1988, 173). Public investment in controlling rivers and the construction and 
maintenance of canals and ponds converted barren wasteland into fertile paddies 
and fields. In the early seventeenth century, local governments carried out many 
large projects to improve public infrastructure, which stabilized the production of 
peasant households and encouraged them to create a close-knit community.
However, the growth hit an environmental limit. Since severe deforestation 
due to paddy expansion as well as logging for a construction boom had caused 
landslides and floods by the late seventeenth century, the shogunate and the 
domain government restrained paddy expansion. For example, in 1666, the sho-
gunate government issued the Regulation for Conserving Mountain and Rivers 
(Shokoku-sansen-okite) to prevent erosion and floods in the Kinai region, and it 
prohibited deforestation in the mountains and encouraged tree planting (Totman 
1998). Then, from the 1680s onward, the growth in paddy acreage slowed down. 
The second period of paddy expansion began with an announcement by the sho-
gunate government to encourage the creation of new paddies in 1722 (Kimura 
1964, 58). In this period, governments carried out large-scale public works, such 
as reclaiming land from lakes. For example, Yasubee Izawa, a shogunate official, 
directed the reclamation of Minuma and Iinuma in 1727, and that of Shiunji in 1733. 
Nevertheless, the development did not last very long. Paddy expansion stagnated 
for about eighty years from 1736 to the 1810s. Then, in the 1820s, the third period of 
paddy acreage expansion began. Paddy acreage increased mainly as a result of the 
construction of canals and reclamation of land from the sea. Village communities 
that had accumulated wealth played an important role at this stage. This expansion 
continued beyond the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and ended in 1880. Thereafter, a 
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Figure 9. Increase of Paddy Acreage of Tokugawa Japan
Source: The database mentioned in the text.
156    Chapter 9
Growth of Productivity
The civil engineering projects not only increased the acreage of paddy fields but 
also laid the foundation for the growth of land productivity per acre. Tokunaga 
(1997) states that agricultural development in Tokugawa Japan consisted of three 
phases: namely, the construction of irrigation facilities, greater input of fertilizer, 
and the amelioration of cultivation tools. “Since agricultural production is based 
on natural factors such as land, water, and plants, we should build water 
 management infrastructure first” (Tokunaga 1997, 15). Then, on the well-irrigated 
paddy fields, peasants started to apply fertilizer efficiently, and practiced deep 
tillage. In fact, after many great civil engineering projects were accomplished in 
the seventeenth century, peasants raised the intensity of agricultural production. 
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to increase fertilizer inputs, 
many peasants began to use purchased fertilizers, such as sardine meal and the 
residue from pressing oil. Furthermore, they developed a variety of hoes and 
 sickles with specific uses for different stages of production (Miyamoto 1999, 46).
Since, as mentioned before, irrigation systems were developed throughout 
Japan, peasants were able to carry out intensive agriculture in almost all districts. 
As a result, land productivity grew in all of Japan and the gap in land produc-
tivity between advanced and backward regions reduced. In the early Tokugawa 
period, peasants in several provinces in western Japan yielded more than twice 
the amount of products than in the backward northeastern provinces. Nakamura 
(1968) estimates land productivity in each province (kuni) in 1700, by dividing 
kokudaka in 1697–1702 by the acreage of arable land in 1716–1747. Kokudaka are 
land values measured by the amount of estimated rice yield based on land surveys. 
Although, from the eighteenth century onward, the kokudaka usually underesti-
mated the real quantity of output,5 kokudaka in 1697–1702 is assumed to reflect 
actual products. In the early Tokugawa period, the average product per tan of sev-
enty provinces (Echizen is excluded)6 was 0.94 koku, the standard deviation was 
0.28, and the coefficient of variation was 0.29. Next, I estimate the land productiv-
ity in the beginning of the Meiji era based on governmental surveys on the yield 
of “paddy and non-glutinous rice” in 1877–1881 (Umemura et al. 1966, 38). The 
data reveal two facts. First, land productivity had increased during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The average product per tan of seventy-one provinces 
was 1.31 koku, or 39% higher than what it was around 1700. This must have been 
the result of the development of intensive cultivation. Second, the difference in 
the productivity among the provinces had reduced. The standard deviation of 
koku per tan of seventy-one provinces was 0.26, and the coefficient of variation 
was 0.20, or 31% lower than what it was around 1700. While the productivity in 
the advanced Kinai area rose, the productivity in the backward area such as the 
northeastern and Kantō areas increased by a greater amount. The establishment of 
water management systems in every corner of the country enabled this growth in 
productivity throughout Japan.
Civil Engineering, Village Communities    157
In sum, civil engineering projects expanded paddy acreage and promoted the 
rise of land productivity in Tokugawa Japan. How did local government projects 
promote the creation of a village community? How, in turn, did wealthy villagers 
begin to help carry out projects?
DEVELOPMENT OF VILL AGE C OMMUNITIES AND 
CIVIL ENGINEERING PROJECT S
The Growth and Decline of the Projects of Indigenous Magnates
Before the Tokugawa period, village communities did not play an important role in 
managing water resources. In the sixteenth century, powerful individuals carried 
out civil engineering projects. Indeed, in Kinai, the most advanced region, indig-
enous magnates usually controlled irrigation and drainage. Although historians 
refer to the magnate in several ways, such as dogō (powerful local clan),  ji-zamurai 
(vernacular warriors), or shō-ryōshu (minor seigniors), its central feature was 
performing large-scale cultivation by employing several genin, or servants, who 
were personally subordinate to the magnate. The indigenous magnates engaged 
servants to build ponds or canals for irrigation and drainage. Furthermore, the 
magnates controlled resources in the woodlands. Private facilities for water man-
agement and the control of woodlands were important sources of a magnate’s 
regional power. In local settlements, several small peasant households also culti-
vated their fields, only with their family’s labor. Although the peasants were not 
personal subjects, they had to follow the magnate’s orders to obtain permission to 
use the irrigation facilities and woodlands. Therefore, the peasants provided labor 
for the maintenance of the facilities (Asao 1967).
Nevertheless, large-scale civil engineering projects by local governments in the 
“great reclamation” from the sixteenth century undermined the power of local 
magnates. Note that there were two types of local governments in charge of water 
control in the Tokugawa period. First, in the regions where a lord, or daimyō, exclu-
sively ruled a large territory, his officials carried out water management and flood 
control. I call this type of government a “domain government.” However, not all 
the domains had a territory large enough to have sole control over a river. Second, 
in Kinai, around Kyōto and Ōsaka, and Kantō, around Edo, many domains inter-
mingled with one another. Therefore, a shogunate magistrate, or bugyō, presided 
over the construction and maintenance of dikes, canals, and ponds for irrigation 
and drainage in the region (Ōtani 1996, Mizumoto 1993, 267–301). I call this type of 
government a “magistrate government.” In the early seventeenth century, the mag-
istrate government promoted several large-scale projects in Kinai. For example, in 
1608, the great repair work of the Sayama Pond in Kawachi within Kinai improved 
the irrigation of the surrounding regions. The peasants benefited most from the 
project since they became less dependent on the private facilities of indigenous 
magnates. Now, the peasants requested equal treatment of water management. 
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Furthermore, Toyotomi’s nationwide land survey from 1582 to 1598 registered 
many former servants who had served indigenous magnates as independent 
holders of land titles. They also benefited from improvements in infrastructure. 
Then, in each village, a cooperative community consisting of autonomous peasant 
households emerged (Asao 1967, Mizumoto 2008, 129–139).
In the advanced regions, the power of indigenous magnates declined as a result 
of the increase in governmental projects. Nevertheless, in the backward north-
eastern and Hokuriku regions, the domain government utilized indigenous mag-
nates to develop many paddies and fields. For example, in Mutsu province under 
the Hirosaki domain government, from 1619 to 1687, if an indigenous magnate 
developed a new village at his own cost, he was given a fief, or jikatachigyō, of 
thirty or fifty koku7 and was then employed as a lesser vassal, or shochigyō samurai. 
However, since the increase in fiefs did not improve the finances of the domain 
government, the fief system was abolished in 1687. Afterward, the shochigyō 
moved to the castle town as samurai and obtained a stipend, or became peas-
ants by returning the samurai title. Then, the domain government directly man-
aged large-scale projects called mikura-ha; until 1730, they established 201 new 
villages by building canals and reclaiming land from marshes. These projects by 
the domain government were sharply in contrast with the previous small-scale 
projects by indigenous magnates (Kikuchi 1977, 70–77, Kikuchi 1986, 635–729). 
Moreover, in other backward regions, indigenous magnates and samurai vassals 
carried out civil engineering projects and expanded paddies. For example, in the 
Aizu domain government, samurai vassals and indigenous magnates established 
hōkōnin-shinden and mitate-shinden, respectively, and in the Akita domain gov-
ernment, samurai vassals developed sashigami-kai (Miura 1983). Nevertheless, as 
in the Hirosaki domain government, in the late seventeenth century, the shogun 
and daimyō, or the heads of local governments, removed the vassals and some of 
the magnates from their fiefs to control the peasants directly. The daimyō provided 
samurai vassals staying in castle towns with “an amount equivalent to the expected 
income from that man’s original fief ” (Gordon 2003, 15). Thereafter, village com-
munities, in cooperation with local governments, played an important role in pub-
lic investment.
In the seventeenth century, local governments dominated the techniques in 
these large-scale projects. Until the sixteenth century, the advanced regions of 
Kinai had had several groups of craftsmen who specialized in building dikes and 
dams. Local government officials employed them or learned techniques from 
them (Miura 1984). Furthermore, in the seventeenth century, the shogun and 
daimyō built castles and dug new mines. The construction techniques developed 
in these projects were employed in the construction of dikes, canals, and ponds. 
Government officials were required to have advanced techniques for water man-
agement. Therefore, “in guidebooks, or jikata-sho, which instructed officials on 
how to control people, there were many explanations of techniques for controlling 
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rivers and irrigating paddy” (Tsukamoto 1984, 197). Nevertheless, it should also 
be known that government officials were not able to complete projects without 
the support of local people who were aware of the detailed conditions of rivers 
and lands. Hence, the officials usually employed a few villagers as their assistants 
(Nishida 1984, 228–229).
Civil Engineering Projects by  
Local Governments and Village Communities
In Tokugawa Japan, there were two types of construction projects for dikes, canals, 
and ponds. Go-fushin was carried out at the expense of shogunates or local gov-
ernments, whereas ji-fushin was carried out at the expense of village communities 
(Ōishi 1960, 75). Furthermore, there were four varieties of go-fushin: first, kōgi-
fushin, whose cost was borne only by the shogunate; second, otetsudai-fushin, 
where the shogunate ordered domain governments to contribute money and labor 
to shogunate construction projects; third, kuniyaku-fushin, where the magistrate 
managed the projects in an area consisting of several small domains by allocating 
the cost to surrounding villages; and fourth, ryōshu-fushin, where each domain 
government carried out projects in its own territories. Out of the four varieties of 
go-fushin, the first three were usually carried out on a temporary basis for disas-
ter recovery or large-scale projects (Ōtani 1996, 133). In kuniyaku-fushin, villag-
ers were sometimes asked to work without receiving wages. The dikes and canals 
constructed in the project were public goods that benefited villages by preventing 
floods and improving water management, but the villagers sometimes complained 
about the “excessive” burden. For example, in 1678, the villages in the shogun 
domain requested an exemption from providing laborers, since they had already 
undertaken other government work (Murata 2009).
The activities of village communities were often connected with public invest-
ments by local governments. In particular, during the seventeenth century, the 
domain government carried out river-controlling projects that provided a basis 
for other projects. For example, in Muko-gun of Settsu province, the Amagasaki 
domain government built the dikes of the Muko River and dug new ponds and 
canals. Thereafter, wealthy villagers invested in building branch canals and 
expanding paddies on the western side of the river. In the process, village com-
munities played an important role. Villagers in the irrigated areas cooperated in 
order to maintain irrigation facilities and allocate water “equitably.” As Mizumoto 
(2002, 45) states, “The civil engineering projects involved several villages in the 
new irrigation system and strengthened the mutual relationship among the vil-
lages.” Furthermore, in Etchū province, which has seven major alluvial fans, pub-
lic investment by the Kanazawa domain government on the construction of the 
dike to control rivers promoted the expansion of paddies. For example, starting in 
1670, the government built a large dike to control the Shō River to prevent floods. 
This construction encouraged village communities to expand paddies and fields 
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Figure 10. Increase in Paddy Acreage in Kaga, Noto, Etchū, and 
Higo Provinces
Source: The database mentioned in the text.
significantly. Imamura (2014) shows that the new arable lands were created not 
only by establishing new villages on the alluvial plains, but also by increasing paddy 
acreages in existing villages. Village communities supported the projects. After 
1660, they had to provide thirty workers per one hundred koku. Furthermore, “in 
principle, villagers living downstream were in charge of cleaning the river bot-
tom to maintain the banks (kawayoke) and maintaining canals, although the local 
governments provided subsidies if the cost was too high” (Saeki 2007, 153).8 In 
Etchū province, paddy acreage increased by 34,400 chō from around 1600 to 1872, 
which is in contrast with a moderate increase of only sixty-eight hundred chō in 
Kaga province under the same local government, namely, the Kanazawa domain 
government (Figure 10). Since Kaga province was a more advanced region, there 
was only a bit of room for the expansion of paddies.
Merchant-Initiated Reclamation
In Tokugawa Japan, there were some individual merchants who promoted civil 
engineering projects. Furthermore, they sometimes became landlords of the 
newly reclaimed land and collected rents from the tenants. These merchants may 
correspond to entrepreneurial individuals in England and the Netherlands that 
undertook land improvement projects. In England, landlords promoted enclo-
sures to improve productivity and raise rents, and farmers also brought about land 
improvements through drainage, fencing, or the erection of new buildings. Then, 
farmers had the “tenant right” to be compensated for their investments (Overton 
1996, 162–184). In the Netherlands, wealthy town dwellers made large-scale invest-
ments to reclaim new polders, since “large landownership was dominant there 
from the outset” (van Bavel 2001, 17). These civil engineering projects increased 
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agricultural production by expanding cultivated land and improving land or 
labor productivity. In Japan, however, the activities of merchants were not always 
praised. They sometimes contradicted the interests of the shogunate and domain 
government. Matsuyoshi (1936/1955) states that “merchant-initiated reclamation 
(chōnin ukeoi shinden)” undermined the “feudal agrarian system.” Nevertheless, 
the policies of shogunate governments on merchants’ projects were not consistent. 
In 1687, the government prohibited merchant-initiated reclamation. In 1722, mer-
chants were permitted to develop new paddies and obtain rents from tenants since 
the shogunate hoped that the new villages built by merchants would stabilize rural 
society, by absorbing the surplus population in the surrounding villages (Kimura 
1964, 52–54, Ōishi 1973, Kikuchi 1977, 516). For example, on the eastern side of the 
Muko River, merchants from Ōsaka and Amagasaki invested in building new pad-
dies in the seventeenth century (Mizumoto 2002, 48–50).
Nevertheless, the merchants’ projects in Japan are not regarded as similar to 
entrepreneurial individuals’ projects in England and the Netherlands for three 
reasons. First, their contributions were limited. The database of civil engineer-
ing projects shows that the acreage constructed by merchants was only less than 
5% and the projects were concentrated around big cities, such as Edo and Ōsaka. 
Second, many government officials and scholars continued to criticize merchants’ 
projects. Even after the shogunate’s authorization, Kyūgu Tanaka blamed mer-
chants for “deceiving and slandering others for money and engaging themselves 
just in obtaining their own profit” and recommended utilizing “the knowledge in 
villages and hamlets” (Tanaka 1721/1996, Kurachi 2008, 75–78). Finally, whereas 
villagers often resisted the entrepreneurial projects in Europe (Blum 1978), vil-
lage communities usually helped merchants create new paddies in Japan. In prac-
tice, villagers used their knowledge to gain profits even from merchants’ projects. 
Nakai states that, in new villages, merchant landlords maintained social order and 
promoted agricultural production with the strong connection with surrounding 
village communities, and therefore, “merchants carried out the projects by par-
asitizing existing village communities even in the most commercialized region 
around Ōsaka, although it is supposed that the tenancy relationship in merchant-
initiated reclamation was contractual and free from communal constraint” (Nakai 
1956, 219). Thus, villagers supported civil engineering projects by merchants, as 
well as by local governments.
The Rise of Contributions by  
Village Communities in the Nineteenth Century
In a later period, the contributions of village communities increased further, and 
the distinction between go-fushin by the local government and ji-fushin by village 
communities became obscure. When the scale of go-fushin projects was not so 
large, wealthy villagers sometimes took the initiative in the project. Indeed, go-
fushin projects executed by local governments were not always effective. In 1721, 
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Tanaka criticized go-fushin for its inefficiency and recommended a procedure 
to carry out go-fushin by which local villagers first requested a project and then 
local governments assessed it. If the project was found to be good, the govern-
ment would subsidize it. In these cases, the villagers provided labor and shared the 
financial burden with the government. Nagatsuma calls this “the subsidization of 
government construction and maintenance” (Nagatsuma 2001, 35).
In the paddy expansion from the 1820s onward, the role of wealthy villagers 
was prominent. Many domain governments had suffered from financial debts 
that were so severe that they were not able to afford to pursue civil engineering 
projects. Meanwhile, some villagers had accumulated wealth and carried out 
large-scale projects without support from their local governments. To avoid the 
risk of a shortfall in capital, villagers sometimes formed a new type of orga-
nization for investment. Yanagita, a famous folklorist, contrasts “cooperative” 
construction of new paddies with projects “led by one leader” (Yanagita 1931/1991, 
247); thus, cooperatively reclaimed districts often have place names such as 
Sōbiraki (literally meaning “collectively reclaimed”). Kikuchi calls this cooperative 
organization hyakushō yoriai shinden (peasant cooperation to develop new 
paddies), which collected from many peasants like a joint-stock company and 
allocated new paddies according to the amount contributed (Kikuchi 1977, 
304–305). For example, in Bizen province in 1852, a peasant cooperation reclaimed 
land from the sea to build 730 chō of paddies. It collected 1,015 kan worth of silver 
from 336 peasants. However, the cooperative organization did not eliminate the 
risk entirely. The manager spent his own entire fortune on the project and became 
bankrupt.
By the development of techniques as well as the improvement of finance, village 
communities contributed to civil engineering projects in the nineteenth century. 
At that time, some villagers had acquired advanced techniques for constructing 
dikes, canals, and ponds. As mentioned earlier, in the seventeenth century, govern-
ment officials nearly monopolized water management techniques. However, after-
ward, villagers improved their techniques and the high-level skills began to spread 
directly to other villagers. “As villagers in several regions communicated with each 
other and broadened their perspectives, their knowledge and skills were able to 
be interconnected without the mediation of government officials” (Tsukamoto 
1984, 225). Then, to carry out go-fushin, some local governments employed capa-
ble villagers. For example, in Etchū province, Dōsan Shiina, born in a family of 
wealthy peasants in 1790, constructed several canals until he was in his thirties. 
Since he displayed great talent in these projects, the Kanazawa domain govern-
ment asked him to give them advice on the construction and maintenance of dikes 
and canals in 1829, and appointed him as a manager of development of new pad-
dies. Thereafter, he directed several projects in Etchū, Noto, and Kaga provinces, 
including Jūni-kanno canal irrigating 652 chō. Shiina had sophisticated techniques 
for planning a waterway route, measuring slopes, and building facilities. Although 
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it is not known as to who taught him these skills, there must have been several 
opportunities for wealthy villagers to learn advanced techniques in rural society. 
For instance, in the same province, Nobuyoshi Ishikuro, born in another family 
of wealthy peasants in 1760, studied Japanese mathematics and astronomy, and 
acquired enormous skills in measurement and calculation (Jūnikanno-yōsui-
tochikairyōku 1985).
Furthermore, wealthy villagers sometimes took the initiative in carrying out 
many go-fushin activities, which were supposed to be done by the local government. 
For instance, in Higo province, under the Kumamoto domain government, a 
regional and originally nongovernmental association of villages (tenaga)  managed 
almost all civil engineering projects. Then, wealthy peasants (sou-shōya), who 
managed the association, were treated as local government officials. Since the 
tenaga was incorporated into the administrative system of the local government, 
civil engineering projects were usually regarded as “public.” The MAC (1926) 
labels them as “governmental,” and, furthermore, Kimura states that all projects 
in Higo province were managed by the Kumamoto domain governments (Kimura 
1964, 179–181). However, the tenaga, rather than the local government, carried out 
projects. Yoshimura states that “in the early Tokugawa period, authorities of the 
shogun and daimyō executed civil engineering projects for river control and water 
management by organizing teams of vassals and the labor services of peasants. 
These were the most important public activities and duties by such authorities 
in order to justify their control over peasants. Nevertheless, in later periods, the 
civil engineering projects were conducted not by the authorities of the shogun and 
daimyō, but by the tenaga” (Yoshimura 2013, 113). The development of regional 
associations promoted civil engineering projects. Yoshimura indicates that in 
Higo province, the nineteenth century was “the age of civil engineering for water 
management.” Some tenaga built several canals for expanding new fields and 
 others reclaimed land from Yashiro Bay on a large scale. For example, Yabe tenaga 
planned to build Tsūjunkyō canal consisting of a ditch of forty-two kilometers, a 
siphon, and an aqueduct. Since the tenaga was creditworthy enough to borrow 
from the domain government, wealthy villagers, and merchants, it was able to pay 
the huge construction costs. The tenaga refunded the debt from the profit of newly 
reclaimed paddies (Yoshimura 2013, 405, 408–453). Then, the paddy acreage in 
Higo province increased significantly, as figure 10 shows.
Major contributions by wealthy villagers to civil engineering projects contin-
ued beyond the political transformation by the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Many 
projects were carried out with private capital. For example, in 1879, the Aichi 
prefecture government permitted two wealthy villagers, Hyomatsu Okamoto 
and Ihachiro Iyoda, to build canals for irrigating infertile fields in Hekikai-
gun. To carry out this project, Okamoto and Iyoda invested their own fortune. 
Furthermore, they persuaded five others to join the project by explaining the 
profitability of the investment. In 1881, they accomplished the construction, and 
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the canal was named “Meiji canal.” It created eighty-eight hundred chō of new 
paddies and improved the hydrological condition of forty-five hundred chō of 
old paddies. The large cost of the project was compensated by the income from 
distributing water. Okamoto and Iyoda had spent too much money in this proj-
ect and were bankrupt, while the five investors gained profit by obtaining new 
paddies (Kondo 1929, 193–197, Hatate 1977, 105–110). Until 1881, the Japanese 
economy had grown based on brisk economic activity, mainly in the countryside. 
As Saito and Tanimoto state, “The period between the early nineteenth century 
and Matukata Deflation (1881–1886) was the period of rural centred develop-
ment” (Saitō and Tanimoto 1989, 226). The increase in civil engineering projects 
sponsored by wealthy villagers was an aspect of the “rural centred development.” 
However, a rural depression caused by the Matsukata Deflation hindered the 
accumulation of wealth by villagers. Thereafter, the pace of paddy acreage growth 
slowed down. The growth of paddy acreage stagnated until the 1910s, when paddy 
acreage started to increase greatly, again. While from 1874 to 1880, paddy fields 
expanded by 914 chō per year, from 1880 to 1905, it extended by 536 chō per year. 
Then, from 1905 to 1930, paddy acreage increased 1,352 chō per year (Umemura 
et al. 1966, 216). However, this time, government funds rather than the private 
capital of wealthy villagers played a very important role. With the Reclamation 
Assistance Act of 1919, the government began to subsidize the rent of the capital 
for the project. Furthermore, after the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 
of Japan issued a Notification to Subsidize Projects for Improving Irrigation and 
Drainage (1923), a government fund was injected into large projects affecting five 
hundred hectares or more (Imamura 1977).
C OMMUNAL FUNCTIONS OF JAPANESE VILL AGES
Functions of Village Communities
In Tokugawa Japan, village communities or leagues of villages played crucial roles 
in many civil engineering projects. The principal reason for the positive role of 
village communities is that paddy cultivation in Japan necessitated close coopera-
tion within and among villages. Since every paddy in a village shared an irrigation 
system, the mismanagement of one plot affected the entire village adversely. One 
household’s negligent water management could interfere with its neighbors’ water 
supply (Watanabe 2008, 81–85, Kanzaka 2018). Reflecting the communal character 
of cultivation, Japanese peasants did not believe that they had exclusive rights to a 
plot even if they cultivated it. At the end of the nineteenth century, a Japanese peas-
ant stated, “the surface layer of the land belongs to me, the middle layer belongs 
to my village, and the deepest layer belongs to Heaven” (Sakane 2011, 137). They 
still had the idea that possession in the village should be common. Yanagita states, 
“the idea that ‘land in a village should be used by the [members of] the village’ has 
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its origin in history and still has a surprisingly strong influence in today’s society” 
(Yanagita 1931/1991, see also Sakane 2011, 140–141). This notion of property rights 
did not match the European view. Therefore, even after the Japanese made the 
Meiji Civil Code by studying European laws in 1898, customary rules continued to 
control life in each village. Peasants were expected to work together and help one 
another. In the beginning of the twentieth century, village communities still had 
effective control over land transfers and field utilization. Even if some outsiders, 
such as town merchants, became absentee landlords, the villagers required the 
landlords and their tenants to follow the rules of cultivation of the village (Saito 
1989, 223–254). Therefore, landlords were not able to buy and sell land freely.
In the Tokugawa period, strong village communities sometimes prevented 
land-improving projects but, other times, promoted agricultural development. In 
some cases, villagers opposed the development of new paddies, since this devel-
opment would reduce the amount of grassland needed to fertilize paddies. In 
this respect, Japanese peasants seem to have behaved in the same way as many 
European peasants did, in resisting the enclosure of commons (Blum 1978, 292). 
Tokugawa peasants made a fertilizer called karishiki from grass and young leaves. 
The area of grassland and mountain necessary for providing the fertilizer was ten 
times larger than the size of the cultivated land area. Therefore, for example, when 
there was a plan to turn grassland into paddies in Yamashiro province in 1702, 
villagers opposed the plan because it would cause a shortage of fertilizer as well 
as the runoff of soil. Furthermore, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a 
shogunate official lamented that “it has become difficult to find land on which 
new paddies could be developed,” and stated that “recently grassland [magusa-
ba] has been turned into paddies. Since the grassland is the place that supplies 
fertilizer and feeds horses . . . this type of new paddy development is unfavorable” 
(Mizumoto 2003, 70–71).
Meanwhile, in other cases, cooperation in villages based on communal prop-
erty supported the construction and maintenance of public goods. Indeed, village 
communities were suitable for improving and maintaining irrigation facilities. 
Hayami and Godo (2002) state that communities were usually superior to markets 
and the state in the supply of “local public goods” because “the community rela-
tionship is effective in preventing free-riders.” Members who did not join collec-
tive works, such as the construction and maintenance of irrigation canals, would 
be severely sanctioned by the village. In addition, Yanagita states that “the negli-
gence of just one or two people will cause failure in community-based works, such 
as destroying insects and weed seeds and repairing canals and roads . . . Japanese 
villages avoid this risk by old customs, while many other law-governed countries 
do this by enactment” (Yanagita 1931/1991, 261–262, see also Sakane 2011, 138–139). 
Since maintenance systems based on village communities worked well, local gov-
ernments and wealthy villagers invested in water management facilities.
166    Chapter 9
The Function of Regional Society
Close connections in Tokugawa Japan were not just found within each  village. 
Several villages in a region were closely interconnected. The villages had to 
 cooperate to maintain the facilities and allocate water. Tokugawa Japan had 
many leagues of villages that cooperated to control irrigation and drainage. The 
league also preserved commons and worshiped a common local Shinto deity. For 
example, in Kizu-gō of Yamashiro province, there was a league of nine villages 
consisting of about eleven hundred households. Since the territory of the nine 
villages was divided into more than ten lordships, the league played a key role in 
preserving order. The league kept control of a total of eleven irrigation ponds and 
five canals and rivers. About twenty-five village officials in this league frequently 
 communicated with one another to reconcile the interests of each village. The 
officials usually joined the meetings of the league more frequently than every other 
day (Mizumoto 1993, 154–159).
Within the league, however, villages not only cooperated, but also fought over 
the allocation of water. Villages that were situated upstream or whose ancestral 
members had greatly contributed to building the facilities had an advantage in 
accessing irrigated water (Kitamura 1950, 208–214). To maintain or to eliminate 
discrimination, each village pursued its own interests. Furthermore, the construc-
tion of new canals and ditches also caused trouble. The establishment of a new 
sluice gate on a river could prevent downstream villages from being sufficiently 
irrigated. In addition, new drainage ditches could emit water and create a nuisance 
for other villages. Therefore, there were many disputes over irrigation and drain-
age (yōsui-sōron) in Tokugawa Japan. The irrigation-drainage disputes were fought 
and settled in three characteristic ways. First, players in the disputes were usually 
not individuals, but village communities. When they litigated disputes, both the 
plaintiff and the defendant were usually village communities. Especially in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, most documents describing the rights and practices 
of irrigation and drainage were signed in the name of the village (Watanabe 2007, 
181–185, Mizumoto 1993, 4–7).
Second, many disputes were settled out of court. Prominent figures and offi-
cials staying in neighboring villages arbitrated several conflicts between villages. 
As mentioned before, officials in the same league of villages frequently commu-
nicated with one another in daily life. This close relationship helped bring about 
reconciliations. Certainly, some disputes went to government court, but it was not 
unusual for government officials not to decide but instead to ask the village offi-
cials to reconcile (Watanabe 2007, 182). For example, the disputes over canals and 
commons between several villages in late-eighteenth-century Odawara domain 
government were settled using the following process. Since voluntary reconcilia-
tion by neighboring villages had failed, the two parties brought the matter before 
the court of the domain government. However, government officials did not make 
a decision, but instead ordered the prominent figures of neighboring villages to 
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arbitrate the dispute. Then, the arbitrators managed to settle it. Thus, local govern-
ments and village communities cooperated to maintain the social order. On the 
one hand, “the government officials utilized practical knowledge and functions for 
the reconciliation of the arbitrators based on village society”; on the other hand, 
“the arbitrators negotiated with parties backed by the authority of the local gov-
ernment” (Mizumoto 2008, 327–328).
In early modern Japan, many civil engineering projects were carried out, and 
paddy acreage was expanded, especially from the sixteenth century to 1680, from 
1722 to 1736, and from the 1820s to 1880. Then, until the beginning of the twentieth 
century, each individual district throughout the country of Japan had developed 
its own appropriate irrigation system. From the seventeenth century to the 
 nineteenth, village communities or leagues of villages played an important role 
in many civil engineering projects. The activities of village communities were 
connected with public investments by local governments through irrigation and 
drainage networks. Government projects made it possible for villagers to create 
new paddies and fields. Furthermore, in practice, village communities sometimes 
initiated the promotion of public projects subsidized by the local government. The 
strength of a village community lay in the irrigation and drainage system, which 
were closely connected with the production activities of each household within a 
village.
Even after Western-style Civil Code was established in 1898, customary law gov-
erned many land transactions and water management in rural society. However, 
in the beginning of the twentieth century, well-developed irrigation systems based 
on cooperation among and within village communities became regarded as an 
obstacle to the growth of agriculture in Japan. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce of Japan believed that customary irrigation rights of village com-
munities prevented the expansion of paddies and caused instability in the water 
supply, and tried to eradicate these customary rights. Furthermore, in 1923, “to 
modernize irrigation facilities and to deny customary irrigation rights effectively,” 
the Ministry decided to carry out large-scale projects supported by the national 
budget (Imamura 1977, 138). Whereas, in the Tokugawa period, investments by 
local governments were promoted and supported by the community-based irri-
gation mechanism, in the twentieth century, the government made investments 
to abolish the traditional irrigation system and established a “modernized” water 
management mechanism.
NOTES
This work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI grant number 15K03589.
1. One chō is 9,917.4 m2 and is almost equal to one hectare. Hence, one chō is 2.45 acres. However, 
the actual area of chō varied according to place and time in the Tokugawa period.
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2. Okura-shō (1927) provides paddy acreage data from 1716 to 1748 (the Kyoho to Enkyo eras), 
although its original source is unknown. Using this data, the paddy acreage in the early eighteenth 
century is calculated as 1,643,450 chō, whereas the total acreage of arable land is 2,969,714 chō.
3. So far, the revised acreage has been regarded as almost 50% larger than the former acreage (Sasa-
ki 2016), since APDLTR (1953–1957) records the revised paddy acreage as 2,622,593 chō and the former 
acreage as 1,701,149 chō. However, this calculation is not correct. The former acreage does not include 
the paddy acreage in the Nagasaki and Ishikawa prefectures. Therefore, to calculate the increase from 
the former acreage to the revised acreage, the acreage of these two prefectures should also be excluded 
in the estimation of revised acreage. Then, the revised acreage is rectified to 2,423,474 chō. Hence, the 
increase rate is 42.9%. Furthermore, the former paddy acreage, including that in the omitted districts, 
was estimated as 1,842,104 chō.
4. The estimation is different from that of Miyamoto since he shows that arable land increased 
more in the late seventeenth century than it did in the early period, and there was not a rapid increase 
of arable land between the 1720s and 1730s (Miyamoto 1999, 38). Since he calculates the field expansion 
without considering the scale of each project, Miyamoto underestimates the effects of great projects in 
the early seventeenth century and from the 1720s to the 1730s.
5. It is because in land survey investigations, peasants hid some paddies and fields to evade tax and, 
furthermore, the domain government that conducted the land surveys did not report the real situation 
to the shogunate. Kawamura 1984, 159, 246, 263.
6. Kokudaka of 1697–1702 in the Echizen province is considered much higher than the real pro-
ductivity; a contemporary stated that “the kokudaka had been determined improperly to pretend about 
the high productivity of the domain.” Fukui-ken 1994.
7. One koku is equal to 180 liters. However, the actual volume of koku varied according to place 
and time.
8. In 1732, the shogunate also stated that each village had to provide fifty workers per 100 koku at 
its own cost, and the shogunate would give wages to additional laborers. 
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PROJECT S ON THE ODER ,  NETZE,  AND  
WARTHE FROM THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
The Prussian diking and cultivation of the river bottomlands during the eigh-
teenth century attracted significant attention, not least because it involved the 
risky plan of rerouting a section of the Oder River at the northern end of the 
Oderbruch.1 Moreover, the Prussian King, Frederick William I (1713‒1740), and 
his son, Frederick II (1740‒1786), declared the project a special goal of the state, 
made a strong financial commitment, and ran the risk of failure (Gudermann 
1999, 352‒354).
Certainly, the diking resulted in the expansion of high-quality royal agricul-
tural lands from which the state itself benefited directly. Here, however, the ques-
tion will be investigated to what extent there were broader objectives, above all, 
the protection of inhabitants, with their homes and farmland, their animals and 
their production, from the frequent flooding. The regions’ climate improved and it 
became viable to invest in infrastructure. The exploitation and securing of Prussia’s 
best farmlands resulted in an increase in the yields of everyone involved in agri-
culture. As a result, it was possible to expand the food supply in the country. The 
river bottomlands, considered in the context of the widespread serfdom, became a 
model system of agriculture with secure ownership and freedom of movement for 
small producers. The Prussian state—until this time an agricultural state—offers 
interesting insights into these interrelations. Nonetheless, such measures were in 
no way unique in Europe.
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THE PREHISTORY OF FLO OD C ONTROL AND 
C OASTAL PROTECTION IN EUROPE
The first documented flood control structures on European rivers were in 
Mycenaean Greece in Orchomenos around 1500 bce (Knauss 1990, 23, Knauss 
1987, 106‒107), and later in Koroneia in Kopais (Greece) in the first century ce, 
which was under the reign of the Roman Emperor Hadrian (Fossey 1991, 5–26). 
There are further indications of river dikes constructed during the Roman Era, 
including Italy, the Netherlands, Central Europe, Romania, and Great Britain—
where several shipping canals were dug and provided with dikes (Winkander 2000, 
321‒330). Dike building then subsided until the end of the early Middle Ages, from 
which point there are indications that levees and dikes existed on estuaries and 
rivers with flat shores. This was the case on the Loire (France), which had levees 
in the ninth century and partly dikes in the twelfth century (Garcia and Pusch 
2002, MGH, 301). Facilities for flood control also existed in the Po Valley (Italy) in 
the twelfth century. This older trend was also strong in Central Europe, where “all 
of the larger rivers and most streams . . . [had] been changed considerably since 
the early Middle Ages” (Jäger 1988, 18). Indeed, dikes were built on the Lower 
Rhine (Germany/the Netherlands) in the ninth century. The Dutch worked on the 
Elbe (Germany) during the twelfth century (Schmidt 2000, 106‒107, Hofmeister 
1981, 7, Boeselager 2003, 234), and the Vistula (Poland) was diked in the thirteenth 
century (Ehlers and Winkel 1947, 8), while the Oder (Germany) received its first 
dike in the fourteenth century.2 Dike work, drainage, and cultivation were done 
on numerous other rivers in Central Europe, including the Scheldt and the Meuse 
(Belgium/the Netherlands), the Ems and the Weser (Germany) (Berendsen and 
Stouthammer 2001, 13, Allemeyer 2006, 35‒37, Peters 2005, 26‒27), the Danube 
(Germany to Hungary), and the Vltava (Czech Republic).3
Outside Central Europe, in 1703, Dutch engineers helped establish the Russian 
city of St. Petersburg where the Neva River flows into the Baltic Sea.4 Dike work 
was first done on the Rhône (France) in the mid-eighteenth century and on the 
Tisza (Hungary, Serbia) at the end of that century (Szűcs 2010, 243‒245). Dikes 
were built on the Sava (Slovenia, Croatia) and on the Drava (Croatia, Hungary) 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.5 In England, dikes were built on the 
River Tweed around 1800, and on the Thames and the River Severn at the end of 
the nineteenth century.6
Although river dikes were presumably developed before sea dikes, river dikes 
were significantly influenced by the diking of the sea. The first Roman reports 
about life on the North Sea, by Pliny the Elder in the first century ce and Tacitus 
around 100 ce, describe the extremities of life in living among the tides and cold, 
the storms and rain. At Isca Augusta, near Caerleon in Wales, structures dated to 
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(74‒75 ce) protected the community from the ocean (Rippon and Cameron 2006, 
76, Campbell 2012, 176). Archeologists have also shown that an early sea dike near 
a farm at Feddersen Wierde, situated on the North Sea coast of Lower Saxony 
(Germany), was built in the first or second century ce (Krämer 1984). Additional 
sea walls on the North Sea coast were built in Flanders (Belgium) before the end of 
the tenth century, while additional ring dikes were built around farms and villages 
on the German North Sea coastline in c. 1000 ce (Ey 2005, 147‒149).
Dike construction on rivers and on the coast is thus a technology dating back 
millennia, which indicates that people in Europe, especially in the south, west, and 
center of the continent, developed and secured areas to deal with a lack of space 
and good conditions for settlement made so urgent by the circumstances of the 
time. This trend continues—although it is increasingly controversial—to this day.
DIKE C ONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE
In addition to protecting existing settlements and agricultural areas, both river 
dikes and sea walls were used to reclaim land that was particularly fertile for agri-
culture and suitable for new settlement.
Sea Dikes: At first, construction and maintenance went hand in hand. This 
was the case in certain areas on the North Sea coast until the eighteenth century. 
Originally, coastal inhabitants made the decision to erect and construct dikes on 
their own. Rulers of the areas in which dikes were built granted coastal dwellers 
who took the initiative more autonomy than the inhabitants of the interior because 
the extreme conditions on the coast did not permit effective feudal control. Given 
the weakness of princely rule, North Sea inhabitants became “peasant republicans” 
(Urban 1991, 50, 59, 119). The more secure the land became, so the infrastructure 
became more developed, and income increased—resulting in greater danger of 
a hostile takeover. In 1500, the Danish king’s first attempt to subjugate the area 
failed and the peasant republic subsequently flourished. The second attempt was 
successful, however, and the region was more firmly incorporated into the Danish 
kingdom in 1559 (Bohn 2006, 41, 57).
The coastal strategy of territories and states began to change in the sixteenth 
century. Like many other areas, they became actively involved in dike matters—
particularly once traditional oral coastal law was codified.7 At the same time, 
technological improvements were often triggered by periods of heavy storms. 
Indeed, after the Burchardi Flood of 1634—also known as the second “Grote 
Mandränke”8—Johann Claussen Rollwagen, the new General-Deichgraf of Duke 
Frederick III of Gottorp (1616‒1659), launched a new section of dikes on the west 
coast of Schleswig-Holstein, while reorganizing construction so that it was no 
longer the communal task of marsh inhabitants but performed by professionals. 
Thereafter, the responsibility of the inhabitants was focused more on dike main-
tenance—and they were no longer able to keep the new land for themselves as a 
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result. This intervention of the territorial state was further strengthened after the 
Christmas Flood of 1717, which was known as the largest flood at the time and 
claimed more than eleven thousand victims.9
River Dikes: The existence of river dikes in the Middle Ages and early modern 
period has been frequently documented.10 Northwestern continental Europe 
and western Central Europe seem to have preceded eastern Central Europe: 
that is, the technological transfer moved from west to east. The Dutch were the 
leaders in coastal protection and other forms of hydraulic engineering (Tols and 
Langen 2000, 358‒366). Indeed, a large portion of the land in the Netherlands was 
created artificially—from dikes, diked marshland, canals, locks, and drainage 
 equipment—and later became farms, villages, and towns. Broad sections of land 
below sea level were secured and developed as highly productive agricultural areas, 
and the first pumping facilities powered by wind (wind pumps)11 were implemented 
in the region. In the twelfth century, the inhabitants of Friesland and Dithmarschen 
were the first eastern Europeans to learn from the Dutch. In roughly 1530, Frisian 
Mennonites (a Protestant religious denomination) were invited to cultivate the 
lower Vistula (Ludwig 1961, 34). As noted earlier, the first hydraulic engineers from 
the Lower Rhine came to Brandenburg-Prussia during the seventeenth century.
Immediately after the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), Elector Frederick William 
of Brandenburg granted the Havelbruch—a small area north of Berlin—to the 
nobleman Jobst Gerhard von und zu Hertefeld of the Lower Rhine for diking and 
cultivation. In the model village of Neu Holland, settlers from the Lower Rhine fol-
lowed the Dutch tradition in receiving rights of quasi-ownership, exemption from 
the requirement to perform servile labor, and freedom of movement in exchange 
for independently working and securing the land (Peters 1989, 18‒30). In this small 
experimental area, dike maintenance appears to have been left to the new settlers 
as no dike decree is known to exist. In the rural world east of the Elbe, which was 
characterized by personal and manor serfdom, this concept was intended to spur 
emulation by the feudal lords of Brandenburg. It had limited success at first. The 
reconstruction of dikes was undertaken on the Elbe during the late seventeenth 
century; while the Havelland Luch (CCM, Part VI, Nachlese, “No. XVIII”) and the 
Rhinluch—areas near the Havelbruch—were cultivated in the eighteenth century. 
These were all state initiatives. In 1717, at the same time that the Christmas Flood 
hit the northwest, Frederick William I ordered the construction of a dike to pro-
tect the upper Oderbruch. This dike and the security it provided became a model 
for further land cultivation projects in absolutist Prussia in the eighteenth century 
(cf. part 2 on dike construction and maintenance on the Oder, Netze, and Warthe 
in the eighteenth century).
There are three early modern variants based on similar needs. The North Sea 
dike variant displays a democratic-communal structure, which continued to exist 
despite increasing encroachment by states or territories. River dike construction 
increasingly fell under the influence of territories. After the seventeenth century, 
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the differences between the variant of the northwest German territories—which 
were based more on class structure—and that of the more strongly authoritarian 
regions of eastern Brandenburg-Prussia and Prussia were, in essence, slight. In 
eastern Prussia, the local feudal lords with their extended estates were much more 
directly and energetically involved in the organization of dike maintenance, and 
they assumed a dominant role as a result. In western territories, the nobility—
who were more dependent on rent income—tended to exercise their influence on 
events surrounding the dikes indirectly through the territorial estate assemblies 
(Melchers 2002, 43–45 et passim).
The necessity of building and maintaining dikes was perceived in various ways 
by those concerned. In places like the Netherlands, potential danger was extremely 
high and the necessity was repeatedly reinforced by flooding. When dikes were 
breached, floods affected not only areas reclaimed for extensive agriculture but 
also villages and towns, particularly as settlement increased. Such conditions 
made the obligation of dike construction and maintenance fully acceptable. This 
continues to be the case today, especially following the trauma of the floods of 
1953. Resistance was more likely where new sea walls were to be built by state 
decree. The fishermen of the Oderbruch in Brandenburg had lived with floods for 
centuries, and rightly viewed their existence as threatened by dike construction in 
the eighteenth century (Kaak 2004a, 224, Kaup 1994, 126–127).
For centuries the area of northwest Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
has been densely packed with people, industry, agriculture, energy production, 
and transportation infrastructure. Consequently, there is a problem in that old 
mine tunnels still exist under the mighty dikes of the Lower Rhine and several of 
its tributaries (Ruhr)—which complicate present-day dike maintenance (Tittizer 
and Krebs 1996, 34).
In order to build the dikes and ensure their safety, organizational forms had to 
be found and developed.
ORGANIZ ATIONAL FORMS:  DIKE BANDS OR  
DIKE ASSO CIATIONS
There can be no negligence in the maintenance of flood control facilities, which 
demands considerable energy. From practical experience on a small scale, in 
instances where all interested parties were more or less equally affected, neigh-
borly pressure at first helped dike and levee construction. The next level at which 
construction took place was the parish (the lowest church district), which included 
several villages. The dike associations grew and existed nearly everywhere that 
dikes and levees were built, whether on the sea or rivers. These still exist today as 
organizations in which membership is mandatory and which require work and 
monetary payments (Allemeyer 2006, 84–85, 91–93).
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On the sea, Dike associations have existed in the Netherlands since the twelfth 
century. In Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) they were at first called “dike bands.” As 
the scope of projects grew, the number of dike associations decreased to a few with 
complex hierarchies governing numerous sub-dike associations. These associa-
tions were affected by a trend toward legal standardization, which was being intro-
duced by the northwestern territories of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation, to which the Netherlands belonged until 1648. During the early modern 
period these territories—counties of East Friesland and Oldenburg; the Free City 
of Bremen; as well as the duchies of Bremen, Lüneburg, and Holstein—took con-
trol of dike supervision in a stepwise manner. Thus, the dike associations in East 
Friesland lost their autonomy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: placed 
under the supervision of the state police, they lost the authority to establish their 
own statutes but maintained the right to elect their officers (Jakubowski-Tiessen 
1992, 228). The dike associations on Schleswig-Holstein’s west coast corresponded 
to the parishes. The parish reeve was also the dike count, and therefore a mem-
ber of the territorial administration. The dike judge—who was in charge of the 
inspection of certain sections of the dike, made neglect and damage public, and 
summoned those remiss in their official duties—was democratically elected by the 
dike band cooperative. Two to three dike inspections were performed annually 
by local commissions (Allemeyer 2006, 88–89). With the decree of January 29, 
1800, King Christian VII of Denmark (1766‒1808) created “a uniform legal basis” 
for Schleswig-Holstein in the “Entire State” of Denmark (which included Norway, 
Iceland, Greenland, and Schleswig-Holstein). As a result, the state controlled dike 
construction, without the dike associations losing their cooperative structure 
(CSVV, cf. Nawotki 2004, 179).
On the rivers: The northwest German political entities noted earlier also con-
trolled river dike matters. Many other territories of the Holy Roman Empire, and 
later the German Confederation and Empire, acted in a similar manner, as con-
struction measures on rivers also covered higher regions. Representative of the 
numerous policies of the early modern period is the Braunschweig-Lüneburg 
Dike Decree of 1664, which governed the dikes on the Elbe north of Hamburg. As 
in the aforementioned regions, local interested parties (Deichinteressenten) were 
formed into groups in which membership was mandatory. Dike sections and the 
property behind the dike were joined indivisibly, and dike sections were indicated 
by marked posts. The so-called Ober= Haupt= und Amt=Leute—the hierarchy of 
supervisors—was named by the territories and designated dike panels for three-
year periods.12 The democratic-communal structure of the North Sea was thus not 
duplicated here.
In 1695, further up the Elbe in Brandenburg, a dike decree for the Altmark 
area was issued based on that of 1476. It was intended to spur reconstruction after 
the Thirty Years’ War.13 The dike captain was nominated by the aristocracy of the 
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Altmark and confirmed by the elector. The decree also specified how many dep-
uties from the nobility, towns, villages, and individual farms had to participate 
in the upper and lower inspection of the dike (Tit. I). More broadly, this decree 
comprised regulations for the dike inspection (Tit. II), detailed how the dike 
was to be maintained (Tit. III), and concluded with a comprehensive dike roll 
of the upper and lower districts. With this Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg 
(1688/1701‒1713) issued in concession to the nobility a decree that did not leave any 
room for bylaws of the dike unions.
The dike decree of 1717 issued for the upper Oderbruch was based on that of 
the Altmark. The decree for this area described the division of responsibilities 
following dike construction. A small staff comprising representatives of the king 
performed inspections of the dike in cooperation with the Deichinteressenten, and 
distributed repair jobs and penalties. However, the dike union did not have the 
freedom to adopt a charter, and its members did not have the right to elect dike 
representatives. Farm owners played an important role among the deputies due 
to the size of their land and their ruling position in the villages of their areas.14 
The General State Laws for the Prussian States of 1794 declared that dike affairs 
were “determined by special river, dike and riverbank decrees.”15 This was not 
amended until 1818, when the influence of aristocratic deputies in the dike asso-
ciations decreased to the advantage of the urban and rural inspectors, and when 
local dike administrators were selected by dike association members—as specified 
by the Prussian “Law Regarding Dike Affairs” in 1848 (GSPS, 57, §15., f., cf. Rönne 
1863, 610—613). These concessions to democracy resulted from the Revolution 
of 1848, when Prussia briefly opened the doors to change. In 1853, however, the 
Amendment of the Dike and Riverbank Decree for the Bottomlands in Lebus did 
not result in any fundamental changes, it essentially confirmed the altered division 
of property. Between 1861 and 1895, four melioration associations and dike subas-
sociations were established within the dike organization of the lower Oderbruch.16
Dike affairs in the Oderbruch were part of a larger movement. Indeed, the 
Yearbook of Official Statistics of the Prussian State lists ninety-four dike associa-
tions with a total of 465,250 hectares of protected land in the nine “old provinces” 
of Prussia in 1866.17 These were almost exclusively river and Baltic Sea dike associ-
ations. In 1867, almost the entire German North Sea coast—including the annexed 
regions in northwestern Germany—were part of Prussia (Dörr 1995, 259‒263). 
The upper and lower Oderbruch merged into a single association in roughly 1900. 
Dike associations shared the costs of construction with the Prussian state, each 
paying half (Spiegelberg 2001, 106‒109).
The “Prussian Water Law” of 1913 treated the dike associations as water 
cooperatives and upheld members’ right to select governing boards themselves 
(Bochalli 1913). The Water Association Law of 1937 unified water and dike affairs 
throughout Germany; based on the principles of the National Socialist regime, 
this law once again eliminated the right of members to select officers—a right 
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that had existed since 1848.18 When the united dike association of the Oderbruch 
protested the establishment of two armament firms in 1938, it was punished by 
having both its responsibilities for serious flood control and its authority to col-
lect membership dues reduced. In 1940, all dike associations and subassociations 
of the region were merged into the Oderbruch Dike Association. The Second 
World War (1939–1945) had catastrophic effects on the dikes on the Oder. Indeed, 
the local dike commissions were only able to resume their work provisionally in 
1947, and cooperation with sites on the east bank—now part of Poland—did not 
come to pass. The passage of the Law on the Dissolution of Common Separations, 
Interested Parties, Associations (Gesetz über die Auflösung der gemeinschaftli-
chen Separations-Interessenten-Vereinigungen) of 1951 by the parliament of the 
German Democratic Republic resulted in the dissolution of the dike association 
of the Oderbruch in 1953. Moreover, local commissions and melioration societ-
ies, which had been reestablished, were once again placed under the strict politi-
cal oversight of state enterprises and institutions. A dike association with its own 
charter was not created again for a long period of time (Spiegelberg 2001, 106‒109). 
In 1991, the Oderbruch Water and Soil Association was established from these 
groups and responsibilities. Consequently, the idea of a dike association on the 
basis of German federal law, and with its own charter (§6) and responsibilities (§2, 
§54), was also revived in 1991.
Today, the German government has largely taken over the financing of coastal 
protection and river dikes, while the federal lands take part in planning financing 
and construction. The main dike associations contribute significantly to making 
buildings secure and providing for dike defense in disasters. They also function as 
contractors of construction work. Contemporary dike associations are statutory 
corporations (Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts) that elect their representa-
tives democratically.19
ENFORCEMENT
The collective construction of flood control structures demands a strict concep-
tion of facility maintenance, especially for those living behind the dike. Mutual 
supervision sufficed when neighbors organized the dike among themselves. When 
the scale of the work grew, however, keeping them in good working order without 
officials, inspections, and government enforcement was not feasible in the long 
run. The more centralized the organization, the greater the tendency of individu-
als to shirk their responsibilities. This is shown clearly by the struggles of officials 
in charge of the construction and maintenance of new dikes and levees on rivers 
and the sea. Whether cooperatively developed or imposed from above, the means 
of enforcement must be available.
In northern and eastern Germany in the Middle Ages, the Sachsenspiegel was 
the universal code of law.20 Its most important passage regarding dike construction 
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was “Villages located on the water that have a dike must maintain their portion of 
the dike in good order. However, if flooding occurs which breaks the dike, every-
one on the dike is required to help rebuild it. Those who do not do their part forfeit 
their right to property behind the dike.”21 A shortened form of this was passed into 
laws and oral tradition as “Anyone who won’t dike must step aside.”22 This prin-
ciple was first codified as the Spadelandsrecht in 1557 (Allemeyer 2006, 84‒86), and 
remained in force until the twentieth century. This essentially meant that anyone 
who was unable to participate in dike construction lost their property and had to 
leave the area. This drastic law reflected the tense situation near the sea. The dike 
court—or shovel court—provided that anyone who could no longer work on the 
dike had to stick their shovel in their section of the dike, or an inspector would 
issue the last warning when a Deichinteressent had neglected his responsibilities 
(Kühn 1992, 83).
Prussia was not the only land that used so-called military execution (against 
those who failed to pay their dues or work their share). It was also widely used 
for various purposes in other territories, as well as on the North Sea coast. 
Indeed, the practice was documented in East Friesland, Oldenburg, the duchy of 
Bremen, as well as in Holstein and Schleswig in even more severe forms than on 
the Oderbruch. Even after the Christmas Flood of 1717, Restanten—outstanding 
payments—were rigorously collected. This indicates that the readiness to work 
the dikes decreased following this disaster. Certainly, settlements were destroyed 
and many people drowned in areas immediately bordering the North Sea, while 
survivors were traumatized. Those in more distant areas considered themselves 
less threatened, and refused to contribute to the massive reconstruction project. 
The more forcefully rulers pushed the work, the more serious were local conflicts 
(Jakubowski-Tiessen 1992, 173‒176, 243‒244). Ultimately, territories and states—
with the higher-level perspective, comprehensive planning, and effective means 
of enforcement—prevailed. Indeed, the Braunschweig-Lüneburg dike decree 
(1717) provided that a hand be chopped off for the crime of moving a marker post, 
while those guilty of the “malicious” breaching of the dike were burned alive. 
The Prussian state guaranteed the implementation of the requirements of this 
decree with “military execution” and, after 1754, prosecuted acts of sabotage with 
Karrenstrafe (hard labor while chained to a cart)—a relatively mild punishment 
compared to those of Bremen and Verden.23
SEC ONDARY EFFECT S
The draining of an area resulted in the sinking of the water table, a change in 
climate, as well as a decrease in the variety of plants and animals. During the 
dike work on the Warthe, for instance, parts of the farmland on hillsides in the 
Warthebruch dried out, further disadvantaging inhabitants for whom the old set-
tlements on the edge of the marsh had already become a legal detriment (Kaak 
2012, 75). In 1800, Friedrich Wilhelm August Bratring quoted the opinion of King 
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Frederick William III’s personal physician that the air had become “cleaner and 
more healthy since the reclamation of various marshes and the felling of forests 
because nothing blocks the winds blowing through” (Bratring 1968, 32‒33). This 
characterization represents the opposite of what is called for today. A diminish-
ing variety of species in the Oderbruch was evident in the eighteenth century. 
The town of Wriezen was no longer able to function as the Oderbruch’s central 
fish market, which had supplied Berlin primarily.24 This was considered collateral 
damage by contemporaries.
The stronger the continuous line of dikes was built, and the more the river’s 
course was shortened, the higher and stronger dikes had to be. This is true of 
the North Sea, where flood barriers and the shortening of dikes reclaimed land 
from the sea. It is also true of rivers, where straightening and narrowing had the 
same result.25 In 2013, heavy flooding due to heavy rainfall (“centenary extreme 
event”) affected eight of sixteen German federal lands: Passau experienced its 
heaviest flooding in five hundred years, while the Rhine, Elbe, Mulde, Saale, Oder, 
Lusitanian Neisse, Danube, and Inn were particularly affected. Flooding along 
many European rivers—including the Danube, Drava, Vltava, and Vistula—
prompted the rethinking of matters. Making facilities higher and stronger had 
done little to diminish the danger. In view of climate change, measures to return 
land to rivers have been called for with increasing frequency. Experts have also 
argued for the creation of flood polders—diked-in areas intended to take in large 
masses of water—and rain retention basins on tributaries of larger rivers. The 
renaturation of the riparian zones is supposed to return flora and fauna to their 
old variety once again (Jakubowski-Tiessen 2009, 181).
DIKE C ONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE ON THE 
ODER ,  NETZE,  AND WARTHE IN THE  
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
In 1709, another bout of serious flooding occurred in the Oderbruch, upsetting 
its already limited agricultural production. As a result, Frederick William, who 
would become King in Prussia in 1713, decided to protect the upper Oderbruch 
with a uniform dike. This was not to ensure the continued existence of agriculture, 
but to significantly expand production on the monarchy’s most fertile lands with 
settlers recruited from abroad (Wentz 1930, 101). This took place approximately 
eighty kilometers east of Berlin in Brandenburg, the central province of the state 
of Prussia.
While the king was pressing for economic progress and settlement in the 
sparsely populated backwaters of Prussia; the head bailiffs on the estates of the 
Order of St. John (Amtmänner) and royals, as well as the noble manor lords 
(Gutsherren) with their feudal operations, were striving to secure and expand their 
areas of cultivation. Meanwhile, the peasants required continuity, at minimum, to 
raise their livestock. It is less clear how local feudal lords were involved in securing 
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the dikes—that is, in an important administrative duty—and what advantages 
and disadvantages that such involvement brought them. The sequence of events is 
illustrated by occurrences in the upper Oderbruch between 1716 and 1717. This also 
provides insight into dike construction in the lower Oderbruch, the Netzebruch, 
and the Warthebruch. (See map 2.)26
PUBLIC GO ODS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD
In contemporary theory, the term “public goods” encompasses a nearly unlimited 
set of tangible and intangible measures taken by governments (or their official 
representatives) on the national, provincial, regional, and local level to guarantee 
or improve the peace, security, and social justice at all or any level using specific 
Map 2. Colonization of the Oderbruch during the Reign of Frederick II
Source: Stier 1957, 69.
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educational, cultural, and technical standards (Becker 2002, Ledyard 1995, 111–194). 
While the scope of government involvement was more modest in the early modern 
period, there are fundamental patterns of thought and action that are comparable. 
These involve national defense, the rule of law, ensuring production and foodstuffs, 
the safety of roads, as well as guaranteeing the basic principles of religion. Rulers 
also act on behalf of those who do not share costs, and can establish methods of 
enforcement to maintain specific needs (Hattenhauer 1996, 600‒602, 734).
The problem of securing and cultivating river bottomlands in Brandenburg 
in the eighteenth century is particularly revealing in this regard. The late Middle 
Ages saw several attempts at flood control on the Oder, in the form of dikes that 
protected several villages. In the sixteenth century there was a continuous line of 
dikes for a small portion of the Oderbruch,27 but this was partially destroyed in the 
Thirty Years’ War (1618‒1648) and fell into disrepair thereafter. In the eighteenth 
century, construction plans reemerged on a brand new scale when the Oderbruch, 
the Netzebruch, and the Warthebruch were extensively drained and settled using 
state resources. The population increased significantly in the area near the dikes, 
Map 2. Continued
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and rivalries arose between the old peasants and the new colonists. There was par-
ticular resistance from the original inhabitants—especially fishermen—who could 
not or would not support the changes. To give the project some security, the state 
issued decrees regarding dike maintenance and integrated both local feudal lords 
and communities into the system.
The scope of responsibilities expected of local feudal lords—particularly the 
manor lords and head bailiffs of royal property and those of the Order of St. John—
as part of the state measures to ensure flood control in the eighteenth century must 
be taken into consideration. This includes examining which duties regarding the 
supervision of the protection system were specifically assigned to them, what meth-
ods of enforcement were at their disposal, how inspection worked in tandem with 
other duties, how effective their contribution to the linking of feudal and state activ-
ities actually was, and how finances were organized. Evidently, the organization of 
these matters was almost automatically given to local feudal lords, who were already 
firmly entrenched in land ownership, the control of the courts, and the adminis-
trative apparatus. A question arises regarding the extent to which these additional 
responsibilities altered the relationship between rulers and local communities.
When King Frederick William I of Prussia made the decision to dike the upper 
Oderbruch, he proceeded with all due caution—it was, after all, his first large project 
of this type. On December 30, 1716, he issued a preliminary dike and riverbank decree 
so that, as the final version read, “all interested parties better understand such a use-
ful work and are able to inform themselves about it” (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV 
Cap., “No. XVIII,” cc. 303). Such need was established on the assertion that
Our [royal] in Amt Lebus, as well as many noble villages on the Oder and the lowlands, 
or located in the so-called marshes, are flooded almost yearly by the rising and over-
flowing of the waters of the Oder, and their farmlands, pastures, and droveways are 
laid waste to the great detriment and inconvenience of Ourselves and Our subjects.28
Compounding matters,
it could not be countered with adequate effort or precaution, not only because many 
localities lacked the necessary supervision, but also because a few localities which own 
farmland and pastureland in marshes have contributed or performed very little to-
ward the conservation of existing dams or ponds; others, in contrast, had to build and 
maintain more dams than they were able to afford, as well as the ponds laid in such a 
way on the edge or banks of the river, as to be almost completely unprotected from its 
attack and its violence. (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., “No. XVII,” cc. 294‒295)
As expressed in the preamble of the decree of June 1717, suggestions for improve-
ment were received and the decree was significantly expanded—by means of the 
dike roll, for example (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., “No. XVII,” cc. 294‒295).
As such, the king recognized a serious problem, identified the causes, and 
understood that inhabitants were not in a position to take common action on 
their own. Realizing that there was no other institution that—given the conditions 
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of the time—possessed the power, means, and authority to rectify the problem and 
provide a lasting solution, King Federick William I ordered the large construc-
tion project. As the recognized ruling power, he subsequently issued a decree on 
his own authority that integrated all concerned parties into a system of controls 
and services. He committed all parties to serve the power of the state, but above 
all to each one another as neighbors—thereby endeavoring for the fair distribu-
tion of burdens. In the medium term, obedience was rewarded with improved 
quality of life, while negligence or resistance was threatened with penalties up to 
and including military intervention to compel service. However, the king’s initia-
tive was not purely intended for the well-being of his subjects. The expansion of 
farmland, as well as of both agricultural production and population, was also in 
the narrow interests of the state. To a large extent, the area to be diked comprised 
royal domains and thus provided the state with an immediate fiscal advantage.
DISTRIBUTION OF L AND AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN 
THE UPPER ODERBRUCH IN 1716
Except the Immediatstadt Küstrin,29 the area planned for dikes comprised three 
Mediatstädte30 of Lebus, Göritz, and Seelow, as well as forty-one villages. Of these 
forty-four settlements, nineteen had agricultural operations that were manorial and 
twenty-two did not,31 while three villages had become purely manorial operations. 
The Mediatstädte and twenty-one villages were located on royal demesnes (twenty-
two on the Lebus demesne, and two on the Quartschen demesne).32 Fourteen vil-
lages were on land owned by the nobility (twelve noble, two Adelslehne).33 Two 
were on land of the Order of St John, two on that of the Margrave of Brandenburg-
Sonnenburg, and one on university property. As nearly all land in Prussia east 
of the Elbe was divided into local feudal districts, the Mediatstädte as well as all 
the villages and manorial operations were under feudal seigneurial.34 Altogether 
the agricultural area of the lords in twenty-five villages of the upper Oderbruch 
comprised about a quarter of the total area: that is, barely 23%—a relatively low 
percentage. Elsewhere in East Elbian Prussia, such land comprised about 40% of 
village acreage at the time. This is because land in the Oderbruch was difficult to 
convert to agricultural uses prior to 1717, and was less interesting for manorial use 
as a result. The peasants of the villages where there were no manorial operations 
were also bound by the feudal system and required to perform servile labor.35
Given the scale of the construction plans and the ever-present doubt regarding 
its feasibility, only the state was able to take the initiative, as well as provide financ-
ing and organization. In any case, rather than weak local dikes, it was a matter of 
building a continuous fifty-kilometer-long dike (50.721 kilometers) on a middle-
sized European river. This dike was intended to channel the waters of the Oder into 
a narrowed course, and thus had to be higher and significantly stronger than any-
thing similar that had been previously built in Prussia. Under the supervision of 
royal director of Agriculture, Martin Friedrich von Creutz, a continuous wall was 
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built on the east side of the river’s main course from Lebus to Zellin in 1716‒1717. 
This was followed by the Royal Dike Decree of 1717 (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, 
IV Cap., “No. XVIII”), which created a dike association in the upper Oderbruch 
to assign maintenance duties, as well as govern the villages, demesne farms, and 
estates located in outlying areas that did not directly border the dike. This associa-
tion was not organized as a purely cooperative and autonomous body—behind 
everything stood the Prussian state with its laws and enforcement measures. In the 
implementation of the project, that royal lands dominated the upper Oderbruch 
was a distinct advantage for Frederick William I. After all, the king himself was 
the largest feudal lord in the area. The dike decree also included the dike roll, in 
which were entered all interested parties—so-called Deichinteressenten—from the 
royal demesne and manor farms of the nobility down to the owners of small sub-
farms, as well as the dike portion of each (Dike roll, CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, 
IV Cap., “No. XVIII,” cc. 305‒326). According to this directory, which was given in 
rods (3.777 meters), royal estates accounted for more than twenty-six  kilometers—
that is, over 50% of the total length of the dike (6,573 rods for the Lebus estate 
and 340 rods for the Quartschen estate). As such, the king was able to influence 
dike construction and maintenance decisively through the royal head bailiffs who 
administered his lands. Similarly, the villages and estates of the Order of St. John 
and those of the Margrave of Sonnenburg—all of which were owned by Margrave 
Karl Albrechts of Brandenburg-Sonnenburg, a member of the Prussian royal 
 family—totaled 1,490 rods. In addition to these, villages that were held by nobility 
or that were part of noble fiefs (held by seventeen noble families and their lines) 
accounted for 4,217 rods. Finally, 1,075 village peasants were listed in the dike roll. 
The allocation of the rods reveals the social structure of village mayors, farmers, 
cottagers, small farmers, and other peasants. Their section of the dike amounted 
to 9,722 rods of a total 13,429. They were thus the portion most heavily burdened 
with maintenance work (72%) and, as shown later, even more duties. (See table 7.)
THE ROLE OF THE LO CAL FEUDAL LORDS
Given the limited technological, communication, and transportation capacities in 
the early modern period, the practical securing of dike facilities in Prussia was a 
local duty. According to the Realprinzip, everyone who had land in the protected 
area was required to participate in flood control measures (Führ 1967, 5, Kluth 1997, 
164‒165). They were bound to this by a system that combined governmental legisla-
tion with forms of self-administration. Under a small staff of government officials, 
the Deichinteressenten—as members of the dike association—were required to act 
in accordance with the principles established by the king in the dike decree, par-
ticularly in securing the dike at their own expense and keeping drainage ditches 
in the diked area in good order. At the same time, the Deichinteressenten were 
integrated into the system as so-called Mit-Urteiler, or coinspectors. This applied 
to representatives of feudal property holders, as well as to the Church and feudal 
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holders of farmer, cottager, small landholder, and tenant parcels who were rep-
resented by their village mayors (village leader and village judge) and jury men 
(assessors of the village court) (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., “No. XVIII,” 
ch. X, cc. 332‒333).
Local feudal lords (two head bailiffs of royal estates as representatives of the 
king, noble manor lords, the master of the knights, and a commander of the Order 
of St. John, as well as the city as a bearer of feudal rights) were included. They were 
affected in three ways:
 1.  As owners of manorial agricultural operations in the bottomlands, each of 
whom had to maintain their own sections of the dike for their own interest 
and those of the dike association;
 2.  As Mit-Urtheiler of the dike area who shared responsibility for dike inspec-
tion and for determining what work and penalties were necessary;
 3.  As manor and judicial lords—that is, as local rulers—of peasants living in the 
villages (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., “No. XVIII,” ch. X, cc. 332‒333).
THE LEADING ROLE OF THE NOBILIT Y AND  
OTHER BEARERS OF FEUDAL RIGHT S IN  
THE EAST ELBIAN C OUNTRYSIDE
The free settlement relationships were established in Brandenburg in the course 
of the eastward expansion during the Middle Ages (after 1150); thereafter, settler 
society was refeudalized. In the late thirteenth century, the first monasteries were 
Table 7. Dike Assignments in the Upper Oderbruch, in Rods/Feet
Feudal Lordship Item Rods/Feet Peasants Rods/Feet Fd. Op. Rods/Feet
Roy. Demesnes 
(incl. L., G. &. S.) 25 ½ 6.913/2 649 5.855/10 9 
1.057/4 
Noble Manors & 
Adelslehne
12 2/2 4.217/2 235 2.712/6 16 1.504/8 
Order of St. John, 
Commanderie
3 963/5 77 577/5 2 386/0 
Mgr. of  
Sonnenburg, 
 Demesne
1 ½ 617/4 106 552/4 1 65/0 
University of 
 Frankfurt/Oder
1 24/0 8 24/0 — — 
Total Villages (incl. 
L., G. & S.)
44 12.735/1 1.075 9.722/1 28 3.013/0 
City of Küstrin 
(incl. New. Ch.)
1 694/0 n. i. n. i. 1 88/0 
Total 45 13.429/1 1.075 3.101/0 
Note: Item = villages and towns; Fd. Op. = feudal operations; roy. = royal; incl. L. G. & S. = villages on the royal demesnes 
including the small towns of Lebus, Göritz, and Seelow; Mgr. of Sonnenburg = Margrave of Brandenburg-Sonnenburg; 
incl. New. Ch. = incl. land of the Chamber of royal demesnes of the New March of Brandenburg; n.i. = no information.
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enfeoffed with villages, which until then had been part of the margravate. This was 
followed by the granting of fiefs in and around the villages to the knights who had 
conquered Brandenburg for the margraves. As such, the system of feudal lord-
ship with tribute—at first minor services—and of the manor lords as the full own-
ers of the farms was revived. In 1319, the death of Margrave Waldemar destroyed 
Brandenburg’s internal stability for the next century. Monasteries, the nobility, 
religious orders, and cities obtained additional rights from the territorial 
 sovereign—particularly judicial lordships, which the documents termed the “higher 
and lower courts” (Assing 1995, 140, 156‒157, Winkelmann 2011, 146‒147). It was at 
first a question of dispensing justice, which strengthened manorial authority vis-à-
vis their peasants, and of the court income obtained therefrom. The responsibility 
for local administration thus resulted in the increasing prominence of magistrate 
character. This seigneurial authority was replaced by manorial authority in the 
sixteenth century. Village inhabitants were made manorial subjects (personal serfs 
in areas near Brandenburg’s eastern border) who were obliged—besides paying 
cash rents—to perform servile labor, were bound to the soil (the personal serfs 
bound to the feudal lord), and were subject to weak ownership rights (lassitisches 
Recht), and their children were forced to work in the manor house and farms 
(Gesindezwangdienst).36 Owning large manors, lords exercised seigneurial and 
jurisdictional control, as well as patronage of the church. They were, in modern 
parlance, the local tax authorities, registration office, trade licensing office, officers 
of the local church, and the largest commercial enterprise; they also controlled the 
mills and breweries that peasants had to use. Moreover, because they filled peasant 
positions and had the right to approve marriages, they had considerable influence 
on individual peasant families.
In 1653, Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg further strengthened the 
position of the local feudal lords—especially the nobility—based on claims of 
runaway peasants, entitlement to “unreasonable” servile labor, and the continu-
ance of personal serfdom in areas where it already existed. Noblemen were to fill 
higher positions in public administration and the military. These concessions and 
offers were made by the elector in exchange for the power to raise taxes at his 
own discretion, and to free key policy issues from the influence of the territo-
rial estates. Before the start of dike construction, bearers of feudal rights consti-
tuted an unavoidable force in the rural power structure. Since local nobles were 
extremely wary of interference in their home domains, they carried out the lowest 
duties of the military administration (Harnisch 1996, 141, 144), and took over the 
duties of school patronage after the introduction of compulsory school attendance 
(Neugebauer 1985, 255‒260). The princely estates into which the elector or, after 
1701, king divided his land were very similar to the farms of the nobility. These 
large operations were called Vorwerke. Beginning in the time of Frederick William 
I, these royal estates, or Ämter, were leased to citizens. While Amtmänner acted 
economically like noble landowners and were responsible for numerous magistrate 
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issues, they did not exercise any higher judicial authority and were bound by 
instructions in many areas—such as dike construction. All in all, the legal and 
ownership conditions of peasants on the estates of the king and the Order of St. 
John, as well as of the towns, were organized in a more tolerable manner than on 
the estates of the nobility (Müller 1981, 318).
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DIKE ASSO CIATIONS  
AFTER 1717
The highest supervisory responsibility was held by the captain of the dike of the 
upper Oderbruch, under whom were two dike counts each responsible for half of 
the dike’s length. Under these dike counts were three dike masters who performed 
inspection functions, as well as enforcement functions with Deichinteressenten who 
had shirked their duties. Deichinteressenten were required to appear in their respec-
tive dike sections twice a year as Mit-Urtheiler before the dike inspection commis-
sion. The captain of the dike recorded damage and the penalties incurred. Fines 
and levies were to be settled on this occasion between the authorities and village 
mayors (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., “No. XVIII,” ch. XV. and XVI., cc. 
336‒340). A dike financial official kept records of the dike association’s income and 
outlays. Six pfennig per dike rod were to be paid annually; this money and any fines 
collected were used to pay state employees and to finance any construction that 
individual villages and so on were unable to perform themselves. (See figure 11.)37
At first glance, it would appear that a group of Deichinteressenten—who were 
equals in principle—were considered Mit-Urtheiler and that Deichinteressenten 
were distinguished solely by the length of their dike section and not by their social 
status. However, the head bailiffs and the noble manor lords actually had more 
power than other commission members. Whether nobles exercised the authority 
themselves or were represented by subordinates (administrators)—due to their 
other duties as officers or government officials—they nonetheless organized the 
affairs of their villages and farming property themselves and were involved in all 
important affairs of their peasants at the lowest judicial level (“self-acting manor 
lords”) (Kaak 1995, 78). While ruling over farm and village, they were closely 
linked to the possessions of the peasants. In the first half of the eighteenth century, 
the manorial parcels of land were complexly intertwined with those of the peas-
ants (Kaak 1991, 69). The head bailiffs and manor lords had the right, derived from 
their judicial authority, to receive servile labor from their peasants (farm work, 
haulage service, and extraordinary services). This constituted a large percentage 
of the labor performed on the demesnes and manors in the eighteenth century. 
The maintenance of the lord’s dike rods became a new area in which peasant farm-
ers, cottagers, and the like could be utilized as servile laborers—and a shifting 
line formed between dike labor and extraordinary labor as a result (Kaak 1999, 
138‒144).
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MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT AND  
ADDITIONAL PROJECT S
The use of means of enforcement refers to subsequent projects. The most serious 
punishment that the master of the dike could threaten or impose was so-called 
military execution. In August 1716, King Frederick William I ordered all regiments 
in the area to be at the ready to compel the necessary support efforts. This prin-
ciple was confirmed in the dike decree of 1716 (CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., 
“No. XVII,” cc. 304). The general threat of this particular measure was clearly suf-
ficient for construction work up to 1717. However, disputes over additional dikes 
increased in the face of the earlier project’s consequences. The waters of the Oder 
had been pushed toward the east bank and larger quantities flowed through the 
Oderbruch into the lower marshlands, which acted as collecting tank. The con-
struction of 1716‒1717 forced a continuation of the enforcement measures, which 
in turn led to the heightened potential for conflict.
The use of military execution did not entail individuals being put to death. 
Rather, it involved situating soldiers in the houses of rebellious peasants, and 
 putting pressure on them to provide shelter and food; it was intended to create a 
 willingness to perform work and make payments. Manor lords also made use of this 
execution when peasants refused to perform other servile labor, as the conditions 
in which the law could be used were not stipulated precisely. As such, a gray zone 
developed. This included the use of military service, which manor lords often 
used to shield their land and peasants, while noble officers—often manor lords 
themselves—supported them (Kaak 2010, 182‒184, 268‒270).
As larger and more complicated work was undertaken to build dikes in the lower 
Oderbruch, attempts to sabotage construction emerged in 1747. Consequently, 
Frederick II increased the degree of punishment and ordered the use of the 
Karrenstrafe against saboteurs. In the Karrenstrafe, infringers were made to work 
on the construction of fortifications while chained to carts for weeks or months on 
a diet of bread and water (Kaak 2010, 183, 370). This affected the fishermen, whose 
basis of existence worsened radically after the area was drained; while the lives of 
farmers, cottagers, and the like improved.
Despite the complications, dike construction and the cultivation of the lower 
Oderbruch, between 1747 and 1752, proved a great success in terms of both 
Figure 11. Organigram: The Hierarchy of the Dike Control (Upper Oderbruch)
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economics and propaganda. Although the first generation of new settlers was 
not free of servile and menial labor duties, they did have a right to their land 
that resembled real ownership—unlike the older lassitisch38 peasant inhabitants. 
Once again, the king was dominant and controlled nearly half of all the devel-
oped parcels. The previously mentioned margrave and master of the knights, Karl 
Albrecht, who owned more than a quarter of the cultivated area, also played an 
important role in the central Oderbruch. It was he who established colonist vil-
lages and demesnes on the Quilitz and Friedland margravate estates and on the 
neighboring Grüneberg estate of the Order of St. Johns. Noble families and cit-
ies shared a further area (Kaak 2012, 179‒180). Indeed, while this dike was “only” 
about forty kilometers long, the effort and risk were greater. This risk was due 
to shortening of the Oder by some twenty kilometers using a canal, and because 
drainage facilities played a much larger role. According to the dike decree of 1769, 
the Deichinteressenten of the upper Oderbruch also shared the responsibility for 
sections of the lower Oderbruch (NCC, Vol. IV, 1769, “No. 7,” cc. 5123‒5125).
As a result of the success of dike construction in the Oderbruch, Frederick II 
was overly hasty in ordering the cultivation of the Netzebruch and Warthebruch in 
1770. After the Netzebruch had been successfully drained, the Dike, Riverbank, and 
Trench Decree for the bottomlands was issued in 1779 (NCC, Vol. VI, 1779, “No. 
XLII”). In the beginning, favorable weather resulted in settlement of the areas in 
the lower Warthe before the dike there was completely finished. In 1775, however, a 
flood destroyed much of the finished work in the Warthebruch. Furthermore, the 
topography of the area was more difficult to convert to a closed polder landscape 
than the Oderbruch had been. There were parallels between the lower Warthe 
and the upper Oderbruch: in the latter, dike work and cultivation were performed 
around the royal Lebus estate, while in the former it was the Order of St. John with 
its extensive holdings at the Hospitaller Sonnenburg estate (10,000 ha) that deter-
mined the course of events (Kaak 2012, 183–184). The nobility played a smaller role 
than the Order, colonizing cities, and middle-class property owners. The original 
idea of Frederick II and his youngest brother August Ferdinand—who became the 
master of Knights of the Order of St. John in 1763—was to provide large parcels 
of land for the settlement of more significant colonists (economically stable, full 
acquisition areas, or Vollerwerbsstellen) and thus provide a model for melioration 
on the manor estates of the other feudal landowners. Consequently, a dike decree 
was issued in 1802 (NCC, Vol. XI, 1802, “No. XX.”).
WHO ACHIEVED WHAT IN PARTICUL AR?
The cultivation of the lowlands of the Oder, Netze, and Warthe showed itself to be 
an extremely successful project in several respects. The protected farmland with 
its dikes and drainage facilities became a symbol of Prussia’s talent for innovation 
in the public opinion of the rest of Europe.
192    Chapter 10
This reclaimed land was seen as the act of a far-sighted king. At first, however, 
this was only true to a certain degree in the upper Oderbruch. Gottfried Wentz 
writes in his publication on the history of the Oderbruch:
In the reorganization of the conditions in the upper Oderbruch, the king [Frederick 
William I] was thinking and acting like a large landowner. The intrinsic value of 
viable farms as economic factors was not recognized, rather rural inhabitants were 
considered only in their capacity as villeins, a source of service and payment. (Wentz 
1930, 169)
Indeed, after 1722, an expansion of the already-dominant royal properties in the 
Oderbruch took place in the upper Oderbruch, first because the king claimed 
large portions of the cultivated land for his own estates, and second because he 
purchased the noble villages of the families von Burgsdorf, von Kameke, von der 
Marwitz, von Pfuhl, and von Sydow. While property of the nobility totaled about 
30% of the dike rods in the upper Oderbruch in 1717, it began to decline. Indeed, 
the very large Lebus royal estate acquired so much new farmland and so many new 
settlers that it was subdivided several times after 1736. In addition, two new estates 
were established. Although Friedrich Wilhelm I’s governmental activities in this 
area did resemble those of a large landowner, Wentz’s criticism is grossly exagger-
ated. He overlooks that first of all the king protected the inhabitants—including 
those who did not own land and who were thus not obliged to make payments or 
provide service—and he ordered the construction of infrastructure in the popu-
lated areas. Not until the second step did he help the state project Bruchkultivierung 
(marsh cultivation) achieve a new scale. Without subscribing to the Oderbruch 
mythos, one can say that an important development was then completed, one that 
had been conceived as part of an entire spectrum of innovative political measures.
When his son Friedrich II continued the colonization of the lower Oderbruch 
shortly after 1750, he was able to take advantage of organizational models that 
helped him protect inhabitants and to expand agriculture in the river bottom-
lands, which in turn supported other state goals. The fact that in the Seven Years’ 
War he risked everything he had achieved is another story.
In 1752, Margrave Karl Albrecht, the master of the Knights of the Order of 
St. John, started establishing colonies and demesnes on the order’s properties in 
the central Oderbruch before expanding this work to his neighboring margra-
vate leased estates. The work complied with the ideas of Frederick II; however, 
as Frederick’s older relative, he took the liberty of proceeding according to his 
own plan. His successor, Prince August Ferdinand, Frederick’s younger brother, 
was faced with a much larger task on the Warthe and took a largely subordinate 
role to the king as a sort of junior partner. Under his tenure, numerous colonies 
and demesne farms—some with foreign names (Ceylon, Havannah, Pensylvanien, 
Philadelphia, Saratoga, Savannah, Sumatra)—were established. And indeed, the 
revenues of the Order of St. John doubled between 1763 and 1811.
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In the lower Oderbruch, nobility with 18% of the land were involved in reclama-
tion, while in the Warthebruch, where even less noble colonies were established, 
Lords von Waldow and von Wreech were particularly conspicuous in this regard. 
Town property played a bigger role than it did in the Oderbruch. Indeed, the town 
Landsberg an der Warthe on its own outperformed by far the limited reclamation 
activities of the towns Oderberg, Wriezen, and Freienwalde.
In principle, Frederick William I and Frederick II pursued economic goals when 
they reclaimed land while the nobility focused on business goals. Despite serious set-
backs the kings, the margrave, and the prince were successful in creating fundamen-
tally secure farmland of the highest profitability out of the river bottomlands, securing 
the existing royal villages—as well as those of feudal lords and towns. They also 
succeeded in significantly concentrating the population through settlement under 
improved law and in stabilizing the general provision of foodstuffs. The amount of 
time and the cost of reclaiming land increased significantly from one area to another. 
The large requirement spent by the state treasuries on construction was money the 
kings considered well spent. This was easy to accept because the royal property in 
Oderbruch grew along with its resident population. This well-secured and highly pro-
ductive agricultural area provided additional income for state coffers, which could be 
used to improve infrastructure inside and outside the dike area (waterways, canals, 
bridges, postal systems), to create a school system as well as to improve the quality of 
the science, and, last but not least, to strengthen the standing army.
However, in the Warthebruch the stated goal of settling large areas with large 
numbers of colonists was only partially achieved. Because of dwindling demand 
from prospective settlers, part of the land was formed into demesne farms that 
also proved to be extremely productive.
The situation of the long-established manor subjects or serfs only improved 
slowly during the diking and cultivation. Their rights of possession improved in 
small steps but they were only rarely able to win their freedom. A number of them 
were even placed on Kleinststellen under conditions similar to the corvee system 
to work the new demenses of the Order of St. John.
When most of the new settlers enjoyed personal freedom and were free from 
servile labor duties, able to develop their own production, largely independent of 
one another, and unencumbered by the three-field system, an important goal had 
been reached (Kaak 2004b, 99‒101). However, the influence on noble landholders 
was tentative.
In the marsh areas all of this contributed to the self-esteem of the inhabitants 
because it strengthened their awareness gradually of their own share in progress and 
in the increasing income. For this they continued to deal with manorial lords and 
the managers of the princely estates on many issues. Like the royal and the Order’s 
demesnes, as well as the noble manors, the villages also were members of the dike asso-
ciations. The delegation of responsibility had been experimented with in the upper 
Oderbruch, and later used in the rest of the Oderbruch, as well as the Netzebruch and 
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Warthebruch. Even if compulsory membership involved onerous work and financial 
burdens, it demonstrated that the population of the cultivated bottomlands accepted 
the region—with its steadily improved dike and drainage facilities—as its own.
NOTES
1. This contribution uses the older German names for these rivers: Netze (now Noteć) and Warthe 
(now Warta).
2. Until 1316, the Neuzelle monastery built a dike along the Oder and the Lausatian Neisse. Cf. 
Krüger and Oelze 2014, 330.
3. Danube: Mohila and Michlmayr 1996, Géra n.d. Moldava: Neuhäusl, Moravec, and Neuhäusl-
Novotná 1965, 401.
4. Müller 1813, 503‒504. To date, there have been 295 floods in Saint Petersburg. To control the 
flooding of the Great Neva, its shores and the three main canals were lined with Karelian granite.
5. Sava: Maissen 2002, 478‒479. Drava: Michor 2014, 351‒352.
6. Tweed: Boucher 1963, 130. Thames: Porter 1998, 192‒193, 227, 264. Severn: Knapp 1979, 70.
7. The dike decree of Eiderstadt of 1595, the dike decree of Tondern of 1619, Royal Danish dike 
decree of 1634.
8. Menschentränke = Großes Ertrinken; a flood in which many people drowned.
9. In particular, Jakubowski-Tiessen 1992, 57‒59, Egidius 2003, 104‒105. General-Deichgraf = su-
preme dike reeve.
10. This is indicated by the Dutch dike decree of 1253, the dike decree of Düsselt and Cleverham 
of 1323, the first dike decree of Cleves of 1343, and the dike decree of Bremen of 1473. Cf. ALZ, col. 732.
11. Beginning in the sixteenth century, although some hold that they originated in the fourteenth 
century. Cf. Gasch and Twele 2013, 342.
12. CBLLG, Cap. VIII, Sectio 4: Von Teich = Sachen, “Nr. LXXII,” §§15, 19, 192, 193. Ober = , Haupt 
=, und Amtleute = supreme supervisors, district, and local magistrates.
13. Dike roll: CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., “No. VIII,” cc. 273‒286. Cf. Berghaus 1845, 218.
14. Schulze 1890, 378: Deichverbände and 416: Gesetz über das Deichverbändewesen von 1848.
15. PrALR, 1089. Intentional breaching of the dike in which flooding results in fatalities was pun-
ishable by death.
16. Spiegelberg 2001, 106‒109. On the development of the dike associations in Prussia, cf. Armenat 
2010, 116‒118.
17. JbSPS, 80. Until 1866, in northwest Germany only North Friesland was part of Prussia 
(1744‒1807); the kingdom was the dominant state in eastern Germany with a considerable exclave on 
the Rhine. The north German sea dike associations are not included here because Prussia did not an-
nex a large part of north Germany until 1867.
18. Merck 1962, 732–733: “Instead of by an election, the chairman and his deputy were named to 
their office by supervisory authorities.” The law remained in force in the FRG until 1991, when a series 
of sections were declared void and the law was supplemented by another state law. Its by-laws were 
enacted by its supervisory authorities.
19. There are, for example, twenty-two dike associations in Lower Saxony, ten in Schleswig-Hol-
stein, two in Bremen, and one in Hamburg. Length of dike sections, for example: eleven dike associa-
tions on the Aller (Lower Saxony) with 69.1 kilometers, an average of 6.28 kilometers of dikes per dike 
association.
20. 1220‒1235 recorded by Eike von Repgow, with partial effect until the introduction of the Civil 
Code in Germany 1900.
21. “Swelke dorp bi watere lieget unde enen dam hebbet, die sie vor der vlut bewaret, jewelk dorp 
sal sinen deil des dames vestenen vor der vlut. Kumt aver die vlut unde brict sie den dam, unde ladet 
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man mit deme gerüchte dar to, die binnen deme damme geseten sien, svelk ir nicht ne helpt büten den 
dam, die hevet verworcht so gedan erve als he binnen deme damme hevst.” Cf. SSp, L, V.
22. “Keen nich will dieken, de mut wieken” or “Wer nicht will deichen, der muss weichen.” Cf. 
Kühn 1992, 83.
23. DOHB, 83, § 1: “shall be burned according to the common rights.” Cf. Allemeyer 2006, 103, 
Mellmann 1795, 126.
24. Richness in fish: cf. Christiani 1855, 13‒16. Loss of the richness: cf. Kaup 1994, 126–128. Resis-
tance of the fishermen: cf. Wentz 1930, 111‒114, 118.
25. Rita Gudermann counts the Oderbruch after the dike construction and bursting of dikes in the 
years 1770, 1771, 1780, 1785, 1829, and 1830 and so on. Cf. Gudermann 1999, 376.
26. On the activities of Frederick II, also see Kouschil 2012.
27. Wentz 1930, 97: “Beginning around the end of the sixteenth century, lively attention was paid 
to dike facilities on the Oder.”
28. CCM, Part IV, 2nd Section, IV Cap., “No. XVII,” cc. 294‒295. Amt Lebus = royal demesne of 
Lebus.
29. Immediatstädte (civitates) were directly under the head of state (here the electors of Branden-
burg, after 1701 kings of Prussia) and were thus independent of local feudal lords.
30. Mediatstädte (oppida) were under local feudal lords. Regarding the Mediatstädte in Lebus, cf. 
Vetter 1996.
31. Here feudal operations are understood to cover the large manor farms of the nobility and the 
demesnes of the king, as well as the Order of St. John, and other village lords—including universities.
32. Royal estates were feudal districts comprising several villages and demesnes; they were also 
called domains. The town of Seelow was part of the royal Lebus estate.
33. A noble family’s fief possession that was part of a tenure of another noble family, feudal corpo-
ration, and so on.
34. The German Reich of 1871 was divided into two parts of similar size by the Elbe River, of which 
the northeastern (i.e., the East Elbian part) was more heavily dominated by the nobility.
35. For example, the villages of Gusow and Platkow were without manorial operations under the 
same noble lord, although the peasants from Platkow had to work in Gusow; similarly, the margravate 
peasants from Quappendorf had to serve at the manor of Quilitz, cf. Kniehase 1995, Kaak 2010, 76‒77.
36. Kaak 1991, 224, Neugebauer 2009, 175. Lassitischer Besitz = Lassbesitz = ceded (überlassen) 
to the peasants for their use. Gesindezwangdienst = compulsory farm service of the subject children.
37. 80.574 d = 3.357 1/4 gr = 279 3/4 Taler.
38. See note 36.
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Von vorsätzlich verursachten Ueberschwemmungen,” 1089‒1090.
SSp (Repgow, Eike von, Der Sachsenspiegel, niederdeutsches Rechtsbuch, 1220‒1235), liber 
secundus.
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During the eighteenth century, China proper was under the rule of the Qing 
Dynasty founded by the Manchus at the beginning of the seventeenth century. By 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the Qing Dynasty had become a vast empire; 
it directly controlled the Manchu heartland and the eighteen inner provinces of 
China, and had annexed the Mongolian territories and Tibet and extended its 
power into Central Asia, and entered into a tribute system with Korea, Ryukyu, 
and Vietnam. It was also engaged in trade with Russia and Japan. Qing relation-
ships with neighboring countries were based on a system that that reflected rela-
tive power, distance, and importance. The Qing Dynasty brought stability to East 
Asia through its skillful foreign policy, which was known as Pax Manchurica.1
Domestically, the Qing rulers took over the Ming bureaucratic institutions, 
adding on the new Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions to supervise 
newly incorporated territories, and establishing the Grand Council to strengthen 
the efficiency of the administrative structure.2
Global deflation during the “Crisis of the Seventeenth Century” affected China 
in the form of the Kangxi Depression (Kangxi Gujian).3 As overseas trade declined 
and less silver came in from abroad, the economy contracted. Once this cycle had 
concluded, the economy entered a new stage of prosperity, which lasted from the 
end of the seventeenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century. As com-
modity prices rose the consumption of cereal products and the production of 
handicraft goods and luxury products flourished. China also benefited from the 
long reigns of three generations of comparatively wise emperors who reigned for 
over 130 years—the Kangxi Emperor (1662–1722), the Yongzheng Emperor (1723–
1735), and the Qianlong Emperor (1736–1795)—a time that came to be known as 
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the golden age of the Qing.4 This period could be extended by a further forty or 
so years, leading up to the Opium War in 1840, and could be called the “Long 
Eighteenth Century of Qing Rule.”5 This chapter focuses on water management 
practices in the Jifu (Beijing Metropolitan) Region, during the eighteenth century.
GEO GR APHIC C ONDITIONS
Beijing served as the capital of the Qing dynasty, and the region known as “Jifu,” 
that is, the region around the capital, was known during this era as Zhili province. 
Jifu signifies land that is directly controlled by the emperor, while “Zhili” means 
“direct control.” This region, which is now administratively under partly under 
the Beijing Metropolitan government and partly under and Hebei province, cov-
ered over three hundred thousand km2, and was roughly the size of present-day 
Germany. Registered land that was subject to tax levies totaled 65,719,000 mu (or 
approximately forty thousand km2) in 1753.6
The region has a warm, continental monsoon climate: winters are cold with 
little snow, while summers are hot with heavy rains. The average temperature is 
around 10oC, and the average annual rainfall on the plains is around five hundred 
to six hundred meters (about a third of that received in Japan). Rain is particularly 
scarce during the spring, autumn, and winter, and the land is often arid.
The Jifu Region is part of the North China Macroregion described by G. William 
Skinner.7 A macroregion is a physiographical regional division created for natural 
and economic reasons by a river catchment, and differs slightly from administra-
tive regional divisions. The Jifu Region is in the northern part of the North China 
Macroregion, while in the west, hilly terrain runs along a large mountain range, 
and alluvial plains created by the Hai River system lie in the east. The North China 
plains were located downstream of the Yellow River prior to the Common Era, and 
though they have developed since ancient times, it is likely that cotton production 
was only just possible in coastal areas after the tenth century, given the alkaline soil 
(the result of salt accumulation), which was a consequence of overdevelopment 
in ancient times. Grain production was insufficient to support the consumption 
needs of the region, and the capital population relied on grain imports from the 
south (through the grain tribute, or caoyun, system).8
POPUL ATION
Political stability and favorable economic conditions allowed for rapid population 
growth. China had a population of approximately 150 million people at the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century; by the eighteenth century this number had grown 
to two hundred million. It continued to grow to three hundred million by the end 
of the eighteenth century.9
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Various strategies were implemented across China to cope with the increasing 
population. Sichuan province in the Upper Yangtze Macroregion developed its 
mountainous regions to cultivate New World crops like maize, sweet potatoes, 
and potatoes.10 The Jiangnan Region in the Lower Yangtze Macroregion, which 
was already an economically advanced region, developed its handicraft industries 
(such as cotton and silks), and continued further along the path of urbanization as 
a means of absorbing the growing population. Meanwhile, Fujian province in the 
Southeast Coast Macroregion, which in comparison was struggling economically, 
avoided experiencing severe population pressures when millions migrated abroad 
to Southeast Asia and elsewhere as overseas Chinese, or Huaqiao.
The population was also growing remarkably fast in the North China 
Macroregion, though this region did not have access to resources such as under-
developed land as in the Sichuan Region or commodity production levels such 
as those in the Jiangnan region. Between 1580 and 1660 the region’s development 
cycle was affected by the crises that occurred as the Ming dynasty declined, namely, 
famines, epidemics, rebellions, and invasions, and the confusion that resulted as 
power was being transferred to the Qing. The population initially peaked in 1580 
at twenty-eight million, then grew sharply under the Qing to five times that size 
by 1850, when it reached 120 million.11 Economic activity also peaked around this 
time, and Beijing’s population reached approximately one million. Jifu province 
had to expand into previously uninhabitable areas to cultivate land for the prov-
ince’s growing population, which was also the main pressure behind the region’s 
efforts to maintain infrastructure through public works.
ASPECT S OF LO CAL SO CIET Y
At the beginning of the Ming dynasty (early fifteenth century) the administrative 
management of local societies was entrusted to self-governing organizations in 
rural areas known as li. However, reforms to the tax system (i.e., the introduction 
of the Single Whip Reform, or yitiao bianfa) at the end of the Ming dynasty (six-
teenth century) changed the situation; land and corvée were combined into a sin-
gle payment in silver, rather than in kind; people began paying their taxes directly 
to the government in silver. Authority over local society was transferred from the 
li to the magistrate, and the infrastructure maintenance that had previously been 
carried out autonomously by local social organizations became the responsibility 
of the magistrate.12
At the same time, the central government’s control of magistrates tightened 
significantly, and performance evaluations were based primarily on a magistrate’s 
ability to collect taxes and maintain order. Under Qing rule, magistrates were not 
permitted—under the Avoidance System—to serve in their place of birth, and in 
principle they were expected to change posts every two to three years.
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Under these circumstances, local elites found it necessary to negotiate with the 
magistrate to protect their region’s interests. Composition of the elite varied in dif-
ferent regions: in economically developed regions like Jiangnan, retired officials. 
(Those who had advanced in civil service examinations to the highest status of 
jinshi [a graduate of the imperial examination] and juren [provincial graduates], 
collectively known as gentry [xiangshen], had a great deal of power.) Meanwhile 
in Jifu, the local elite included many lower degree holders such as sheng yuan (a 
student of a prefectural or county school) and jian sheng (a student of the Imperial 
Academy), in which case the magistrate had the most power.13 Since the region 
was very close to the center of national power in Beijing, government policies had 
a comparatively direct impact, and, in fact, the Kangxi Emperor and the Qianlong 
Emperor often visited the Jifu Region, thereby ensuring the concrete manifesta-
tion of their policies.
CHALLENGES FACED BY THE QING DYNAST Y IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
When the Kangxi Emperor assumed direct rule in 1667 he intended to address 
three issues: the Three Feudatories (sanfan), the grain tribute system (caoyun), 
and flood control of the Yellow River (hewu). The Three Feudatories were a mili-
tary and political issue related to the suppression of rebellions led by Wu Sangui, 
who had previously helped the Qing shore up control over China proper, while 
both the grain tribute system and the flood control system for the Yellow River 
related to infrastructure. The Jiangnan Region was the economic center of Ming 
and Qing China, and important industries were concentrated there, including the 
production of commodities such as raw cotton, the silk and cotton textile handi-
craft industries, and the production of salt. In addition to this concentration of 
wealth it was also a cultural center, producing a relatively large number of success-
ful candidates in the imperial civil service examinations.
Beijing, however, was the capital and political center, and, as a result, various 
resources were transferred from the south to the north. The Grand Canal system, 
which extended approximately twenty-five hundred kilometers from Hangzhou 
to Beijing, served as a major transportation artery, and was used in the grain trib-
ute system to transfer wealth from the south to the north: every year, four hun-
dred thousand to five hundred thousand tons of grain were transported to Beijing 
from the rice bowl in the middle of the Yangtze River Basin (Huguang Region), 
through the Jiangnan Region. This transfer of wealth served to ensure the unity of 
an empire in which the politics and the economy were divided between the north 
and the south. When this north-south structure broke down at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the empire began to split apart. In other words, maintaining 
the Grand Canal’s infrastructure played an important role in the empire’s survival.
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The second major infrastructure concern is North China was related to the 
Yellow River; successive dynasties concentrated enormous quantities of energy 
in controlling the river. The Yellow River, flowing through the loess highlands of 
Northwest China, gathered a high sediment content, which resulted in frequent 
flooding. From ancient times, skill in controlling the Yellow River had served as 
a marker of the legitimacy of China’s rulers. As a result, the scholarly  officials, 
who in general paid little heed to technology, devoted great effort to flood 
control, which they frequently discussed, and about which they amassed a 
wealth of literature.
The Qing dynasty was no exception. The Kangxi Emperor appointed Fu Jin 
(1633–1692) as the director-general of River Conservation in 1677. Fu Jin  developed a 
successful flood control program for the Yellow River, but even Jin’s  comprehensive 
plan could not prevent the continuing erosion of the river’s embankments, and 
the Qing was forced to conduct constant maintenance. Just prior to the  eighteenth 
century the central government paused in its nationwide focus on infrastruc-
ture maintenance and public works related to the grain tribute system and flood 
 controls on the Yellow River, and embarked instead on redeveloping and improv-
ing the regions surrounding the capital.
FLO OD C ONTROL AND IRRIGATION POLICIES IN THE 
J IFU REGION DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Some of the improvements in regions surrounding the capital included developing 
flood control measures for the Yong-Ding River and other rivers. Work also com-
menced on rice paddy development projects, albeit temporarily.
Flood Control on the Yong-Ding River
The Yongding River originates in Shanxi province, crosses over the Taihang 
Mountains, and passes through the Marco Polo Bridge (Lu Gou Bridge) to the 
southwest of Beijing, where it joins the sea east of Tianjin. Fortified embank-
ments had been constructed around Beijing to protect the capital during the Ming 
dynasty, but the river’s lower reaches had been neglected, and the river, which was 
much like the Yellow River in that it had high sediment levels, frequently changed 
course, and the roads that intersected with the river were frequently damaged by 
floods. Local gazette records from the Late Ming era clearly described the loss 
of life and fortunes whenever the river flooded, but local officials only addressed 
the issue in a palliative manner, while suggesting that prayers be offered during 
religious services.
Under the Kangxi Emperor high waterworks policies were implemented by the 
central government on stretches of the Yongding River downstream of Beijing, 
and the first embankments were constructed as far as the middle basin in 1698. 
It was at this time that the Kangxi Emperor gave the Yongding River its name, 





























Map 3. The Flood Control System of Yongding River
meaning “the river of eternal stability.” The embankments were extended a further 
sixty kilometers downstream in 1700, and then to the outskirts of Tianjin in 1726. 
This expanded the area that could be inhabited and cultivated within the sphere of 
the embankments, and also made possible the cultivation of fertile soil known as 
yudi on the riverside land, which the government leased to farmers. Consequently 
both the population and productive capacity increased, though the establishment 
of a fixed waterway concentrated sediment deposits outside the embankments, 
and made it necessary to dredge the river constantly to protect the raised riverbed. 
Moreover, when the embankments were breached, the damage to human settle-
ments was greater than it had been prior to this construction.
The Qing government responded to this problem by establishing jurisdic-
tional regions of about five to fifteen kilometers known as gong on the northern 
and southern banks of the Yongding River to maintain its embankments, and 
appointed an assistant magistrate to oversee them; it also established jurisdic-
tions known as hao every five hundred meters, and stationed soldiers to guard the 
embankments. (See map 3.) Ultimate overall responsibility for flood control of the 
Yongding River was initially given to the central government’s Board of Works but 
was later transferred to the governor general of Zhili province. The yearly cost of 
the gong was between one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand taels,14 at 
a time when major works were being conducted for around twenty thousand taels 
in normal circumstances; these costs were borne entirely by the central govern-
ment. (At the time, central government reserves were around twenty millon taels.) 
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Approximately thirty thousand workers could be mobilized for a single project. In 
1738, 190,000 taels were spent building a large stone facility like the Jinmen Sluice 
to act as a lock to control water volume. Three hundred dredgers (five to six meters 
long) and nine hundred dredge workers were usually employed in areas where 
downstream deposits of sediment had gathered. They dredged two to three fang 
(one fang is approximately 3.3 cubic meters, or approximately four to six tons) of 
mud per day, in five-day periods when water levels were high, from March to May 
and August to October. However, the operation of these dredgers ceased in 1764.
Since maintenance costs were very high, a proposal was made by the scholar 
official Jiagan Sun (1683–1753) in 1740 to abandon the embankments, and instead 
follow a low waterworks policy of “governing without governing” that returned the 
river to a pre-1698 state. Jiagan Sun argued that only one or two villages would be 
harmed in the case of a flood, and mitigating this damage would cost only one-
tenth of the costs that would be incurred if the embankments burst.15 The Qianlong 
Emperor supported this policy and even adopted it for a time, but in the following 
year (1741) there was such widespread and severe flooding that it was subsequently 
impossible to rehabilitate the people and redevelop the area. In the flood’s immedi-
ate aftermath, embankment-based flood control policies (i.e., high waterworks) 
were once again adopted, and they were retained until the end of the Qing.
Flood controls of the Yongding River were most effective during the early years 
of the Qianlong Emperor’s reign. Under Guancheng Fang (1698–1768)16 a Han 
 official—who had held the position of governor general of Zhili from 1749 to 1768 
and who had previously been successful in the disaster relief efforts of 174317—
conducted thorough surveys of downstream sediment deposits in 1752 and 1755, 
and the course of the river was subsequently changed multiple times by moving 
embankments. These were major projects that involved moving residences, farm-
land, and graveyards, but they were successfully implemented according to plan.
The Qianlong Emperor had great faith in Guancheng Fang, and often met 
with him for face-to-face discussions unrelated to formal work-related instruc-
tions or reports. Furthermore, they occasionally communicated by exchanging 
poetry, which implied their real intentions, which they were unable to express 
in the formal official documents. This method was used when they committed to 
make flood control policies for the Yongding River as well. The Qianlong Emperor 
once asked Guancheng Fang for how many years it would be possible to maintain 
the river’s course, to which the official replied that it could last for twenty years. 
However, when asked what would happen afterward, he was unable to provide 
an answer.18 Essentially, the river’s embankments would require constant 
 maintenance. In 1773, twenty years after Guancheng Fang first changed the course 
of the river, his successor Yuanli Zhou initiated the Great Works (da gong), a 
large-scale maintenance project that ended up being the last comprehensive work 
undertaken during the Qing. At its conclusion, only embankments that burst as a 
result of water damage were dealt with.
Infrastructure Maintenance    209
The 1748 local gazetteer of Dongan County, located in the Yongding River 
valley basin, recorded a series of questions and answers between local elites and 
the local magistrate (the editor) concerning flood control of the Yongding River.19 
One of the first questions expresses local dissatisfaction with flood control 
 measures on the Yongding River, and asks if there is any basic policy for flood 
control of the river. The local magistrate responds that unfortunately there is no 
basic policy, and no way to avoid the build-up of sediment downstream, thereby 
making it necessary to deal with the matter on a continuing basis. This could be 
taken to suggest that the local magistrate is expressing responsibility for the river’s 
maintenance.
Other Rivers
Apart from the Yongding River, four other rivers once flowed in the Jifu Region: 
the north canal, the south canal, Daqing River, and Ziya River. These were dif-
ferent from the Yongding River, in that they were used as transportation routes. 
For example, the Ziya River was used to transport salt produced in the Tianjin 
Region upstream, and was an important river for the nation’s finances, because of 
the state’s monopoly on salt at the time, which meant that the central government 
controlled its production and distribution. It was also an important route for com-
merce, as it was used to transport grains and raw cotton from upstream regions 
to Tianjn. This led to the serious challenge of drafting a flood control policy that 
would maintain the route while protecting the farmland and residences in the area 
around the river.
Work on embankments for the Ziya River began at about the same time as for 
the Yongding River in 1700, under the Kangxi Emperor’s high waterworks policies. 
While this limited unforeseen flood damage and expanded the cultivatable and 
inhabitable land around the river, it also resulted in more serious damage when-
ever a flood occurred, and the embankments required constant maintenance, 
thereby necessitating the stationing of officials at strategic points along the river, 
albeit on a smaller scale than on the Yongding River. The ultimate authority lay 
with the governor general of Zhili province, as was the case as for the Yongding 
River.
Different flood control policies were implemented on the river during the 
Yongzheng and Qianlong years according to the prevailing conditions. For exam-
ple, the governor general of Zhili province, Guancheng Fang, seriously altered the 
course of the river in 1753. However, whereas the central government bore most of 
the costs for the Yongding River, financial responsibility for the Ziya River lay with 
the regional government, and ways had to be found to cover these costs, such as by 
charging interest on loans from the government to pawnshops (yingyun shengxi 
yin). During the Qianlong era, contributions from the Tianjin salt merchants who 
used the river to sell their salt were used to pay for these works. Later, and in par-
ticular after 1766, Manchu officials involved in the salt trade and administration 
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gradually acquired greater influence over flood control policies, and became 
important political actors.20
Paddy Field Development Projects during the Yongzheng Era
In addition to the infrastructure improvements that primarily focused on flood 
controls discussed earlier, irrigation development projects known as Jifu yingtian 
were also conducted during the Yongzheng era. Prince Yi (1686–1730), the younger 
brother of the Yongzheng Emperor, started a redevelopment project for the areas 
surrounding the capital in 1725. Irrigation facilities were built, and efforts were 
made to develop paddy fields, in an attempt to increase the productivity of a region 
that was then a dryland farming area. There had previously been multiple debates 
over the issue, with discussions during the periods of crisis at the end of both 
the Yuan and Ming dynasties over whether to increase agricultural production in 
the Jifu Region to lessen the burden of transporting grains from the south to the 
north. However, the aim behind developing the region in the eighteenth century 
was to improve its productivity, while maintaining the grain tribute from south to 
north, and it may have involved the application of a type of labor-intensive rice 
paddy cultivation in northern China that was becoming increasingly popular in 
the Jiangnan province and Japan at the time.
From 1727 to 1730 a special government office (shuili yingtian fu) led by Prince 
Yi as its commissioner divided Zhili province into four jurisdictions to develop 
the rice paddies. Experienced farmers from the south were invited to provide 
 technical guidance, while the government provided funds, and gave awards to 
supportive farmers. The government spent several million taels over three years to 
develop seven thousand qing (420 km2), and private citizens developed a similar-
sized area. Liangji Hong (1746–1809), known as the Malthus of China, made a 
calculation that it contributed the amount of food needed for approximately three 
hundred thousand more people, assuming that the amount of space needed for 
one person for one year was 4 mu (twenty-four hundred m2).21
According to government records, the development project was successful for a 
time, but in the years following the death of Prince Yi in 1730, with few exceptions, 
most of the paddy fields were abandoned. Several factors, including environmental 
factors, were responsible. They included an unstable water supply, very hard 
 sediment, the unsuitability of the soil for rice farming, the technological limita-
tions of rice paddy farming in the Jifu Region, differences in eating habits between 
the northerners (who preferred wheat) and the southerners (who preferred rice), 
and resistance from local students (shengyuan) and elites (jiansheng) who feared 
tax hikes. Following the death of the Yongzheng Emperor in 1735, the Qianlong 
Emperor assumed power and immediately abolished the special government office, 
thereby abandoning the central government-led development of rice  paddies in 
the Jifu Region, and instead focusing on flood control policies.
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The Shapeless Treasury (Wuxing Zhi Tangcang)
There were both successes and failures among the numerous public works projects 
conducted in the Jifu Region by the Qing in the eighteenth century. The phrases 
yigong daizhen (以工代賑) and gongzhen (工賑) (i.e., providing work to relieve 
poverty) were frequently employed as a way of illustrating the worthiness of the 
government’s expenditures on these projects. This was a smart twofold method 
of employing citizens to work on projects that tackled disasters and paying them 
wages for their efforts as a form of disaster relief.
In implementing the disaster relief plans, a crucial issue was having an adequate 
supply of small denomination copper coins available to pay the wages of those 
who were hired to do such work. In contemporary China, silver was generally 
used for paying taxes and in larger transactions, and copper was used in everyday 
life. However in the Jifu Region, copper was more customarily used than silver. 
As the population grew, the demand for small coin denominations increased, but 
a fall in the imports of Japanese copper led to an insufficient copper supply, and 
caused problems for the government. Around 1740, the Qing government was tak-
ing three thousand tons of the copper produced each year at the copper mines in 
Yunnan province. It was transported on a nine-month journey down the Yangtze 
River and used for public works, rather than as a basis for commercial trade. It was 
taken north to the two mints in Beijing where up to 1.5 billion copper coins were 
produced each year22 that were used to pay the wages of construction workers. 
Wages for earthworks per day were one sheng (around one litre) of rice and eight 
wen (eight copper coins) for food, handling fang (approximately 3.3 m3, four to six 
tons) of soil. This meant that a large number of copper coins were kept in stock in 
the Jifu Region for currency, which contributed to growth in the region’s economy. 
However, yigong daizhen ultimately remained a countermeasure against disasters, 
and its critics pointed to its inefficiencies.
In 1744, the censor Chao-sheng Zhai23 became concerned about the policies 
being implemented to deal with that year’s water damage. He therefore went to 
see the emperor, who was a passionate advocate of the need for irrigation projects 
in Jifu, to emphasize the serious inefficiency of yigong daizhen, and to argue that 
the civil service should mediate these policies. He argued that instead of paying 
out large sums of money in relief when a disaster occurred, it would be better to 
plan irrigation projects in advance, and invest in public works to provide irriga-
tion facilities that would provide “relief that is not abused” (wubi zhi zhenxu 無
弊之賑恤). Moreover, he argued that instead of stockpiling grain to counteract 
increases in the price of rice, the government should instead build rice paddies 
to improve the harvest and so create “never-emptying granaries” (bujie zhi chang-
ing 不竭之常平). He also argued that instead of providing incentives for wealthy 
citizens in the capital, the government should revive work on irrigation projects 
to create a “shapeless treasury” (wuxing zhi tangcang 無形之帑蔵).24 This specific 
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term symbolized his argument that developing arable land would have the same 
effect on coping with famine and poverty as maintaining a treasury or granaries 
for poor and famine relief. In other words, the term “shapeless treasury” or “never-
emptying granaries” in those days implied the sense of “social infrastructure” in a 
contemporary meaning.
These propositions were an attempt to go beyond the traditional methods based 
on “famine relief ” (huangzheng), and by extension yigong daizhen, that had been 
used in the past to temporarily deal with disasters and famines. In other words, the 
Qing should put all its efforts into improving its infrastructure (such as maintain-
ing embankments, improving irrigation facilities, and promoting the cultivation 
of paddy rice) to improve productive capacity and increase peoples’ welfare.
These ideas were disseminated among the administrative organs at each level 
of the Qing, and resulted in the implementation of various construction proj-
ects funded by government finances at both the central and the regional levels 
in the eighteenth century. They were subsequently also maintained. For example, 
data from Ningbo, Zhejiang province, shows that water damage clearly lessened 
between 1751 and 1800, during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor. This information 
provides one measure of the efficacy of the Qing’s infrastructure improvements.25
In June 1801, heavy rains caused widespread water damage in the Jifu Region, 
leading the Jiaqing Emperor (1796–1820) to expend large sums for gongzhen. 
This achievement was proudly recorded by the Qing in the Chronicle of Public 
Works and Relief Activities (Qinding Xinyou Gongzhen Jishi), but, in reality, 
the power of the central government to carry out the improvements of social 
 infrastructures ebbed during the nineteenth century, and this act illustrates that 
the government was now limited to implementing temporary relief measures 
through gongzhen.
OTHER PUBLIC WORKS IN THE J IFU PROVINCE 
DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Various other public works were implemented by the central government in the 
Jifu Region during the prosperous eighteenth century, as it tried to strengthen 
social infrastructure and absorb the growing population. These initiatives included 
Guancheng Fang’s decision to build a public granary to hold the fruits of the flood 
control of the Yongding River,26 the establishment of a foundling home,27 relief 
work for the poor, and the promotion of cotton cultivation.28
“Famine relief ” (huangzheng)—a custom of providing temporary relief at times 
of disaster—had existed in China since the time of the ancient emperors, as had 
flood control projects for the Yong-Ding River and flood control of the Yellow 
River. There was therefore a close relationship between these traditions and the tra-
ditional civil service, and they continued to be practiced at least to some extent until 
the end of the dynasty. However, several things did not continue: the development 
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of rice paddies, which were ill-suited to the soil and land conditions and required 
the constant toil of farmers; the public granary, managed autonomously by local 
power holders; and the foundling homes, based in Buddhist temples. The govern-
ment’s attempt to uplift all sections of society across the region did not last, and 
private society in the Jifu Region lacked the power to support these efforts by itself. 
Meanwhile, self-government in Jiangnan was left to the local elite class, of which 
the Benevolent Societies (shanhui) and Benevolent Halls (shantang) are examples.29
In the early years of the Qianlong Emperor Zhili province was developing its “shape-
less treasury,” or, in other words, improving its social infrastructure and the region’s 
redevelopment. At the same time, it was guarded by a systematic framework struc-
tured by the strong leadership of the emperor, intelligent agenda-setting by the 
governor general and governor, an embankment maintenance management system 
funded through focused public investment (which led to an expansion in inhabit-
able and cultivatable land), and success in absorbing the growing population. Flood 
control and irrigation projects also served to guarantee employment. The well-
thought-out yigong daizhen policy, which involved flood control and minting vast 
quantities of copper coins in Beijing, based on an effective transportation system 
for moving copper from Yunnan, helped the region transition to a currency-based 
society, which in turn played an important part in stimulating the province’s econ-
omy. The favorable economic conditions of the time made these policies possible, 
and the redistribution of wealth that occurred under these conditions allowed the 
Qing’s authority and sovereignty to impact each member of society in a rather strik-
ing way, by stabilizing society and arguably creating a form of commonality.
Qing authority waned as it entered the nineteenth century, and it became diffi-
cult for the regional government to carry out public works in the Jiangnan region. 
Consequently the further implementation of these works was increasingly left up 
to the local elite. The responsibility for public works in northern China shifted 
from the central and provincial governments to local magistrates at the county 
level, but a lack of funds and an inability to oppose the influence of Manchu offi-
cials meant infrastructure improvements became patchy.
Under the favorable conditions of a strong economy, population growth, and 
the authority of wise rulers, eighteenth-century China (albeit limited to the regions 
around the capital) made several attempts to transcend the framework of a limited 
government, which had been based on the tax collection contract, minimal main-
tenance of public order, and the distribution of benevolent relief when disaster 
struck, through being engaged in the improvement of the social infrastructure 
that might deserve the concept of welfare state. However, limits to governance, 
coupled with the technological and social limits characteristic of the time, made it 
impossible for this new state to continue. As China entered the nineteenth century, 
the favorable conditions it had enjoyed in the eighteenth century were no longer 
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present, and responsibilities for developing and maintaining infrastructure were 
decentralized, according to the conditions in each region.
NOTES
1. See Mancall 1984.
2. See Bartlett 1991.
3. Kishimoto-Nakayama 1984.
4. For research summarizing eighteenth-century China from a comprehensive political, cultural, 
economic, and regional perspective, see Naquin and Rawski 1987.
5. See Ni 2013.
6. Wang 1973.
7. Skinner 1985.
8. See Chi 1936.
9. Ho 1959.
10. See Perkins 1969.
11. See Huang 1985.
12. See Ch’u 1962.
13. See Ho 1962.
14. 1 tael was worth 37.301 g of silver according to the official standard (ku-ping liang) for the col-
lection of tax.
15. Sun, Jiagan, Sun Wen Ding Gong Zoushu (Collected Memorials of Sun Jiagan), 7, ca. 1800.
16. Both his grandfather and father were exiled during the Literary Inquisition, so he was unable to 
join the government school during his youth or to earn a high grade in the civil service examinations, 
but he was raised in the home of a scholarly official, and therefore had a good education, and was a 
famous poet.
17. See Will 1990.
18. Hong Li, (Qian-long Emperor), Yuzhishi Siji (Forth Collection of Qianlong’s poems), 59, 
1782.
19. Dong’an xian zhi (Gazetteer of Dong’an County), 15, 1750. Other questions included “Would it 
be possible to try and wash away the sediment build-up in cloudy rivers where it is prevalent using riv-
ers with little sediment?” “Are there not unnecessary officials stationed here?” “Would it be possible to 
install a sluice gate on both banks of the Yongding River to irrigate it?” “Why do some people want the 
government to buy out the land where it floods downstream, and some who do not?”
20. See To 2011.
21. Hong, Liang-ji, Juan Shi Ge Wen Jia Ji (Collected Essays from the Juan-shi Hall), 1, 1795 .
22. The value of this in silver at the time was approximately 1.2 million taels.
23. The Censor was an official of low rank, but had the sole right to ask the emperor about indi-
vidual political problems.
24. Pan, Xi’en, Jifu Shuili Sian (Four Collected Records on the Investment in Beijing Metropolitan 
Region), 3, 1823.
25. Oka 2012.
26. Fang, Guancheng, Ji-fu Yicang Tu (Maps of the Public Granary in Zhili Province), 1753. Ac-
cording to these maps, 1,005 public granaries were built in 144 counties in Zhili province, for which de-
tailed management plans were drawn up and self-managed by the villages. However, they were largely 
disused after several decades.
27. See Li 2007.
28. Fang, Guancheng, Mian Hua Tu (Pictures of Raw Cotton), 1765. Sixteen drawings were made 
beginning with the cultivation of raw cotton, and ending with the production of cotton textiles, with 
Infrastructure Maintenance    215
explanations by Guan-cheng Fang added. The Qianlong Emperor has attached a poem to the complete 
works.
29. See Fuma 1997. 
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Traffic is a global phenomenon. Generally it can be defined as a movement form a 
point A to point B. In many cases the outcomes of this are repeating traffic conditions 
and relations between different people with varied needs. Therefore traffic is way to 
meet these demands. Moreover traffic is a basic condition for trading, market trans-
actions, and economy itself. This term allows us to research the repeating process 
of exchange and communication, the conditions of local and long- distance traffic, 
and the development of transport networks and road systems. Mostly categories like 
centrality or periphery depend on the existence or absence of such traffic relations.
Today the roads and the transport infrastructure as fundaments for traffic are 
provided and organized by the state with its central institutions. Using the exam-
ple of waterways the basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany states the 
following: “The Federation shall be the owner of the former Reich waterways.” 
Furthermore “the Federation shall administer the federal waterways through its 
own authorities. It shall exercise those state functions relating to inland shipping, 
which extend beyond the territory of a single Land, and those functions relating 
to maritime shipping, which are conferred on it by a law. Insofar as federal water-
ways lie within the territory of a single Land, the Federation on its application may 
delegate their administration to that Land on federal commission. If a waterway 
touches the territory of several Länder, the Federation may commission that Land 
that is designated by the affected Länder.”1
These regulations received favorable comments by German historians of law 
like Albrecht Frisecke. He points out: “die vom Grundgesetz gewählte Lösung 
einer zentralen Verwaltung der Bundeswasserstraßen [bedeutet] den Abschluß 
einer langen historischen Entwicklung” (Friesecke 1962, 13). In this point of view 
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only the central state seems to be destined to guarantee the administration and 
the function of the traffic and its infrastructure. For this reason the state is also 
the provider of common good and public welfare. According to this Heinrich 
Geffcken advised against minority interests in his own time using a view to the 
history of the German water right. He verified: “Auch die künftige Gesetzgebung 
wird daher, wie ich glaube, gut daran thun, für die öffentlichen Flüsse an  dieser 
Auffassung festzuhalten oder zu ihr zurückzukehren: das Strombett steht im 
öffentlichen Eigenthume, nicht anders wie die vom Staat erbaute und unterhal-
tene Landstraße” (Geffcken 1900, 200; for more examples, see 216–217). Today it is 
widely recognized that these sentiments affects some serious problems especially 
for historical studies. As Masayuki Tanimoto stresses, “one of the main questions 
will be about who provides public goods. Although a central government can 
naturally be nominated as a main provider under the modern state system.” 
But it is also known that “this was not the case before the twentieth century.”2 
Nevertheless the modern state serves very often as a rule for good government, 
security, and public welfare.
MEDIEVAL TR AFFIC IN RESEARCH:  
POINT OF DEPARTURE
Against this background the traffic in medieval times is usually discussed in a very 
demoting way. For example in Neil MacFarlane’s and Yuen Foong Khong’s view 
medieval Europe was characterized by chaos and permanent conflicts. Hence they 
speak about “dark” ages with the following result: “Transport systems broke down 
and the Roman economy collapsed into localized fragments. Since the state as we 
understand it did not exist during the Dark Ages, the idea of loyalty to the state, 
or giving the ends of the state a priority greater than that accorded to those of the 
individual or group, was weak, if it existed at all” (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 
30). The well-known German traffic historian Otto Most pointed out that there is 
almost nothing good to tell about medieval traffic (Most 1950/1951, 1). This is due 
to the weak government in the Holy Roman Empire. Referring to the daily life 
in the Middle Ages Paul B. Newman also stated that the “road building generally 
stopped with the collapse of the Roman Empire since there was no longer a pow-
erful central authority to plan and direct such projects and raise the taxes to pay 
for them” (Newman 2001, 84). Therefore many historians refer to the ancient road 
system as a “pinnacle” in the history of the roads (Lay 1992, 52–56). In contrast the 
roads in the Middle Ages seemed to be in decline (Lay 1992, 57). Many historians 
hold local landlords and cities and their self-interest responsible for that situa-
tion. In Norbert Ohler’s opinion these local rulers seemed to shown no interest in 
building new roads, bridges, or tunnels (Ohler 2009, 19). Referring to the water 
transport, Detlev Ellmers regards the inland navigation in medieval times as a 
cow, which everyone wants to milk but nobody wants to feed (Ellmers 1985, 244). 
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Based on these statements its questionable whether public welfare, referring to 
medieval traffic, existed at all.
Of course the medieval traffic history is full of examples of maintaining roads 
and traffic infrastructure influenced not only by personal interest. So we can notice 
many efforts to keep roads and waterways in good and passable condition. For 
example, James Westfall Thompson refers to monks of the Cistercian order “who 
established themselves in out-of-the-way districts, [and] turned their industrious 
hands to the building and maintenance of roads” (Thompson 1931, 293). Very often 
the residents and communities along the roads were requested to keep several 
parts of them in good condition. In many cases even individual merchants took 
the building and maintaining of roads into their own hands, as Peter Spufford illus-
trates (Spufford 2002, 190–191). In this context he talks about a road revolution dur-
ing the fourteenth century, similar to what Thomas Szabó recognizes a “Discovery” 
of the road in the thirteenth century (Szabó 1994, 913–929). (See map 4.)
A further reason for those interpretations is the fact that the road and its infra-
structure became a more and more important task for medieval governments, as 
is clearly shown by the communities in northern Italy. Very often these powerful 
city-states organized the construction and maintenance of roads. For example, they 
took care of traffic infrastructure like bridges, dams, fountains, and roadhouses. 
These infrastructural elements were regarded as collective goods. Concerning this 
matter the several governments considered themselves as guarantors of “human 
security” and public welfare, as Gerrit Jasper Schenk found out (Schenk 2010, 
209–233). The famous frescoes in the town hall of the former Republic of Siena 
painted by Ambrogio Lorenzetti around 1338/1939 illustrate this self-image in a 
very concrete way. In minutest details we see here a cultural landscape formed by 
humans. For instance, there are a lot of infrastructural buildings like a bridge or a 
mill. In the foreground we can see many people building a road. In the picture the 
wealthy as well as the poor find their place in community. In the words of Schenk, 
we can see here “an extremely complex allegory of good government or social 
peace” (Schenk 2010, 211). Ambrogio’s frescos are therefore an impressive example 
for the importance of the bonum comune topos in the late Middle Ages, also in 
connection with traffic and traffic infrastructure. During this period there was 
a very pragmatic perception of the common good, as several researchers proved 
(Gailing, Moss, and Röhring 2009, 51–73, Moss, Gudermann, and Röhring, 2009, 
31–49). Thus the bonum commune became a main term in the political and social 
language in medieval times (Simon 2012, here 90).
Against this background the following article concerns the use of this bonum 
commune topos in connection with traffic infrastructure, especially in the fif-
teenth- and sixteenth-century Brandenburg electorate. In comparison to Italy we 
have here no impressive frescoes or similarly complex allegories of the bonum 
commune. In fact the main sources are documents and several files published by 
the elector himself and the three orders. One leading question will be about the 
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building of traffic infrastructure and the maintenance of bridges, paved roads, and 
locks. Another concern is the way this infrastructure became important collective 
goods. However, first it is necessary to give a short definition of the bonum com-
mune topos in medieval times.
THE B ONUM C OMMUNE  TOPOS
Starting in the late Middle Ages providing the bonum commune increasingly 
became an integral part of the political thought of kings, princes, landlords, com-
munities, and other potentates in the Holy Roman Empire (Hibst 1991). This 
progress is shown, for example, in the King’s Peace of this time. For instance, in 
1442 king Frederic III founded a “Reichslandfrieden” regarding robbery, murder, 
and malicious arson, which affected public welfare. Therefore he argued with the 
bonum commune (“gemainer nucz”). Moreover, his subjects were requested to 
help him enforce the peace as his document proves: “und ermonen auch ew all 
und yeglich unser und des heiligen reichs undertan, in welhen wirden stat oder 
wesen ir seit, solher trew und phlicht, als ir gote, dem heiligen rieche, auch uns 
als ainem Romischen kunige, ewerm obristen herren, gemainem nucze und ew 
selbst schuldig philichtig und gebunden seit” (Herre and Quidde 1928, No. 209, 
402). In this argumentation, providing the public welfare plays a decisive role. 
As Otto Gerhard Oexle shows, this pragmatic use of the bonum commune topos 
originates from early formations of groups and communities in medieval times 
(Oexle 2001, 65–83). Daily problems like ensuring safety and protection, provid-
ing peace and security, and holding autonomy and identity are references of the 
bonum commune topos used by these communities in fourteenth and fifteenth 
century. It becomes much more obvious with the building and providing of infra-
structure in connection with maintaining traffic and its roads. For instance, in 
1469 the city council of Heilbronn concluded a contract with the Count Palatine 
of the Rhine and the Counts of Württemberg. All parties obligated themselves to 
make the Murr, a tributary of the Neckar River, navigable. They legitimized that 
with a reference to “merglichen und gemeinen nuetze” (Knupfer 1904, No. 862, 
484). Once again we meet here the bonum commune topos used not only by a 
community or city but also by several rulers. Already in this case, it can be shown 
that these potentates used the common good as a legitimation for their actions 
often in the fifteenth century and sixteenth century. Therefore Peter Blickle speaks 
about a kind of “nationalization” of the bonum commune topos during this period 
(Blickle 2001, 95, 99). Consequently the regulations (“Willkühr”) for the city of 
Löbejün, situated in the territory of the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, are formed 
by the administrator in 1593 and legitimized by “Gottes Ehre vndt gemeiner Nutz” 
(Anonymous 1839, here 75). Here the administrator himself became a provider of 
public welfare.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE B ONUM C OMMUNE  TOPOS IN 
BR ANDENBURG
In this regard, the electors of Brandenburg are no exception, although the main-
tenance of roads and traffic was one of the traditional responsibilities of the local 
cities and communities. They acquired a high grade of autonomy during the four-
teenth century (Winkelmann 2011, 167–179). Here we can also find the origins of 
the common good topos in Brandenburg. For instance, in 1340 the city council of 
Beeskow arranged a constitution for the guild of tailors. This act was legitimized 
by “nuttze vnd . . . vromen derselbin stat” (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 20, No. VII, 
344). Nearly eight years later the council founded another constitution for the 
guild of butchers. This time the councilmen referred themselves to “groseren nuc-
zen vnd vromen der vorgesprochenen stat.” Moreover, two of the councilmen were 
present at the congregations of the guild. In doing so, they supervised the keeping 
of the regulations and the common good: “daz si der stat nuczse syn vnd bequeme” 
(Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 20, No. XIII, 348–349, here 349). Here and elsewhere 
recurring terms like “nutz” or “vromen” refers to the “bonum comune topos.”
They often were used in many contexts, as the Magdeburger Schöppenchronik 
from the fourteenth century shows. The author wrote a considerable preface, 
which offers several insights into his intentions. One of them refers to the reader 
himself, who should learn from history by reading the chronical. In his own words 
he intended to save his contemporary and the future inhabitants of Magdeburg 
from any loss by presenting and explaining to them the former legal situations.3 
In this connection the authors aim was the public benefit of his hometown, as he 
self explains: “Godde to eyneme loue vnd to eren, mynen leuen heren den schepen 
der stad to magdeborch to leue vnd dersuluen Stadt to vromen” (Riedel 1838–1869, 
Vol. 4, 1, No. IV, 168). The self-conception of the councilmen in medieval cities 
is clearly reflected in these and similar phrases, which we can find a lot in docu-
ments of Beeskow, Magdeburg, and other communities. All these city councils 
have used “the common good” and “public welfare” as popular terms to legitimize 
their political actions since the fourteenth century.
Expectedly trade, traffic, infrastructure, and the conservation and maintenance 
of cultivated landscape were important reference points of good governance. For 
instance in 1442 the city of Oderberg had got the authority to cast for fish in the 
waters of the castle of the elector. This privilege was legitimized by the “Fromen” 
and “Nucze” of the city of Oderberg (Zimmermann 1838, 183–184, here 183). A 
similar situation obtained in Prenzlau. Starting in 1448 the local councilmen were 
entitled to dig lime scale and brick earth out of the fields around the city. The 
elector who had given this privilege emphasized in his document that he aimed 
at the “Stadt Nutz und frommen” by doing so (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1,21, No. 
CCCXVII, 359–360, here 360). In another document from 1515 the councilmen 
of Prenzlau were also authorized to hold a free cattle market that coincided with 
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“Nativitatis Marie” (September 16). In order to guarantee the traffic to the Prenzlau 
market the citizenry was requested to keep the roadways and bridges in good con-
dition. Therefore the council of Prenzlau was free to take a toll (Deichselpfennig) 
from foreign merchants. These takings were intended for the city’s and its inhabit-
ant’s good and nothing else: “der Stadt gemeinen Nutz vnd sonst nirgend anders 
hinkehren” (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 18, No. XCV, 438). Also the city of Wriezen 
was allowed to demand a toll from travelers on the roads around the town. The 
well-known legitimation for that was the city’s welfare. In return the community 
had to maintain these streets with several building materials, such as stone, timber, 
and sand. In case of need they were admonished to build new roadways. The same 
applies for Treuenbrietzen. This city was situated on a highly frequented medieval 
street between the trade fair town of Leipzig and Berlin (Bütow 2015a, 285–286). 
For that reason road construction became an important element for effective 
trading. This is documented by two more tolls: one in Beelitz and another in 
Saarmund. Both cities were also situated on the road between Leipzig and Berlin. 
Like Treuenbrietzen, they had to provide for the traffic by maintaining the roads 
and infrastructure, which were used by passengers as well as the merchants with 
their takings.
Many similar examples could be quoted. Nevertheless these cases are enough to 
show that the local cities and communities had borne responsibility for traffic and 
road construction. Moreover, they took care of the traffic infrastructure such as 
bridges and causeways. There was no “state” for realizing such duties. Instead the 
elector himself granted several privileges to the cities for financing these important 
building measures. In all these cases the bonum commune topos shows up in several 
documents, illustrating the activities of the cities in relation to the collective good. 
In many respects this should increase the value of building roads, bridges, and 
other infrastructure. The same applies to the municipal administration itself. To 
provide financing for infrastructure projects, the communities often were allowed 
to levy a toll on the passing traffic. Many modern historians view those medieval 
tolls as impediments to traffic flow.4 Other authors, which we follow here, began to 
reassess the role of the tolls in the Middle Ages. According to Max Baumann, we 
can see that under no circumstances did the medieval tolls completely encumber 
the traffic in a technical or in an organizational way (Baumann 1992, 86). In con-
trast tolls always act as an indicator for traffic and its infrastructure (Bütow 2015b, 
48). Furthermore the bonum commune topos was associated with significant social 
aspects, which are mentioned in the following chapter.
THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOT S
Modern historical infrastructure research considers humans as an essential fac-
tor (Engels and Schenk 2015, 32). As Birte Förster and Martin Bauch pointed out, 
infrastructure always has the potential to facilitate social integration (Förster and 
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Bauch 2015, 18). Felicitous examples of this can be found beginning in ancient 
times. For instance, providers of infrastructure often used arguments about facili-
tating public welfare and social health, as Helmuth Schneider proves using the 
example of building a water pipeline in the city of Sinope at the beginning of the 
second century. Therefore the roman governor of Pontus and Bithynia Plinius 
mentioned that a water pipeline could be feed salubritas and voluptas (Schneider 
2015, 90). Astrid Möller states that the water supply in archaic Greek was a col-
lective achievement although single aristocrats exceled in this occasion (Möller 
2015). However, infrastructure could even force or document social segregation 
(Förster and Bauch 2015, 18). For instance, Jaroslav Jásek describes several systems 
of water distribution in medieval Prague (Jásek 2015, 60–64). One of the oldest 
systems can be found in the area of Vyšehrad. Established in the twelfth century, 
this water supply was designated for the king and his court. The general public got 
water in other places. The first communal water main existed in today’s Havelské 
marketplace of the Old Town of Prague. Examples like this are useful in illustrat-
ing that the research needs to go beyond conventional technical descriptions of 
infrastructural systems (Schröder 2014, 11).
This finding can be confirmed in the medieval Brandenburg electorate. As we 
saw traffic infrastructure, road construction, and municipal buildings or proper-
ties are favored references for the public welfare. The regulations of Soldin from 
1511 offer a kind of summary of these important common goods, including inter-
ests, benefits, contributions (including traffic and trade), customs, waters, fishery, 
woods, grasslands, brick manufacture, the cellar of the town, and other posses-
sions of the community (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 18, No. XCIX, 509–512, here 
509). Many users had access to these public goods, which were often adminis-
trated by the councilmen. Their governance was commendable if the council pre-
ferred no single group but all groups of the citizenship, the haves and have-nots. 
Therefore the reference to the rich and poor people became an important issue of 
good governance. In many cases rulers used these terms in connection with the 
bonum commune topos. For instance, in 1343 bishop Otto II of Würzburg passed a 
new order for his city and its inhabitants. According to the text of this regulation 
Bishop Otto intended to facilitate the common good concerning the rich and the 
poor people “in der stat zuo Wirtzebug” (Hoffmann 1955, No. 10, 43). Moreover, 
in 1474 King Matthias of Bohemia permitted his city of Bautzen to put up a cellar 
of the town regarding the public welfare and the rich’s and poor’s good. Back to 
the medieval Brandenburg electorate, the margravine Agnes authorized the two 
cities, Berlin and Cologne, to export their excessive grain to Hamburg and else-
where. That applied to the rich and the poor people of both cities, as we can see 
in a document of the year 1320: “volumus eciam, quod pauperes Ciues Ciuitatum 
premissarum cum suo frumento non minus quam diuites . . . Ciuitatem Honbusch 
[Hamburg] ac reliquas Ciuitates frequentent nauigando” (Voigt 1869, No. L, 35–37, 
here 36). As a last example, we consider the regulations of the city of Landsberg 
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from 1511, which accentuated that the city council was committed to supervise 
the measures and weights in the city’s taverns. Once more this authority should 
be used within the meaning of public welfare treating rich and poor with equal 
dedication: “damit dem gemeinen nutz, dem armen als den Reichen, vor das sein 
gleich geschee” (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 18, No. LXXXIX, 432–434, here 433). All 
these expressions and phrases provided the opportunity to encompass all persons 
and groups in a single city, area, or territory, making clear that the regulations, 
arrangements, or laws applied to them all without any exception.
AVOIDING ANY SELF-INTEREST
Administrating common goods means avoiding the preference of someone’s self-
interests. As the councilmen of Prenzlau 1515 pointed out: nobody should make 
any individual profit by using the city’s common goods (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 
21, No. CCCXLIV, 383–388, here 383). Therefore, tolerating personal gain was a 
characteristic trait of bad governance. Cities very often used that as an argument 
to put several opponents in a bad light. For instance, in 1562 the community of 
Lübben were involved in a legal dispute with the lord-high-constable Sigmund von 
Tschammer of Lübben about a dam in the Spree River. This dam had been con-
structed a few months before at the village of Schlepzig to avoid the flooding of 
the constable’s possessions.5 The territory of the city of Lübben was situated on the 
other side of this dam. Because of the new infrastructural building, the fields, grass-
land, and range lands owned by the citizenship were very often overflowed. For 
this reason, the councilmen of Lübben wrote to the governor of the March of the 
Lower Lusatia. In this letter the councilmen criticized their opponent, Sigismund 
von Tschammer, by bringing out his personal and individual interests against pub-
lic welfare. They mentioned “das mhan recht haben wollte, den gantzen waldt vnd 
pusch ßeins eigenen Nutzens vnd gefallens zuvortemmen.”6 To foreclose some-
one’s selfishness city councils very often supervised their deputies and municipal 
officers, who became fixed in corresponding regulations and directives. Moreover, 
the councilmen controlled one another. For example, the regulations of the city of 
Soldin pledged every single councilman to account for his earnings and spending 
habits in public and private (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 18, No. XCIX, 509–512, here 
509). Thereby any misuse of authority could be specifically prohibited.
FROM CIT Y ’S  GO OD TO PUBLIC WELFARE
In all these cases a community was anxious to procure its common good. 
Councilmen very often used not only the single community’s good but also the 
public welfare as arguments for legitimation. Beyond city limits they wanted to 
confirm that they care for the general public’s good. Infrastructure was an excel-
lent subject for verifying that. For example, in the early sixteenth century the 
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community of Soldin rebuilt their ruined brick-kiln together with the brick-barn 
by referring to the city’s and public’s profit.7 Nearly at the same time, the city of 
Lenzen was allowed to publish a new fire protection regulation (Willkür) provid-
ing for the city’s good and the public welfare (Raumer 1831–1833, Vol. 2, No. VI, 
210). Like other communities in the Middle Ages, the city of Treuenbrietzen was 
an owner of woodland (Holtzung) situated in the municipal area. A document 
from 1525 confirms that the citizens were requested to keep their woodlands in 
good condition in order to supply the city’s and general public’s good (Raumer 
1831–1833, Vol. 2, No. LXXL, 286–289, here 287). As we can see in these cases, there 
seems to be a significant compatibility between the common good of a city, on the 
one hand, and the public welfare, on the other hand. This was a typical phenom-
enon in the Middle Ages, as Peter Blickle remarks (Blickle 2001, 87–88). Under 
these terms the bonum commune topos expanded into the chancellery of the elec-
tor of Brandenburg in the late Middle Ages. Our final question will be about the 
transfer levels and the transmitters in the context of this development.
It is safe to say that the unifications of the cities in the fourteenth century 
assumed an increased significance for this gradual change in using the bonum com-
mune topos. For instance, in 1348 the cities of Prenzlau, Pasewalk, Angermünde, 
and Tempin formed an alliance for mutual protection. Later in the document of 
this unification, they declared that this alliance was formed to promote their lord’s 
and the land’s good (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 21, No. XCVI, 161). Beyond individ-
ual interests of one single member we can recognize here a superior concern for 
the general public and its welfare. The same goes for another unification of several 
cities of the Mittelmark in 1399.8 Their members referred also to the margrave of 
Brandenburg and the common good in the electorate.9 The main basis for this was 
a well-known principle expressed in the unification document: the problems that 
face one member of the union concern the others.10 At this period the elector him-
self began to use the bonum commune topos several times, having probably been 
affected by his cities. For example, in 1369 some of them together were anxious to 
get control of the mint, which was situated in Berlin. Elector Otto of Wittelsbach 
permitted this because of the general public’s profit and good. This term seemed 
to originate from the cities. They had called the elector’s attention to their hard-
ship with the value and weight of the coins.11 It is likely that they had called on the 
common good argument as a legitimation for their petition. However, they exactly 
argued in all mentioned cases that the unifications between serval communities in 
Brandenburg and the legitimation for these acts had contributed to the expansion 
of the public welfare terms into the elector’s environment. Nevertheless, we have 
to notice that the common good terms were no integral part of the legitimation 
strategy for the unifications between the cities, because in many cases the bonum 
commune topos is absent in the several texts of the unification documents.
Therefore there must be other possibilities for transferring the topos. That 
applies to the diets (“Land- und Herrentage”) in the late Middle Ages and early 
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modern times. For instance, in 1518 the elector of Brandenburg assembled the 
estates of his territory to discuss his outstanding debts and ways of resolving 
them. In return he met several requirements of the estates regarding the mint-
age, the day’s wages, the banking out of the farmers, shooting with rifled guns, 
and other subjects. On this account the elector promulgated a series of regula-
tions concerning all these topics. Accepting his estate’s advice, he pronounced 
that he was willing to strengthen the common good for his whole territory. So he 
mentioned in the resolution’s text: “unnser Lande und underthan gemeinen nutz 
zu befordern” (Raumer 1831–1833, Vol. 2, No. XVI, 224–226, here 224). First this 
intention referred to trading. Therefore the elector decided to stop the produc-
tion of new coins for a while in order to avoid a price decline. To legitimize this 
proposal, he referred once more to the common good in his territory. Here we can 
see a systematic use of the bonum commune topos practiced by the elector him-
self. In this case the public welfare is an important term in the political and social 
language at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Since this period the elector 
became more and more a provider of public welfare by caring for trade and build-
ing traffic infrastructure such as bridges, paved roads, and locks. For instance in 
1523 Elector Joachim I of Brandenburg assembled the prelates, the gentry, and the 
communities of his territory to discuss the export of the grain. Much to his sur-
prise, he found that many of the invitees did not show up. That applied especially 
to the gentry. Together with the remainder of the estates, he made the decision to 
forbid the illegal export of grain, which was often practiced by the gentry. Joachim 
confirmed this prohibition by referring to the general public’s good: “solich verbot 
gemeinen nutz und dem armut zum Besten geschicht, thewrung zuvorkommen” 
(Raumer 1831–1833, Vol. 2, No. XVII, 227–232, here 228). We can see here that this 
request included the poor people as an essential legitimation for this important 
act. Moreover, the elector wanted to substantiate that this resolution concerns all 
of his subjects, although many of them had not come to the diet. Therefore he used 
also the bonum commune topos. Against this background it makes good sense that 
the diets were a fundamental background for transferring this topos into the chan-
cellery of the elector. By exchanging information and communicating between the 
elector and his subjects in the context of the diets, the common good terms began 
to stabilize. For both parts, it was an essential term for legitimizing their positions. 
To look at the whole topic from a higher point of view, we can assert that the rul-
ers and their estates together were constituent parts within the development of the 
constitution in the Holy Roman Empire. Jointly but also against one another, they 
had a major impact upon the social and national modernization in Germany in 
medieval times, as Kesten Krüger mentions (Krüger 2003, 30).
Also in this period infrastructure and traffic were favored reference objects 
for the public welfare topos used by the elector of Brandenburg. For instance, in 
1459 Elector Frederick II planned to build a bridge in Plaue, near to the city of 
Brandenburg. At that time a ferry boat had to be used to pass the Lake of Plaue. 
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Frederick executed an instrument in which he declared that he considered his 
chamber-master, Georg von Weidenfels, responsible for the construction of the 
bridge. In the arrenga of this document the elector set out his personal view by 
using the common good terms as a demonstration of political virtue. Therefore, 
he insisted that he is willing to achieve his subject’s and territory’s good. Moreover, 
he pointed out that this is one of his urgent duties as a ruler and elector of 
Brandenburg.12 In this connection the construction of the bridge in Plaue was a 
central element of providing public welfare by the elector. In his argumentation 
and acting, Frederick II followed those of the communities in fourteenth-century 
Brandenburg. His successor, Margrave Johann Cicero, did similar things while 
building important infrastructural facilities.13 For example, in 1480 he established 
saltworks in the town of Saarmund, near Berlin. The intention for this building was 
the general public’s good and profit, as Johann himself mentioned: “umb besser-
ung und zunehmunge willen disses kurfurstentumbs der Marck zu Brandenburg” 
(Raumer 1831–1833, Vol. 1, No. XLVIII, 45–46, here 45). But building the saltworks 
seemed to be a result of communication between the elector and his estates. So 
Johann noted that several of his subjects had asked for such saltworks by sending 
him numerous requests. It seems clear that these subjects had used the bonum 
commune topos as an argument to enforce their requirements. Thus the common 
good term found its way into the document of the elector.
In summary we can assert that under the rule of Johann Cicero and later under 
his son and successor, Joachim I, the common good terms became an integral 
part of legitimizing their political actions as electors of Brandenburg. They both 
left no doubt about their role as guarantors of public welfare. For instance, Johann 
Cicero presented himself as an overlord and a sovereign who provides the general 
good for all his subjects, as is articulated in several documents (Riedel 1838–1869, 
Vol. 1, 9, No. CCCXIV, 241–242, here 241). Elector Joachim I for his part used 
the common good terms in a very systematic way. To cite an example, the city 
regulations of Soldin (1502), Frankfurt (1505), Landsberg (1511), Prenzlau (1515), 
Strasburg (1515), and Treuenbrietzen (1525) have nearly the same wording. As the 
initiator of this order, the elector referred to “der Stat vnd dem gemeinen nutz” 
in all cases (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 23, No. CCCLXXVI, 319–322, here 319). In 
order to retain his interests in three rivers, the Oder, the Spree, and the Havel, 
and their use as traffic routes, Joachim concluded individual contracts with the 
cities Frankfurt, Berlin, and Brandenburg. Similar to the city regulations, all the 
contracts follow the same wording with the exception of the names of the dif-
ferent rivers. Expectedly Joachim I legitimized his declared intention with terms 
about providing the common good. Regarding this, we can agree with Winfried 
Eberhard, who pointed out that the ruler himself had the right and also the duty 
to make decisions about the public welfare by interpreting and representing it 
(Eberhardt 1986, 246). Nevertheless we should not forget the role of the estates, 
which called for the common good in many situations. According to this, the 
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public welfare could not have been realized without their help. Finally, also in the 
sixteenth century the communities still show responsibility for the common good. 
For instance, with the elector’s acceptance the councilmen in the cities were in 
charge of a righteous regiment willing to realize the public welfare by defining 
new regulations and exercising the police powers as they did centuries before.14 
In certain circumstances they acted together with the elector in order to avoid 
mischief. For example, in a diet in the late fifteenth century both parts turned 
against illegal shipping on the river Elde at the border between Brandenburg and 
Mecklenburg. In this situation Johann Cicero made clear that he would not come 
to any decision without the advice of his estates. He justified his intention with the 
common good term and the security in his territory. Joachim I for his part took 
care to preserve his freedom of action upon controlling traffic and its infrastruc-
ture and other important objects. For instance, toward the three communities of 
Berlin, Brandenburg, and Frankfurt, he stipulated that the Spree, Oder, and Havel 
are rivers under his control. As he mentioned, all conflicts about any alteration 
in the course of these rivers or problems with navigation should arranged by him 
(Raumer 1831–1833, Vol. 2, No. XXII, 234–235, here 235).
Nevertheless, the estates and especially the communities had not lost their mean-
ing. We can demonstrate this by using the example of Elector Joachim II. Under his 
rule a number of locks were constructed in the cities of Rathenow, Brandenburg, 
Berlin, and Fürstenwalde. Using the example of the lock in Rathenow, which was 
built since 1548, Joachim II pointed out that this infrastructural building would 
enforce the public welfare in his hole territory. Moreover he praised it in extrava-
gant terms of usefulness and welfare: “zu vnsern vnnd vnsers freuntlichen lieben 
sons des Erz Bisschofs zu Magdeburgk beiderseitz Landenn, Algemeinen Nutz 
aufnhemen und wollfardt, Dasz hochnützliche werck die Schleuse bei Inen Im Bau 
vorlegt vnd geforderdt” (Riedel 1838–1869, Vol. 1, 7, No. LXV, 453–454, here 453). 
Even though Joachim was the builder-owner of this lock, he could not finance 
it alone. He depended on the community of Rathenow, which had spent a lot of 
money in 1548 to dig a “Schutgraben” (Riedel 1838–1869, No. LXI, 449–450, here 
449). In return the elector promised to reimburse these expenses. Despite this, the 
city of Rathenow had a share in providing the territory’s welfare. In the same way 
the councilmen were responsible for the functioning and maintenance of the lock. 
Therefore they were allowed to keep half of the lockage to use for repair (Riedel 
1838–1869, No. LXIII, 451–452). This is more proof that the estates of Brandenburg 
took a lot of responsibility for providing public goods.
Between fifteenth and sixteenth century the bonum commune became an impor-
tant part of the political thought in the Holy Roman Empire. In this time, provid-
ing the public welfare was a major concern of the king and other rulers in the 
empire. An important proof of this welfare thinking on a high level of the Holy 
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Roman Empire is the Reichspoliceyordnung, published in 1548. This document 
contains a multitude of references to the common good topos and the public 
welfare ideology, as Wolfgang Reinhard confirms (Reinhard 2001, 197). But that 
was not the beginning of arguing with this topos. Centuries before, communities 
had used several common good terms as legitimations for their ruling. Traffic and 
infrastructure were especially popular reference objects for the bonum commune 
topos.
The same counts for medieval Brandenburg, where the maintenance of roads 
and traffic was one of the traditional responsibilities of the communities. But at 
the beginning of early modern times things changed gradually. The elector him-
self became a provider of public welfare by building traffic infrastructure such as 
bridges, paved roads, and locks. By this time the common good terms had found 
their way into the elector’s chancellery. The unifications between several cities in 
the fourteenth century, on the one hand, and the communications between the 
elector and his estates in the context of the diets in the late fifteenth century, on 
the other hand, were important interfaces for this transfer of the topos. Moreover 
the elector uses the bonum commune topos to legitimize his ruling and his actions. 
On this account the infrastructure itself became an important public good. Elector 
Joachim I for his part used the public welfare terms in a systematic way. That rep-
resents a significant feature of his ruling. However, under his and his son’s rule this 
conception could not have been realized without the help of the cities. Also in the 
sixteenth century they still show responsibility for the common good as they did 
centuries before. Through the time of change between the Middle Ages and early 
modern times, this indicates some sort of often overlooked continuity.
NOTES
1. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany in the revised version published in the Federal 
Law Gazette, Part III, classification number 100–1, as last amended by the Act of 11 July 2012 (Federal 
Law Gazette I, 1478), Art. 89, 1, 2. www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0475.
2. For details of these aspects see the overview by Masayuki Tanimoto in this volume, chapter 2.
3. “vppe dat me by den dinghen, de scheen sind, schaden bewaren moge.” Riedel (1838–1869), 
Vol. 4, 1, No. IV, 168.
4. For example, according to East Central Europe in the Middle Ages Jean W. Sedlar pointed out that 
“tariffs and internal tolls diminished the total quantity of trade in the interest of benefiting the royal 
treasury or powerful individual lords.” Sedlar 1994, 360.
5. Until today this document was not edited. See Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv, Rep. 8 
Lübben, No. 12/1, fol. 237v-241r.
6. Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv, Rep. 8 Lübben, No. 12/1, fol. 241.
7. Riedel (1838–1869), Vol. 1, 18, No. XCIX, 510: “der Stadt unnd gemeinen nutz zum besten.”
8. The Mittelmark was the core territory of the Margrave of Brandenburg. Many important cities 
like Brandenburg (Oldtown and Newtown), Berlin-Cölln, Frankfurt, Strausberg, Bernau, and Eber-
swalde were situated in this region. For more details and information, see Schich 2008.
9. “vnsen gnedighen heren vnde syne lande to ghude.” Riedel (1838–1869), Vol. 1, 24, No. XCVI, 
393–394.
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10. Riedel (1838–1869), Vol.1, 24, No. XCVI, 393: “wat eyner stad angheyet, dat schal vns allen 
steden med eyn andern anghan vnde schullen dar by blyuen.”
11. Riedel (1838–1869), Vol. 1, 12, No. XXVII, 501–503. They mentioned: “an desse kegenwortige 
tzyd von der Muntze wegen doselves besweret und bekummert geweset syn, und durch das sy dicke 
grocze nod und treflichen scaden genommen und gemeynlichen geleden haben” (501).
12. “Als wir alltzeit geneyget und auch dortzu von unsers Stats wegen verpflichtet und schuldig 
sein, unnsrer land und leut bests und besserung In unnserm Curfurstenthum der Margk zu Brandburg 
und annderswo zu betrachtenn und furzunemen.” Riedel 1838–1896, Vol. 1, 10, No. XV, 23–25, here 23.
13. For more information about Margrave Johann the later Elector of Brandenburg, see Fisch-
bacher 2015.
14. Referring to the councilmen Elector Joachim I noted: “bey Irn mitburgern In allem regiment 
ein rechte pollicej dem gemeinen nutz zu gut verordnen und hanthaben, wie sie von alters gehabt und 
gebraucht haben.” Raumer (1831–1833), Vol. 2, No. XXVII, 240. As Tomas Simon states the common 
good topos was frequently used in the context of legislation: Simon 2012, 91.
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During the early modern periods and even later, the lives of people worldwide 
depended on woodlands. Woodlands satisfied the basic needs of local inhabitants 
in various ways. They provided timber for building houses, barns, stables, and 
workshops, as well as firewood, which was an indispensable fuel for households 
and industries. In addition, woodlands supplied various foodstuffs and served 
agro-pastoral needs for pasturage, fodder, and fertilizer.
Because of these multiple uses, various users felt a sense of entitlement to a 
single woodland, which was either common to a community or owned by a single 
party, who granted usufruct to the local people for a moderate fee. Since wood-
lands were lifelines, forest owners often found it difficult to exclude the surround-
ing populace from using their forest. From a “market economy” perspective, 
forest owners were interested in selling their products to well-off consumers who 
offered the highest purchasing-price, regardless of whether they were local or not. 
However, from a “moral economy” perspective, forest owners often had to con-
sider the demands of the locals in need.
The frequent occurrence of freeriding users, or “thieves,” in the forests could 
be explained by the difficulties in monitoring forest use. The larger and denser the 
forest, the more difficult it was to levy a proper fee on forest use or to catch and 
punish wood thieves. Thus, forests could be regarded as nonexcludable “public 
goods,” if not nonrivalrous.
Part 4 of this volume focuses on forests owned by or reserved for the state in 
Prussia, Japan, and China in the early modern and modern periods, and discusses 
to what extent and in which ways they contributed to meeting basic needs of the 
local populace. We begin our discussion with the Prussian case because Japanese 
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modern government explicitly based its approach to forestry management on the 
German model. However, it is revealed that the state forestry in Japan did not fol-
low the German way. This Japanese trajectory clearly reflects the diverse possibili-
ties in the way of managing the forest and meeting people’s needs among societies.
As shown in Takashi Iida’s chapter (chapter 13), traditionally the major rev-
enue of the Prussian kingdom was generated from the direct management of royal 
domains and forests. Specifically, from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth 
century, state authorities intensively created and expanded fast-growing conifer-
ous stands to improve timber and firewood production and sale, while granting 
the domain subjects (mainly peasant farmers) the entitlement to obtain timber, 
firewood, pasturage, and litter in the royal forests for domestic use but never for 
sale. After experiencing various conflicts between the forestry and the subjects’ 
forest use, the authorities redeemed the subjects’ entitlements by 1870s and 1780s 
by paying the compensation that they elaborately assessed. Through the redemp-
tion, the authorities created sufficient latitude to widely and flexibly accept the 
previously unentitled parties from a growing landless class and from outside the 
domains, who were in real need of forest use, without burdening the forestry. Thus, 
the authorities consistently controlled the people’s forest use, while achieving the 
profitable forestry for improving the state budget.
In spite of the adoption of Prussian or German model, Japanese modern state 
forestry, as Takeshi Aoki (in chapter 14) discusses, developed more path-depend-
ently, adopting the practice of domain lord forestry in the Tokugawa period. 
Unlike the Prussian system in which the authorities grasped and regulated the 
locals’ forest use directly, Japanese local villagers retained self-governed access in 
domain and state forests to fulfill their basic needs, which the domain and state 
authorities consistently tolerated and saw no reason to redeem. In addition, villag-
ers played an active role in managing domain and state forests, sometimes even 
profiting from activities such as charcoal making and the grazing of animals; vil-
lagers checked the excessive expansion of artificial conifer stands, leaving diverse 
tree species that they needed for various purposes. Thus, unlike with German for-
est authorities, in the Japanese domain and state forestry, the ruler placed more 
importance on granting people the opportunity to self-govern and earn their own 
living.
In early modern China, unlike Prussia and Japan, forestry for timber produc-
tion and sale was mostly in private hands; the government was rarely involved 
in it, except in Northeastern areas of Qing-China. For nonmarket provision of 
wood resources, such as firewood, only insufficient records are available. However, 
as Yoshiyuki Aihara (in chapter 15) clarifies, the areas designated as “government 
mountains” contributed to such nonmarket provision, at least in the relatively 
mountainous areas of Southern China. These areas could not be owned by individ-
uals for profit-making purposes. Instead, they served as “commons for the poor,” 
and were often wasteland or grassland.
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Both Prussian and Japanese state forestry operated profit-making activities 
while meeting the needs of the locals. In Japan, however, unlike Prussia, the local 
village communities significantly undertook the management of state forests, 
demonstrating the specific character of the Japanese historical path. In China, 
although the forestry business was mostly operated by private individuals, the state 
reserved “government mountains” that functioned as common areas for the poor.
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In early modern Brandenburg-Prussia, the Hohenzollern monarchs were not only 
sovereigns of the electorate of Brandenburg or the Prussian kingdom but also lords 
of their domain estates, just as nobles were lords of their noble estates. Like noble 
lords, the sovereign lords owned domain estates as landed property, which included 
their demesne farms and their forests, as well as the peasant farms that they lent 
to their domain subjects in hereditary or leasehold tenure. Tenant peasants were 
obligated to render labor for the lords’ demesne farms and forests as well as to pay 
feudal rent in cash or kind. Conversely, the lords were also obligated to supply 
their subjects with many of life’s necessities, especially from their forests, because 
most of subject peasant communities lacked woodland.1 In general, demesne lords 
had an obligation to grant the necessary timber for construction free of charge 
to subject peasants who held farmsteads in leasehold tenure. This obligation was 
owed, because the lords owned the farmsteads exclusively and, thus, were solely 
responsible to (re)build and repair the farm buildings.2 Otherwise, demesne lords 
were obligated to allow their subjects access to their forests to gather fallen dead 
wood as firewood, graze livestock, collect litters, and so on. Accordingly, while the 
royal authorities managed their forests for profit, they were obligated to meet the 
basic needs of royal domain subjects.
In 1713, however, King Friedrich Wilhelm I transferred all domains, includ-
ing the forests, to the state budget and reserved only a specific amount for the 
royal family and the court. Owing to this development, the Prussian General Legal 
Code (Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten) of 1794 declared the 
domains to be the property of the state.3 Consequently, the royal authorities had 
to allow not only domain subjects but also the other state’s population to use the 
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royal forests. During the eighteenth century, the Prussian state rose to become one 
of the great European powers through the expansion of its army. To secure army 
personnel, the state was very eager to increase the state’s population. As a result, 
an increasing population of cottage residents emerged, among which the lodgers 
were not domain subjects but joined in the use of the royal forests.4 Furthermore, 
King Friedrich II, with his remarkable sense of right and wrong, began allowing 
subjects of noble lords to use the royal forests just as his domain subjects.5 Thus, 
while the exploiting pressure on the royal forests increased, Friedrich II started 
the project of afforestation and established the system of sustainable forestry in 
the royal forests.6
This chapter examines how and to what extent the royal authorities met the 
demands of the growing population both inside and outside domain estates for 
wood resources in the royal forests while advancing the forestry. Prussia’s royal 
domains and forests in Brandenburg during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies will be explicitly focused on. While surveying the general developments in 
Brandenburg, this chapter details the case of the royal domain and forest district of 
Alt-Ruppin (das königliche Domänenamt und Forstrevier Alt-Ruppin). Delving into 
this case will help reveal the realities that a survey of Brandenburg alone cannot.
ROYAL D OMAIN(S)  AND FOREST(S)  IN 
BR ANDENBURG AND ALT-RUPPIN
The royal domain and royal forest district of Alt-Ruppin traditionally belonged to the 
Kurmark Brandenburg (the greater part of Brandenburg comprising the Altmark 
west of the Elbe River and the East Elbian areas to the Oder River surrounding 
Berlin and Potsdam). In 1815, after ceding the Altmark in 1807, the Kurmark area 
roughly became the governorate district of Potsdam (Regierungsbezirk Potsdam), 
the western part of the Prussian province of Brandenburg.
Traditionally, the Kurmark had a higher density of sovereign lordship than 
other Prussian territories. At the end of the eighteenth century, it included fifty-
four royal domains, encompassing 40% of all peasants in the East Elbian area.7 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, approximately one-third 
of Brandenburg was covered in forests.8 In the Kurmark around 1800, the crown 
owned seventy-two royal forest districts covering approximately 58% of the total 
woodland, while the nobility and peasants owned 28%, and the cities and towns 
owned 14%. This calculation, however, did not include at least 134 other forested 
areas belonging to nobles and peasants because no records were available for these 
areas.9 Data regarding the share of peasant’ ownership is available in the Ruppin 
district (Kreis Ruppin) of the Kurmark. This data shows that peasants owned only 
4% of the forests while 75% belonged to royal families and 13% to noble lords and 
private owners.10 Peasants or peasant communities often had meager or no wood-
lots, making their entitlement to the lords’ forests indispensable.
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Both the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin and the royal forest district of Alt-Ruppin 
had their headquarters in or around the town of Alt-Ruppin, which lay approxi-
mately sixty kilometers northwest of Berlin. The domain and forest authorities 
cooperated in the exercise of royal lordship over the agricultural lands in the 
domain as well as the woodlands in the forest district.11 As a result of incorpo-
rating a part of the domain of Lindow in 1764, the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin 
became comparatively sizable among the royal domains in the Kurmark. Around 
the year 1800, the domain included the two towns of Alt-Ruppin and Lindow, 
two royal demesne farms in the town of Alt-Ruppin and the village of Dabergotz, 
twenty-six villages, and new settlements such as eight colonies (one of them was a 
colonist village) and two Büdner-etablissements. Some of the new settlements were 
constructed by a tar oven, a glasswork, or a farm hereditarily leased to a noble-
man. While the towns and the villages had long been established mostly since the 
Middle Ages, the construction of the new settlements occurred only in and around 
the 1750s. The royal authorities settled these new settlements with “foreigners” and 
retired soldiers.12
Table 8 presents the development of the social structure in the rural settlements 
that belonged to the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin in the year of 1800. Farms of 
peasants (Bauern and Kossäten) existed only in villages and towns. Due to limits 
on arable land and the impartibility of individual farms, the number of peasant 
farms was mostly constant except for the devastation caused by the Thirty Years’ 
War. Conversely, the number of cottages increased drastically beginning in the 
early eighteenth century. The cottages were built not only in old villages but in new 
settlements also. An increasing number of disinherited children of peasant farm-
ers and offspring of cottage residents were repeatedly permitted to own and lease 
cottages as cottagers (Büdner) and lodgers (Einlieger), respectively.
In 1798, the forest district of Alt-Ruppin included a total area of more than 
thirty-five thousand Morgen (one Morgen is approximately 0.26 hectares), a com-
paratively large area among the royal forest districts in the Kurmark.13 In 1820, it 
incorporated a part of the neighboring forest district of Zühlen, and this amounted 
to a sizable district of more than forty thousand Morgen, which consisted of the 
seven subdistricts of Klausheide, Lietze, Krangenbrück, Hohenheide, Pfefferteich, 
Glienicke, and Rägelin. This size proved to be uneconomic in many regards. In 
1843, as the new forest district of Neu-Glienicke was founded, the two subdistricts 
of Glienicke and Rägelin were transferred to it. As a result, the Alt-Ruppin forest 
district was reduced to about twenty-six thousand Morgen, a size more conducive 
to protection and administration.14
According to an investigation in 1825, six-sevenths of the forest district of Alt-
Ruppin consisted of pine stands. Considering the dominance of pine trees, it is 
no wonder that in the forest district of Alt-Ruppin, high forest management with 
100- or 120-year cutting cycles was practiced. Here, even broad-leaf trees formed 
exclusively high forests, leaving no room for coppice. Thus, the subjects and locals 
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were permitted to gather fallen dead wood as fuel and to graze their livestock 
under the high trees.15
FEUDAL ER A TO 1811
After the end of Thirty Years’ War in 1648, it took more than half a century to reset-
tle the peasant farms devastated and abandoned during the war. In the Alt-Ruppin 
domain, one-fourth of the peasant farms were still not yet resettled even forty 
years after the war (Table 8). During the postwar depopulation, the woodlands 
increased.16 In 1688, however, the annual income of the electorate of Brandenburg 
from the electoral forest was only about sixty-one thousand Reichstaler (rt), while 
that from the electoral domains (which consisted mainly of farmland) amounted 
to more than one million rt. As Otto Behre noted, this meager income from 
the  electoral forest was in striking contrast to its immense size. After deducting 
the salaries of forestry and hunting officials, the surplus that the electorate of 
Brandenburg could earn from his immense forest did not reach even seven thousand 
rt.17 At that time, based on the wood ordinances of 1590, 1593, and 1622, peasants of 
the electoral domains were entitled to obtain the necessary timber for maintaining 
and constructing farm buildings by paying half of the cost.18
While Elector Friedrich III (1688–1713, King Friedrich I beginning in 1701) 
only minimally improved the electoral or royal forests, King Friedrich Wilhelm I 
(1713–1740) succeeded in increasing the revenue from the forests mainly through 
an intensive ship timber trade with foreign countries as well as by putting the for-
est accounting system in good order. The monetary budget of the royal forests in 
the Kurmark in the fiscal year 1731/1732 was 108,017 rt in revenue and only 6,057 
rt in expenditure.19 However, Friedrich Wilhelm I was more interested in improv-
ing agriculture on domain lands than in improving the forestry. Thus, the king 
lowered the price of timber for his peasants. Even after the farms were completely 
resettled in the early eighteenth century, royal authorities still faced the problem 
that buildings on usufructuary peasant farms were mostly dilapidated because the 
peasants could not afford to pay for the timber. Such conditions made the farms 
susceptible to fires, collapse, or total abandonment. To remedy this problem, King 
Table 8. Development of the Social Structure of Rural Settlements That in 1800 Belonged to the 
Royal Domain of Alt-Ruppin, 1687–1831
  1687 1757/64 1800 1831
Large peasants (Bauern) 347 (97) 420 (1) 420 412
Small peasants (Kossäten) 98 (21) 110 105 94
Cottagers (Büdner) 0 124 124 359
Lodgers (Einlieger) 18 135 322 682
Sources: Iida 2010, 43; for 1831, BLHA, Rep. 7, Amt Alt-Ruppin, 283.
Notes: (1) A fishing village was not considered. (2) The number of devastated farms in parentheses.
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Friedrich Wilhelm I released a patent on April 25, 1729, in which he declared that 
all timber, regardless of whether it was necessary for new constructions or mainte-
nance, would be given from his forests to non-farm-owning peasants in the royal 
domains free of charge. According to the investigations in 1747 and 1748, about 
53% of all peasants (5,774 out of 10,898) in the royal domains in the Kurmark were 
non-farm-owners. Additionally, the king declared that timber granted to his farm-
owning peasants for new constructions and repairs would only require payment of 
one-third of the total cost. In this way, the domain peasants’ entitlement to timber 
reached its peak in 1729.20
King Friedrich II (1740–1786) further increased the revenue from his forests 
through timber trade with foreign countries. The revenue from the royal forests in 
the Kurmark amounted to 215,044 rt in the fiscal year 1747/1748 and 233,046 rt in the 
fiscal year 1756/1757.21 He was the first monarch who thoroughly engaged in affor-
estation, which, however, did not advance without difficulty. The Seven Years’ War 
(1756–1763) interrupted his forestry endeavors and caused devastation to the royal 
forests, from which they recovered only over a long period.22 Furthermore, the king’s 
forestry endeavors clashed with his other central policy of populating his kingdom.23
In the royal domains in the northern districts of Brandenburg like Prignitz, 
Ruppin, and Uckermark, the building of new settlements concentrated within a 
few years around 1750.24 Within the Alt-Ruppin domain alone, at least eight col-
onies and two Büdner-etablissements were established in and around the 1750s. 
Some of these, such as Frankendorf, Woltersdorfer Baum, and Wüsten-Rägelin, 
were founded within the royal forest district of Alt-Ruppin.25 Thus, colonization 
increased exploitation on the royal forests.
While new establishments increased the demand for building timber from the 
royal forests, the authorities took measures to prevent the waste of timber grants, 
which was likely to occur, especially in cases of non-farm-owning peasants who 
were entitled to free timber. In 1784, the General Forest Department created a 
draft of a building code. Domain and construction officials from the Altmark and 
the Prignitz were commissioned to provide expert reports if the code would apply 
to their areas. According to the draft, the necessity for a new building and its size 
were determined by the building’s master carpenter and peasants, which often 
resulted in excess timber being granted. To remedy this problem, the draft pro-
posed that a construction official should visit the construction site to determine 
whether or not a repair would be sufficient and to estimate the size and amount of 
timber needed for the new building on the basis of model drawings (clauses 1, 2, 
and 6 of the proposed code). This proposal had, as expert reports revealed, already 
been put into practice in several domains and then was generally applied dur-
ing the 1780s. In fact, in 1840, an official named Wittchow, of the governorate of 
Potsdam, reported for the Alt-Ruppin domain that buildings that were more than 
sixty or eighty years of age had been built with superior timber and had greater 
longevity than newer buildings.26
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Specifically in the Alt-Ruppin domain, the timber economy advanced in another 
way. In 1763 and 1764, as the royal domain of Lindow was dissolved and incorpo-
rated into the neighboring domains, including Alt-Ruppin, the authorities offered 
farm ownership to the usufructuary peasants in these domains. Approximately 
240 usufructuary peasants from sixteen villages in the expanded domain of Alt-
Ruppin accepted this offer by agreeing to pay one-third of future timber costs, 
while approximately 260 peasants from ten other villages did not accept the offer 
due to concerns with losing the provision of free timber. Consequently, the author-
ities not only improved the royal forest revenue but could certainly economize on 
timber grants as well, because the farm owners used to refrain from demanding 
unnecessary timber due to the one-third payment, as expert reports on the draft 
of the building code of 1784 explained.27
One reason why many peasants in the Alt-Ruppin domain gave up free tim-
ber is illustrated by the case of the village of Grieben (which belonged to Lindow 
domain until 1764, then to Friedrichsthal, then to Alt-Ruppin after 1819). Here, 
only eight peasants accepted farm ownership while the other twelve refused it. 
Starting in 1765, however, even the twelve usufructuaries paid one-third of the 
costs for granted timber, the same as the farm owners, a choice that was influenced 
by the threat of eviction. Being replaced by other tenants who were willing and 
able to pay more for timber was no longer an unrealistic fear. It might have been 
out of such a fear that all of the peasants in each of the sixteen villages fell into 
line with accepting farm ownership by giving up free timber.28 Rivalry over the 
limited number of impartible farms intensified in the agrarian boom during the 
latter third of the eighteenth century, as farms enjoyed an increasing demand for 
grain from growing populations in rural Brandenburg and Berlin as well as from 
industrializing England.29
While economizing on timber grants, the authorities improved the royal for-
estry to increase wood production. In 1764, King Friedrich II prohibited selection 
cutting and introduced compartment cutting, which made artificial planting in 
each compartment possible.30 On the basis of this development, the authorities 
began to mobilize the labor of subjects toward afforestation works. On January 
17, 1785, it was declared that each subject who was entitled to receive timber from 
royal forests should work to improve the forests. This consisted of ploughing, har-
rowing, and raking forest lands as well as gathering and delivering pinecones to 
the authorities, who used them for artificial regeneration.31 In the late eighteenth 
century, as the afforestation of the royal forests advanced, the authorities no longer 
permitted new settlements in the royal forests to conserve wooded areas.32
Traditionally, the royal authorities not only provided domain subjects with tim-
ber but also firewood. While the authorities collected the larger cordwood to be 
sold, the subjects were typically permitted to gather only the thinner fallen dead 
wood (Raff- und Leseholz) for domestic use “but never for sale.”33 To make this divi-
sion effective, authorities forbade subjects to bring axes or hatchets into the royal 
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forests and specified an upper limit of wood to be gathered. These regulations, 
however, were often met with resistance as the fallen dead wood became insuf-
ficient for the growing population, especially from the mid-eighteenth century.34
According to the oldest available register, from 1809/1810,35 243 inhabitants of 
nineteen surrounding settlements were entitled to gather fallen dead wood in the 
royal forest district of Alt-Ruppin. Most were subjects and preachers in the villages 
and colonies belonging to the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin. Three of the registered 
settlements, however, belonged to the noble or princely estates, from which the 
lords’ demesne farms and their subjects were entitled to the fallen dead wood. 
A peasant farmer or a preacher was entitled to gather fallen dead wood with a 
two-horse-drawn wagon by paying four Scheffel oats or twenty-four to thirty-two 
Groschen (gr) for two days a week, while a cottager was entitled to bring only a 
handcart and paid eight gr. The register included 227 wagon users, from which 
seven were allocated to two noble demesne farms, and sixteen handcart users.
It should be noted that among the nineteen registered settlements, at least five 
(Pfalzheim, Frankendorf, Stendenitz, Gühlen, and Woltersdorf) were only estab-
lished in and around the 1750s. They joined with nineteen wagon users and ten hand-
cart users in the practice of gathering fallen dead wood. Additionally, as reported in 
the late eighteenth century, there were a large number of freiwillige Heidemieter, who 
apparently entered the forest for firewood without entitlement. This was probably 
due to the fact that the lodgers, who increased most rapidly in number (table 8), were 
not included in the register of the entitled inhabitants. With this increasing rivalry, 
authorities were compelled around the year 1800 to raise the maximum thickness 
limit of fallen dead wood that subjects could gather, namely, from 2.5 to 3 Zoll. 
Furthermore, since the royal forestry shifted from selection cutting to compartment 
cutting in 1764, pure pine stands became dominant, which caused frequent insect 
damage, because pure stands were more vulnerable to insects. Especially in the years 
following insect or wind damage, subjects could enjoy an abundance of fallen dead 
wood without strict controls by the royal authorities.36
The royal forests were not only the place of timber and fuel-wood production 
but offered pasturing areas as well. In the seventeenth century, the forest orders 
did not yet care about the damage of unrestricted pasturage in the royal forests, 
because the livestock were few at that time.37 Population growth during the eigh-
teenth century, however, resulted in an increase of livestock and, thus, grazing 
pressure on the royal forests. According to the first available list of 1812,38 twenty-
six settlements were entitled to pasture a fixed number of livestock in the forest 
district of Alt-Ruppin. Most of these settlements belonged to the royal domains, 
but a few were subject to surrounding noble estates. Out of the twenty-six regis-
tered settlements, at least three farms hereditarily leased to nobles (Woltersdorf, 
Frankendorf, and Gühlen) and three colonies (Bienenwalde, Stendenitz, and 
Pfalzheim) were established in the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin between 1747 and 
1755 and joined in the pasturage of the forest district of Alt-Ruppin.
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While the number of pasturing parties increased, the pasturing area in the royal 
forests narrowed because, for successful afforestation, the authorities enlarged the 
area preserved from the grazing animals. As a result, the forest-grazing parties were 
not in harmony. A report from 1797 mentioned “countless numbers of conflicts” 
in the Pfefferteich subdistrict. At that time, livestock from Darritz, Frankendorf, 
Storbeck, Woltersdorf, and Katerbow grazed there collectively. Since no party had 
a specified territory, they constantly felt intruded upon and were at odds with one 
another. Parties who advanced their interests by force gained the upper hand. In 
this respect, Storbeck stood out. Around 1797, Storbeck seized the animals that the 
villagers of Darritz pastured in an area called Hasche, denying them their rights 
to pasture there without reason.39 In any case, such rivalry functioned as mutual 
regulation of the number of animals pastured in the forest.40
To support forest-grazing villages, the authorities offered them additional pas-
toral use of the forest. In 1796, the villagers of Storbeck petitioned the authori-
ties to permit them to continue raking moss and pine needles in the Alt-Ruppin 
forest. They could not spare these forest by-products for supplementing the litter 
that they lacked because of insufficient hay and straw yields. On this occasion, the 
forest official of Alt-Ruppin not only accepted Storbeck’s demand, but also offered 
the same permission to other villages like Darritz, Pfalzheim, and Nietwerder, who 
were experiencing the same or an even more severe litter shortage. Ultimately, 
the four villages were allowed to rake moss and pine needles only on a predeter-
mined day every week during the winter half-year in a place specified by the for-
est officials.41 As discussed in the annual economic report for 1802 on the district 
of Ruppin (Kreis Ruppin), to which the Alt-Ruppin domain and forest belonged, 
raked moss and pine needles helped peasants to keep up with the general inten-
sification of manure production at that time, which notably resulted in intensive 
potato cultivation on fallow lands. The potatoes and their waste served as livestock 
feed.42
The peasants’ gain from the forest was, of course, combined with their obliga-
tions to the forest owner. In return for being permitted to rake moss and pine 
needles, the peasants were obligated to deliver a certain quantity of pine cones 
to the forest authorities. This obligation was due to an ordinance from 1788, with 
which the authorities had increased their opportunities to extend their subjects’ 
labor into afforestation.43
REFORM LEGISL ATION OF 1811 AND THE  
FOLLOWING HALF CENTURY
After the defeat of Prussia by Napoleonic France in 1806, Prussia launched a 
reform to dissolve the relationship between lords and subjects. The reform legisla-
tion (such as the 1811 Regulierungsedikt and the 1821 Ablösungsordnung) prescribed 
how to redeem the rights of lords and subjects, including the subjects’ entitlements 
246    Chapter 13
to the lords’ forests. However, these entitlements were often long maintained 
because they were excluded from settlements where relationships between lords 
and subjects were dissolved.
Even before the legislation, royal authorities watched for an opportunity to 
negate subjects’ rights to free timber. They found such an opportunity in 1799, as 
they offered freedom from labor obligations and farm ownership to those peas-
ants in the royal domains who did not enjoy these.44 In the domain of Alt-Ruppin, 
negotiations began in 1803 with four villages (Dabergotz, Molchow, Nietwerder, 
and Wuthenow) where the peasants were mostly usufructuary farm holders and 
saddled with labor obligations for the royal demesne farms. For freedom from 
labor and farm ownership, the authorities enforced rigid conditions, including 
that peasants should surrender their entitlements to free timber without any com-
pensation. The peasants eventually accepted such conditions by 1818 because their 
greatest concern was emancipation from labor services.
In the royal domain of Alt-Ruppin, however, peasants saddled with labor obli-
gations for the royal demesne farms were in the minority. Besides the four vil-
lages referenced earlier, there were six villages dominated by usufructuaries that 
were already exempt from labor obligations. Without the inducement of freedom 
from labor obligations, they could take the time to fight against the abolishment 
of their entitlement to free timber. Eventually, the royal authorities redeemed the 
entitlement in the form of rent by the mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, the 
domain included sixteen to nineteen villages comprising mostly farm-owning 
peasants without labor obligations for the demesne farms, who were entitled to 
timber for a one-third payment. The authorities proposed to redeem their entitle-
ments through rent. In most cases, the negotiations only began around 1840. As a 
result of the determined opposition of the majority of the farm-owning peasants, 
however, the authorities found no alternative but to continue granting them tim-
ber until the 1860s and 1870s when, eventually, their rights were redeemed. Until 
then, the authorities had to meet their increased timber needs for enlarging or 
increasing their stables and barns to handle concurrent advancements in agricul-
ture, in accordance with Clause 210, Title 22, Part I of the Prussian General Legal 
Code of 1794.45
In contrast to the situation regarding timber, the royal authorities left the sub-
jects’ rights to fallen dead wood and forest pasturage untouched for half a century 
after the reform legislation of 1811. In his guidebook for redeeming rights to for-
ests from 1829, Georg Ludwig Hartig, the chief forester of the Prussian kingdom, 
argued that it was unwise for forest owners to redeem entitlements to fallen dead 
wood and forest pasturage. Fallen dead wood, which satisfied the necessity of sub-
jects, was of little or no value for the authorities because it was unsaleable and cost 
time and labor to collect piecemeal. Pasturing animals caused no noticeable harm 
to the forest, as long as they were kept from preserved areas. It was not prudent 
to abolish forest grazing because the rich undergrowth would then die uselessly.46
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For regulating the surviving entitlements to the forests, the authorities relied 
on the 1811 Landeskulturedikt, which promoted the cultivation of land. Concerning 
forestlands, the Landeskulturedikt stated that, for silviculture, entitlements to pas-
turage and gathering firewood were, per se, not harmful unless there were abuses. 
Based on this perception, the edict ordered that each forest owner should be 
authorized to limit the fallen dead wood collected by an entitled person to neces-
sary purposes only, by permitting the gathering of wood only on fixed days under 
a forest official’s supervision (§26). Preservation areas were to be made as large 
as necessary to enable regenerative silviculture (§28). If, however, the indispens-
able forest pasturage suffered from the unrestricted application of this rule, a fair 
restriction would be put in place by an arbitrator (§29). Thus, the edict aimed to 
make sustainable forestry and indispensable forest use somehow compatible.47
In the Alt-Ruppin forest district, the authorities not only retained entitlements 
to fallen dead wood but also even permitted unentitled parties to gather it. As 
reported in the Description and Management Plan of the forest district in 1825:
Besides (the entitled parties), still many unentitled individuals enter the forest for 
fallen dead wood. They cannot be removed because they were living in the forest and 
very poor. They, however, had to pay a higher access fee than the entitled.48
In 1846/1847, while 270 wagon users and twenty-eight handcart users were 
entitled to gather fallen dead wood in the royal forest district of Alt-Ruppin, the 
authorities allowed two wagon users and 159 handcart users to do so, not by enti-
tlement but by granting formal permission. Thus, the authorities accepted the pre-
viously unentitled parties mostly from the growing lower-class population living 
in cottages. This increased openness was based on the increasing volume of wood 
as a result of advancing afforestation.49
While fallen dead wood increased with advancing afforestation, forest-grazing 
areas narrowed as a result. In 1820, in the Alt-Ruppin forest district, the authorities 
planned to afforest all existing clearings of 4,523 Morgen by 1839. In fact, between 
1825 and 1846, clearings were reduced from 4,145 Morgen to 572 Morgen or from 
10.2% to 2.2% of the total district area.50 To afforest the clearings, additional areas 
had to be continuously preserved to prohibit grazing animals. Meanwhile, however, 
the authorities kept the people’s entitlements to forest pasturage intact. To make 
forestry and pasturage somehow compatible, the authorities carefully investigated 
each preserve, focusing on when it could be reopened for pasturing.51 Starting 
in the 1840s, the forest authorities spoke of the “permissible extent of preserved 
areas,” which was, on the whole, limited to one-fifth of the total pasturing area.52
Obviously, the forest-grazing parties did not fully exercise their entitlements. 
As reported in the Description and Management Plan of 1825, “although many vil-
lages were entitled to pasture horses, they did not exercise these rights any more 
at all.”53 This was the result of their efforts to shift from pasturage to the feeding 
of horses by stalls.54 Nevertheless, the pasture in the forest district seemed to be 
248    Chapter 13
insufficient for the livestock pastured. As the forest and domain officials of Alt-
Ruppin in 1829 reported, even during the summer months, the forest pasturage 
could not support the livestock without supplementary fodder.55
From 1847 to 1854, the numbers pastured in the forest district of Alt-Ruppin 
were recorded. For each year, the forest official counted and recorded the numbers 
of livestock pastured by each party. The total number of animals pastured in the 
forest district of Alt-Ruppin was between 882 and 1,402 in cows (table 9). Even 
the smallest number significantly exceeded the capacity of the district’s pastures, 
which, in the assessment of 1856, worked out at 661.9 cows.56
Excess grazing animals had significant consequences, especially in the 1840s. In 
1842, most areas of the Prussian state were struck by an unprecedented drought, 
causing a severe lack of livestock feed, primarily because the meadows and pas-
tures became arid. On September 1, the central authority in Berlin proposed to 
permit suffering peasants, even if unentitled, to graze their livestock in the royal 
forests, which, because of the shade, still afforded some pastures. To this proposal, 
the domain of Alt-Ruppin replied that it would be no use, because a large number 
of peasants were already entitled to pasturage in the Alt-Ruppin forest and, there-
fore, would never admit the unentitled parties. The domain proposed that peas-
ants lacking straw and hay be given extraordinary permission to gather litter in 
the forest. This counterproposal was, eventually, supported by the forest inspector 
of Rheinsberg, von Schaltzen. He initially remarked that a forester always wanted 
to see his forest as free as possible from litter exploitation because it hindered the 
growth of trees.57 Ultimately, he gave priority to the general interest over special 
forestry interests.58
The excessive quantity of grazing animals also damaged the foresters’ meadows 
and surrounding stands in the forest district. In 1847, the senior forester 
(Oberförster) of the Alt-Ruppin forest district petitioned the governorate of 
Potsdam to redeem the pasture rights on the meadows of all foresters in the 
Table 9. Number of Livestock Pastured in the Royal Forest District of Alt-Ruppin, 1847–1854
 
Horses Oxen Cows Calves Sheep Pigs
Calculated 
as cows
1847 15 51 398 71.3 8,188 343 1,383
1848   55 289 35 9,847 300 1,402
1849 10 55 313 54 7,133 327 1,181
1851 14 10 320 44 8,534 390 1,276
1852 16 10 358 53.7 7,910 321 1,251
1854   4.7 215 21.5 6,290 171 882
Source: BLHA, Rep. 2A, Regierung Potsdam, III F, no. 4288, 263–283.
Notes: (1) One cow = 3/4 horse = 3/4 ox = two calves = ten sheep = eight pigs. (2) The values of 1850 and 1853 are 
not presented, because for both years the data is incomplete. (3) Numbers of geese, which were very few, were not 
considered.
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district. The meadows were pastured by many entitled parties in spring and 
autumn. Consequently, they deteriorated constantly, and their productivity 
 levels were deficient because there was no opportunity to improve them. For 
years, all foresters had requested this redemption without success. In 1847, they 
could no longer endure as their meadows were deteriorating at a greater rate 
than ever because hungry animals could find “no fodder” in the forest and, thus, 
depended almost exclusively on the meadows.59
In his petition, the senior forester indicated the merit of stopping spring and 
autumn pasturage on Eggersdorf meadow for the benefit of the forest surrounding 
it. If ceased, the animals would also leave the royal forest in spring and autumn 
because the forest alone could hardly feed them during these seasons. For the 
forest, the pasturage in early spring was most dangerous because the grass was 
lacking: therefore, woody plants necessarily served as fodder and suffered. As this 
meadow was narrow and long, the pasturage on it continuously and inevitably 
damaged the neighboring forest preserve. It was all the more sensitive as the bor-
dering forest grounds were mostly designated for growing beech trees.60
In fact, in 1847 and 1848, the number of livestock pastured in the forest was 
remarkably large (table 9). This situation might have resulted from a severe potato 
failure that prevailed in Brandenburg during the 1840s, most seriously in the mid-
dle of the decade. It meant a decrease in feed, which made the livestock more 
dependent on the wood pastures than usual.61 Also, 1848 was the year of revolu-
tions, in which the populace overused the royal forests in various ways.62
THE REDEMPTION OF THE  
ENTITLEMENT S TO FOREST
In 1849, the budget of the royal forests in the governorate district of Potsdam was 
approximately 504,289 rt in revenue and 202,289 rt in expenditures. The revenue 
was more than twice that of the Kurmark a century earlier, when King Friedrich II 
began afforestation activities, and approximately 452,660 rt (90%) were generated 
from the sale of timber and firewood.63 During this century-long forestry improve-
ment scheme, subject’s and local’s traditional use of royal forests was, as shown, 
intensified as a result of population growth. This use survived for a substantial 
period even after the reform legislation of 1811.
In Alt-Ruppin, it was only in 1856 that the values of all the people’s entitle-
ments to the forest district were thoroughly estimated by Marot, an official of the 
Potsdam governorate. His task was to calculate the cost of redemption and to 
examine whether it was practicable and profitable. According to this assessment, 
the total annual yield of the forest district was 21,606 rt, of which, 6,634 rt (30.7%) 
went to the local populace.64
While the redemption of timber entitlements had long been pursued and partly 
realized, Marot’s report in 1856 was the first official report that recommended the 
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authorities redeem the entitlements to fallen dead wood and forest pasturage by 
paying an assessed amount.
Marot considered that it would be profitable to the authorities to redeem the 
entitlements to fallen dead wood as soon as possible, and with good reasons. 
First, the entitlement holders obtained 195,482 Kubikfuß from the forest while 
they were legally able to obtain only 128,314 Kubikfuß. Thus, the authorities lost 
67,168 Kubikfuß because it was impossible to monitor firewood gatherers thor-
oughly. After the redemption, they would be free from this loss because they 
would then pay compensation rent only for the lesser legal amount. Second, as 
silviculture and forest monitoring improved, the volume of wood and fallen dead 
wood (which entitled subjects and locals could gather) increased. Therefore, 
the authorities could redeem entitlements by paying lower rent sooner than at 
some future point. Third, with this redemption, Marot did not intend to stop 
the widespread practice of gathering firewood entirely. Instead of entitled parties 
who were mainly from the farm-owning class and had their wagons, he planned 
to accept more of the unentitled parties, which consisted mainly of lower-class 
people with handcarts, for a particular access fee. The fee would then help to 
cover the redemption rent paid to entitled parties, which he estimated at 1,046 
rt. Marot also expected that a significant number of the people committing wood 
theft would prefer the honest way if they were given an opportunity to obtain 
fallen dead wood for a moderate fee, which would profit the public interest as 
well as the interest of forest owners.65
Marot reported that the authorities should redeem pasturing rights by paying 
1,631 rt as annual compensation. His reason was that the forestry needs for the 
preserved areas, which at that time exceeded the permissible limit of 20% of the 
total pasturing area, could not be satisfied without redeeming the existing rights to 
forest pasturage. Even with his redemption plan, however, Marot never intended 
to drive the grazing practice itself out of the forest but to lease the woodlands for 
pasturage once they were free from the pasturing rights, under conditions better 
fitting forestry needs. He expected that the rent obtained by the leases would cover 
the bulk of the compensation.66
Marot’s plan seems to have been based on the general policy of the Potsdam 
governorate for leasing forest pastures. In 1853, the governorate declared that, 
when necessary, even livestock owners who were not entitled to forest pasturage 
should “always” be permitted to exercise such by paying a pasture fee according 
to a tariff schedule. Following this declaration, each royal forest district within 
the governorate’s jurisdiction had drafted a tariff schedule according to animal 
types.67
It was primarily in the 1870s and 1880s that the redemption plan was put into 
practice. At the end of the 1880s, only the town of Alt-Ruppin and some other par-
ties maintained the rights to pasture livestock equivalent to 292 cows. Through the 
redemptions, the Alt-Ruppin forest district created sufficient latitude to provide 
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the surrounding livestock owners with pastures according to their needs, espe-
cially in cases of severe hay and straw shortages.68
This research has proven that the royal forestry improved its wood production 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, especially after Friedrich II intro-
duced afforestation practices. Meanwhile, however, the royal forests provided 
for the basic needs of subjects and locals. The entitlements of domain subjects 
to the royal forests were enlarged as a result of the establishment of new settle-
ments in the domain in the mid-eighteenth century; they substantially survived 
reform legislation in the early nineteenth century; and, in most cases, they were 
only redeemed between the 1860s and 1880s. Additionally, the royal forest had to 
permit unentitled parties from the growing landless class and individuals from 
outside the domains access to the royal forests. The continuing and intensifying 
forest use of the subjects and locals was a burden on the royal forestry. There were 
many free riders among the Heidemieter. In particular, forest pasturage clashed 
with the enlargement of preserved areas for successful afforestation and collecting 
litters impoverished the soil of the woods.
From the 1860s to the 1880s, almost all the entitlements to the royal forest were 
finally redeemed. After redeeming peasant farmers’ entitlements to gather fallen 
dead wood, lower-class people were permitted to continue to do so in the form of 
flexible contracts in higher numbers than before. Thus, the authorities provided lati-
tude to accept firewood theft honestly. Through the redemptions of the entitlements 
to wood pastures, forest authorities created sufficient latitude to widely and flexibly 
provide the surrounding livestock owners with grazing according to their needs, 
especially in cases of severe hay and straw shortages. Through such flexible provi-
sion, forest use practices could be made more compatible with forestry practices 
than before.
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The Role of Villagers in Domain and 
State Forest Management
Japan’s Path from Tokugawa Period to the  
Early Twentieth Century
Takeshi Aoki
This chapter investigates to what extent and in which ways Japanese villagers took 
initiative in forest management from the Tokugawa period to the early twentieth 
century, focusing on the path-dependent process of the modernization of forest 
management.
Early efforts at forest management in Japan can be traced to the Tokugawa 
period,1 when villagers and local notables began to share their knowledge of for-
est management techniques. This pattern of development stands in contrast to 
what we see in Germany, which has long been regarded as the leader in forest 
management.
Japanese forestry administration is often thought to have had similar character-
istics to Germany’s, in that both tend to have a top-down structure.2 This view is 
seemingly understandable because Meiji Government was also eager to adopt the 
German style of state forestry.
In fact, in Germany, the intensification of agricultural and forest land use was 
usually initiated by the officials of lords and state authorities from the early mod-
ern period onward. They established guiding principles for intensified land man-
agement that annually contributed to the lords’ and state’s finance.3 Therefore, the 
forestry administration in Germany of the same period as Tokugawa Japan had the 
literally top-down characteristics. The strong linkage between forest management 
and power also facilitated the juridification of forest usages that enabled various 
users, irrespective of the rulers and the ruled, to struggle over forest rights by legal 
means. In juridical processes, the ruled were often able to ward off encroachments 
on their forest-use rights from the authorities that tried to regulate and restrict 
customary forest use for intensified land management.4
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The local domains in Tokugawa Japan also introduced sustainable forestry 
methods such as rotation cutting, which had been practiced in Germany. To draft 
wood-cutting plans, the domains’ officers drew forest maps and quantified tree 
volume.5 Thus, the Japanese domains were seemingly oriented toward top-down 
regulation of forest use. However, in Tokugawa Japan, it was villagers or local 
notables that accumulated and disseminated experience in on-site forest manage-
ment, such as tree planting and nurture. A good example of this is the publication 
of the books on agro-forestry by villagers or local notables that also provided the 
know-how to practice silviculture as subsidiary work in off-season for farmers.6 
The villagers deeply involved in silviculture planted trees not only in their own 
fields, but also in the lords’ forest lands, free from prior approval or monitoring 
by the authorities. The villagers’ forestation activities often competed with com-
munal forest use, such as cutting brushwood or procuring grass as green manure. 
In such cases, the struggles between different forest usage also in the lords’ forest 
lands took the form of the disputes between fellow villagers or several villages. 
Japanese scholars have long discussed how local disputes among the different for-
est uses often broke out among villagers in Japan and how disputes were settled 
out of court. Villagers frequently achieved the local consensus on what kinds of 
forest use they considered suitable, free from interference by domains’ authorities.7 
This is because the authorities did not aspire to grasp the full extent of daily use of 
their forest lands to manage them directly. Accordingly, the domains in Tokugawa 
Japan could turn forest regulations into a reality only if villagers participated in 
the governance of forest use. What mattered for villagers’ forest use in Japan was 
“informal institutions, unwritten law, and collective patterns of behavior estab-
lished by long-standing custom.”8
Japan and Germany followed different paths in regard to who accumulated and 
passed on silvicultural experience and in what manner. This difference persisted 
into the first half of the twentieth century: the primary actors in Japanese forest 
management continued to be villagers and rural communities, while in German 
forestry, forestry officials were the leading actors. This chapter considers the con-
sistent characteristics of villagers’ role in forest management from the Tokugawa 
period to the early twentieth century.
VILL AGERS’  ROLES IN D OMAIN FORESTRY IN 
TOKUGAWA JAPAN
Tokugawa Japan consumed an enormous volume of timber in building its  castle 
towns, particularly during the first half of the seventeenth century. The con-
struction of these towns required considerable timber, not only for the lords’ 
residences but also to house the common people who served the lords and their 
retainers. Urbanization also created a demand for fuel wood for domestic heating. 
Additionally, domestic monetization and the growth of metal exports in Tokugawa 
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Japan required the development of metal ore mines and nearby forests for fire-
wood. Accordingly, lords especially in northeast Japan during the Tokugawa 
period often laid claim to entire timber forests or valuable forest products on their 
domains, prohibiting the unauthorized logging of certain valuable trees or declar-
ing certain timber and firewood forests off-limits to villagers.9
However, most Japanese lords did not aspire to direct forest management to 
the extent of actually conducting activities such as tree nurture and lumbering, 
which were instead managed by the neighboring village communities. In most 
cases in northeast Japan during the Tokugawa period, forestry was implemented 
as natural regeneration. Villagers were authorized to cut and collect firewood or 
grass in lords’ reserved forests to procure fuel for cooking and heating, or to col-
lect green manure. In return, they took charge of patrolling timber forests, and 
participated in timber-cutting operations at the lords’ request. In relation to 
natural regenerative forestry, the lords’ claiming of timbers, including conifers, 
together with daily forest use by villagers, such as cutting brushwood and grass, 
significantly contributed to timber growth in the lords’ forests: brushwood and 
grass grow more robustly than young conifers, especially in northeast Japan, and 
the young conifers tend to fail, if not given some assistance in their early years. 
In other words, forest use by villagers encouraged the growth of young conifers 
by removing competing vegetation that would otherwise have crowded out the 
young conifers. Valuable timber forests, including Japanese cedar (sugi) forests in 
the Akita domain in northeast Japan, resulted from intensive salvage-cutting by 
villagers during Tokugawa period.10
Therefore, the protection of timber forests that the lords in Tokugawa Japan 
considered important succeeded only if local villagers actively participated in the 
lords’ forestry administration. A typical case can be found in the coppice forests 
near the castle town of the Akita domain.11 The coppice forests had supplied the 
lords’ vassals of the castle town with fuel wood, and the nearby villagers’ living, 
including charcoal making, also depended on raw materials provided by the for-
ests. During the second half of Tokugawa period, the coppice forests supplied the 
castle town with more and more fuel wood. For example, from 1792 to 1835, the vol-
ume of charcoal that the branch family of the lord received increased from twenty 
hyo to eighty hyo.12 The domain’s official and the village leaders had reported that 
most coppices in the forests were cut down, and more and more conifer trees, 
such as the Japanese cedar, grew in the cutover area, partly due to the prohibitions 
of illegal cutting of conifers. Thick-grown conifers interfered with the growth of 
brushwood and grass; they hindered villagers’ charcoal making, so the villagers or 
the minor forestry officials requested permission from the high domain officers to 
remove crooked or poorly developed conifer trees to create space for the regrowth 
of shrubbery, even if the logging of these trees was banned.13
The lords or their officers understood the symbiosis between their forest pro-
tection and villagers’ forest use, and they always tried to keep open the space 
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where villagers could collect or cut grass and brushwood at their discretion.14 The 
lords did not interfere with self-governance of villagers’ forest access, and they did 
not usually investigate the actual conditions of villagers’ forest use unless illegal 
cutting of valuable conifers was reported. This toleration policy toward the use 
of the lords’ forest was a major factor blocking German-style top-down forestry 
administration that compiled information on all the usage of their forest lands to 
regulate villagers’ forest use for intensified and rationalized land management.15
In addition to natural regeneration, another means of forest management was 
artificial forestation. Again, it was the villagers rather than the lords who played 
the central role in this process. While the lords’ functionaries did not play an active 
role in forestation, tree planting by villagers in their lords’ forests was officially 
recognized and promoted throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
When the trees were fully grown, the proceeds of mature trees in the form of logs 
or cash were shared among the lords and the villagers. These sharing agreements 
related to forest management were adopted by some lords in northeast and south-
west Japan.16
A typical case can be found in the Akita domain in northeast Japan. By the 
early eighteenth century, there were already a number of informal examples of the 
sharing of proceeds, in which the lords and the villagers shared the proceeds of 
mature trees in a ratio of 7:3. Thereafter, the lord in this case came to recognize that 
villagers were reluctant to plant and nurture trees without being given a greater 
incentive to engage in forestation, which led the lord to authorize the sharing of 
proceeds with the villagers in a ratio of 5:5 in 1712. This sharing ratio remained 
fixed for more than a century. However, villagers excessively used the domain’s 
forest to procure basic necessities during the years of the famines in the last quar-
ter of the eighteenth century. To restore the degraded forest lands to health, the 
domain’s authorities decided to promote villagers’ forestation activities by further 
enhancing villagers’ incentive, so they increased the villagers’ share from one-half 
to seven-tenths of the total in 1811.17 But, according to the analysis of the forestry 
official in the Akita domain, only two-tenths of trees planted by villagers there 
from 1819 to 1823 completed their growth.18
The poor achievements from the viewpoint of the domains’ officers notwith-
standing, villagers’ planting activities in the lords’ forests certainly worked to their 
advantage: they would like to secure access also to the lords’ reserved forests to 
gather their forest outgrowth (lower branches, weeds, and the like) rather than to 
claim a share of the plantation’s profits. In other words, artificial forestation by vil-
lagers, who were compensated for their work by receiving extensive forest access, 
seems to have been one of the bottom-up means to secure communal use area.19
In consequence, the retention of some valuable forests during the Tokugawa 
period resulted from the tense and symbiotic relationship between the lords and 
the villagers over forest use.
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APPLICATION OF GERMAN FORESTRY METHODS IN 
MEIJI  JAPAN
Forestry administration in the Tokugawa period was oriented toward the sustain-
ability of their forest resources. However, lords and their functionaries did not 
play a proactive role in on-site forest management, so the enforcement of forest 
regulation depended mainly on villagers’ cooperation. In addition, when Meiji 
government took over political control of the lands and their subjects from the 
lords in 1869, the domains’ forestry officers did not usually transfer to positions as 
government officials. Instead, the experiences in on-site forest management, such 
as drafting of rotation cutting plans, had accumulated in the village communities 
in the former Akita and other domains.20 For these reasons, the new Japanese gov-
ernment was less inclined to engage in direct forest management. Furthermore, 
the government considered the forest lands taken from the lords as the areas pro-
posed for the former samurais’ returning to the farming, and as financial sources 
to fund the early industrialization policy. First, the new government decreed the 
ordinance of land reclamation in 1870, and the forest lands suitable for clearing 
were assessed at two hundred thousand ha by the authorities. After that, in 1872, 
the new government tried to auction off all the forest areas.21
However, the Japanese government began to reconsider earlier practices as it 
became familiar with central Europe’s experiences in the reform of forestry admin-
istration. For example, Toshimichi Ōkubo, a member of a high-ranking mission, 
traveled to America and Europe to seek the renegotiation of existing commercial 
treaties in the first half of the 1870s. During his stay in Berlin, he heard a lecture on 
the superiority of German forestry by Hazama (Kan) Matsuno, who had studied 
in Germany with funding from the Japanese government. After hearing this lec-
ture, Ōkubo became a leading advocate for the establishment of modern forestry 
administration, and he influenced the government’s decision in 1873 to stop selling 
forest lands. In 1882, after the government decided to model its modern forestry 
administration after that of Germany, it founded a governmental forestry school 
(Tokyo Sanrin Gakkō) in Tokyo. The faculty’s first head teacher was Matsuno, who 
had returned from Germany in 1875 and who would train budding foresters to be 
well versed in German methods.22
In contrast to Japanese lords, Germany’s lords and their functionaries seemed 
to have accumulated experience in on-site forest management. During the nine-
teenth century, they advanced significantly toward developing a direct forest man-
agement system. This process often corresponded with the modernization of the 
forestry administration. Essential steps in the process were the nationalization of 
the lords’ forests and the redemption of forest-use rights exercised by villagers.23
To redeem forest-use rights, forestry authorities in Germany engaged in tough 
bargaining with other claimants. After long negotiations, the state redeemed vil-
lagers’ rights in return for parceling out forests or providing fixed-benefit pension 
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plans. Through this step, the roles of the government and villagers in forest manage-
ment became fundamentally separated in Germany in the course of the nineteenth 
century.24
DIVISION OF FOREST OWNERSHIP IN MODERN JAPAN
As graduates from forestry schools in Japan attempted to put the German style 
of forestry into practice, they were challenged by the necessity of establishing a 
direct forest management system from scratch. As a first step in that direction, the 
Japanese government, beginning in the 1870s, set about dividing forests between 
the government and villagers while training its forestry officers.
In Germany, the division of forests meant eliminating or limiting villager access 
to state forests by formally redeeming forest-use rights. However, the Japanese 
government avoided being drawn into potentially interminable negotiations over 
forest-use rights. Instead, it placed the burden of proof of forest ownership on 
villagers. To present evidence of forest ownership, they were obliged to prove that 
they had spent a certain amount of money and labor in managing the forest they 
asserted their claim to. Between the 1870s and the 1890s, the government national-
ized forests for which villagers could not present proof of ownership. This proce-
dure created state-owned and imperial forest lands covering about nine million 
ha, or nearly one-third of the total forest area of Japan. The procedure of dividing 
forests created two types of regions.
In the first type of region, such as the Kinki, Chūgoku, and Chūbu regions, vil-
lagers’ historical control of forests was relatively entrenched. In the Kinki region, 
the villagers in the Tokugawa period engaged in timber-planting and lumbering 
to bring forest products to the neighboring metropolitan markets, such as that 
of Osaka.25 In the Chūgoku region in the pre-Meiji period, villagers in the hills 
managed the thickets and pine woodlands to supply the fuel for salt making in 
the coastal areas of the Inland Sea.26 Accordingly, they were able to establish their 
claims to and retain their ownership of the forests they had managed. Thus, the 
percentages of the forest lands owned by the government as of 1936 were almost 
negligible in the Kinki and Chūgoku regions.27
In Yamanashi prefecture, in the Chūbu region, grasses and trees in communal 
forest lands were used for fattening horses and wooden handicrafts. Local com-
munities in Yamanashi Prefecture also asserted their claims to the forest lands, but 
they failed to present proof of ownership. The former communal forest lands were 
nationalized and later transferred to the imperial estate. Village communities reso-
lutely petitioned the Imperial Property Office for the return of the converted forest 
lands. Furthermore, they pressured the imperial authorities to accept the petitions 
through illegal felling of trees, setting fires, or unauthorized grazing on the impe-
rial forest lands. After these struggles against the Imperial Property Office, the 
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imperial authorities decided to hand over the ownership of the former communal 
forest lands to the prefectural authorities in Yamanashi in 1911. The relevant bureau 
in Yamanashi came to manage the forest lands, taking note of the local communi-
ties’ needs.28 The subtotal percentage of government and imperial forest lands in 
the Chubu region as of 1936 was 22%, so this region belonged to the first type of 
region, where the subtotal percentage of government and imperial forest lands was 
relatively low.29
In the second type of region, where the lords had reserved control over 
extensive forests or valuable trees within their domains during the Tokugawa 
period, power relations in forest management favored a quick takeover of forest 
ownership by the state. Furthermore, the orientation of villagers toward secur-
ing forest ownership for communal use was relatively weaker, because they 
expected to be granted tax-free use of the underbrush and thinnings from the 
government’s forest lands. This type of province was concentrated in northeast 
Japan, where the subtotal percentage of government and imperial forest lands 
was 47%.
THE C ONFLICT S OVER POLICY DIRECTION ON  
NEW STATE FORESTRY IN JAPAN
Following the introduction of German state forestry methods in Meiji Japan, there 
were many who questioned the suitability of the new methods in the Japanese 
context.30
When Zentarou Kawase, a Japanese forestry student a generation younger than 
Matsuno, visited Germany in the late nineteenth century, that nation had already 
advanced to a final stage in its modernization of the administration of forestry. 
According to Kawase’s observations, German state forests were managed in con-
formity with officially drafted management plans, the goal of which was to assure 
regular harvests, and thus incomes, in perpetuity. Plans drafted in the nineteenth 
century were generally based on the scientific concept of the “Normal Forest,” 
which favored setting out each high forest of even-aged conifer trees, with long 
cutting periods. Furthermore, operations in state forests, from tree planting to 
lumbering, were conducted under vertical integration only by the government 
sector. As for labor management, forestry authorities directly employed regular 
workmen, thus providing them with opportunities for life and pension insurance.31
During Kawase’s stay in Germany, opinion became widespread in Japan that 
the complete separation of the roles of government and villagers in forest manage-
ment would deviate from Japanese tradition, in which both actors worked together 
to manage and share proceeds from forests owned in common. Kaneko Kentaro, a 
current undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1893, who 
had once helped Ito Hirobumi with making the draft Meiji Constitution modeled 
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on that of Germany, agreed with this opinion. According to this opinion, extensive 
forest access for villagers to procure essential goods, along with their responsibil-
ity for patrolling forests and undertaking operations such as timber planting or 
lumbering, contributed to sustainable forest management.32
In an article he submitted to a magazine well known in Japanese forestry circles, 
Kawase refuted this opinion, emphasizing that only the governments, as champi-
ons of the concept of “Normal Forest,” could manage forests sustainably. Because 
German forestry theory, which he studied, deemed villager participation detri-
mental to the performance of state forestry, he also took little notice of the roles 
of villagers in forest management during the Tokugawa period.33 After returning 
from Germany, he, who had once served as an expert at the Forestry Bureau of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, became the first professor of forestry at 
the College of Agriculture, University of Tokyo, and trained many budding for-
estry officers.34 But the modernization of forestry administration in Japan, which 
Kawase’s former students promoted, would follow a path-dependent process dif-
ferent from its development in Germany.
In 1896, the Japanese government presented the Forest Bill to the Imperial 
Diet session. The bill included sections on state forest policing and administrative 
supervision of private forest management. However, it aroused fierce opposition 
among members of the House of Representatives, most of whom raised the ques-
tion of whether the earlier division of forest ownership between the government 
and the villagers had been a suitable method of creating an area of state forestry in 
modernizing Japan.
Yaroku Nakamura, who had been a forestry teacher at Tokyo Sanrin Gakkō in 
the 1880s and was later elected to the House of Representatives, insisted that the 
method the government had adopted to divide forest ownership was inappropri-
ate. According to Nakamura, the government had not conducted a German-style 
redemption of forest-use rights and hence failed to create state forests from which 
villagers’ access was eliminated. The German-style redemption of villagers’ rights 
may have taken the form of parceling out extensive bushlands suitable for produc-
ing fuel wood and low-grade timber to villagers. This redemption process would 
also enable the division of roles between state and private forestry, allowing the 
government to concentrate its funds and personnel in the management of the pro-
tected forest areas beyond the capacity of other business entities. His opinion was 
a result of a realization that the government had insufficient funds and personnel 
to manage the forests it had previously taken over. In other words, he questioned 
what the purpose of state forestry would be and how much forest land the govern-
ment needed to achieve its goals.
In addition to discussions of Nakamura’s expert viewpoint, others spoke out 
about local residents’ complaints regarding the results of the division of for-
est ownership between the 1870s and the 1890s. Yukimoto Kudō, a member of 
the House of Representatives from the Aomori prefecture in northeast Japan, 
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argued that valuable state forests in the Aomori prefecture had been created 
by the tree planting and nurturing activities by villagers during the Tokugawa 
period. According to Kudō, villagers in the Aomori domain not only were granted 
extensive access to the lords’ forests to procure basic necessities, but also shared 
profits from forest products with the lord as a reward for their forestation labor. 
Accordingly, he lamented the fact that the villagers in the Aomori prefecture who 
ought to have retained the ownership of forests they used had been unable to pres-
ent positive proof of forest ownership in the earlier procedure of the division of 
forests. He complained that they had been extremely restricted in their traditional 
use of state forests after the division of forests, arguing that the government should 
revise the division of forest ownership so that more villager ownership of forest 
could be recognized.
Despite these discussions, the government at that time was not deeply involved 
in discussions regarding the appropriateness of the previously conducted division 
of forest ownership. All that the government did was to present a bill separate from 
the Forest Bill. This bill allowed those unsatisfied with the earlier division of forest 
ownership to petition the forestry administration for the return of forests under 
dispute on a case-by-case basis. Despite the strong opposition to the bill among 
some representatives, it passed in 1899.
Following criticism by those representatives versed in forestry, such as 
Nakamura, the government also presented a National Forest Bill to the Diet 
in 1899. However, the bill included only the procedures for the administration 
of national forest lands and clarified neither the division of roles between state 
and private forestry nor the purpose of state forestry. Interestingly, it included 
clauses recognizing the roles of villagers in state forest management, which 
aroused fierce opposition among some members of the House of Peers, includ-
ing Takei Morimasa, an ex-bureaucrat who had once served as chief at the 
Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. He supported 
the idea that forest management should be the special domain of the state and 
its forestry officers and that state forestry should make a sustainable amount of 
profit, contributing annually to its general account. Accordingly, he opposed 
the arguments in the House of Representatives that state forestry should limit 
itself to unprofitable activities such as management of protected forest areas. 
However, among the other members of the House of Peers, who rather appreci-
ated the achievement of villagers’ forest management, there were discussions 
supporting the clauses that recognized the roles of villagers in state forest man-
agement. In deliberations over the bill in sessions of the House of Peers, it was 
made clear that the government and most members of the House of Peers did 
not regard villagers’ continuing access to state forests and their engagement 
with state forestry as problematic. Although the discussions on the purpose of 
state forestry remained unresolved, the National Forest Bill also passed in the 
1899 Diet.
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MODERN STATE FOREST MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN
Overview of State Forestry in Modern Japan
On June 30, 1900, the Japanese government officially closed petitions for the 
return of forests in accordance with the law of 1899. Petitions for the return of 
forests encompassed a total area of about two million ha. However, only an area 
of about three hundred thousand ha was authorized for return to the petitioners. 
The geographical distribution of state forest lands created by the division of forests 
between the 1870s and the 1890s was rarely changed through the procedures put 
into place by the law of 1899.35
State forest lands in Japan consisted mainly of broadleaved trees. According 
to statistics from 1915 that described the composition of Japan’s forest lands for 
the first time, total forest lands consisted of unforested fields of 3,638,887 ha, 
 bamboo thickets of 121,895 ha, coniferous forests of 3,989,628 ha, broadleaved for-
ests of 6,933,581 ha, and mixed forests of conifers and broadleaves of 7,645,770 ha. 
In comparison, the state-owned proportion of the total consisted of unforested 
fields of 491,761 ha, bamboo thickets of 344 ha, coniferous forests of 820,864 ha, 
broadleaved forests of 3,361,204 ha, and mixed forests of conifers and broadleaves 
of 3,147,237 ha. In view of these statistics, the composition of state forest lands 
of about eight million ha was rather broadleaved and natural, and broadleaved 
 forests in state forest lands were located more in remote mountain zones than on 
level ground.36
How did the forestry authorities in Japan try to change the existing composi-
tion of state forest lands? They began to draft a management plan for state forest 
lands in 1899 and finished drawing up the plan for the total area of about four 
million ha, except the nonmanaged woodlands, until 1921. According to the autho-
rized management plan for an area of 4.13 million ha until 1924, 61% of the total 
area was left to the management of high forest, including conifers.37
Forestation activities in state forest lands consisted of the afforestation of tree-
less wastelands in mountains near human settlements, and changeover foresta-
tion in remote mountain zones, from natural forest areas to artificial plantations. 
Between 1899 and 1921, these operations advanced in parallel. The proportion of 
annual forestation area to that of the total state forest lands hovered around 0.9%. 
However, after 1922 forestation activity was limited to the changeover forestation 
from natural forest areas to artificial plantations. Hereafter, the pace of foresta-
tion slowed. The proportions of annual forestation areas from 1922 to 1935 ranged 
between 0.38% and 0.24%. This slow pace of replanting was partly due to the lack 
of good markets for the broadleaved trees from the mountainous state forest 
lands; as a result, proceeds from sales did not cover the government’s expenses in 
cutting, processing, and transporting. The reduced market for broadleaved trees 
at that time hampered their cutting and the replanting of the cutover area with 
conifers.38
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This lack of adequate marketability of state forest products, including broad-
leaved trees, led to a low level of government logging of trees in terms of the pro-
portions of the volume of governmental logging to total cut volume in state forest 
lands. Governmental logging began only after the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, and the government focused on logging timber forests.39 Indeed, the percent-
age of timber volume cut by governmental logging increased steadily from 16% 
in 1905 to 61% in 1935. However, the percentage of fuel-wood volume by govern-
mental logging increased modestly from 1% in 1907 to 15% in 1935.40 This low level 
of governmental logging is explained partially by the low cost-bearing capacity of 
broadleaved trees that had no use other than as fuel.
Another important feature of Japanese state forest management, in compari-
son with Germany’s, is embodied in the structure of the organs of actual for-
est management. Regional and district forest offices in Japan were responsible 
for a much more extensive area of jurisdiction than their German counterparts. 
In Japan, during the interval between the two world wars, the average regional 
forest office in the home islands was in charge of a forest area of about seven 
hundred thousand ha, and the average district forest office was in charge of a 
maximum forest area of twenty-five thousand ha. In comparison, in Germany, a 
regional forest office was, on average, responsible for an area of about one hun-
dred thousand ha and a district office was in charge of four thousand ha. This 
contrast also seems to explain Japan’s low level of modern state forestry com-
pared to Germany.41
As discussed in detail later, the slow pace of the governmental logging and for-
estation in Japan’s state forest lands resulted mainly from villagers’ continuous par-
ticipation in forest management.
Villagers’ Forest Use in State Forests
High rates of state ownership of forest lands in northeast Japan resulted from the 
relative weakness of the ownership claims presented by villagers or  communities. 
Despite this weakness, villagers did not give up traditional forest use in state 
 forests, and the government also took over the former lords’ policy of  tolerating 
villagers’ self-governance of communal forest use.42 Thus, high rates of state forest 
lands, particularly in northeast Japan, coexisted with villager retention of  extensive 
access to state forests.
Table 10 shows the areas of state forest lands in which traditional forest uses 
were officially recognized during the early twentieth century. The dedicated cat-
egories of traditional uses consisted mainly of forests with sharing of proceeds, 
grass-collecting areas, pasturing areas, and fuel-wood supply forests.
First, the institution of forests with sharing of proceeds dates back to the 
Tokugawa period. The modern Japanese government inherited the institution of 
the sharing of proceeds to promote artificial forestation by villagers in state forests. 
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in a certain amount of forestation activities under agreements for the sharing of 
proceeds with lords. The villagers practiced selective-cutting operations in forests 
under such agreements, so the composition of such forests was rather uneven in 
age. However, the government recognized only forests of even-aged conifer trees 
created by clear-cutting operations as subject to legitimate agreements for sharing 
of proceeds, so it disregarded most of the villagers’ tree planting achievements.43 
Therefore, villagers were less and less inclined to continue planting trees under 
agreements for the sharing of proceeds from the time of the Meiji Restoration.44
In modern Japan, a relatively successful case of the institution of the sharing 
of proceeds is found in Miyazaki prefecture in the Kyūshū Region, which had 
a relatively large area of state forest lands under a proceeds-sharing agreement 
between villagers and district forest offices (see table 10). For example, the Obi dis-
trict forest office in Miyazaki Prefecture had jurisdiction over a state forest area of 
approximately 22,350 ha as of 1921, which amounted to 66% of the total forest lands 
in the district. In Obi district, there was an established custom whereby villagers 
gained access to the lord’s forest and planted trees on the basis that the villagers 
received two-thirds or four-fifths of the total proceeds. Accordingly, they com-
plained about the state’s takeover of extensive forests at the time of the division of 
the forest. To mitigate their complaints, the Obi district forest office drafted a local 
management plan as of 1922 that designated 49% of the total state forest area as 
subject to agreements for the sharing of proceeds with villagers. Villagers planted 
sugi (Japanese cedar) sets in state forests under the agreements and set out forests 
suitable for the logging of ship-building timbers. The total area of forested lands 
in Obi district between 1923 and 1942 was 4,363 ha, a little less than three-fourths 
of which was areas forested by villagers. Judging from this case, the allowance of 
villagers’ relevant access to state forests enabled them to participate in high forest 
management, which the German state forestry model considered to be the sole 
responsibility of forestry officers.45
Second, the designation of pasturing and grass-collecting forests meant that 
state forest lands were left only to pasture and grass collection, particularly for 
animal husbandry. The lords in the Tokugawa period tacitly permitted their vil-
lagers to use their forest lands for animal breeding and husbandry. The villagers 
managed the pasturing and grass-collecting area communally, so they practiced 
also the controlled burning of a field for protection against the growth of thorny 
plants, as part of their work for sustainable use of fields as grassland.46 But the 
afforestation activities of the treeless areas in state forest lands from 1899 tended 
to shrink the former pasturing and grass-collecting area unless there were pro-
test movements by the local stock farmers. According to table 10, the Tōhoku 
region, a famous breeding center for horses and other animals, had a relatively 
large area of state forest land left to pasture and grass collection. This designation 
of pasturing and grass-collecting area was a result partly of a request by the Army 
Ministry of Japan, which had placed a premium on the production of warhorses 
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after the Russo-Japanese War.47 This is also because the regional authorities of 
state forestry faced difficulties from the intentional and unauthorized burning of 
state forest lands by villagers and they accepted the villagers’ petitions for protec-
tion of customary use for horse breeding and husbandry. Thus, in the Aomori 
regional forest office’s jurisdiction, the villagers participating in horse breeding 
and husbandry could maintain a designated area almost as large as the customary 
use area.48
Finally, the largest category of traditional use was for supplying fuel wood for 
villagers’ domestic heating and cooking or producing charcoal for sale. In a state 
forest designated for the supply of fuel wood, the forestry authorities did not sell 
self-logged wood, but specified the places where villagers themselves could fell 
standing trees. Villagers bought the standing trees in the specified places. This 
sales method enabled villagers to receive relevant forest access to cut some fire-
wood and make charcoal as commodities. The merit of this method for forestry 
authorities lay in the fact that the villagers cut down aged broadleaved trees at their 
own cost. But the forestry authorities were also obliged to keep open a certain area 
of broadleaved forests where villagers could get access to fuel wood.49
In northeast Japan, the composition of state forest lands was more broadleaved. 
For example, in 1915, state forest lands there consisted of unforested fields of 136,365 
ha, bamboo thickets of eight ha, coniferous forests of 214,010 ha, broadleaved for-
ests of 1,291,751 ha, and mixed forests of conifers and broadleaves of 639,172 ha. 
Full-scale use of these extensive broadleaved forests began after the construction 
of a national network of railways in the 1890s that could transport the charcoal 
from rural areas to metropolitan markets like Tokyo.50 As table 10 shows, fuel-
wood supply forests amounted to 41% of the state forest lands of 2,224,182 ha in 
northeast Japan. In the jurisdictions of the Aomori and Akita regional forest offices 
in the Tōhoku Region, the supply of fuel wood to a large extent took the form of 
sales of standing trees. For example, as of 1920, the percentage of sales of standing 
trees that were for fuel wood was 96.2% in the area under the Aomori regional 
forest office and 90.3% in Akita.51 Furthermore, under the Aomori regional for-
est office’s jurisdiction, most fuel wood was sold under private contract at a spe-
cial price lower than the competitive contract price. This private contract price 
applied to sales of fuel wood both for domestic use and for villagers’ production 
activities such as charcoal making. If the German experience is used as a model of 
state forestry, selling forest products at an uncompetitive price might not be seen 
as an ordinary practice. This is because German state forestry tried to transfer 
its proceeds to the general state account and reduce tax burdens by selling forest 
products at an increased profit.52 However, in Japan, the allotment of fuel-wood 
supply forests and this sales method guaranteed villagers’ rights to participate in 
and profit from production activities in state forests, particularly during the char-
coal booms after the First World War.53
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Villagers’ Organization of Labor in State Forests
Japanese forestry authorities used the allotment of forests for traditional use as 
a lever to organize two types of villagers’ units to engage in forestation-related 
operations such as nurturing trees or patrolling state forest lands. The first type 
of organization was the labor units, taking on regular patrols of state forest lands 
while being compensated for their work by receiving forest access to gather forest 
outgrowth, such as lower branches, weeds, mushrooms, and edible wild plants. The 
second type of organization was that of units engaged in tree planting and nurtur-
ing operations while being granted free cutting of fuel wood for domestic use.
A typical case in the first type of organization can be found in the Aomori 
regional forest office.54 The Aomori regional forest office began to use the grant 
of free use of forest outgrowth as a lever to prompt villagers to patrol state forest 
lands as early as 1910. In the Aomori regional forest office’s jurisdiction, which as of 
1937 included 313 municipalities containing state forest lands, there were 522 labor 
units to which the forest offices subcontracted the operations in 1933. These data 
suggest that one or more units were organized in each municipality. These labor 
units, as a whole, took charge of most of a state forest area under the jurisdiction 
of the Aomori regional forest office.55
A good example of the second type of organization can be found in the Akita 
regional forest office. In the Akita office’s jurisdiction, from the early 1920s, the 
weight of forestation activities had begun to shift away from the afforestation of 
wasteland in mountain zones near human settlement to changeover forestation 
in remote mountain zones, from natural forest areas to artificial plantations. This 
shift in forestation activities would only work if the forestry authorities could 
secure more industrious laborers for forestation operations at much lower wages. 
Accordingly, the authorities organized villagers’ units, which would take collec-
tive responsibility for working on state forest operations. In the jurisdiction of the 
Akita regional forest office, which as of 1937 included 224 municipalities contain-
ing state forest lands, there were ninety-nine municipalities where villagers’ units 
were placed, or about one villagers’ unit for every other municipality.56
One illustrative example of the forestation labor units can be found in the state 
forest within the Noshiro district, under the jurisdiction of the Akita regional for-
est office (Nibuna Kokuyū-rin). This state forest covered approximately thirty-six 
hundred ha. In 1918, tree planting was conducted on approximately 133 ha, with 
tree nurturing being conducted on 341 ha and logging being conducted on 78 ha. 
Subcontracting units employed 243 workmen, who were local inhabitants either 
serving as full-time forestry laborers or working in state forests as a side job. There 
were 662 households in the communities, so the ratio of state forest workmen to 
local households was approximately 1:3. In return for engaging in these operations, 
full-time forestry laborers were supplied with timber at a specially reduced price; 
temporary workmen received fuel wood in the same way.57
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At the beginning of Meiji period, the Japanese government decided to model its 
state forestry after that of Germany. In fact, the existing tradition of forestry admin-
istration in Japan was already similar to that of Germany. As with the German 
method by lords’ authorities, Japanese domain lords during the Tokugawa period 
often laid claim to timber forests or valuable trees on their domains, intending to 
use them for their own use and for their timber dealing business in the metropoli-
tan markets, such as those of Edo and Osaka.
However, generally, the domain lords and their forestry officials in Tokugawa 
Japan were not directly involved in domain forest management, leaving substan-
tial activities such as timber nurture and lumbering to local villagers’ initiatives. 
Villagers’ active roles in domain forestry often led them to check the excessive 
expansion of conifers in the lords’ forests, and they tried to secure the coppiced 
area subject to their communal use. The villagers’ forest access was regulated by 
customary laws that had been updated through many intravillage or intervillage 
disputes, and their informal settlement, free from lords’ interference. The lords’ 
toleration of villagers’ self-governance of informal communal forest use, however, 
not only eliminated the chance of villagers’ legally protecting their forest usage, 
but also decreased the opportunities for forestry officials to regulate villagers’ 
usage for rationalized land management. Thus, the state forestry that took over 
the domain lords’ forests followed a historically path-dependent process different 
from that of Germany.
First, the Japanese government left the neighboring villagers’ access to state 
forests intact. After taking over domain lords’ forests, the government incorpo-
rated those forests for which villagers could not present proof of ownership into 
the state forests. During the 1899 Diet’s deliberation on the National Forest Bill 
and other matters, some representatives who were experts in forestry insisted that 
the government had failed to create state forests from which villagers’ access was 
eliminated because it had neglected the redemption of forest-use rights as accom-
plished in Germany. However, the government that had ended up taking over the 
lords’ toleration policy toward communal forest use strongly denied the necessity 
of redeeming villagers’ forest access. Thus, the government did not regard villag-
ers’ continuous access to state forests as problematic.
Second, the government, which had learned to apprehend the established 
symbiosis between forest management and villagers’ forest use, recognized the 
neighboring villagers’ involvement in state forest management. As the case of the 
regional forest office in northeast Japan shows, the fuel-wood sales method in state 
forests was generally stumpage sale, which allowed villagers to cut standing trees 
in state forest areas themselves. It enabled villagers not only to meet their basic 
daily needs but also to participate in and profit from production activities such as 
charcoal making. The merit of this method for forestry authorities lay in the fact 
that the villagers cut down aged broadleaved trees at their own cost. However, this 
method obliged the authorities to leave a certain proportion of the cutover area 
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open for the regrowth of broadleaved forests where villagers could get access to 
fuel wood again. This is a basic reason why broadleaved and natural woodlands 
remained dominant in the Japanese modern state forest lands. In addition, as the 
records of a proceeds-sharing arrangement in southwest Japan show, allowing 
villagers to plant and nurture saplings in state forests could contribute directly 
toward the creation of high forest management, which the German state forestry 
model considered to be the sole responsibility of forestry officials. Japan’s modern 
forestry authorities used the allotment of forests for these traditional uses as a 
lever to secure villagers’ labor units that were engaged in forestation-related opera-
tions such as nurturing trees or patrolling state forest lands. The villagers’ labor 
organizations enabled the authorities to manage a much more extensive area of 
jurisdiction.
In sum, the development of modern forestry in Japanese state forests should be 
considered as a history of the ongoing interaction of villagers’ forest use with the 
tradition of forestry administration that tried to use the granting of forest access 
as a lever to keep order in forest management.
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Forests as Commons in  
Early Modern China
An Analysis of Legal Cases
Yoshiyuki Aihara
Today, the relationship between human beings and forests has become increasingly 
important. Researchers have stressed the role forests play in fulfilling basic needs 
of local populations for timber and nontimber forest products, and in embodying 
environmental, recreational, and many other social values.
In this chapter, I will focus on the functions of forests that provide for the 
basic needs of local residents, and the role of government authorities concern-
ing the provision of forests for their use. We can identify a range of ways for 
managing forests: in some countries and regions, forests are owned by the gov-
ernment; in other places, the ownership or management falls to local adminis-
trations, individuals, or communities. Considering these issues in a historical 
context, many environmental historians have used theories about the “com-
mons” to approach questions related to forest management. The term “com-
mons” refers to institutions for the collective management and use of natural 
resources, in addition to the natural resource themselves.1 Following the pub-
lication of Garrett Hardin’s famous article “The Tragedy of the Commons” in 
1968—which concluded that the use of resource areas as commons would inevi-
tably generate major problems through excessive use, ultimately leading to the 
destruction of the resource—much counterevidence has been provided from 
regions around the world. This counterevidence offers examples of sustainable 
cooperative resource use. Moreover, it has been observed that the “tragedy of 
commons” of which Hardin forewarned was actually the “tragedy of open 
access”—that the problem is not “commons” but lack of rules about how the 
commons can be used. Scholars have identified the kinds of conditions that lead 
to sustainability, such as membership, scale, property, management, the kind of 
resources, and the legitimacy of governance.2
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Regarding the commons in China, scholars have questioned the strength of 
community ties in rural China. However, most of the research concerning this 
topic is based on studies of customary law in rural North China during the late 
1930s and early 1940s, conducted by Japanese researchers, or based on the collec-
tion of customary laws that were investigated by Chinese administrative powers 
in the early twentieth century.3 The most frequently cited example is the custom 
of kai yezi (open leaves), a custom that allowed anyone to enter the fields and col-
lect sorghum leaves during a fixed period just before the sorghum matures. Since 
the right to pick up leaves was not restricted to village members, many research-
ers consider this to indicate a lack of strong communal ties in North China vil-
lages.4 In recent years, some studies about the management of natural resources 
in China have been undertaken, inevitably taking into consideration the concept 
of commons.5
However, these articles are mostly based on research that took place in the 
first half of the twentieth century, or they only regard lineage land as commons. 
Consequently, there has been little study of how people in the Qing era used and 
managed the land itself, or how and by whom the legitimacy of that utilization 
was granted.
AB OUT THE MATERIALS
In this chapter, I extract examples from the archives called Xingke Tiben (routine 
memorials or reports to the Ministry of Justice, hereafter “XKTB”). In Qing China, 
cases where defendants faced the death penalty were reported from lower-level 
government offices to higher government offices. XKTB is the final one: reports 
from high-level officers to the emperor to decide the judgment.
XKTB reports include many statements regarding the suspect(s) and the 
person(s) concerned, as they comprise the important evidence used in making 
judgments and sentencing decisions in criminal courts. A variety of data can be 
extracted from the testimonies and can be used in studying social history.6
In this chapter, I extract and analyze examples of the use and management of 
forest resources from descriptions of mountains, forests, wild lands, and trees 
included in these archives. I will examine how ordinary people used natural 
resources in the mountains, particularly through the observation of descriptions 
of “public mountains” (gong shan) and “government mountains” (guan shan), and 
will discuss the role of local commons in rural China. Furthermore, I will dem-
onstrate how the administrative power approved people’s acquisition of resources 
that would meet their basic needs.
XKTB is held in the First Historical Archives of China in Beijing and in the 
Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, in Taipei, and several reprints 
have been published. In this article, I mainly use the archive held by Academia 
Sinica (hereafter “ASX”) and the reprinted series Qing Jiaqing Chao Xingke Tiben 
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Shehui Shiliao Jikan (“Sources on Society Excerpted from Routine Memorials of 
Scrutiny for the Board of Punishments during the Jiaqing Reign (1796–1820),” 
hereafter “JQX”).7
THE VARIET Y OF EC ONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN 
MOUNTAINS IN XKTB
Common people carried out a variety of activities in forests and extracted various 
profits from the mountains. The profits can be classified into four types. The first 
type of profit came from extracting various products from the mountains, usually 
involving investment in order to extract resources.8
The second type of profit was gained by extracting or removing materials from 
the mountain, but without investment in production.9
The third type of profit did not involve extracting materials from the mountain, 
but rather the continual investment in, or care of, the land. The most frequent 
examples of this usage are ancestral burials and the maintenance of forests or trees 
for the purpose of “protecting good geomancy” (fengshui). Although not discussed 
in depth in this chapter, ancestral graveyards were of great importance and were 
protected in particular ways.10
The last type of profit use also did not extract resources from the mountain, nor 
did it involve investment. Poor people, unlike the better off, could not invest time 
and money to maintain their ancestral graveyards, and so they used the mountains 
for simple burials. In historical documents, this was called pinmin anzang (the 
burial of the poor).
Of course, these four types often overlapped, as multiple benefits were derived 
from the same mountain land.
FR AMEWORK OF PROPERT Y RIGHT S OVER 
MOUNTAINS IN QING CHINA
Any consideration of commons must include an inquiry into who was regarded as 
having a legitimate right to use and manage mountains. I begin with a brief survey 
of the notions of property rights with regard to land in late imperial China. It is 
well known that the notion of Wang-tu wang-min (which appeared in The Book of 
Songs [Shi Jing] and means “all land and all people are owned by the sovereign”) 
persisted throughout the imperial period. In essence, regardless of whether it is 
clearly stated, principally and originally, the owner of all land was the “govern-
ment” (guan). However, if people established themselves with suitable enterprises 
and started managing the land (such as by clearing land, residing on it, or opening 
mines), then they could be granted rights to the land, and it would be reclassified 
as land under the ownership of “people” (min). The right to gain profit from land 
was divided into units, which were called ye. These units could be sold, mortgaged, 
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or passed down to descendants. The person who owned the unit of profit-making 
(ye) was, for convenience, referred to as the “owner of land” (zhu), and the land 
itself was regarded as “one’s property.”11
Conversely, when no specific individual had guaranteed property rights over 
a particular tract of land, it was still assumed to belong to the government and 
so was called “government land” (guan di) or “government property” (guan ye). 
Hence, “government mountain” (guan shan) referred to mountain areas that did 
not belong to specific individuals.
Lands that were managed jointly by multiple individuals, including families, 
made up a subcategory known, in the case of mountains, as “public mountain” 
(gong shan) or “public property” (gong ye). These mountains or properties were 
also “people’s property” (min ye), rather than part of “government property.”
Not all government mountains were managed in the same way. From exam-
ples given in historical records, we can distinguish three patterns of management 
of government mountains. It is possible to classify the land designated in Qing 
dynasty historical records as “government mountains” into three types, accord-
ing to who used and managed it.12 The first type of “government mountains” were 
those used and managed by the government or individuals to whom the gov-
ernment gave this authority. Examples include the mountains around Shengjing 
(Mukden), which provided wood and ginseng for imperial use, the mountains 
preserved for the Emperor’s autumn hunt, and the land used for the imperial 
tombs.13 It was necessary to distinguish these activities, particularly from private 
business, since these advantages were only afforded to the emperor or the impe-
rial family.
Regarding the second type of “government mountains,” the government and 
the common people were forbidden from using resources from these regions. 
These were mountainous regions that had been the sites of rebellions, or were 
believed to be likely to be used for such acts, and therefore no one had the right 
to utilize such areas. This type of mountainous area was also sometimes called 
“banned mountains” (fengjin shan). We can find some examples in late imperial 
China, such as the Tongtang Mountains along the border between Fujian and 
Jiangxi, in addition to certain mines that had been shut down. These were called 
“government mountains” as a reminder that the use of their resources had been 
halted at a certain point in time.
The third type of “government mountains” were those that the government did 
not manage or utilize and where no individuals were given exclusive legitimacy 
to generate profits. Mountains of this type were mostly located near villages, and 
as noted later, villagers used these lands daily. Concerning this third type of “gov-
ernment mountain,” Noboru Niida noted that there was no individual ownership 
over these regions and anyone had the right to access them.14 Akira Morita quoted 
the description in the Gazetter of Funing (in Fujian province) and claimed that 
such “government mountains” were open access. He repeatedly emphasized that 
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these mountains were exposed to a wave of privatization, although this was lim-
ited because the condition of such lands was poor.15 Menzies also cited this mate-
rial and observed that the state‘s “policy of inclusion” might have been practiced 
in such mountains.16
The term “government” (guan) was not only used with “mountain” but also 
with various natural resources.17 We can, therefore, observe some indications that 
these “government mountains” were open access. Consequently, I analyze these 
mountains’ “openness” in detail in comparison with the case of “public moun-
tains,” and describe how the forests provided for the basic needs of local people in 
Qing China, and whether there were any rules for their management.
MANAGEMENT AND USE OF “PUBLIC MOUNTAINS”
As noted earlier, the phrase “public mountain” (gong shan) refers to those moun-
tains that were owned in common. Although it was not stated in historical mate-
rials that regions were “public,” a description such as “this family’s (or lineage’s) 
mountain” meant that the mountain was held in common by one family or lin-
eage. I will first analyze the range of coownership. Possession by families of the 
same surname was the most general and these mountains were also known as 
“lineage property” (zu chan). There are some examples of coownership by mul-
tiple families.
Conversely, in cases where a mountain was owned by a lineage or other group, 
not all members of the group necessarily had free access to the mountain. We can 
find examples where a person who had changed his family name and entered the 
lineage would not receive much profit from the public mountain (JQX, 533). In 
another case, a husband who entered the family as bridegroom to a widow had 
no share in the public mountain (Zheng and Xiong 1999, 274). Furthermore, some 
people may have been restricted from having cultivation rights upon the moun-
tain because of bad behavior (JQX, 906).
There were many examples of mountains owned in “partnership” (hegu) rather 
than by a family; multiple individuals might own a mountain based on joint 
financing arrangements. Such a case could also be designated as one of a “public 
mountain.” For enterprises with high commercial value, such as timber or char-
coal, coowners might establish a rule for dividing the profits. In some cases profits 
were divided by dividing the land itself (ASX, no. 73818, no. 75002), while in other 
cases the agreement was based on sharing in the profits (JQX, 60, 534). In Wuning 
County, Jiangxi province, the Wang family’s mountain was rented to Erxian Zhuo, 
and the rent was for public use (JQX, 1348). In the case of Mao County, Sichuan 
province, the public mountain was rented to a family of another surname to grow 
trees timber (JQX, 693) or cultivate maize (JQX, 810).
However, even if the rights were divided among individuals, there were often 
contrary opinions as to whether owners could sell their shares to others. In a case 
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in Changhua County, Zhejiang province, Jiayou Wu intended to sell a share of the 
right over “Muzhuping public mountain” and was searching for a buyer. While 
Jiayou Wu was negotiating a sale, Wu Facheng (of the same lineage) refuted the 
assertion that the mountain was public, and consequently, no one was able to sell 
their share (JQX, 60). In another case, in Jiangshan County, Zhejiang province, 
Shugen Wu sold a public mountain arbitrarily to Jizong Jiang, with Tingcang Wu 
as a mediator. In court, the seller, the mediator, and the buyer were punished (JQX, 
261). Public ownership can be seen to have aroused quarrels easily. In the year 
Jiaqing 9 (1804), Guangfu Xu of Shangrao County, Jiangxi province, did not wish 
to buy the Tong Shitang family’s private mountain, because it was next to a public 
mountain and so could easily become involved in quarrels (JQX, 41).
There are many examples of people crossing the boundaries onto a neighbor-
ing mountain and then being challenged. It seems that the land boundaries were 
clear and outsiders were not allowed to enter. Occasionally, a very small quar-
rel concerning borders triggered armed battles between lineage groups (ASX, no. 
197020). Although there were rules about profit sharing with regard to certain 
products of the mountain, all those who shared the rights to the mountain could 
freely gather firewood or other products that required no investment. For exam-
ple, Zonglu Zhang of You County, Hunan province, cut the grass on the public 
mountain daily (JQX, 496). In the case of Changsha County, Hunan province, the 
Li lineage and others had a public mountain called “Yanjia Tang,” which provided 
firewood that could be gathered by anyone of the Li lineage. Li Maoqi also had 
his own trees on the mountain. As Maoqi Li was afraid of his trees being felled 
by others, he suddenly erected a stele to prohibit firewood gathering. After a vio-
lent quarrel, Maoqi Li died from his wounds. In the ruling on this case, the judg-
ment was to “keep these mountains for public use” (ASX, no. 148). In the case of 
Yongjiang County, Zhejiang province, the Xie lineage and the Wang lineage owned 
a mountain in common, and it provided for both lineages (ASX, no. 15396, ASX, 
no. 45653).
There were some examples where a clear statement was made about the moun-
tain in a decision, but this was infrequent, because the matter of utmost impor-
tance was to decide on the punishment of the criminal. The decisions dealing 
with public mountains varied. For example, “All of the firewood in the mountain 
ought to be prohibited from being cut, so as to stop quarrels” (JQX, 268), and 
“The public land that Xie Hui and Xie Kai hold must be separated in half and 
managed separately. A clear boundary must be set up to avoid conflict” (ASX, no. 
15396). However, in judgments, magistrates nearly always made rulings based on 
the stated aim “to stop future disputes.” Although this attitude may seem superfi-
cial, it was a direct expression of the Qing government’s position. In summary, we 
can say that a “public mountain” was open to insiders or stakeholders, but closed 
to outsiders. The Qing government almost always preserved the local use of the 
mountain, except when it led to quarrels.
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MANAGEMENT AND USE OF  
“GOVERNMENT MOUNTAINS”
“Government mountains” were open-access to anyone, and to engage in an 
enterprise of one’s own on such mountains was generally prohibited, because 
this obstructed the rights of others. In the year Qianlong 10 (1745), Fake Xie of 
Haifeng County, Guangdong province, went to the mountain to fell miscellaneous 
small trees for making charcoal. After he had cut three branches, Junxiang Lai 
approached hurriedly and sharply admonished him for stealing the pine and 
cypress trees that he had cultivated. Fake Xie denied this allegation, retorting that 
the branches he had cut were from miscellaneous small trees on the mountain. 
The judgment stated: “On the trees on the government mountain, Junxiang Lai is 
only in charge of the land where he had planted the pine and cypress trees, other 
miscellaneous trees must be reserved for gathering firewood for the poor. Fake Xie 
need not return the three branches that he had cut, because they were not from the 
trees that Junxiang Lai planted” (ASX, no. 13518).
Let us consider another case. In March in Qianlong 12 (1747), Yalong Chen of 
Lianping District, Guangdong province, designated a piece of grassland in Litong’ou 
as his property, stating that he intended to cut the grass in the autumn. On August 15, 
Yalong Chen cut the grass and piled it on the ground. Three days later, Shizong Ou 
also went to the mountain to cut the grass; however, Yalong Chen claimed that he 
had already claimed the grass on the mountain as his, so others should not cut it. 
The judge declared that Litong’ou was a government mountain, so the firewood and 
grass on the mountain should be reserved for gathering by the poor, and no one had 
the right to declare those resources as his own in advance (ASX, no. 43620).
In a case in Le’an County, Jiangxi province, in Qianlong 14 (1749), the records 
show that a government mountain named Niueling was reserved as an area where 
anyone with any surname could gather firewood. Furthermore, after a quarrel 
between lineages about cutting trees, the judge ordered each lineage to present 
a confirmation about the use of the mountain where persons of that family name 
could undertake firewood collecting, in order to stop quarrels (ASX, no. 50512).
In another case, there was a government mountain named Wushi behind the 
Ceng family’s house. Fulong Ceng found that lime could be extracted from the 
mountain, so he gathered friends, invested, paid a wage to one, Chaohuai Zhong, 
and others, and prepared to dig lime out of the mountain. However, a judgment 
was issued to stop such digging, and it was declared that in order to prevent quar-
rels, no one could enter that area and dig into the mountain. This judgment was 
based on the illegality of encroaching on the government area, even for those liv-
ing nearby (JQX, 133).
From these examples, we can extract some rules and principles regarding 
government mountains. As a rule, such mountains were open-access to anyone; 
everyone could use the profits gained from them through gathering firewood and 
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grass. To engage in an enterprise of one’s own on such mountains was prohibited, 
because this obstructed the rights of others. However, in cases where it would not 
prevent the access rights of others, it could be permitted, subject to certain limits.
FOREST S FOR LIVELIHO OD
It is worth questioning what kinds of people have priority to use common land. 
Regarding the nature of the hierarchy used in the commons, there are various 
examples in many regions. For example, Hiroyuki Torigoe claimed that in Iriai-chi 
(village common land) in Japan, the weak were allowed to use more resources than 
others,18 whereas Yanagisawa Haruka argued that rich, large-scale farmers who 
owned abundant farmland also enjoyed great profits from the commons.19 It is 
necessary to investigate which type of use better represents the situation in China, 
or whether the Chinese case was unique.
Many XKTB records describe “gathering firewood in the forest” as a means of 
livelihood that was related to poverty. We can find many examples that say the 
needy could satisfy their basic needs from forests. Of course, for the common 
people, collecting firewood from the mountain around the village as fuel for daily 
life was performed routinely. However, if people made a living only by gathering 
and selling firewood, they were seen as poor. We consider some examples later.
Shouer Zhou of Xinyu County, Jiangxi province, made a living by selling fire-
wood. One morning, Zhou attempted to wake his wife, Mrs. Sun. However, she 
was lazy and talked back to him. Shouer Zhou was so angered by this that he 
struck his wife. After a struggle in the kitchen, Mrs. Sun died from her wounds. In 
his testimony in this case, Shouer Zhou said: “my family is poor, so I earn money 
by gathering firewood,” stressing his family’s poverty (ASX, no. 71519).
The next example shows that gathering firewood was an activity taken into con-
sideration when making a judgment in court. In Yongfeng County, Jiangxi prov-
ince, the Wu lineage’s mountain and Wang lineage’s mountain were close to each 
other. One day, Sisheng Wu gathered firewood on the Wu lineage’s mountain. Xili 
Wang happened to pass by and, suspecting that Sisheng Wu was collecting fire-
wood on the Wang lineage’s mountain, hit Sisheng Wu. After a struggle, Sisheng 
Wu beat Xili Wang to death. In the court, the magistrate (presiding as the judge) 
took into consideration the situation that Sisheng Wu was the only adult son of his 
mother, and whether he was one of the “poor little people who gather firewood” 
(ASX, no. 50115).
The case later involved a man and his wife from another county who organized 
a gathering. Chen Shenshan was born in Chengmai County, Guangdong province, 
and moved to the next county, Ding’an, in Qianlong 1 (1736). One morning, Chen 
and his wife, Mrs. Li, went to the mountain to gather firewood and returned home 
in the afternoon (ASX, no. 27934).
284    Chapter 15
Furthermore, the needy relied on their relatives and might ask permission to 
make a living by gathering firewood on a relative’s mountain. Zhenqi Liang lived 
with his wife, Mrs. Feng, in the house of Shangzhi Pan, who was Liang’s second 
eldest sister’s husband. In September of Qianlong 19 (1754), Zhenqi Liang and 
Mrs. Feng went to the house of Tianjue Xie, Liang’s eldest sister’s husband, and 
implored him: “Our family is very needy; please let us move here and make a living 
by gathering firewood.” Tianjue Xie considered his kinship with them and allowed 
them to live with him. However, unexpectedly, there was no firewood to cut down 
on the mountain. On October 13 of that year, Liang and Mrs. Feng traveled back to 
Shangzhi Pan’s house (ASX, no. 41692).
These examples show how impoverished people made a living on the moun-
tains. Some even said that they were poor and lived with firewood as a matter 
of course, and it was not unusual for impoverished people to ask a person close 
to them to allow them to take firewood from a mountain. It may be risky to 
assume that mountains and forests always functioned as a safety net for the needy. 
However, the words “gathering firewood for livelihood” were recorded not only 
in these legal cases, but also in the historical materials from many other periods. 
Therefore, the collection of firewood in the mountains by the poor seems to be 
more common than expected.
Concerning examples from the XKTB, we can conclude that the Qing govern-
ment is primarily interested in preventing disputes. This was increasingly a prob-
lem in the later Qing, as population pressure forced more of the poor into trying 
to gain things from the mountains. Therefore, the prevention of conflicts helped 
preserve the place where the poor gathered firewood.
However, it seems that the Qing government had little obvious intent to keep 
the mountains covered by forests. In fact, forests on government mountains were 
also vulnerable as their cultivation was not legally prohibited. Since the population 
increased almost continuously throughout the Qing period, it was important to 
enlarge cultivated areas and to increase food production.
A PROPOSAL TO PL ANT TREES ON  
“GOVERNMENT MOUNTAINS” IN THE  
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
In Qing China, unlike cases in Germany and Japan, the dynasty was less often engaged 
in long-term silviculture management.20 Although Qing authorities did not usually 
engage in silviculture, one mid-eighteenth official did draft a proposal to engage in 
such activities. His proposal mainly aimed to keep the “government mountains (guan 
shan)” as commons for the local “little people” to gain things from there.
In eighteenth-century China, the population increased approximately threefold, 
and reclamation of land was progressing incrementally. In 1757, taking the state’s 
condition as background, Pengnan Wu, an Imperial censor in Jiangnan province, 
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presented a memorandum to the Qianlong emperor. The title of the memorandum 
was “Instruct Bureaucrats in the Empire to Conduct a Policy on Mountain Forests, 
and Enrich Civilian Use.” The memorandum stated the following:21
The peaceful time has lasted long, and the population in our empire has increased; 
however, goods that are produced are not keeping up with the need of the materi-
als to be used. So, we must undertake politics to improve people’s living conditions.
I heard waters are blocked up, ponds dried up, lands and mountains went bald; 
therefore obtaining everyday goods is gradually getting more difficult and prices 
have increased remarkably. The price of firewood has doubled, the price of building 
materials increased threefold, and the price of the mast of a ship increased fivefold.
The reason is as follows: Requirements of [timber materials] increased day by day 
and more people are felling many trees. However, they are logging only in the “govern-
ment mountain”; they only seek [timber] and do not pursue arboriculture. Nourishing 
the trees takes time, but cutting trees takes only one moment. This is the first reason.
Ignorant people not only take branches but also remove trunks and roots. In such 
a way, people can only obtain a temporary profit, but the tree will never come to life 
again in the following year. This is the second reason.
And besides, there is a lazy trend. If it is difficult to take away creeping weeds, 
one can easily remove them by setting fire to mountains. Therefore, in all the towns 
and countryside, people often burn the forest down. The people are going to reduce a 
temporary burden and let the neighboring forest be reduced to ashes.
In these sentences, Pengnan Wu highlighted that population increase had caused 
deforestation, which depleted water sources and caused soil runoff. He also notes 
that the forest resources, as necessities of life, had become rarer and their prices 
inflated. Furthermore, Wu argued that the deforestation had increased only on 
“government mountains,” and no trees had been planted there.
Wu repeatedly compared the situation with the “government mountain” to that 
of “private property”:
I was born in Fujian, where half of the land is high mountains. I always knew how 
to plant trees there, and I recognized that planting ten thousand young trees only 
costs thirty or forty teals of silver, and they grow in less than three years so that 
one can get the capital. The situation is the same in Jiangxi and Lingnan. In Jiangxi, 
Zhejiang, Henan, and Shandong provinces, it is slightly more difficult to plant trees, 
but you can still plant ten thousand young trees for less than one hundred teals of 
silver. However, this only takes place on “private property.” No one plants trees on 
the “government mountain.”
This statement should be considered in relation to the following description, 
which was given in the same period and concerned Wu’s native land, Fujian:
Most of the land in Fujian is “government mountains,” with no prohibition on cut-
ting timber. Any branches or twigs that grow are burned or taken away, and people 
even dig up the roots to use as cooking fuel so that nothing can grow again and the 
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mountains become barren. However, where the mountain belongs to someone, in-
dustrious owners plant pine, Cunninghamia, bamboo, tung oil tree, and tea oil tree, 
earning themselves considerable profits.22
This also articulated that with the situation of “open access,” with no prohibi-
tion on public use, “government mountains” were becoming barren.
We can conclude that Wu recognized that the government mountains were 
extremely important for local people’s lives, and he was also fully aware of the 
open-access nature of the government mountains and even noted a kind of 
“tragedy of the commons” (or “tragedy of open access”). Of course, these trends 
should be considered in the context of population growth and resource shortages. 
Furthermore, Wu might have realized the need to provide the people with the 
means to satisfy their basic needs, such as firewood, by planting trees with the 
authorities’ help. Based on the notions earlier, Wu proposed giving incentives to 
government officials, gentlemen, and common people to plant trees on govern-
ment mountains. This suggestion gained the approval of the Qianlong emperor; 
a document was then circulated to each local official through gongbu (“the board 
of construction”), and the actual condition of government mountains was investi-
gated by local officials.
However, responses from the local government officials regarding giving tree-
planting incentives were predominantly negative. Not all of the local government 
officials fully understood the significance of Wu’s proposal. The reasons for this 
negativity can be classified as follows: The most frequent reason was that there was 
no government mountain on which to plant trees in the district concerned, or the 
existing government mountains were so barren that no plants could be cultivated. 
Another frequent reason given was that government mountains were lands that 
lacked ownership and were used by the poor for gathering firewood or for burial, 
so it was desirable to leave them untouched. In addition, some officials argued 
against providing incentives because tree planting was the duty of local officials. 
Furthermore, some officials suggested that the land should not be maintained as 
“government mountains,” but instead changed to “private properties” to better uti-
lize people’s capacity.
After the replies from each local government official had been submitted, and 
despite their widespread objections, official regulations were introduced to estab-
lish incentives for tree planting and these were given to local officials and gentle-
men. However, the proposals were vague in their contents and their impact was so 
slight that we cannot trace evidence of the regulations being subsequently imple-
mented in practice. Wu’s aim to keep government mountains covered by forest did 
not bear fruit.
The mountains in Qing China may be classified into two types: the mountains 
from which any individual had the right to derive profits, called “private property,” 
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and those from which no one had the right to derive profits, called “government 
mountains.” Of the former type, some were owned by individuals, but in many 
cases, they were owned jointly by various means. These jointly owned mountains 
were called “public mountains.” All members of the coownership could freely 
gather firewood and pasture on these mountains, which often had boundaries 
and were closed to the outside world. Therefore, if nonmembers crossed a moun-
tain boundary, the members would attack them. To summarize, these lands were 
“open” to members, but “closed” to others. The second type of mountain was called 
“government mountains”: essentially, anyone could access them and could gather 
firewood and bury ancestors freely thereon, provided these activities did not dis-
turb the mountain’s use by other people. This type can be classified as an “open” 
mountain. Both of these types of mountains, though their openness is different, 
had the function as “commons,” and served as a reliable source of people’s daily 
necessities.
Making a living by gathering firewood was considered to be standard practice 
for the poor and weak. Thus, it may be said that, to some degree, allowing use 
of the public or government mountains was intended to ensure the survival of 
the disadvantaged. Both types of mountains could therefore be called a kind of 
“commons” for the poor in early modern China. On government mountains, 
the legitimacy of these lands’ use was specified by the Qing government, and 
ultimately by the emperor himself. In these mountains, the Qing government 
determined policies through directions appropriate not to disturb the people’s 
daily use, but to prohibit ownership by individuals for profit-making purposes. 
However, it is difficult to deduce to what extent the Qing imperial court took 
an active role in providing livelihoods for the weak and poor while maintaining 
the reproduction of sustainable resources. As far as can be discerned from the 
records, it seems that the prevention of disputes in these mountains was the gov-
ernment’s main interest. Even if this deduction is correct, we can conclude that 
some of the poor’s basic needs were nonetheless addressed by these policies. In 
the eighteenth century some proposed actively prescribing that the forest cover-
ing the “commons” must be preserved; however, the actions of the Qing govern-
ment were too vague to institute changes in the management and use of land on 
such a large scale.
The findings presented are expected to contribute to a better understand-
ing of commons in China and a basis for comparison with similar examples in 
other regions. However, there are still many unanswered questions. Most of the 
evidence in this chapter comes from southern China, where forest resources 
are relatively abundant. The term “government mountain” appears most 
 frequently in historical records from Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian. Further 
study is needed to examine differences between the regions. In addition, it 
will be necessary to consider these issues from the perspective of the non-Han 
people’s customs of forest use, as they have a long history in southern China’s 
mountains.
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Disagreements over the use and management of forest resources have become 
a more urgent subject in modern times, as both officials and the people have 
become aware of the sparse forest cover in China in comparison to other areas in 
the world, and afforestation has consequently become an important policy issue. 
Conflicts have arisen when authorities established national or public forests or 
disposed of areas that “no one had the legitimacy to possess,” which actually were 
often the areas of people’s daily use.
Based on newly established forest laws or regulations in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and twentieth, many “government mountains” and “government wilderness 
areas” (guan huang) were sold or were lent to common people or local entities, and 
authorities tried to establish exclusive ownership in forests. However, there were 
many appeals against these actions, citing such reasons as “the mountain is for 
people gathering firewood and it is unsuitable for occupation.” This indicates that 
some form of the “forests as commons” still functions as a source of resources for 
basic needs in contemporary China.
NOTES
1. There are various definitions of “commons” offered by many researchers; this definition of com-
mons is based on Inoue 2004.
2. One well-known study is Ostrom 1990. With regard to developing the study of commons, see 
Mitsumata 2014.
3. Tanaka 1925, Hatada 1973.
4. Hatada 1973.
5. To give some representative examples, Menzies categorized several kinds of forest and argued 
about the land management of forests in late imperial China by using various documents as well as 
reports produced under customary law in China (Menzies 1988, 1994, chap. 5). Perdue claimed that a 
redefinition of Chinese land property rights was in progress, as a response to new trends of population 
growth, commercialization, and ecological exploitation in eighteenth-century China (Perdue 2002). 
Quoting examples of kai yezi, Suga Yutaka reached the conclusion that Chinese commons were a result 
of “passive, defensive cooperation” and were maintained by networks of individual relationships, not 
by villages with definite boundaries and membership (Suga 2009). Ōta Izuru articulated that some 
parts of the water surface of near Taihu Lake could be regarded as a form of open-access commons (Ōta 
2009). Hirano Yūichirō and Okuda Shin’ich considered forest policy in present-day China, showing 
people were pressed for various responses with the change of the forest possession policy by the nation 
(Hirano 2008, Okuda 2014).
6. For further information about XKTB, see Horichi 2012. Osborne and Buoye also investigated 
land problems using this kind of material (Osborne 2004, Buoye 2000).
7. Du 2008.
8. For example, mulberry trees (an example can be seen in JQX, 22), the cultivation of other trees 
(JQX, 591; i.e., Cunninghamia lanceolata, JQX, 1785), fruit trees (JQX, 1565), tong cha (JQX, 1227), cy-
presses (ASX, no. 119973), the cultivation of bamboo (JQX, 721), the grazing of maize (JQX, 810), selling 
trees (JQX, 809), cultivation (many references), and plantations of indigo (JQX, 1248).
9. For example, coal mining (JQX, 230), grazing (JQX, 590), gathering bamboo shoots (ASX, 
no.44535), making charcoal (JQX, 547, 905, 1248), gathering and making lime (JQX, 1248), cutting grass 
for fertilizer (ASX, no. 1306), cutting grass for raising cattle (ASX, no.89904), and collecting dung 
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(ASX, no. 73119). The most popular activity of this type was “gathering firewood,” which served not 
only for daily use but also for fertilizing the land and making bricks (ASX, no. 72825).
10. On this type of use, some historians discuss in detail the regulations concerning the sale of 
graveyards and neighboring land and trees. See Nakajima 2004, Wei 2015.
11. On the notion of wang-tu wang-min and ye, see Terada 1989 and Kishimoto 2011.
12. This classification is mainly based on Morita 1984.
13. Menzies 1994, chap. 3.
14. Niida 1962.
15. Morita 1976.
16. Menzies 1994, chap. 6.
17. Ōta Izuru based his study on a survey of the fishermen at Taihu Lake, arguing that the surface 
of the water, called “government lake” (guan hu), was also open access, with no one having exclusive 
rights to it. Furthermore, he observed that the surface of the water provided materials for the livelihood 




21. This section is based on Aihara 2007. Wu’s memorial was copied by Junji-chu (office of Grand 
Council of State) and in the collection of Junji-chu Lufu Zouzhe no.0978–035, in the First Historical 
Archives China.
22. Funing Fu Zhi (Gazetter of Funing, in Fujian Province), printed in 1762, chap. 32, 24b.
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Public Goods and Economy in the  
Early Modern Era—New Perspectives on 
Modern Economies and Contemporary 
Environmental Concerns
R. Bin Wong
This volume of essays has examined the ways in which people and their govern-
ments produced and paid for nonmarket goods in both early modern East Asia and 
Western Europe. We have especially considered the kinds of goods often supplied 
through nonmarket means at the regional and local levels of society, sometimes 
but not always far removed from the concerns of the central government. This per-
spective has allowed us to consider the early modern developments of public goods 
quite separately from the later crystallization of modern public finance. Early mod-
ern European public finance, as we mentioned in the introductory chapter is largely 
associated with the concept of the fiscal state, which is sometimes called the fiscal-
military state because of the intimate relationship between increased government 
borrowing and taxation with military expenditures. The major expenditure of cen-
tralizing European states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was military. 
State formation in Europe took place as part of the construction of relations among 
European states competing with one another for power and wealth. This dynamic 
has had profound impact of the shaping of modern politics through the expansion 
of European power around the world that included the early modern formation of 
white settler societies in the Americas, the purchase and export of African slaves 
to the Americas, and a trade in Asian commodities that expanded the range of 
products available during Europe’s early modern consumer revolution. By the early 
nineteenth century the early modern American white settler societies had shed 
their colonial status to become independent countries, and by the late nineteenth 
century, African and Asian trading partners and their neighbors had largely suc-
cumbed to colonial rule by European powers.
Fundamental to the imposition of political authority was the presence, or at 
least threat, of military violence against which subject populations were largely 
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unable to resist. The European deployment of military violence for a combina-
tion of political and economic aims in both nineteenth-century Africa and Asia 
extended political and economic logics first formulated in the early modern era 
and most clearly developed by the aptly titled “fiscal state.” Yet the phenomena 
that the term most especially points out all lead to a focus on Great Britain, as 
Richard Bonney, one of the leading specialists on the subject, makes clear when 
concluding his introduction to a volume on European fiscal states: “Only one 
state, Britain, had reached the more advanced stage of a ‘fiscal state.’ . . . In that 
sense, perhaps the book should have been entitled The Rise of a Fiscal State in 
Europe, c. 1200–1815, instead of The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–
1815” (Bonney 1999, 14). By locating the fiscal state’s formation as the product of 
successful development of state fiscal capacities in response to military threats, 
Bonney locates the concept firmly within European history and provides back-
ground to Britain’s rise to its hegemonic position politically and economically in 
the nineteenth century.
Britain’s fiscal successes supplied the norm for the fiscal state. Its main early 
modern expenditures, especially dramatic in the rising costs of expanding its 
eighteenth-century navy, are part of a larger British success story of becoming 
the first industrial nation and Europe’s most successful colonizer of peoples in 
other world regions. Folding the fiscal state into these larger narratives of capital-
ism and political power gives the fiscal state a particular prominence that is both 
more and less than the subject of state expenditures. It is more because the fiscal 
state is made part of a larger set of changes characterizing European economic 
and political changes. It is less than state expenditures generally because as the 
fiscal-military state concept in particular makes clear, it highlights one kind of 
expenditure, namely, those for military matters.
After the important work on the European fiscal state came subsequent efforts 
to make a “global” history of the fiscal state in The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global 
History, 1500–1914, edited by Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla and Patrick K. O’Brien. 
Only five of the seventeen case studies addressed non-European cases—two 
 chapters on China and one each on Japan, India, and the Ottoman Empire. The 
studies in general assemble a rich trove of information on revenue strategies across 
Europe and the countries beyond Europe just mentioned earlier. On the expen-
diture side, military matters loom large in most of the European cases. The early 
modern European state’s need to expand its revenue and become a fiscal state 
derived largely from the costs of its war making. The fiscal state’s public finance 
has relatively little to do with the provision of goods and services ill suited to 
market mechanisms other than national defense or, what we might perhaps more 
accurately call in the context of early modern European war making, a successful 
“national offense.” In his essay in The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500–
1914 titled “Taxation in the Habsburg Low Countries and Belgium, 1579–1914,” 
Paul Janssens assembles data supporting his estimate that “Only one-third of the 
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total local and provincial revenue from taxation was used for the government’s 
own ends. Apart from administrative expenditure (salaries and operating costs), 
only public works constituted a significant item of expenditure. The government’s 
contribution to poor relief was limited. The Church played the dominant role here, 
as it did in education” (Janssens 2012, 76). While others scholars in this global 
history of fiscal states do not make as comprehensive a summary regarding the 
relative size of fiscal expenditures, it is unlikely that officials in many European 
countries were spending much of their time or energy addressing issues of pov-
erty and famine, infrastructure construction, or forestry management, examples 
of what we are calling in this volume “public goods” to stress the importance of 
nonmarket management and provision in all of our cases.
Our intention is hardly to argue that the “fiscal state” concept has been unhelp-
ful to understanding the processes of European state formation. But we do suspect 
that the process of taking the fiscal state concept to a global scale has followed 
an intellectual path already well trod by economic historians of diverse disposi-
tions who have evaluated non-European sites according to their differences from 
European economic practices within their preferred frames of interpretation, 
be these neoclassical economics, Marxist, or Weberian. One of the costs of such 
an intellectual strategy regarding public goods and public finance is to miss the 
production of goods that are in no reasonable sense private because they are not 
produced for exchange on the market for the mutual benefit of private parties. 
We have argued that such goods can be considered public goods with “public” 
referring to far more than only the government. Public goods are created in a 
social space within which market mechanisms might be present, as well as com-
munity-based exchanges and those organized by the state. They are not limited to 
goods and services produced and allocated by the government. Working with an 
expanded definition of public goods to include non-market-produced goods and 
services, we have been able to highlight several areas of early modern economic 
activity in a new way.
The payoffs from the approach we suggest are several. First, considering the 
provision of nonmarket goods and services addresses activities fundamental to 
the economic life of early modern societies that are typically not covered in discus-
sions of the fiscal state. These include in fact activities taking place in England, the 
model of the fiscal state. Second, the kinds of nonmarket goods and services we 
discuss have clear similarities to nonmarket goods and services today for which 
public finance remains important. Infrastructure is perhaps the most salient 
example, but the provision of disaster relief also spans both publicly and privately 
mounted campaigns. Looking at early modern public goods and the ways in which 
they were financed thus offers us a different perspective on our contemporary 
practices from those encouraged by the fiscal state narrative.
A third benefit comes from recognizing the historical particularities of the 
modern industrial era through appreciation of the concerns shared by early 
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modern and contemporary societies that the modern industrial era did not take as 
seriously. From our examination of forest management, for example, we can gain 
a perspective on issues of natural resource management and the environment. The 
industrial era was built on the exploitation of fossil fuels and their destructive 
impacts on climate and environment that have become more fully appreciated 
only in the past several decades. Resources and their exploitation were assumed 
to have limits in early modern societies since people had no way to anticipate 
the technological breakthroughs that would enable people to capture ever-greater 
amounts of energy and create new sources of power. Early modern management 
of natural resources thus bore some partial parallels with the approaches taken 
today when an awareness of limits is much stronger than it was between the 
mid-nineteenth century and mid-twentieth. Our sampling of approaches to early 
modern forest management can help identify examples of practices potentially 
relevant to the policies pondered by analysts seeking to establish some standards 
for best practice today. Issues of water resource management, which we have also 
addressed in this volume, take us to the connections between infrastructure and 
natural resource management because they include the use of water for infrastruc-
tural projects spanning power generation, transportation, agricultural production, 
and consumption.
A fourth and final payoff to highlight is more methodological than simply sub-
stantive. The subjects we cover in this volume can be found in both East Asia and 
Europe. Because the motivation to look for such subjects came out of intensive 
study of early modern Japan, we have been able to avoid the more common selec-
tion practices that follow criteria that highlight the particularities of the most suc-
cessful early modern European states. The results of such familiar exercises have 
often told us how some countries are not like European ones without explaining 
directly what they in fact were like. By choosing common concerns such as infra-
structural construction, natural resource management, and the clusters of activ-
ities concerning poverty policies and famine relief efforts, we are able to make 
comparisons in a more neutral way. In fact there is no reasonable measure of what 
is better or worse before we catalogue what in fact occurred across a range of cases.
At the same time, we do recognize that there are advantages to examining 
some case in more depth than others in order to have a sense of how public goods 
were created in the context of one particular country. The choice of Japan for this 
purpose has been made possible by the availability of rich sources and careful 
scholarship. The country’s small size also affords the same advantages that look-
ing at England offers. At the same time we have deliberately chosen to use as our 
two main cases beyond Japan a connected yet contrasting East Asian one, namely, 
China, and a European case, namely, Prussia, that in itself contrasts with the para-
digmatic English fiscal state. This allows us in this final chapter to distinguish three 
spatial scales of variation—those within Europe, those within East Asia, and those 
variations most usefully arrayed across both East Asia and Europe.
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If we take for the moment the paradigmatic English fiscal state as a point of 
departure, but consider those activities that don’t fall neatly under the fiscal-
military state rubric, we can begin by considering poor relief, the one case study 
addressing this country that we include in this book. While there is an act of 
Parliament establishing the Poor Law across England, the English fiscal state had 
little to do with its implementation. No taxes collected by the centralizing state 
busy building military and fiscal bureaucracies were used to fund poor relief. 
No state officials were involved in administering poor relief. English poor relief 
depended on members of the local elites serving in the unpaid status of justice of 
the peace or magistrate. Resources for funding poor relief were raised and used 
locally. While certainly a nonmarket good, poor relief has traits of a community-
based activity organized and funded by local people for the benefit of locals, at the 
same time it can be considered an activity promoted by the state. To the extent 
that it was a state activity, it alerts us to the limitations of the fiscal state concept 
for addressing public finance issues. But the notion we employ in this volume of 
public goods as nonmarket goods allows English poor relief to be a public good 
because our formulation explicitly includes the varied acts of elites to provide 
goods and services by nonmarket means that create value for others and typically 
with some kind of social benefits that are positive externalities to the individual 
benefits derived from market transactions. While the presence of nonmilitary 
expenditures at more local levels that are missing from the main message of the 
fiscal-military state concept has already been noted by others (e.g., Innes 2009), 
locating such efforts in a public goods frame of reference has not been, to our 
knowledge, done.
If we turn to another of our three subject areas, English practices for infra-
structure building are distinctive. Where water control projects in both China 
and Japan, as well as Prussia, were undertaken by different constellations of actors 
and market mechanisms played little to no role, the development of the English 
rivers was similar to the development of roads. For both, private investments 
played a crucial role in the increased funding of transportation networks in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Dan Bogart has shown that turnpike trusts 
could cover costs by charging tolls and accessing needed capital by mortgaging 
future toll receipts (Bogart 2005, 2011). From a related but distinct perspective, 
Piet de Vries has suggested that English canal projects were joint ventures, that 
is, public-private partnerships combining the efforts of government and private 
entrepreneurs (de Vries 2013, 15). These institutional innovations are part of the 
broader financial market innovations that spanned both public and private finance 
in eighteenth-century Britain. Another institutionally distinctive political feature 
was the opportunities for competing interests to express their concerns and desires 
regarding river navigation improvements in Parliament, where a series of Inland 
Navigation Acts enabled private actors to pursue projects they anticipated would 
yield profits (Yamamoto 2018, 143–156).
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Infrastructural public goods for transport in East Asia and Prussia were 
handled differently in England. Among the East Asian and European cases, 
public goods creation along rivers was also pursued to improve and protect 
agricultural interests as well. The relative dependence on river control projects 
for agricultural production was higher in East Asia than in our European cases 
because the irrigation needed for paddy rice cultivation presented a need for 
which there was no near equivalent in Europe. East Asian households engaged 
in small-holder agriculture were unable to mobilize the resources or mount the 
organizational efforts themselves to assure the scales of spatial coordination 
needed to manage water control operations, the spatial scale of these projects 
being far greater in many Chinese cases than in Japanese ones. Returning to the 
Prussian case of transportation infrastructure, Sascha Bütow’s chapter on road 
construction in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Brandenburg explains how 
important municipal initiatives were to creating a network of roads that con-
nected cities to one another and along which commercial traffic could develop. 
The status of German cities and their finances were embedded in the relations 
that cities had to other territorial authorities, including princes and the Holy 
Roman Empire. The activities Bütow recounts emerged from a thirteenth- 
century foundation of urban public finances being independent from and more 
developed than those of territorial noble rulers (Ormrod and Barta 1995, 74–75, 
Hocquet 1995, 91–92).
We see German territorial rulers taking on a larger role in subsequent centuries 
regarding infrastructure, as Heinrich Kaak shows in his detailed case study; while 
he certainly notes that there was a longer tradition across Europe more gener-
ally of organizing river dikes to reclaim agricultural land and protect land already 
being cultivated, the financial and organizational scales of dike projects in Kaak’s 
Prussian example demonstrate just how large the capacities and commitments 
to infrastructure were that a major German ruler could mount in the eighteenth 
century. Under Frederick I (r. 1701–1713) and Frederick II (r. 1740–1786), Prussia 
became a leading European power and the core of what would be the future uni-
fying drive for Germany in 1871. Kaak’s Prussian case study combines local dike 
associations and the king’s major projects into a single framework of riverine 
infrastructure. While regional in scope the organization of riverine infrastructure 
spanned local and central government actors in ways that fit Elinor Ostrom’s con-
cept of a “nested hierarchy” of actors taking on components of managing a com-
mon pool resource, much as Chinese water control projects reflected this attribute, 
often on yet larger territorial scales.
In Britain, the fiscal state was not much involved in either poor relief or creat-
ing the transportation infrastructure of roads and navigable rivers, beyond pass-
ing legislation to mandate local efforts at mounting poor relief and to encourage 
private investment in infrastructural improvements. Government involvement in 
financing and organizing poverty policies and infrastructure projects occurred in 
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both China and Prussia and involved activities not conventionally considered to 
be part of the fiscal state’s activities.
Moving on to consider English material related to our third subject of forests, 
early modern England had both public and private forestlands. The public lands 
were those forests claimed by William the Conqueror (r. 1066–1087) who brought 
with him from Normandy forest law and forest courts, which were then used to 
define the Crown’s control over almost one-third of the kingdom’s land. Initially 
the Crown’s principal interest in forests, which included fields, pasture, and vil-
lages as well as forests proper, was the use of the forests themselves as hunting 
preserves. Rulers recognized their royal forests to be subject to multiple uses and 
granted licenses for use of the forest lands. In the early modern era, the expanding 
Royal Navy’s need for timber meant that the royal forests joined private estates, the 
colonies, and the Baltic region as sources for naval timber (Scott 2008, 339–347). 
Private forestland in England was controlled by lords who held title over specific 
woods but shared with their manorial tenants the use of other woods. These com-
mon woods were managed according to custom, which included the commoners’ 
rights to access resources and use them for specific purposes. Different catego-
ries of people enjoyed different rights to timber and wood for house building and 
repair and for firewood (Scott 2008, 448–498). The multiple uses of forestlands 
in early modern England suggest the accommodation of diverse claims that can-
not be reduced to simple public-private binary. This general observation is in line 
with what the Japanese, Prussian, and Chinese chapters of the volume also suggest 
regarding the presence of various ideas about the commons that were variously 
accommodated alongside other claims or challenged by alternative demands. The 
multiple claims placed by different people on a lord or ruler’s forestlands or, in the 
Chinese case, lands simply labeled “public” (公) suggest more similar and complex 
ranges of challenges in defining the commons and the relation of the commons to 
other claims on forestland.
In Takashi Iida’s Prussian case the king used his forests as the source of timber 
for ship building in foreign countries. This revenue-making operation encour-
aged Frederick II to begin afforestation projects to sustain the timber supply from 
which he derived profits. The Prussian rulers also had to negotiate the access of 
their subjects to these forests for both timber and firewood. Nineteenth-century 
Prussian rulers moved to end the access of their subjects to timber and firewood 
in order to sell more of the former and make the latter available at lower prices to 
people clearly poorer than those who had previously exercised claims on firewood 
gathered in forests. The evolution of claim making on forests used by the ruler for 
market-based commercial operations and by his subjects as public goods differed 
in Prussia and Japan. Takeshi Aoki shows that the late-nineteenth-century Meiji 
government recognized the Tokugawa-era peasant claims to forestland nominally 
held by lords because peasants in some areas provided the upkeep of the forests 
through replanting. This Japanese practice of peasant-based afforestation contrasts 
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both with the Prussian case of tree planting under the ruler and with the practice 
to be considered later of commercial afforestation in some Chinese forests that 
supplied a long-distance timber trade.
Yoshiyuki Aihara’s chapter on Qing forests as commons considers the situa-
tion in a variety of forestland legal cases, especially from three provinces south 
of the Yangtze River, where he finds examples of the tragedy of the commons 
because forests were depleted without replanting. Not surprisingly, given the Qing 
empire’s large size, there were other forest management regimes in other parts 
of the empire. In the northeast, the Manchus retained forests on which lived a 
variety of indigenous groups who supplied the court with different forest animal 
pelts and other forest products as tribute (Bello 2015, 63–115). The Manchus also 
established more than a hundred hunting reserves, which featured large amounts 
of forestland. The Mulan Weichang in what is today northeast Hebei province near 
the city of Chengde was the largest reserve and site of the annual autumn hunt 
begun in the 1680s and continuing until 1820 (Menzies 1994, 55–64). Other forests 
in China produced timber for commercial sale, a practice of considerable impor-
tance already by the twelfth century (Miller 2015, 234–283). During the early mod-
ern era the demand for timber in China’s most economically developed region 
of Jiangnan, an area centered on modern-day Shanghai after the mid-nineteenth 
century, stimulated the development of commercial trade from the southwest 
province of Guizhou more than one thousand kilometers away. The financing of 
afforestation was met by selling forest land as shares for which a secondary market 
existed to facilitate the circulation of capital over the two to three decades required 
for the timber-yielding trees to mature (Zhang 2017).
The subject of poverty and famine shows variations within both East Asia and 
Europe regarding the roles and relative importance of different social and politi-
cal actors. For infrastructure, the English case seems quite different from both the 
Prussian and the East Asian ones; the main difference between Prussia and East 
Asian cases was the more prominent role of water control issues for agricultural 
production in Asia. Finally, for forestry management we can see diversity of forest 
use and management within each case study as well as among them. It makes clear 
that the different dimensions of comparison help us to distinguish among types of 
comparisons worth noting and the challenges of combining different types of con-
trasts into more general evaluations of similarities and differences found in public 
goods provision in the early modern era.
Establishing the levels and dimensions of generality that come out of using 
English, Western European, or Euro-American metrics of evaluation can be 
advanced through adopting a non-Western case as the reference point for evalu-
ating several others. In this volume we have chosen early modern Japan. Japan 
enjoys features that make it similar to European countries—especially the spatial 
and demographic scales of the country and other features that make it related 
to China—in particular overlapping sets of values and some similar forms of 
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agricultural production. We can therefore observe different sets of similarities 
and differences that early modern Japan has with its Chinese neighbor and with 
European countries that are more similar to Japan in size and some features of 
political organization.
To recap our use of early modern Japan, as a reference point: Variations within 
East Asia begin from a shared cultural base. The Japanese and Chinese share some 
Buddhist, as well as Confucian, beliefs and practices, which include certain views 
regarding nature and the aspirations of people to live in some sort of basic har-
mony with that natural world. They also faced similar challenges in organizing 
paddy rice cultivation, which meant coordination of water use among groups of 
agricultural households depending on a common source of water who organized 
access in ways that could be deemed fair and effective. In both spiritual and mate-
rial realms therefore, Japanese and Chinese shared sensibilities and challenges 
that were distinct from those found within early modern Europe. Yet, the ways in 
which Japanese and Chinese actually organized water control varied considerably. 
At very local levels, groups or networks of households reached agreements regard-
ing how to manage access to water for irrigating their fields. In both societies there 
was also the need to mount larger water control operations that required local 
leaders to mobilize resources and labor to repair dikes and dredge river chan-
nels. The differences in geographical and demographic size of the two countries 
meant that there were far more local water control groups in China that were in 
turn linked to other similar groups than was the case in Japan. More specifically, 
Japan has a large number of relatively short rivers flowing down mountains so that 
the technological and organizational challenges of water management differ from 
those in China.
In Japan the marked expansion of water control projects depended on new 
kinds of mobilization taking place beneath the domain level of government. The 
provision of some public goods in early modern Japan depended greatly on non-
state actors. In China officials and local elites played related but often distinct 
roles, with officials becoming involved in larger projects that required some kind 
of special financing and plans for mobilizing labor to implement the work needed. 
A combination of official and local elite activism to maintain, repair, and even 
expand water control projects characterized eighteenth-century Chinese nonmar-
ket provision of collective or public goods. The increased efforts at a particular 
local level of Japanese society contrast with the increased activism exhibited by 
Chinese officials at multiple levels, often responding to calls from the court or 
from provincial-level leaders. In both countries the historical evidence suggests an 
increase in public goods of the kinds we have examined being produced during 
the early modern era, especially during the eighteenth century. But the constella-
tion of mechanisms deployed to achieve these increases was certainly different.
Innocent of the facts, there is little reason to expect the differences in mecha-
nisms for public good provision in Japan and China to involve greater bureaucratic 
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involvement in China and less in Japan since Japan is a far smaller area to govern 
and thus far more amenable to centralized bureaucratic control than an empire 
the size of eighteenth-century China. The actual contrast of greater bureaucratic 
involvement in public good provision in China than in Japan must however be 
qualified since the viability of Chinese public goods provision depended crucially 
on the efforts of local elites whose embrace of a neo-Confucian social agenda, 
the formulation of which began in the twelfth century, made elite efforts largely 
complementary to those of officials. The limits to bureaucratic reach and pen-
etration below the county level were substantial in eighteenth-century China, but 
the impact of the bureaucracy’s agenda cannot be measured solely by the formal 
bureaucracy’s extension into local societies since local elites were in many ways 
responsive to the priorities that officials were setting (Wong 1997, 105–126). The 
relevant temporal frame within which to situate Chinese and Japanese public 
goods provision also differs since the early modern Chinese practices are part of 
a centuries-old set of policy strategies themselves developing out of political prin-
ciples and practices articulated and elaborated beginning in the centuries before 
imperial unification in the third century bce.
The temporal and spatial differences between the Chinese and Japanese cases 
lead us to consider the temporal and spatial similarities that Japan shares with 
European countries. The founding of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1603 and its 
successful ending to an era of military competition within Japan and the devel-
opment of its capacities to rule successfully for more than two and a half centu-
ries make it a state comparable to those European states that also embarked on 
processes of consolidating rule over previously fragmented territories and estab-
lished themselves as effective states. The tendency to make these comparisons 
follows from a larger recognition that in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth Japan proved to be the only non-Western country to have begun pro-
cesses of industrialization and militarization that made it comparable to and ulti-
mately a competitor with European countries and the United States. Historians 
of Japan developed desires to establish a longer period of transition from the 
early modern era to the modern era to parallel that seen in European history, 
an important part of a larger process of making Japanese history more familiar 
and thus credible to Western sensibilities. There are indeed parallels and simi-
larities worth noting, whether we wish to focus on economic developments like 
rural industry or proto-industry, social changes including urbanization, or politi-
cal transformations such as the formation of stronger governments. In all these 
respects Tokugawa Japan’s similarities to Europe can be clearly seen. Considering 
the ways in which public goods provision was formulated and the very specific 
ways in which Japanese public goods provision considered in this book was sig-
nificant for economic infrastructure, common people’s material welfare, and 
popular access to natural resources helps us see ways in which Japan was also 
different from Europe in some significant ways.
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Before considering Japan-Europe comparisons among the major topics of this 
volume, we should recall how Tokugawa Japan does not fit very well the model 
of a European fiscal-military state since the central government was not pursu-
ing an agenda of war making. Military expenditures would only become increas-
ingly important in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, 
as the Meiji state transformed Japan into a challenger to Chinese hegemony in 
East Asia and then in the first four and a half decades of the twentieth century 
subsequent Japanese governments made the country into an imperial power seek-
ing political and economic dominance over Northeast and Southeast Asia as well 
as China. During the early modern era of the Tokugawa, however, the state did 
not pursue a European fiscal state kind of agenda. The crucial level at which new 
kinds of initiative emerged in early modern Japan, especially from the late eigh-
teenth century forward, to expand public goods provision was both at the village 
level and at a level above the village, which lacked any administrative identity and 
which was led by elites who were not employed by either the shogun or any of the 
families leading the various domains. In part such actions were compensatory for 
the reduced capacities of government. These new activities were welcomed by the 
political authorities in charge of different domains who saw them as promoting 
the economic potential and security of their subjects.
Comparing the Prussian cases (Prussia defined to include those territories 
under eighteenth-century Prussian kings) with Japanese cases suggests that rulers 
and government officials played more prominent roles there than in Japan. These 
contrasts follow in part from the different kinds of political authority enjoyed by 
Prussian municipalities and by Prussian nobilities enmeshed in a feudal system’s 
social relations. What the Prussian and Japanese cases share is the creation of pub-
lic goods well below the spatial scale of what would be the late-nineteenth-century 
states of Germany and Japan. Both the Japanese and Germans states of the late 
nineteenth century grew and became military powers as their industrial economies 
expanded to support their larger territorial aspirations. But those developments 
are more parallel to the fiscal-military state narrative that highlights early modern 
and modern British successes at war making than the early modern German and 
Japanese public goods provision addressing poverty, economic infrastructure, and 
forest management covered in this volume.
If we turn to issues of water management in contemporary Germany, we 
discover that the German water supply issues are actually parts of a far larger 
European Union policy arena that takes on a spatial scale of issues more akin 
to those faced in China or the United States for water management matters. 
Germany-Japan contrasts seem irrelevant. The message of these different tempo-
ral snapshots of early modern, modern, and contemporary situations alerts us 
to the ways in which similarities and differences among the public finance con-
cerns within a country can change in both related and distinct ways. What makes 
each country’s particular history potentially relevant has already been raised by 
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Masayuki Tanimoto in the opening chapter, where he suggests that early mod-
ern local and regional public finance practices can influence subsequent patterns 
of activity in modern times, as the persistence of early modern expectations of 
claims made on Meiji-era state forestry policies suggests. This case demonstrates 
how the definition of what become legitimate claims early in the Meiji era was 
negotiated on the basis of older understandings—acceptance of a new public 
finance regime depended in this case on people believing that regime would likely 
carry forward some version of older practices. This case poses a perspective on 
the move from early modern to modern quite different than those posed by theo-
ries based on Western experiences that predict forward historical movements in 
regions beyond Europe and North America simply to follow their lead on the 
fiscal-military state model.
Returning to the incompleteness of the early modern fiscal-military state 
model for tracking changes in all the public goods relevant to economic success in 
a broader Eurasian context, the afterword chapter by Patrick K. O’Brien in a vol-
ume on the global history of fiscal states sets up the significance of the state’s fiscal 
capacities for taking advantage of trade and developing human capital and new 
knowledge. “In the prevailing medieval and early modern international order of 
geopolitical violence, conquest, imperialism, and mercantilism, as well as weakly 
enforced laws and rules for the protection of production and exchange located 
within and beyond the frontiers of empires, realms and republics, marked by 
divided sovereignties, the formation of well and consistently funded centralized 
states remains (in the view of most historians who study these centuries) some-
thing approximating to prerequisites for securing greater gains from trade and 
from domestic and foreign investment in the accumulation of physical and human 
capital and for the production and diffusion of useful and reliable knowledge” 
(O’Brien 2012, 444). Defining the early modern international order by “geopoliti-
cal violence, conquest, imperialism, and mercantilism” certainly captures condi-
tions within the European world region and Europe’s relations to several other 
world regions. But it hardly applies globally—China alone had a larger population 
than that of Europe and politically was only marginally involved in the geopo-
litical violence initiated by Europeans. Significantly, they rebuffed early modern 
European military advances, achieving what Tonio Andrade has recently called 
military parity (Andrade 2016). The Chinese thus were able to exercise a far larger 
role in determining the conditions under which eighteenth-century trade with 
Europeans took place than people in other parts of early modern Asia or than they 
themselves would enjoy after British iron ships arrived in China in the late 1830s. 
They benefited from trade despite not having the kind of fiscal state exemplified 
by the British case. How important fiscal capacities actually were for influencing 
investment into human capital or for producing and disseminating new knowl-
edge is difficult to pin down and O’Brien offers little concrete evidence of causal 
connections.
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If we consider eighteenth-century China as a world region comparable to 
Europe in spatial and demographic terms and consider its domestic relations 
(same spatial scale as relations among European polities) and its foreign relations 
with countries of Central, Northeast, and Southeast Asia, we see no mercantilism 
and relatively little violence. Only with some groups in Central/Inner Asia did 
Qing dynasty military activity play a long-lasting role more similar to the even 
longer-lasting persistence of military violence in Europe’s conquest and imperial-
ism of Africa, the Americas, and Asia. O’Brien lifts the fiscal state from its original 
connection with the military to make the fiscal state key to the development of 
modern economies and modern state policies to support industrial economies. 
“State formation was part and parcel of the process of long-run growth and could 
well be an important chapter in narratives designed to explain divergence between 
Eastern and Western economies, and possibly a key factor behind the observed 
sequence of leaders, followers, and convergence in any global history of modern 
industrialization” (O’Brien 2012, 444). Interested principally in explaining eco-
nomic change, his interest in the fiscal state leads us to see what he calls the “for-
mation of economically effective Eurasian states,” with the criteria of effectiveness 
relating to economic growth rather than criteria anchored more narrowly and 
deeply in public finance and the ways in which public finance changed in different 
parts of the world between the early modern and modern eras.
O’Brien’s interpretation of the fiscal state is one of several ways the term has 
been understood. Philip Harling and Peter Mandler, for instance, see a clear change 
from a fiscal-military state to a laissez-faire state in Britain between 1760 and 1850. 
They remark, “It was primarily the need to wage war on an unprecedented scale 
that fueled government growth up to the late 1810s” (Harling and Mandler 1993, 
47). They further note that government expenditures declined after the defeat of 
Napoleon in 1815: “In the immediate postwar period, there was consequently a 
considerable deflation of government expenditure in absolute terms, reaching its 
nadir in 1834; relative to the population, spending shrank rapidly” (Harling and 
Mandler 1993, 60). While there was a contraction of central government expen-
ditures, the development of nineteenth-century British public finance supplies a 
striking contrast to both the early modern fiscal state’s expansion driven by mili-
tary expenditures and Patrick K. O’Brien’s reformulation as a state fostering mod-
ern economic growth. According to Martin Daunton, “The fiscal system should 
therefore be located in the context of voluntarism and the strength of civil society, 
the role of municipal culture, and the relative autonomy of professional bodies. 
The English fiscal system combined a diffuse pattern of delegation or subsidiar-
ity in the collection and administration of the tax, with an attempt to preserve 
generalized legislation that removed discretionary power from the authori-
ties” (Daunton 2010, 50). Daunton’s characterization reminds us much more of 
 eighteenth-century poor relief practices than it does of the fiscal-military state and 
O’Brien’s focus on state support for economic growth. This contrast between fiscal 
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capacities to affect economic growth and government expenditures to serve social 
purposes in turn represents two competing priorities of public finance present 
over the course of the twentieth century and still with us today.
If we return to the eighteenth-century Britain of John Brewer’s “sinews of 
power,” a phrase that captured the close connections between warfare and taxa-
tion, we can recall that the fiscal-military state became the robust actor nourished 
by revenues created by the East India Company’s commercial capitalists accessing 
the Asian commodities and that the state developed the military muscle to assert 
its political will within Europe and beyond. But Brewer also noted that this state 
in fact shifted from its earlier domestic concerns to place priority upon central 
state relations with people and places abroad. As Joanna Innes’s research suggests, 
prime targets of eighteenth-century domestic expenditures became social issues 
spawned by those new priorities, even as the familiar concerns of dearth, disease, 
poverty, and crime continued to haunt government leaders. These older issues 
were now linked to the social problems caused by war making, in particular the 
domestic transition challenges of military demobilization after the conclusion of a 
war, when crime rose and the ranks of the vagrants and poor swelled. Innes shows 
that central government funding to meet such problems was in fact far more lim-
ited than local efforts to mobilize resources, but suggests the symbolic significance 
of central state interventions when and where they occurred (Innes 2009). Thus, 
social expenditures in eighteenth-century Britain were themselves responses to 
some of the consequences of increased military expenditures preceding them.
The diminished nineteenth-century focus on war making removed the military 
origins of domestic social expenditures, and, as Harling and Mandler’s research 
indicates, expenditures overall declined through 1850. As we move through the 
nineteenth century, several studies of other countries in Europe stress the expan-
sion of state expenditures for social projects, such as education, rather than for 
promoting economic growth (Cardoso and Lains, 2010). Taking capital away from 
investment in production is often seen to reduce economic growth. At the same 
time, however, social spending on education can help create human capital, which 
in turn contributes to making higher levels of labor productivity possible. Peter 
Lindert has demonstrated that the growth of nineteenth-century government 
social spending, a process he calls “growing public,” does not appear to have had 
adverse effects on relative rates of economic growth (Lindert 2004). His work sug-
gests that social expenditures could therefore at worst not derail economic growth, 
and indeed, could even be considered to create as a perhaps unintended conse-
quence improvements in human capital that O’Brien counts as part of what his 
fiscal state pursues to support economic growth.
Our presentation of materials on early modern provision of public goods 
other than military ones identifies forms of spending that also have mattered 
in the modern era. From a perspective based on Japanese history, one could say 
that the reduction of military spending in at least some countries of Europe in 
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the early nineteenth century created conditions in which public goods creation 
sometimes took place at more local levels, as had been the case in early mod-
ern Japan. Central governments became more involved in social spending by the 
late nineteenth  century in both European countries and Japan; in a sense they 
converged temporally along a similar path, but not simply through the Japanese 
emulation of Western practices, as is conventionally claimed. Nor, to be sure, were 
Europeans copying Japanese practices. Rather, both European and Japanese states 
were attending to some increasingly similar economic, political, and social chal-
lenges even as they also faced distinct economic opportunities, addressed different 
social relations and expectations, and made varied political choices. The chapters 
of this book supply a new and different vantage point from which to assess public 
goods provision and public finance beginning from practices of the early modern 
era beyond those highlighted by the fiscal state.
Looking at early modern examples of public goods creation in both East Asian 
and Western European settings has led us to identify ways in which a range of 
actors, especially at the local level, and both within and beyond formal govern-
ment, created some of the public goods either essential to early modern economic 
activities or conceived as interventions compensating for the limitations of eco-
nomic production and distribution. Since we consider public goods as simply non-
market-produced goods depending on more than just some immediate personal 
connections between producer and consumer, we can see how government and 
nongovernment actors created goods that mattered to early modern economies—
the creation of economic infrastructure, the management of natural resources, and 
the capacities to address poverty. Some final remarks on each follow.
For infrastructure, the importance of community groups is especially salient 
in our Japanese case study by Jun’ichi Kanzaka on Japanese civil engineering 
projects between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. In his case study, the 
overwhelming purpose of water control projects was to expand paddy agriculture 
and thus improve people’s material welfare and assure their capacities to pay the 
high levels of taxation imposed by domain and shogun authorities. Households 
within village communities pursued their shared interest in developing water con-
trol investments with the support of their local governments. Kanzaka also notes 
how villages disagreed with one another over water use, illustrating the kinds of 
issues that Elinor Ostrom highlights in her analysis of common pool resources and 
in particular her concept of nested hierarchy of relations responsible for creating 
durable management of common pool resources.
Our Chinese case study, which, being in the capital region, may especially 
include state efforts, demonstrates a larger scale of bureaucratic organization and 
greater range of intended goals from infrastructure investment, including envi-
ronmental protection, riverine commercial transport, agricultural productiv-
ity, and work relief for famine victims. In addition, the author Takehiko To also 
makes clear the temporal dimensions of the central government’s effectiveness 
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in promoting infrastructure expansion and maintenance; eighteenth-century 
successes could not be continued in the nineteenth century for environmental, 
economic, and political reasons. The specific array of priorities for infrastructure 
expressed in the capital region were certainly reflected more generally across the 
eighteenth-century empire, but the practicalities of raising capital and marshaling 
labor were not left in the hands of officials but also included both local elites and 
community groups, as the chapter on Chinese approaches to poverty and famine 
relief outlined. In both China and Japan such infrastructure activities involved 
community groups, elites, and government officials. In Chinese cases especially, 
official involvement occurred from the center, through the province, and down 
to the county. It is difficult to discern any sharp division between public and pri-
vate goods in the conventional economic sense of the categories because both 
are present and, between them, we find the crucial role of organizing common 
pool resources. We have opted for expanding the “public” category to include a 
variety of nonmarket approaches that span being community based, elite led, and 
state managed. Such a taxonomy makes clearer the alternatives or complements 
to market-based activities. The same conclusion can be drawn from forest man-
agement, where we observe another set of ways that the conventional taxonomy 
of public and private goods can be usefully revised to include those goods usually 
not included in either.
In the contemporary world, we can distinguish between three ideal approaches 
to forestry management based on state control, entrepreneurial exploitation, and 
community-based decision making. In reality the three ideal logics are entwined 
in multiple ways—in some countries, like Nepal, governments have promoted 
community regulation of forest land, while in larger countries with forests sub-
ject to multiple objectives a far more complex set of policy practices has emerged 
over time, as can be observed in American government approaches to public and 
private forestlands in the Pacific Northwest (Edmonds 2002, Cashore and Howlett 
2007). Turning to our German and Japanese case studies one last time, we see in 
the transitions from early modern times to policies of the late nineteenth century 
that German people’s access to forestlands became increasingly limited even if not 
completely terminated at the same time as Japanese villagers’ claims to forestland 
use were affirmed. When we add Yoshiyuki Aihara’s study of Chinese forestland 
commons, we learn that a state’s capacity to defend the commons could be lim-
ited, in the Chinese case by the scale of the empire. Aihara suggests that the sub-
sequent twentieth-century evolution of policies toward forestlands as commons 
remained unresolved. Together these cases make an argument for recognizing that 
 twentieth-century changes in forestland management could only be varied and 
complex, well beyond the simple contrast for the use of commons promoted by the 
paradigmatic English case of enclosures.
The kinds of forestland policies pursued in this book’s case studies also form 
a modest counterpoint to one of the prominent themes in early modern global 
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history as it has taken an environmental turn. The environmental historians’ views 
of natural resource depletion in the early modern era in some ways echo our con-
temporary concerns. Arguments about and evidence of deforestation in China, 
Japan, and England point to resource constraints in the early modern world that 
make their situations more similar to our own than might otherwise seem plau-
sible. At the same time, we have seen different early modern efforts to navigate 
the issues posed by forestland management that we might consider as we evalu-
ate the diverse challenges and complexities confronted by policy makers today. 
In particular we have mentioned Japanese evidence of peasant afforestation and 
some Chinese and Prussian practices of tree planting to assure the maintenance of 
sources for the eighteenth-century commercial timber trade, alongside other poli-
cies demonstrating competition among alternative uses of forestlands and their 
products with resulting strains on the maintenance of forestlands in some cases.
A similar takeaway regarding the potential usefulness of considering early-
modern-era practices for pondering contemporary challenges comes from look-
ing one last time at issues of poverty and famine. Mitsuo Kinoshita stresses in 
his chapter the importance of micropolitics to understanding the particulars of 
addressing the issues of poverty and famine and the reasons for variation within a 
single country. To this observation we can add that variations among early mod-
ern countries can be associated with the distinct sets of political ideologies and 
institutions each had. Differences in political ideologies help account for the rela-
tive priority that governments assigned to addressing poverty and enacting famine 
relief. Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen famously has argued that famines are 
not simply caused by supply shortfalls but in fact can occur when there is food 
 available—famine in such situations therefore results from the absence of entitle-
ments that the poorest strata of society can claim on existing food supplies. He 
further suggests that the failure to recognize the entitlement of the poorest people 
to food is less likely in a democratic political system where a free press will expose 
state failures to protect subsistence (Sen 1981). Sen’s argument highlights the link-
age between a free press and unacceptability to people in general of living in soci-
ety where the poor are starving. This truth works to explain popular expectations 
and state policies in democracies after World War II, but doesn’t help us grapple 
with contrasts in poverty famine relief policies in early modern times.
Our Japanese, German, and English cases all point to the crucial roles of local 
actors, in the English case guided by directives coming from the central govern-
ment and in the German case from a smaller-scale territorial state. The Chinese 
case in contrast highlights the existence of both a political ideology and state 
institutions that framed and motivated activity to address poverty and famine on 
more than local scales. While the chapter on China doesn’t include any analysis 
of the micropolitics that Kinoshita uses to suggest the reason for contrasts among 
other case studies, it is certainly plausible to posit the importance of micropoli-
tics within China as well. Certainly, the changes in central state capacities and 
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proclivities to sustain infrastructure that Takehiko To observes based on his analy-
sis of capital region water control fit with what Kenneth Pomeranz finds for the 
part of inland North China he studied and what Pierre-Etienne Will and I found 
for China’s granary system (Pomeranz 1993, Will and Wong 1991). In all these cases 
the  nineteenth-century diminishing of state capacities combined with a shift in 
central state priorities necessarily made the provision of public goods far more 
dependent on more local levels of decision making. That would of course change 
dramatically after 1949 when the party-state centralized and expanded state capac-
ities but would also fail tragically to manage the famines resulting from the disas-
ters of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960).
Readers who have worked their way through all the individual chapters of this 
volume may well have some uncertainty about how to combine essays that treat 
different centuries, centered to be sure on the early modern era, but also reaching 
back into the late medieval and stretching into the modern era. There is of course 
a virtue in being able to place an early modern set of practices in a deeper histori-
cal perspective, as I tried to do earlier in this chapter regarding the two German 
case studies of part 3. Placing those two cases from the fifteenth and sixteenth 
century and eighteenth century in an even longer temporal frame allows us to 
reconstruct what many scholars have argued that early-modern-era political suc-
cesses displayed, namely, the centralization of political power and the construc-
tion of larger bureaucratic capacities. This is a major theme in Victor Lieberman’s 
critically acclaimed Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830 
(Lieberman 2003, 2009). Brandenberg-Prussia is not one of Lieberman’s case stud-
ies because he only considers histories of polities that exist in the world today. But 
the building of the early modern Prussian state meets the criteria of “strange par-
allels” through the end of Lieberman’s period of coverage, circa 1830, but Prussia 
doesn’t become a twentieth-century state. In other words, parallels at one moment 
of history don’t predict continued similarities at a later date; only Lieberman’s case 
selection guaranteed that outcome. At the same time we can note that early mod-
ern public goods practices in Prussia likely helped prepare this polity to take a 
leading role in constructing the modern German national state, a complex amal-
gam initially comprising twenty-five formerly autonomous states.
By broadening our conception of public finance from that used in contempo-
rary times and for which a stark divide exists ideologically and institutionally from 
private finance, we offer a view of early modern practices addressing poverty and 
dearth, economic infrastructure, and natural resource management that embraces 
the efforts of political actors to act as economic agents by influencing the produc-
tive capacities of their economies and to address the limitations of their economies 
to provide adequately for all the people all of the time. These activities do not figure 
very visibly in our understanding of how public finance worked in the early mod-
ern era or in our more general understanding of the significance of public finance 
to the twin processes of modern state formation and economic development. 
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Regarding politics, the reasons relate to our persistent preoccupation with narra-
tives of the fiscal-military state basic to the larger themes of modern state forma-
tion and from which concerns about economic development have spawned related 
ideas about the importance of public finance to economic development.
By looking at other ways early modern public finance mattered to economic 
life, we have built on the insights of scholars who have considered the ways in 
which the Japanese economy was supported by policies pursued in domains out-
side the control of the shogun’s government. Such a vantage point encourages us 
to look at types of public finance that did not concern the competitive concerns 
of early modern European rulers. In the first instance we can conclude that there 
were in fact other important targets of public finance that affected economic pos-
sibilities and prosperity in early modern times. These targets, including poverty 
and dearth, economic infrastructure, and natural resource management, certainly 
have been studied by specialists for quite some time, but their research fails to fit 
comfortably within more general narratives of historical change.
This volume has focused on the early modern era to view ways in which gov-
ernments and elites addressed subjects they deemed important to their economic 
prosperity and the material well-being of their poorer neighbors in two parts of 
East Asia and two parts of Europe. Each of these places became important sites of 
economic development at some point between the late eighteenth-century onset 
of industrialization and the present day. We have considered the ways in which 
government agents, especially those below the level of a central state according 
to the norms crystalized in the nineteenth century, often played crucial roles in 
creating public goods important to the growth potential of their respective societ-
ies and to addressing the problems of poverty and dangers of dearth. Our find-
ings are no substitute for but rather a complement to the more common concern 
expressed for what centralizing early modern European states did to increase their 
fiscal capacities in order to garner resources to build military strength.
Even as multiple paths from early-modern-era public goods provision to 
modern-era public finance become more visible from the kinds of topics covered 
in this volume, we also recognize that what had been a largely European inter-
state geopolitical competition in early modern times was transformed by the late 
nineteenth century into a form of competition found in other world regions as 
well. Thus, Japan’s geopolitical rise in East Asia entailed its state undertaking mili-
tary mobilizations akin to those of an earlier century in Europe. These in turn 
depended on the state extracting more revenue and devoting more effort toward 
expanding the country’s war-making potential. What differed between Japan’s 
rise in East Asia compared to Britain’s rise within Europe beginning some two 
centuries earlier was the kind of economy providing the state its much needed 
resources—eighteenth-century British economic success was founded upon its 
commercial capitalism and late-nineteenth-century Japan was building the world’s 
first non-Western industrial capitalist economy. Those industrial capacities also 
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mattered to Germany’s geopolitical rise following its relatively late formation, 
within a European context, as a national state. Germany’s pursuit of geopolitical 
gain was premised on its expanding industrial might affirmed by its becoming 
Europe’s largest economy by the turn of the twentieth century. Germany was thus 
able to pursue geopolitical competition within Europe that had evolved out of a 
pattern present in Europe in early modern times, much as Japan was able to extend 
what had been a more specifically European geopolitical process to East Asia in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
At the other end of the modern era, our present moment in contemporary his-
tory, the modern-era priority on economic growth as the focus for understand-
ing economic development and dynamics has required some reframing as we 
increasingly acknowledge limitations to continued economic growth and recog-
nize the intimate relations between economy and environment. We have become 
more aware since the late twentieth century about issues that were early-mod-
ern-era concerns regarding poverty and dearth, economic infrastructure, and 
natural resource management. The issues of poverty and vulnerability to food 
shortages affect not only people living in areas lacking access to modern tech-
nologies and the abilities to improve agriculture or develop industries, but also 
people in well-developed societies where gaps between rich and poor have been 
growing in some places for much of the past several decades. Neither markets 
nor states, whether separately or together, seem adequate to meet the present-day 
challenges of conceiving food availability in ways that increase access to those in 
need of sustenance, thus making the examples of how related issues were con-
fronted in other times and places possibly relevant to our construction of policy 
alternatives.
Another weakness of markets and states concerns the maintenance of economic 
infrastructure in mature economies and the inabilities to expand infrastructure 
where economies lack such facilities. The popularity of the concept of “public pri-
vate partnerships” to characterize a mix of government and private sector efforts 
to fund and manage large-scale infrastructure projects points to contemporary 
realities more in line with early-modern-era practices than those of the modern 
era when states had been able to fund and manage public goods and services that 
included infrastructure. Finally, among our three topic areas, forest management 
today involves a public goods aspect that extends the range of issues understood in 
the early modern era due to the role that large forests can play in carbon capture, 
a process crucial to environmental sustainability threatened by forest destruction, 
the economic value of which for conversion of land into commercially produc-
tive prosperity motivates deforestation.1 Responses to the negative environmental 
implications of deforestation are of course part of a contemporary awareness of the 
dangers posed by climate change, yet they also represent an awareness of the dif-
ferent groups of people who benefit from forests as a public good that transcends 
the dichotomy of public and private enshrined in the state/market binary.
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We hope this volume has persuaded the patient reader who has taken in the 
pictures of Japanese, Chinese, Prussian, and (for one of our cases) British scenes of 
early-modern-era public goods provision addressing poverty and dearth, economic 
infrastructure, and forestry management to recognize important traits of public 
goods and public finance that help explain why that era was both connected to and 
different from the modern era covering the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
and yet resembles in other ways the world through which we make our way today.
NOTES
1. To compensate for the economic value of destroying forests, a multilevel effort reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries  (REDD+) was launched in 
2008 by the United Nations. Among the contributors is the Norwegian government, which has made 
major investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation. 
The effort is under the Ministry of Climate and Environment and includes a component geared toward 
supporting civil society organizations contributing to the goals of REDD+. www.un-redd.org/; www.
norad.no/en/front/funding/climate-and-forest-initiative-support-scheme/.
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